Photo: weapons.technology.youngester.com
Aircraft carrier "Charles de Gaulle"
nuclear powered (R91), France
The maritime powers of Europe, which have or once had classic strike aircraft carriers in their fleets, are gradually abandoning this type of ships in favor of smaller, but multifunctional. For major players such as Great Britain and France, this process is either going painfully, or has not yet begun at all. Countries with more limited financial capabilities have already reoriented their shipbuilding programs towards combining an attack aircraft carrier with a universal amphibious assault ship, since it is too expensive to build and maintain both. The inclusion of most of the European powers in the partnership program for the supply of American F-35 fighters will equip these combat units with an acceptable strike potential.
European carrier forces: picture and dynamics
The state of the aircraft carrier forces in Europe was significantly influenced by two factors: the gradual withdrawal from the European fleets in the 2000s of the aircraft-carrying ships of the old construction (not even physically obsolete yet and having the potential for limited use or modernization) and the extremely insignificant introduction of new combat units instead of them. same profile.
Thus, Great Britain got rid of two of its three Invincible-class aircraft carriers:
the lead Invincible was decommissioned in August 2005, the Ark Royal in March 2011. The remaining Illustrious in the same 2011 was deprived of the Harrier II strike aircraft and converted into a helicopter carrier. Currently, the British Navy does not have a single carrier ship of carrier-based aircraft.
France withdrew both Clemenceau-class aircraft carriers from the fleet:
in 1997 Clemenceau itself was launched, in 2005 - Foch (sold to Brazil). In 2010, the helicopter carrier Jean d'Arc left the fleet. Instead, only one ship Charles de Gaulle (2001) was introduced.
Spain in February 2013, due to financial difficulties, withdrew from the fleet the aircraft carrier Principe de Asturias,
built just in the late 1980s. As a result, the Spanish fleet had only one large aircraft-carrying ship, Juan Carlos I, which was accepted into service in the fall of 2010.
Against this background, Italy looks like an exception, which, despite the reductions in the military budget that were repeatedly announced in 2012 and early 2013, still retains the aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi in the fleet.
In 2009, the fleet was replenished with the new multipurpose aircraft carrier Cavour.
Britain: "Cheap Imperialist Politics", Second Edition, Abridged
Photo: www.buquesdeguerra.com
Aircraft carrier Juan Carlos I (L-61)
At the moment, the air group of ships is supposed to have approximately 40 aircraft, including 12 multirole F-35B Lightning II fighters, multipurpose helicopters Merlin HAS.1 (AW.101), Wildcat (AW.159) and helicopters of the Sea King AEW radar patrol..2.
The most interesting in the project is the evolution of its weapons. In 2002, the British military, choosing the version of the carrier-based fighter, settled on the F-35B, which is made according to the STOVL ("short take-off, vertical landing") scheme.
However, around 2009, discussions began about equipping ships with an electromagnetic catapult to launch "full-fledged" carrier-based aircraft, including those that could replace the F-35 in the future. As a result, in 2010 there was a reorientation of the military from the F-35B version to the F-35C version, which the American fleet also intends to order to replace the F / A-18 carrier-based multipurpose fighters.
It should be noted that the C version has better flight and tactical and technical characteristics than the B version, in particular, a larger combat radius (1140 km versus 870) and a wider range of combat load. In addition, the F-35C is somewhat cheaper both in purchase and in operation, which can provide significant savings when operating a fleet of several dozen aircraft.
However, the limiting factor here is the willingness of the British budget to bear additional costs for the re-equipment of ships. If in 2010 the cost of re-equipping one ship was estimated at 951 million pounds, then in 2012 the military department has already named the figure at 2 billion pounds.
As far as can be judged, it was this factor that played its role against the backdrop of the growing financial difficulties of the British budget. Problems were also added by the shift in the timing of the ship's commissioning - approximately until 2020. Recall that by that time Britain had already withdrawn the aircraft carrier Ark Royal ahead of schedule, and the military would hardly have calmly accepted the increase in the construction time of Queen Elizabeth. As a result, in May 2012, the military department returned to the purchase of the F-35B, and Queen Elizabeth will receive a springboard for a shortened takeoff of these aircraft.
The weak point of the British aircraft carrier forces remains the lighting system. Neither CVF nor previous Invincible-class ships have the capability to operate a full-fledged early warning and control aircraft. Such a chance existed if the British military chose the ejection version of the CVF, but at the moment it is lost. The AEW.2 and ASaC.7 models of the Sea King radar patrol helicopters can hardly be considered an equivalent replacement.
The fate of the second ship of the program is not clear, the construction of which was started in 2011 (the first metal was cut for the hull structures). The final decision on the completion of construction will be made after 2015.
Thus, by the early 2020s, the UK will have at best two new multipurpose aircraft carriers with F-35B aircraft. The following commissioning dates seem realistic: Queen Elizabeth - not earlier than 2020, Prince of Wales - a few years later. However, if the budgetary problems continue to grow or at least persist, the second aircraft carrier, if completed, can be sold literally from the shipyard (the most likely buyer is India), or its construction will be stopped altogether.
The second option is fraught with difficulties in the form of payment of penalties. According to British officials, the ship is more profitable to complete than to pay shipbuilders to abandon it. In 2011, British Prime Minister David Cameron stated this directly.
The situation is increasingly reminiscent of the interwar period, when Great Britain, gradually losing world leadership, in order to save money, went to reduce the fleet and, more importantly, to limit its construction during the Washington naval agreements of 1922. In the 1930s, this behavior was called “cheap imperialist politics.
France: a special path at a fork
Photo: digilander.libero.it
Light multipurpose aircraft carrier
Cavour (C550), Italy
For a long time France had been hatching the idea of building the so-called "second aircraft carrier" - Porte-Avions 2 (the first is the nuclear aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle). However, in April 2013, the Defense White Paper, published by the French Defense Ministry, listed only one aircraft carrier in the section on the face of the armed forces in 2025.
There were no official comments, from which two conclusions can be drawn: either the project of the "second aircraft carrier" was canceled (or postponed indefinitely, which is the same in the current conditions), or the French military, realistically assessing the capabilities of the state budget and shipbuilders, decided that even with the immediate start of work, it will not be possible to get a finished ship in 12 years. Even if we take the financial question out of the equation, the epic with Charles de Gaulle is indicative - from the moment of its laying to the final commissioning, and in much better economic conditions, it took just 12 years. It should also be noted that the technical appearance of Charles de Gaulle was developed in general terms back in the late 1970s, i.e.about 10 years before the laying, while the final technical appearance of the Porte-Avions 2 has not yet been determined.
Nevertheless, the history of the evolution of the project of the French "second aircraft carrier" deserves attention and can be instructive. According to initial calculations, the ship's displacement was supposed to be 65 thousand tons, then it was increased to 74 thousand and, finally, reduced to 62 thousand tons. "Headache" in operation. The air group was to include 32 Rafale fighters, three E-2C Hawkeye early warning and control aircraft and five NH-90 helicopters.
It should be noted here that the consideration of the CVF and Porte-Avions 2 programs in conjunction with each other is more than meaningful. The fact is that in the early stages of the French project (2005-2008) the future contractor (consortium Thales Naval and DCNS) planned to work together with British shipbuilders from BAE Systems. Moreover, the project had to be so close to the British CVF that at first even the CVF-FR ("French") marking was used. However, subsequently the project "bloated", including in terms of displacement, and in the implementation of the British program there were no signs of special activity.
As a result, France de facto abandoned the CVF-FR project, and an interesting clause appeared in the 2008 White Paper: "the change in economic conditions since 2003 requires new research to choose between classical and nuclear power plants." Thus, the nuclear version of the Porte-Avions 2 is again accepted for consideration, which seems logical, since the UK does not build nuclear ships, and if the project has finally dispersed with CVF, then we need to weigh all the pros and cons again.
Attempts by the UK to find an answer to the question of where to attach, if necessary, the second aircraft carrier of the CVF program, in principle, revive the idea of ordering Porte-Avions 2 based on the British project. However, France does not purchase the F-35 and is focusing on the use of Rafale aircraft as deck-based aircraft, which will immediately require equipping the ship with catapults (steam, as on Charles de Gaulle, or electromagnetic, as it was assumed for CVF).
Moreover, within the framework of naval cooperation, which implied the creation of unified Franco-British aircraft carrier formations and the "alternate" use of ships for mutual tasks (such an initiative was put forward in the second half of the 2000s), the French were still ready to allow the use of the F-35C, but not the F-35B. And - more importantly - they were not satisfied with the absence of launch catapults on Queen Elisabeth and Prince of Wales.
The fate of the Porte-Avions 2 remains, perhaps, the main intrigue of the European aircraft carrier programs. At the same time, it is quite obvious that if this ship is built, it will become almost the only new attack ship in Europe with a full-fledged air group, and not with short-take off aircraft. In fact, over the next 10–20 years, this is Europe's only chance to build a new "clean" aircraft carrier.
European type of aircraft carrier: unification and ample opportunities
Photo: Suricatafx.com
Comparison of modern deck
fighters
At this stage, we have to state three characteristic points.
Firstly, the main aircraft carrier powers of the EU - Great Britain and France - were actually left without an aircraft carrier fleet, even in the limited volume that they had before the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The operational readiness of Charles de Gaulle remains rather low, and today Britain does not have a single carrier ship of carrier-based aircraft. New ships of full readiness will be able to appear at the earliest in 6-8 years from Britain or already in the second half of the 2020s - from France.
Secondly, the powers of the "second echelon" (Spain, Italy) are now actually catching up, and in some ways surpassing the leaders, for example, in the number of combat units of this profile, especially if we take into account the use of strike aircraft. However, this is not happening due to the active implementation of shipbuilding programs, but in a natural way. However, given the growing financial difficulties of Italy and Spain, it is clearly premature to expect further growth or even preservation of the number of active aircraft carrier units in their fleets in the medium term.
Third, there is a clear shift in the needs of the fleets from the actual strike aircraft carriers to relatively light multipurpose aircraft carriers, often performing the functions of amphibious assault ships. Such a ship may carry strike aircraft (short take-off planes), or may not (in fact, being a helicopter carrier). But in any case, it has a wide range of capabilities for the transportation of amphibious units. In terms of philosophy, such a combat unit is closer not to classic strike aircraft carriers (for example, the American Nimitz type, the French Charles de Gaulle, the Russian Admiral Kuznetsov, the Chinese Liaoning or Indian ships), but rather to the American Wasp type amphibious assault ships.
An example of the application of this approach in shipbuilding is the French "expeditionary force ships" of the Mistral type (three units),
as well as the already mentioned Spanish Juan Carlos I and Italian Cavour.
It should be noted that these are new ships built over the past 4-9 years and reflect the current views of the naval headquarters on the priorities of military shipbuilding.
The air groups of the new ships follow a pan-European approach: the earlier ships carried mainly vertical take-off and landing aircraft of the Harrier type,
while the new ones (and the same old ones after modernization) are the future American carrier-based fighter F-35B.
The traditional exception is France, which used its own aircraft in the navy: first the Super Etendard, now the Rafale.
Thus, the creation of a multipurpose, relatively cheap ship with obligatory amphibious landing capabilities is becoming a common place in the European construction of aircraft-carrying ships. As an option for reinforcement for the "second-line" powers, it is considered giving these ships the ability to use short take-off aircraft F-35B, which actually turns them into "ersatz strike aircraft carriers."
France and Great Britain, trying to bear the burden of their own aircraft carrier power, will apparently continue, as far as the state of the economy allows them, to rigidly separate the actual strike aircraft carriers and aircraft-carrying amphibious assault ships. And if the British, in tight budgetary conditions, can always go for the unification of the pan-European type, switching to a single type of aircraft-carrying amphibious assault ship, then France, which does not have its own short take-off aircraft, will have to at least request niche F-35Bs in the United States. Given the established naval traditions and traditions of military procurement, this can cause serious complications.
New "gunboat diplomacy"
Everything that is happening can, in principle, be called the final bringing of the military fleets of the European NATO countries to a new military-political situation that has developed after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Organization. The likelihood of a major continental conflict in Europe (read - with the participation of Russia) has greatly decreased since the late 1980s, which necessitates the restructuring of the armed forces. The new set of challenges is associated, in particular, with the expansion of the role of the expeditionary forces both in joint operations of NATO members (for example, in Yugoslavia in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011), so and in the independent actions of the European powers to stabilize the situation in the explosive regions of the Third World (for example, the French operation in Mali in early 2013).
On the one hand, this situation does not impose exorbitant requirements for the level of military expenditures under the threat of the existence of the state (for the fleet, this means a strict limitation of the number of operatively ready ships, and, consequently, increases the requirements for their versatility). On the other hand, it shifts the emphasis in the system of naval missions from purely shock functions in a full-scale naval war to supporting combined air-naval operations of the armed forces in low-intensity conflicts.
The physical reduction of aircraft carrier fleets, which is unpleasant for the prestige of major powers, can also be viewed from the angle of the effectiveness of the use of the remaining ships or those under construction. In this sense, a country that has universal aircraft-carrying ships with amphibious assault and landing functions gets more opportunities for using the fleet for less money in the modern version of "gunboat diplomacy."
Therefore, the reduction of classic strike aircraft carriers in Europe in favor of universal ships with short take-off aircraft should be qualified not only as a contraction of the naval potential of the EU powers (evident at least quantitatively), but also as a reasonable-sufficient response to the new challenges facing the naval forces in XXI century.
