While the battle cruiser Moltke was being developed and laid in Germany, the next naval revolution was being prepared in England, namely the transition to 13.5 inch (343 mm) guns. Without a doubt, this was a giant step forward, opening the era of superdreadnoughts to the world. But there is reason to suspect that, unlike the "Dreadnought", in this case, the revolution took place according to the principle "there would be no happiness, but misfortune helped."
The fact is that there were two methods of making tools in the world at that time. Germany and Russia used the “bonded cylinder” method, when the gun barrel was assembled from several cylinders that were very precisely matched to each other. At the same time, England, in the old fashioned way, used "wire" technology. Its meaning was that an inner pipe was taken, several layers of high-strength calibrated steel wire were wound around it, and then placed in another pipe and a cylindrical casing on top. The advantage of this system was that the tool was relatively inexpensive to manufacture, as less expensive carbon steel could be used for the outer tubes and casings. But the "wire" system also had drawbacks: for example, the British guns were much heavier. The British 305 mm / 50 Mark XI gun had a mass of 67 770 kg, and the weaker 305 mm / 45 Mark X - 58 626 kg. At the same time, the much more powerful German 305 mm / 50 SK L / 50 weighed 51 850 kg, the Russian 305 mm / 52 artillery system - 50 700 kg.
However, the increased weight was not the main drawback of the "wire" artillery systems. Many Russian authors, such as B. V. Kozlov, V. L. Kofman, note the low longitudinal strength of such guns, which led to barrel deflection and vibration when fired, which increased the dispersion of shells. Apparently, this drawback practically did not manifest itself (although … was it not for this reason that the firing accuracy of British battleships and battle cruisers with 305-mm guns at long distances dropped?) In relatively short-barreled 40-45-caliber artillery systems, but it became noticeable with lengthening the gun over 45 calibers.
At the same time, O. Parks notes that the 305 mm / 50 Mark XI was less accurate compared to the 343 mm guns, but does not elaborate on the reasons. But a larger-caliber gun can have superiority in accuracy over a smaller one simply due to the greater kinetic energy of the projectile, which, due to this, has less dispersion at the same distance. Thus, O. Parks does not confirm, but does not refute our authors either. On the other hand, an indirect confirmation of their point of view can be the fact that after the 305-mm / 50 Mark XI, the British never created large-caliber guns over 45 caliber in length.
Accordingly, the author of this article suggests that the history of the emergence of superdreadnoughts looked like this. Soon after the Russo-Japanese War, due to the gradual increase in the size of battleships, as well as (which was probably even more important) the range of fire combat, the fleets of the whole world began to feel the need for more powerful artillery systems than they had before. Many countries took the path of creating more powerful 280-305-mm artillery systems with an increased barrel length - Germany, the USA, Russia increased the length of their guns to 50 calibers. England also made a similar attempt, adopting the 305 mm / 50 Mark XI, but it was not very successful. At the same time, a return to 45-caliber 305-mm guns would deliberately put Great Britain in a lagging position. Unable to create long-barreled guns, Britain could only compensate for this by increasing the caliber of the guns - and this is how the 343-mm / 45 artillery system appeared.
However, regardless of the reasons that prompted the British to switch to the 343-mm caliber, it should be admitted that this artillery system was significantly superior in firepower to any 305-mm weapon in the world. But how much? Here, alas, everything is very difficult.
Firstly, the British 343-mm / 45 guns were equipped with the so-called "light" and "heavy" shells, the former weighed 567 kg (although 574.5 kg are also present in the same line), the latter - 635 kg. Both "light" and "heavy" line of shells included armor-piercing, semi-armor-piercing and high-explosive shells. But why did the British need to introduce such an "imbalance"?
As far as the author of this article could understand this, it was like this. Initially, the 343-mm / 45 Mark V guns were created with a 567 kg projectile each, and it was with such projectiles that the first superdreadnoughts of the Orion series and the Lion battle cruiser were equipped. But later, more effective 635 kg projectiles were created for 13.5-inch guns - we see something similar in the development of the domestic 305-mm / 52 gun, which was originally created for a lightweight 331.7 kg projectile, but later it was adopted for armament heavy 470, 9 kg "suitcase".
However, by the time the British were about to switch to 635 kg shells, work on the Orions and Lyon was at such a stage that it was considered inappropriate to redo their feed mechanisms. In other words, it turned out that the 343-mm cannons of the Orions and Lyons, no doubt, could fire 635 kg of shells, but their supply systems to the guns could not turn them over. As a result, the new British battleships and battle cruisers, starting with King George V and Princess Royal, received 635 kg of shells, while the Orions and Lyon had to be content with 567 kg. At the same time, when after the Battle of Jutland it became clear that something was wrong with the British armor-piercing shells, the British created new Greenboy ammunition, which weighed 574.5 kg for Orion and Lyon and 639, 6 kg for subsequent superdreadnoughts armed with 343 mm guns.
But with what initial speed the English 13.5-inch guns fired, the author of this article did not figure it out.
The 899 m / sec and 863 m / sec cited in some publications for "light" and "heavy" shells are deliberately erroneous. This was the initial velocity of the 343-mm British railroad cannons, but not the naval ones. O. Parks (and many monographs after him) indicate 823 m / s for "light" and for "heavy" shells, but this is most likely incorrect.
It is well known that with an equal charge, a heavier projectile will have a lower muzzle velocity, and that to equalize muzzle velocities with a lighter one, it will need a much more powerful powder charge. In this case, of course, the increased pressure will reduce the barrel life. Therefore, usually the transition to heavier shells is accompanied by some drop in its initial speed, but O. Parks claims that this did not happen. But here we are faced with such a strangeness: according to O. Parks, the charge for 635 kg of the projectile was only 1.8 kg heavier (132.9 kg for the "light" and 134.7 kg for the "heavy" shells). The question arises, could the charge, with an increase in the mass of gunpowder by less than 1, 4%, send a projectile heavier by almost 12% into flight with the same initial speed? This looks extremely dubious.
Perhaps the initial speed of 823 m / s had a "light", 567 kg projectile, and a "heavy" one was somewhat lower, but the author could not find such data. V. B. Muzhenikov indicates 788 and 760 m / s, respectively. The popular electronic encyclopedia navweaps.com gives an initial speed of 787 m / s for 567 kg of a projectile and 759 m / s for 635 kg, but, unfortunately, no links to the source of information are given. And without the appropriate links, it is still better not to use the navweaps.com data, since this encyclopedia contains a sufficient number of errors and cannot be considered as a reliable source.
But even if we take the lowest of all the above initial velocities (787 m / s for a "light" projectile), then in this case, 567 kg of ammunition, leaving the gun, had a kinetic energy that is about 20% higher than that of the German 305-mm / 50 tools. But in addition to energy, the power of the ammunition should also be taken into account, and here the 343-mm projectile also has a tangible superiority. An armor-piercing 305-mm German projectile was equipped with 11, 5 kg of explosive, a high-explosive one - 26, 4 kg. The British "light" armor-piercing projectile initially had 18.1 kg, and the "heavy" one - 20.2 kg of explosives, but here the question of the correctness of the comparison arises, because, as you know, British shells, when hitting thick armor plates (which, nevertheless, they, in theory, should have pierced) had a tendency to detonation or destruction before, or at the time of passage of the armor plate. But the full-fledged armor-piercing shells "Greenboy", which in quality were quite consistent with the German ammunition for the same purpose, had a slightly lower content of explosives - 13, 4 and 15 kg, respectively. Thus, they exceeded the German 305-mm projectiles in explosive content by 16, 5-30, 55%, and this, of course, is extremely significant.
As for the high-explosive shells, here the superiority of the British 343-mm "suitcases" was simply overwhelming - and the "light" and "heavy" "land mines" carried 80, 1 kg of liddite, which is more than three times (!) Higher than the content of explosives of the German 305 -mm projectile. Of course, we can say that the Germans, in general, have never been leaders in the content of explosives in ammunition of this type, but even the extremely powerful Russian high-explosive 470.9 kg projectile had a maximum of 61.5 kg of explosives.
In general, it should be stated that the British have created a very powerful weapon, in terms of its qualities obviously superior to any 280-305-mm artillery system in the world and were the first to equip their ships with such guns: including the new, third generation battle cruiser, "Lion".
I must say that the "Lion" in general has become in many respects a revolutionary ship, and not only because of the placement of heavy 343-mm cannons on it. The fact is that until recently, many of the ideas of the British Admiralty did not find embodiment in metal due to the need to save money. But by 1909, circumstances had developed in such a way that they forced the British government to forget about saving.
Until recently, England was clearly in the lead in the construction of the newest classes of warships that determine the naval power of the state, such as dreadnoughts and battle cruisers. "Dreadnought", three ships of the "Bellerophon" class, then - three dreadnoughts of the "St. Vincent" class and in addition to them - three battle cruisers of the "Invincible" class, and in total - ten large ships, which Germany opposed half the forces - four battleship of the Nassau class and the battle cruiser Von der Tann (of course, we will not take Blucher into account in this list). In other words, until 1908 Great Britain laid down large ships in a two to one advantage against its main continental enemy, and Foggy Albion allowed itself to relax - according to the 1908 program, only two large ships were laid down, the battleship Neptune and the battle cruiser Indefatigable.
But Germany has demonstrated that it is capable of “harnessing slowly, but driving fast” and, according to the program of the same, in 1908 laid down four large ships - three dreadnoughts of the Helgoland class and the battle cruiser Moltke. The English program of the next, 1909, proposed the laying of three more dreadnoughts and one battle cruiser, but the Germans were preparing to respond in a mirror-like manner, with the same number of battleships and a battle cruiser.
All this greatly excited Great Britain - until recently, the double superiority in large ships somehow imperceptibly turned into 16 against 13, which, of course, did not suit the "Lady of the Seas" at all. In addition, in England they believed that things were heading for war and therefore made a "knight's move": they doubled the 1909 program, finding funds for 6 dreadnoughts and two battle cruisers, but most importantly, they canceled economic restrictions on new projects of large ships. In other words, for the first time in the history of the dreadnought race, admirals and designers of Great Britain were able to not look back at government financiers when designing new types of ships (within reasonable limits, of course).
As a result, the Orion-class superdreadnoughts became 2,500 tons larger than the battleships of the previous type Colossus and Hercules (although, perhaps, here O. Parks used the “rounding up” technique) and the difference was somewhat smaller - 2,275 tons), but, in any case, it really was a huge leap forward - before that, the increments in the displacement of British "capital" ships from series to series were much more modest.
But Lyon … it broke every record imaginable. The actual displacement of the "Indefatigable" was 18,470 tons, and the newest British battle cruiser with 343-mm guns had 26,600 tons, that is, the increase in displacement was 8,130 tons! If we compare the design displacement of cruisers (18,750 and 26,350 tons, respectively), then the difference will be slightly less, but it is still colossal - 7,600 tons. Let's see where the additional tons have "gone" by comparing the weight reports of these cruisers (in brackets - the weights " Indefatigebla "):
Equipment - 760 (680) tons;
Artillery - 3 260 (2 580) tons;
Machines and mechanisms - 5,840 (3,655) tons;
Normal fuel supply - 1,000 (1,000) tons;
Armor - 5,930 (3,735) tons;
Hull - 9,460 (7,000) tons;
Displacement stock - 100 (100) t;
Total, normal displacement - 26 350 (18 750) tons.
The largest increase is the power plant (59, 8%), followed by and almost equal to it armor (58, 8%), the hull - 35, 1%, artillery - only 26, 4%. The smallest increase in equipment (less than 12%), but it, in fact, did not affect anything - the difference was only 80 tons. But, of course, we will consider the "Lion" in more detail.
Armament
We have already said a lot about the main battery of the third generation of British battlecruisers, and we will not repeat ourselves. We will only mention that eight 343-mm guns were located in the center plane, but linearly elevated - only two bow towers, and the third was located between the engine rooms. As a result of such placement of the sector of shelling of the "Lion" guns were as follows (on one side): 0-30 deg (where zero is right along the course of the ship) - 4 guns, 30-150 deg. - 8 guns, 150-180 degrees - 2 guns.
Before the war, peacetime ammunition was 80 rounds. on the gun and included 24 armor-piercing, 28 semi-armor-piercing, 28 high-explosive and 6 shrapnel shells. In wartime, the ammunition load increased to 110 shells, including 66 armor-piercing, 22 semi-armor-piercing and 22 high-explosive. However, after the Battle of Jutland, the number of high-explosive shells was first recommended to be reduced to 10 and then eliminated altogether, leaving 55 armor-piercing and 55 semi-armor-piercing shells. The final version, after the appearance of "Greenboy" - 77 armor-piercing and 33 semi-armor-piercing shells.
Mine artillery consisted of 16 102-mm / 50 Mark VII guns, firing 14, 06 kg shells with an initial speed of 873 m / s. They were placed in the superstructures of the ship, eight each in the bow and stern. The British themselves considered such an arrangement to be successful, since the superstructures had a shape that made it possible to shoot from 6 guns in the bow, 4 in the stern and 8 on any side. Ammunition was 150 rounds per gun (according to some sources, in wartime it was increased to 200).
In addition, four 47-mm salute cannons were installed on the Lyon during construction. The torpedo armament did not differ from that on the "Indefatigeble" and consisted of two 533-mm underwater vehicles located perpendicular to the side in front of the barbet of the bow turret of the main caliber (the first). Ammunition consisted of 14 torpedoes.
Power plant
Usually, when analyzing the characteristics of a ship, we first consider the armor, and only then - the driving performance, but today we will make an exception, since in order to understand the features of the Lion's armor it is very important to know the features of its power plant.
Before Lyon, the speed standard of a British battle cruiser could be considered 25-25.5 knots, but the newest ship was set a more ambitious goal - it had to develop 27 knots (with a normal displacement, of course). To do this, a ship of more than 26 thousand tons required a super-powerful power plant of 70,000 hp. - Recall that the rated power of the Indefatigebla machines was "only" 43,000 hp; an increase of 62.8% was required.
Of course, it was absolutely impossible to "shove" machines and boilers of similar power into the dimensions of the "Indefatigable". As a result, the Lyon's hull turned out to be much larger - it was 33.6 m longer than the Indefatigeble, 2.6 m wider, and the draft was 45 cm.
Full speed tests of the Lion were carried out in difficult weather conditions, which is probably why the required result was not achieved. During the 8 hour run, the battle cruiser developed an average speed of 27 knots, but with a slightly more than rated power of the machines - 73,800 hp. At the same time, the Princess Royal of the same type with 78,600 hp. developed an average speed of 28, 5 knots, and "Queen Mary" at 78,700 hp. - 28 knots, so it is quite possible to assume that if not the influence of bad weather, then the contract conditions for speed "Lion" would have fulfilled. Nevertheless, the Admiralty remained dissatisfied with the result: apparently, under the influence of the first series of battle cruisers, which, when forcing machines, reached speeds of over 27 knots, no less than 29 knots were expected from the Lion-class ships.
The normal fuel supply was 1,000 tons, the full one was 3,500 tons of coal and 1,135 tons of oil. The cruising range is indicated at 4,935 miles at 16.75 knots and 5,610 miles at 10 knots.
Reservation
Undoubtedly, the British admirals and designers paid the utmost attention to the armor of the new type of battle cruisers - this is evidenced by the increase in the mass of armor by almost 60% in comparison with the previous project. They, no doubt, managed to improve something, but here, by and large, the scythe found on the stone - the fact is that the additional displacement that could be allocated to the armor could not "keep up" with the growth of the geometrical dimensions of that what should have been defended - and especially the citadel.
As you know, the citadel then fully fulfills its function if it protects not only the engine and boiler rooms, but also covers the supply pipes of the end towers of the main caliber, but this distance for British battle cruisers grew from project to project. The distance between the axes of the end towers of the Invincible was 91 m, but in the Inflexible project, due to the need to space the traverse towers closer to the extremities, it was already 112 m. In addition, the barbets of the towers of 343-mm guns were wider than 305-mm, but this would not give a large increase in the length of the citadel. The main reason for the need to increase it was the gigantic increase in the power of mechanisms, which required an increase in the length of the engine and boiler rooms. As a result, the distance between the axes of the Lion's end towers was 128.4 m, respectively, the length of the citadel (in order for the armor belt to cover the side within the barbets of the bow and stern towers) should have been at least 137 meters! And this is a colossal length for ships of those years.
The Lion has finally received the 229 mm armor belt that British sailors would like to see on the Indefatigable. It was very high (3.5 m) and long (116 m), but at the same time it covered only the engine and boiler rooms of the battle cruiser - to "stretch" it for another 21 meters so that it protected the supply pipes and artillery cellars of two the bow and stern turrets of the main caliber, the British designers could not.
From 229 mm of the belt in the nose, the sides were protected by armor plates of the same height, 3.5 m, but its thickness gradually decreased. Throughout the first 14 m (from the forward wheelhouse, covering the feed pipe of the second tower and to the barbet of the first tower of the main caliber), its thickness was 152 mm, then, over the next 8, 5 m, opposite the barbet of the first tower - 127 mm and further, on over 26 m - 102 mm. The armored belt did not reach the stem of 15.2 m, and where it ended, a traverse with a thickness of 102 mm was installed.
In the stern of 229 mm armor belts went first 127 mm, and then 102 mm armor plates, they defended another 11, 3 m of the side opposite the aft tower of the main caliber. On this, the armor belt ended with the same 102 mm traverse as in the nose, the remaining 22, 3 m sides to the sternpost did not have armor protection. Thus, the total length of the armor belt was very impressive 175.8 m, however, within the bow tower the armor belt had a thickness of 127 mm, the second - 152 mm, and the fourth - 102-127 mm.
Unlike the Invincible and Inflexible, the Lyon's vertical defense was not limited to the main armor belt - an upper armor belt of the same length was located on top of it. It protected the space between the main and upper decks and was of variable thickness. Above the 229 mm section of the main armor belt, the armor plates of the upper armor belt had a thickness of 152 mm, above the section of 152-127 mm in the nose - 127 mm and further, above the 102 mm section - the same 102 mm. In the stern, the thickness of the upper armor belt coincided with the main one - 127-102 mm. As well as the main one, the upper armor belt was covered with 102 mm traverses in the bow and in the stern.
Deck booking is a little more complicated. To begin with, let's look at the decks of the Lion - the uppermost deck is a forecastle, which, despite its great length, still did not reach the stern of the ship. The next deck is the upper one, it extended from the stem along the upper edge of the upper armored belt. One interdeck space below (along the lower edge of the upper and along the upper edge of the main armor belts) was the main deck, which was also the armored deck. And, finally, the lower deck was located at the level of the lower edge of the main armor belt.
According to the existing and somewhat different descriptions, the forecastle did not have armor, but in a small space in the area of the chimneys and the third tower of the main caliber, structural steel thickened to 38 mm. The next upper deck under it, within 175.8 m of the armor belt, had a thickness of 25.4 mm. The main deck within the citadel had bevels, to the lower edge of the main armor belt, but, unlike the Invincible and Indefatigebla, its thickness in the horizontal part and on the bevels was the same - 25.4 mm. The lower deck within the citadel had no protection, but outside it was armored with 64.5 mm armor plates.
Oddly enough, but against the background of "Invincible" and "Inflexible" with their 38 mm armored deck in the horizontal part and 50 mm bevels, the horizontal booking of the "Lion" looks like a step back. It is rather difficult to give any explanation for this, but we will try. Most likely, the presence of a second, upper armor belt played a role in weakening the armor. "Invincible" and "Indefatigable" did not have one, and a shell hitting the side between the main and upper decks, that is, on top of the 152 mm belt, only the lower armored deck would meet. At the same time, the projectile hitting the same place of the "Lion" had to overcome the 102-152 mm armor belt and only then hit the ship's armored deck.
The main battery artillery was better protected than on previous cruisers. On those, 178 m of armor plates ruled the show, but the forehead and sides of the Lion's turrets were protected by 229 mm of armor, the roof had 82-108 mm, and only on the reverse bevels - 64 mm. But with barbets it was a little more difficult.
Three towers (except for the stern) rose above the forecastle and defended themselves like this - the barbet from the base of the tower to the forecastle was 229 mm, from the forecastle to the upper deck - 203 mm and from the upper to the main deck - 76 mm. Thus, above the forecastle, the enemy was opposed by 229 mm armor, from the forecastle to the upper deck - 203 mm barbet and 25.4 mm (unarmored) side plating, and even lower, from the upper to the main deck - 102-152 mm plates of the upper armor belt and 76 mm barbet. But the barbet of the fourth, aft turret of the 343-mm guns differed from the others. The fact is that this tower itself was not located on the forecastle, but one space below the deck, that is, on the upper deck. Accordingly, the barbet from the base of the tower to the upper deck had 229 mm thickness, and below, between the upper and main decks, it had differentiated protection from 76 to 102 mm (as far as you can understand, 76 mm - in the area of 127 mm side armor plates, 102 mm - in the area of 102 mm armor belt). On paper, such a defense looked quite impressive.
As for the anti-mine caliber, as you can understand their sources, he did not have armor protection, however, later 102-mm / 50 installations received armored shields (possibly only in the bow superstructure), and then, according to some reports, the guns in the bow superstructure received some semblance of a casemate (probably the walls were reinforced with armor plates that provide anti-splinter protection)
The conning tower was oval and had 254 mm front and side parts, and 178 mm wall towards the stern. The roof was protected by 76 mm armor, the floor - 102 mm. The fire control post (located on top of the conning tower) had 76 mm armor protection. The conning tower for torpedo fire control, located in the aft superstructure, had anti-splinter armor of 25.4 mm. In addition to the above, chimneys (up to 44 mm) and artillery cellars of the main caliber were covered with 64 mm, and the central post located inside the ship's hull was covered with 38 mm "armored screens".
In general, the following can be said about the Lion's armor protection. Formally, it was, of course, more powerful than that of Invincible and Indefatigable. For example, on the Invincible, the thickest, 152 mm section of the armor belt had a length of 95 m and a height of 3.43 m. At Indefatigebla, the 152 mm belt had 91 m and 3, 36 m, respectively. And the "Lion" had the most durable 229 mm section, and it extended to 116 m, at a height of 3.5 m!
But with all this, the increased size of the ship largely negated the advantages it received. Of course, the Lyon's engine and boiler rooms received better protection, but the feed pipes and cellars of the two bow and stern towers were covered from the sides by the same 102-152 mm armor, and this was completely insufficient. The armoring of the barbets was increased - from 178 mm to 203-229 mm, but the protection of the supply pipes remained seriously vulnerable. The fact is that a projectile hitting the side of the cruiser above the upper armored belt could penetrate an inch of structural steel, then a 25.4 mm deck, and then only a 76 mm barbet was an obstacle to it, which would hardly be enough against a large-caliber 280-305 -mm of ammunition.
In addition to reservations, O. Parks notes that there are three major drawbacks to the Lion:
1. As you know, the British built their armored cruisers "in pair" with new types of battleships, using similar technical solutions on both of them where possible. "Lion" was a "variation" of battleships of the "Orion" class, and O. Parks writes that the project of the battle cruiser should have abandoned the third tower of the "Orion", and not the fourth. In this case, the battle cruiser would receive a linearly elevated position of artillery, like the future battleships "Queen Elizabeth", that is, two towers in the bow and in the stern. Here it is difficult to disagree with O. Parks, because such a transfer was quite possible, and would not require any increase in displacement, but would provide the third tower of the Lyon with much better firing angles;
2. The location of the three-legged mast in the image and likeness of "Orin", that is, between the first and second chimneys. Even without a dreadnought, this design solution can hardly be considered optimal, but there the bow tube "served" six boilers, but on a battle cruiser - 14. As a result, the use of the post on the mast was not that difficult, but completely impossible - the mast was so hot that it was impossible to climb it. This deficiency was subsequently corrected, at a cost to the British government of £ 60,000. Art.;
3. For the last time on British ships, the bridge was installed over the conning tower.
Unfortunately, there is no room left in the article for comparing Lion and Moltke, and therefore …
