In this article for your attention, we will compare the combat capabilities of the battlecruisers "Lion" and "Moltke". As you know, a warship of those years was a fusion of speed, artillery power and defense fortress, and, for starters, we will try to evaluate the English and German ships in terms of armor and projectile resistance.
Artillery and booking
Unfortunately, the author of this article does not have detailed data on the armor penetration of 280-mm / 50 and 343-mm / 45 guns, but nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn without them. As you know, the thickest armor of the Lion was 229 mm thick (not counting the protection of the conning tower), while the Moltke had 270 mm. For 343-mm cannons "Lion", firing a "lightweight" 567-kg projectile, indicated the ability to penetrate Krupp armor 310 mm thick at a distance of 10,000 yards, or almost 50 kbt. The recalculation according to Jacob de Marr's formula suggests that the Moltke's 270 mm armor belt will be pierced starting from a distance of 62 kbt. At the same time, the author could not find any calculated data on the armor penetration of the Moltke guns, but, as we said earlier, the slightly weaker 280 mm / 45 Von der Tann guns, according to German data, should have penetrated 200 mm Krupp armor for 65 cables. The Moltke guns fired shells of the same caliber and weight as the Von der Tann cannons, but gave them a higher muzzle velocity of 25 m / sec. In the Battle of Jutland, the Moltke pierced the Tiger's 229 mm armor from a distance of 66 kbt, so it would not be a big mistake to assume that its guns were capable of penetrating 229-235 mm armor plates at a distance of 65-66 kbt.
Thus, we seem to see the approximate parity of "Lyon" and "Moltke" in the ability to hit their opponent. Still, 3-4 cable advantages of Moltke ("zone of invulnerability" in the range of 62-66 cables, on which Moltke already penetrates 229 mm armor of the Lyon, and Lyon still cannot hit the 270 mm armor of the German line cruiser) is too insignificant to have a real impact on the outcome of the battle. However, in reality, everything is much more complicated.
The fact is that the Moltke's 270 mm armor protected a very narrow (albeit extended) section of the side in the waterline area - the height of 270 mm of the armor plate section was only 1.8 m. This gave good protection against flooding and well protected the artillery cellars from penetration of enemy shells into them, but above the side of the "Molte" was protected by only 200 mm of armor. From a projectile that pierced 200 mm armor belts, cars, boilers, and, in fact, the artillery cellars "Moltke" was protected only by an armored deck, which had 25 mm in the horizontal part and 50 mm - on the bevels. However (theoretically!) Such protection was quite permeable for an armor-piercing 343-mm projectile at the same 62 kbt - it pierced 200 mm armor belt, went deep into the ship and hit the deck or bevel.
And even if the kinetic energy of the projectile was not enough to overcome this obstacle, it would have exploded directly on the 25 mm or 50 mm armor plate, or at the moment of their overcoming. Of course, in this case, the projectile would not have penetrated deep into the engine or boiler rooms as a whole, but machines, boilers, etc. would still have been hit by shrapnel and deck armor. At the same time, the 200 mm armor of the British 567 kg projectile pierced, in general, at all imaginable battle distances - up to 100 kbt. Of course, these are not test results, but only a calculation using the de Marra formula, but the battles of the First World War fully confirm such capabilities of 343-mm guns.
So, in the battle at Dogger Bank, the Lion's shell from a distance of about 84 kbt pierced the unarmored Seidlitz deck (which, albeit only slightly, but still slowed it down), and then a 230 mm barbet of the main caliber turret. The British projectile exploded when passing 230 mm of armor, but at that time this was generally characteristic of British heavy artillery, in our case, it is important that the Lion from a distance of 84 kbt not only broke through the deck flooring and 230 mm barbet, but also caused heavy damage to the space protected by the barbet - the German battle cruiser was on the verge of death, one hit knocked out both turrets of the main caliber, while 165 people died.
The Moltke barbets and turrets of the main caliber had a protection of 200-230 mm and were also vulnerable. Consequently, both machines, and boilers, and artillery "Moltke" theoretically could be hit by the "Lion" at distances of about 62-85 kbt. Thus, with the exception of a narrow 270 mm waterline strip, the Moltke's armor did not protect the vital parts of the ship from full-fledged 343 mm armor-piercing shells. However, it should be noted separately that such inability of the Moltke to resist the British cannons arose only after the Battle of Jutland, towards the end of the war, when the British developed the first-class Greenboy armor-piercing shells.
The fact is that the British, having adopted the ultimatum-powerful 343-mm gun, did not bother to provide it with the same high-quality armor-piercing shells and did this only according to the experience of Jutland. Until then, British ammunition of this type was extremely prone to explode when passing through the armor, and this seriously changed the protection status of the Moltke. After all, a projectile that exploded in a 200 mm armor plate continued its flight only in the form of fragments, and such a blow of 50 mm bevels and a 25 mm horizontal deck could well reflect. However, for 203-230 mm barbets and Moltke towers, this did not really matter - there was no protection behind them, and the passage of the projectile, even in the form of fragments, inflicted severe damage that could threaten the ship with death.
In general, taking into account the real qualities of the British 343-mm armor-piercing shells, it can be stated that the vertical armor of the Moltke at the main battle distances (70-75 kb board, but did not provide protection for artillery towers and barbets.
However, "Lion" in the confrontation with "Moltke" also did not look like an invulnerable knight. Its 229 mm belt with a height of 3.5 m, combined with an inch armor deck and a 229 mm main battery turret, were probably impenetrable for German shells 70 cables and beyond, but 203 mm barbets at this distance, perhaps, could still be amazed. The main problem was the armored belt "Lion" in the area of the supply pipes of the bow and stern towers of the main caliber was thinned to 102-127-152 mm. Such armor, most likely, was penetrated by 280-mm German shells and at 75-85 kbt., And only 152 mm defense of the second tower could still count on repelling the blow.
Consequently, as in the case of the Moltke, the Lyon's vertical armor did not provide reliable protection at the main battle distances (70-75 kbt.) From 280 mm shells of German battlecruisers. Like the German battle cruiser, the engine and boiler rooms were well protected, but the artillery was not.
Thus, in terms of vertical armor thickness and armor penetration of guns, we see parity (before the appearance of the Greenboy shells, after which the British ship got an obvious advantage), but one should not forget about such an important parameter as the armor action of the shell. And it was in the British 567 kg "suitcases" almost twice the weight of the 302 kg German 280-mm shells, was much stronger. Without a doubt, an armor-piercing British projectile, equipped with 18, 1 kg of liddite, during an explosion, could cause much more damage than a German one, which had 8, 95 kg of TNT. Of course, the mass of the explosive in the "greenboys" decreased (to 13, 4 kg), but it still remained greater and, moreover, this was compensated by improved armor penetration. The Moltke had only an advantage in the number of main-caliber guns (10 versus 8), but these two additional barrels, of course, could not compensate for the power of the British 343-mm shells.
As for the horizontal armor, here, by and large, things were bad for both battle cruisers. Formally, two decks 25.4 mm thick at the Lyon looked twice as good as one 25.4 mm at the Moltke, but in practice, both were not a reliable barrier for heavy shells. Some serious horizontal protection can only be spoken about in the area of the Moltke casemate, which (in addition to the 25-mm armored deck under it) had 25 mm "floor" and 35 mm "roof", which, taken together, made it possible to hope to keep 305 -mm shells from penetration behind the armored deck (even in the form of fragments). A similar section was available at the "Lion", next to the chimneys and the third tower - the deck of the forecastle was thickened there to 38.4 mm (but not from side to side). In view of the above, the horizontal protection of these ships can be considered approximately equivalent, but the problem of the German battle cruiser remained the unequal value of threats - heavy and powerful 343-mm shells were much more dangerous for the Moltke decks than the relatively light 280-mm Moltke shells for Lyona.
In addition, for both ships there was a danger of "light" penetration of shells into the barbets of the main caliber guns. The fact is that the barbet itself is a wide pipe with a diameter of up to 8 meters or more, its weight is very large - and such barbets are required 4-5, according to the number of towers of the main caliber. In order to lighten the mass of the barbets, differentiated booking was used - for example, opposite the side protected by 200 mm armor belt, the Moltke barbets had only 30 mm thickness, opposite the 150 mm upper belt - 80 mm, and where the side armor was not protected barbets - 200 mm. This was logical in the sense that in order to get to the feed pipes, the projectile had to overcome first the side armor, and only then the barbet armor, but at the same time it was overlooked that the projectile could hit the "weak" part of the barbet, not punching the side, and going through the deck.
On the whole, it can be stated that the battlecruisers of the "Lion" class significantly surpassed the German ships of the "Moltke" class in terms of the ratio of defensive and offensive qualities. With the advent of the full-fledged 343-mm Greenboy armor-piercing shells, this advantage became almost overwhelming. But even in this case, the duel with the Moltke remained a dangerous business for the British battle cruiser - there were enough vulnerable spots in the Lyon's defense, hitting which a 280-mm projectile could cause dire and even fatal consequences.
Speed and seaworthiness.
The speeds of the Moltke and Lyon turned out to be quite comparable, during the tests, the ships of both types developed 27-28 knots, and in the realities of service - probably somewhat less, but in general their driving performance can be considered approximately equal. The range of the Moltke and Goeben was slightly shorter - 4,230 miles at 17 knots versus 4,935 miles at 16.75 knots at the Lyon. The British have always attached great importance to the seaworthiness of their ships, and therefore it is not surprising that the battlecruisers of the "Lion" type became high-board handsome men (although … in English one should say - "beautiful women"). At the same time, German battlecruisers (and the Moltke are no exception) are usually considered low-hued. But attention is drawn to such an important indicator for a warship as the height of the axes of the guns relative to the sea surface. It is clear that the higher the tools are located, the more difficult it is to flood them with water in waves. With normal displacement, the axes of the Lion's guns rose above the waterline (starting from the bow, the first tower) by 10 m, 12, 4 m; 9.4 m and 7 m. On "Moltke", respectively, 10, 4 m, 8, 2 m (two "traverse" towers) and aft 8, 4 m and 6, 0 m. Thus, we can say that this parameter battle cruisers of Germany and England differed slightly. On the other hand, of course, the height of the trunks above the sea is far from the only parameter of seaworthiness, here the emergence on the wave is important, etc. The Royal Navy highly appreciated the seaworthiness of "Admiral Fisher's cats", noted only a very strong roll, because of which these ships did not become as stable combat platforms as could be expected with their displacement. As for the Moltke, the author did not find any information about problems with the seaworthiness of ships of this type. In addition, the battle cruisers of Germany were built to participate in a general battle as a high-speed wing, and not for use in remote oceanic theaters, and, at least, their seaworthiness was quite enough for operations in the North Sea.
conclusions
We are used to seeing German ships of the First World War era as excellently protected combat vehicles, and this is true - no one in the world paid so much attention to protecting battleships and battle cruisers as did German engineers and shipbuilders. They did a great job in the case of the Moltke, but still it should be understood that it was designed (and even then, with certain assumptions) to withstand twelve-inch projectiles. The British, having switched to the 343-mm caliber, radically changed the rules of the game - the Moltke's defense was no longer sufficient against such shells. The Moltke versus Lyon fight was in the full sense of the word a duel of an "eggshell armed with hammers" and, despite the best defense, the Moltke had more vulnerabilities in such a fight than the Lyon. But the absolute superiority of the British ship still did not exist: the Moltke, like its enemy, had the ability to inflict a fatal blow on the Lyon, it was just that the German battle cruiser had fewer chances of doing so.
Attention is drawn to the speed of technical progress in those years. The first-class Von der Tann battle cruiser has just been laid down, at the start of construction - by far the best battle cruiser in the world, followed by two Moltke-class ships, one per year. They are an improved copy of Germany's first battle cruiser, but if the Von der Tann was the strongest ship in its class, then the Goeben was already significantly inferior to the Lion, with which they were almost the same age. In other words - the speed of progress was such that the improved design of the world's best ship became obsolete within two years!
Studying the history of the design of German battlecruisers, we can distinguish two quite understandable, but no less regrettable errors from this. Initially, on the Moltke, the Germans were going to unify the main caliber with the corresponding dreadnoughts, ie. type "Helgoland" and that would be absolutely the right decision. But during the design, they abandoned eight 305-mm guns in favor of ten 280-mm - according to the tactical views of the German fleet, a ship intended for a squadron battle should have been able to fire several enemy ships at the same time, and for this 10 guns were much better suited. than 8. At the same time, the use of 10 305-mm cannons was a very "heavy" decision (in terms of weight) and did not allow to adequately strengthen the protection of the future ship.
However, as the history of the First World War at sea irrefutably testifies, such a concept was completely erroneous - at the same time, if you get Moltke instead of 10 280-mm 8 very powerful 305-mm / 50 guns, then in terms of aggregate offensive and defensive qualities, if not equal, then, at least, came close to the "Lion". However, the Germans decided that "it would be fine anyway" and left 280-mm cannons on the Moltke. This was the first mistake of German shipbuilders.
Nevertheless, the Moltke project should by no means be considered a failure or somehow wrong: as we said earlier, the moment of its laying roughly coincided with the start of construction work on the British Indefatigeble, which was inferior in all respects to the newest brainchild. gloomy Aryan genius . In other words, when laying the Moltke (even with 280-mm cannons), the Germans made no mistake, but the start of construction next year for the Goeben according to the same project cannot be considered the right step. In essence, Germany should either build the same type of Moltke and Goeben, but with 305-mm guns instead of 280-mm, or else it was necessary to lay Goeben according to a new project. They did not, and for a time Germany lost leadership as battlecruisers.
As for the British, they really created a revolutionary ship. British admirals and designers set themselves very high benchmarks: an increase in speed from 25.5 to 27 knots, an increase in the caliber of guns from 305 mm to 343 mm and an increase in armor thickness from 152 mm to 229 mm. It was absolutely impossible to fit such qualities into a displacement equal to a modern battleship, and the British took an unprecedented step - the Lion-class battlecruisers, already at the design stage, received a greater displacement than their "counterparts" - the Orion-class battleships. Without a doubt, already at the TZ stage, the British ships were distinguished by a strong imbalance of weapons and protection, but the fact of the matter is that against their German "counterparts" with 280-mm artillery 229 mm armor "Admiral Fischer's cats" were, in general, enough. In fact, the main problem of the Lyons was that the British could not protect the entire citadel and the barbets of the main battery towers with such armor - if they did this, the British fleet would receive a series of battle cruisers for which Moltke and Goeben would become legal prey. Nevertheless, in the person of the Lyons, the British fleet received a series of ships, albeit not ideal, but fully meeting their tasks.
What did the Germans answer?
