The formation of brigades of a new look in the Ground Forces sharpens the question of the role and place of the armored vehicles of the current infantrymen on the battlefield. Mechanical copying of existing approaches to the use of armored vehicles can negatively affect the combat effectiveness of motorized rifle units.
At the first, even the most superficial look at the problems of domestic motorized riflemen, the question immediately arises about the equipment on which they should fight. Or, perhaps, it would be more correct to say - forced? We are not talking here about the technical characteristics of the AFV and not about the modernity of their layout solutions, the element base or the structural materials used. The very adequacy of the concept of the main armored infantry vehicle, adopted in our Armed Forces, raises doubts.
The simplest assertion that motorized riflemen, in essence, should not ride "what they will give" (and this point of view, despite its undeniable "mossiness" is rooted quite firmly), does not always evoke mutual understanding in the circles of specialized experts. But it would seem that what could be more obvious than the fact that the BMP should help its infantry, and not distract it from the combat mission.
Modification of the nature of hostilities, coupled with an outdated scheme for integrating armored vehicles into the combat system of motorized rifle units, strongly dictates a radical reworking of the BMP idea itself. This already implies a change in the composition of the tasks solved by the armored vehicles of the infantry. That in turn (and only after that!) Will pull a new structure of requirements for the tactical purpose of the vehicle and its technical characteristics.
In the article "Infantry" armor "of a new look, we have already touched on the deplorable state of development of the conceptual role of armored combat vehicles for new motorized rifle units of constant readiness. As part of summarizing the analysis carried out in this article, a proposal was put forward to consider the BMP as a system-forming complex of weapons in the tactical level of infantry “squad-platoon-company”. This point of view needs some clarification, which in turn will lead us to new questions on the way to clarify the appearance of the new combat vehicle.
It's not the same as it used to be
Before discussing in detail the BMP as a system-forming complex of armament for motorized riflemen, it would be nice to analyze the picture of modern combat operations. Only then can we talk about the functional purpose of the vehicle and its place in the combat system of motorized riflemen.
A key element of the picture of modern combat (and even, perhaps, an integral requirement for the conduct of this battle) is a significant increase in the autonomy of lower tactical units. The high requirements for the independence of actions in the composition of companies and battalions, both in fire engagement and in maneuver, are due to the nature of combat operations, in which the time factor, timeliness and accuracy of a strike play an increasingly important role.
Infantry tactics are modified both for the case of "conventional" war of equal rivals, and in asymmetric conflicts characterized by a qualitative difference in the military and technological potential of the opposing sides. In the latter case, it is often also necessary to talk about all-round support for the movement of troops in areas of activity of irregular partisan formations.
The picture familiar to us from school history textbooks about both world wars of the 20th century is changing. The continuous, echeloned front line disintegrates into separate episodes, in which tactical units up to a battalion level inclusive can and should act as autonomously as possible. At the same time, efforts in battle are transferred to a much greater operational-tactical depth.
Combat operations lose their continuous frontal character, acquire a discrete form of "surgical strikes" and are characterized by transience, as well as by what could be called a "target designation war." They are no longer conducted for the territory, but for key areas: transport corridors, communication centers, industrial and infrastructure centers, centers of military-political control.
This leads to the massive use by troops of deep penetration techniques into the enemy's defenses, throwing forward isolated but self-sufficient combat groups. Groups, in turn, must be able to provide their movement with fire in a timely manner. Moreover, it is advisable to do this with your own hands, not "standing in line" to receive support from artillery, army aviation and other means of reinforcement attached to higher-level units.
Thus, we come to the task of maximum completeness of collecting and processing information about the tactical situation in the zone of responsibility of the combat group. It is solved through the introduction of automated control systems, which allows you to independently and flexibly build a detachment of forces to defeat, using information received in real time. Note that armored vehicles in such a group, on the one hand, are in dire need of a multipurpose weapon system integrated into the general target designation system, and on the other hand, having acquired it, they are able to demonstrate new qualities in battle.
Challenges and opportunities of the present day
The picture has cleared up a little, now is the time to look at what we already have on our hands. The BMP of the Russian (Soviet, if we talk about the time of the formation of the doctrine of application) of the army is designed to solve three problems. First, for transporting infantry to the battlefield. Secondly, to give the infantry additional protection, maneuverability and firepower. Thirdly, for joint actions with tanks in battle.
So, what are the fire missions currently facing the BMP armament complex and how are they solved under existing conditions? There are three such framework tasks, and all of them should be solved both by single machines and as part of a subdivision. The first of them is the defeat of ground targets observed from the infantry fighting vehicles, both from the front edge and from the depths of the battle formation. The second is the defeat by external target designation of ground targets that are not directly observed by the vehicle's crew. The third is the defeat of air targets.
The BMP weapons complex at the disposal of the Russian army, out of these three tasks, only two are solved - and, to be honest, half of them (and by no means the best half). BMPs are experiencing problems with the defeat of the enemy from the depths - over the head of the infantry located in front. The task of hitting unobserved targets is not being solved at all, and the scheme of firing from "closed positions" is not being built. When working through the air, we can only talk about contact kinetic damage with standard ammunition, and specialized fire weapons with damaging elements are not used.
What does this fragmentary picture lead to? To the fact that at the moment the system-forming complex of infantry weapons in the lower tactical level is actually melee weapons: small arms and grenade launchers. The place of the BMP in the general structure of fire damage is not clearly traced, the vehicle plays only an auxiliary role, moreover, drawing on itself a fair share of the infantry's efforts for protection, without providing a qualitative reinforcement of the subunit in return.
At the same time, the battle is fleeting and intense, and the timely inclusion of the senior commander in the work of the assigned artillery is not always possible. As a result, a picture of unsystematic firefighting is taking shape in the lower infantry echelon, with deliberately insufficient means.
A separate issue is the full integration of the existing BMP weapons complex into a single tactical network of automated unit control. After all, it is this step that is ultimately required to achieve successful work on unobserved ground targets, as well as to destroy air targets.
All this, in turn, seriously disrupts the process of solving strike missions, both fire and maneuverable. Fire must provide maneuver, such is the dialectic of combat. Can the modern infantry, which is actually left to its own devices along with automatic weapons, properly deal with them?
Foothold for infantry
To put this situation upside down is possible only due to a radical change in the very approach to the appointment of infantry fighting vehicles. Having begun to consider the combat vehicle of motorized riflemen as a system-forming complex of weapons in the lower tactical echelon of troops, we thereby give them the opportunity to solve the entire spectrum of combat missions, which were discussed in detail above.
Among the main tasks of the fighters themselves are the provision and protection of infantry fighting vehicles. The machine, in turn, solves the bulk of the firing tasks. The “armor” armament complex is becoming the dominant component in the structure of fire engagement of subunits up to and including a company. Thus, in interaction with melee weapons, an opportunity is created for the effective implementation of maneuvers.
Fire destruction of uncovered targets in the area of responsibility of a motorized rifle company is thus carried out independently - by the decision of the respective commanders and without involving the forces and means of senior commanders. This dramatically increases the efficiency and autonomy of the subunit, especially in light of the shift we have considered to focus on the actions of isolated combat groups.
However, the tasks of effective engagement are not all. BMP, as we remember, is the main transport of the infantry. This means that it is necessary to reconsider the procedure for the transfer of combat vehicles with motorized riflemen on board. It is required to ensure the guaranteed delivery of personnel to the designated area in conditions of enemy influence both at the operational depth (here enemy aircraft, precision weapons and special forces groups will interfere with us), and at the tactical (here, the fire of cannon artillery and MLRS comes into play).
In addition to the problems associated with all-round support for the actions of troops and the consolidation of these rules in the form of charters and manuals, three main areas of work can be distinguished. First, the task of improving tactics and organizing marches. Secondly, giving the BMP new security capabilities. Thirdly, a dramatic increase in the maneuverable characteristics of the machine.
The topic of improving the tactics of organizing marches is beyond the scope of our article, although it is closely related to the main issue - the design of a new image of the BMP. As part of improving tactics, it will be necessary to give the combat vehicle on the march new levels of protection from special forces, from ambushes, mines and land mines. Other approaches are required to solving the tasks of marching and direct protection of troops on the march.
It is possible that this will require a radical revision of the current views on the construction of marching columns and, in particular, on the task of comprehensive support and protection of maneuvering troops. It would seem quite appropriate here, for example, to formally introduce into the military regulations and instructions such a comprehensive support as the isolation of the maneuver area. Within the framework of this approach, the currently scattered measures can be assembled for fire and anti-aircraft support for maneuvers, for the deployment and use of an air cover echelon (helicopters and army UAVs), for the formation and operation of a grouping of electronic warfare forces and assets.
Giving infantry fighting vehicles new security capabilities implies a number of traditional areas, such as strengthening resistance to direct damage (for example, in the form of improving dynamic protection), as well as covering personnel and equipment from damaging elements in the area of operation of cannon artillery and MLRS. However, opposition to the actual use of homing weapons, aimed primarily at disrupting the illumination and target designation, should become an integral element of the comprehensive procedure for protecting combat vehicles. The solution to this problem, in turn, should be tightly integrated with the electronic warfare support.
Improving the maneuvering characteristics of a combat vehicle in the proposed section should be in the nature of a qualitative leap and not be reduced to a linear increase in engine power. At the same time, taking into account the growth of the characteristic depth of actions of isolated combat groups in the tactical and operational rear of the enemy, which we outlined at the beginning of the article, it is necessary to carefully approach the preservation of the BMP's motor resource and the reliability of the material part.
The combat vehicle must become the fundamental, supporting element of the lower level of motorized riflemen. It is necessary to achieve full-fledged, not piecewise integration into a single information-combat system of troops. We are talking mainly about the armament complex, about the solution of fire tasks and about system target designation, but this approach extends much further. After all, the BMP may well be the key unit of the unit, even in the rear! In fact, no one bothers to regularly place stocks of ammunition, water on it, duplicate kits of medicines, equip the car with a supply of modern engineering and sapper tools (up to perforators powered by onboard power, which make it possible to simplify the process of digging in stony or frozen soils).
A painstaking combination of all these factors will change the purpose of the vehicle, turning it into a fulcrum for the fire and maneuver of our infantry. The soldiers cover their main weapon - BMP, which will thus be able to solve the lion's share of the unit's fire missions.
