The fire on the "Admiral Kuznetsov" caused a flurry of publications in the society about the fact that now this ship is over. At the same time, we recalled all the accidents and emergencies that happened to this ill-fated ship.
It is worth bringing the venerable public back to reality. In this regard - a small "digest" of near-airborne questions, plus some "repetition".
A little about the fire
First of all, there is a fire. I must say that in our ship repair something is burning all the time. This is due to the serious degradation of domestic ship repair. Interestingly, the boards of directors of ship repair enterprises are the same people who sit on the boards of directors in shipbuilding, in the development of naval weapons and in various state boards and commissions. Those who influence everything receive dividends from everything, but are not personally responsible for anything.
In fact, ship repair is still "in the feeding" of the characters, who do not care about its effectiveness from the big bell tower. In many respects, this explains the shortage of personnel at repair plants, and "antediluvian" (for example, pre-war) equipment, and the general condition of the entire repair infrastructure, buildings, structures, etc.
This "from above" is superimposed on the moral decay of the top of the Navy, which has naturally turned into the "Queen of England" - it performs purely ceremonial tasks. Neither the High Command, nor the Commander-in-Chief, nor the General Staff of the Navy manage the fleets, they are responsible for military-technical policy, but they cannot always influence it. The fleet is de facto turned into "Naval units of the ground forces", which cannot but affect the attitude of his senior officers to the service.
All this is at the top, and below we have an unorganized crowd of people on the ship being repaired, the permit-orders signed by the performers "for the fool", it is unclear whether it is a broken or not a formalized technology for repairing the ship, when it is not cleaned of dangerous pollution before starting work, and a fire-retardant cape not draped over the cable-route shaft.
All this is one of the many indicators that the fleet is seriously "sick", but nothing more.
The fire itself did not cause fatal damage to the ship. The 95 billion rubles announced by the Kommersant newspaper are nonsense, absolutely obvious to anyone who can think a little. There is simply nothing to burn for that amount. The fire area on the ship was equal to four good three-room apartments, and on different decks. The combustion temperature of organic fuels in confined spaces with a limited supply of oxygen at atmospheric pressure can never be more than 900 degrees Celsius, even in the epicenter of a fire.
All of the above together clearly indicates that there is no fatal damage to the ship. Of course, some equipment was damaged, possibly expensive. Yes, the terms of the ship's exit from repair will now increase, as well as its cost. But this is not a reason for writing off and certainly not 95 billion rubles. The ship could be decommissioned for serious damage to the hull, but even if some steel structural elements have lost their toughness and become more fragile, then when repairs are performed in a technically competent way, the significance of this problem can be reduced to zero. However, steel conducts heat well and it is unlikely that the housing heating, even in the combustion zone, has reached some dangerous values for steel parameters - heat removal to other structural elements outside the combustion zone was too strong.
The only truly irreplaceable loss is the lost people. Everything else is more than fixable.
You can treat A. L. Rakhmanov, the head of the USC, but it must be admitted that in this case he is right in preliminary assessments of the consequences of the fire.
Of course, the investigation is still ahead, as are the conclusions of the commission, which will examine the ship. Ahead and adequate and accurate assessment of damage. But the fact that there can be no question of any write-off of "Kuznetsov" because of this fire is obvious already now.
So, everyone should stop singing someone else's nonsense - nothing at the moment prevents the restoration of the ship, although, of course, it is a pity for additional money and time.
This means that it must be restored.
What's next?
In the correct version - normal repair, with the renewal of the power plant in general and the boilers in particular, and the modernization of electronic weapons. It is not necessary to invest madly in this ship, it is already old, unlucky, and it was invented in not the best form, but it is necessary to bring it into a combat-ready state. The combat value of "Kuznetsov" before the repair was frankly conditional, and not only because of its condition, but also because of the training of its crew - from the commander to the sailors on the flight deck, and frankly weak in terms of the preparation of the air group.
Correctly performed repairs of an aircraft carrier, which will make it possible to operate it in normal modes, make transitions at high speed and stay at sea for a long time without losing serviceability, will make it possible to organize full-fledged combat training of the 100th and 279th separate shipborne fighter aviation regiments.
It is worth saying the following: what we had in terms of training air regiments earlier is absolutely unacceptable. Initially, "Kuznetsov" was created as an air defense aircraft carrier with missile weapons. The anti-ship missile "Granit" has never been its main weapon; in the old training films of the USSR Ministry of Defense, everything is said quite clearly on this matter. However, the specificity of repelling an aircraft strike from the sea is that the reaction time required for this must be very short.
The article “We are building a fleet. Wrong Ideas, Wrong Concepts " an example was analyzed of the repulsion of an attack on surface ships by the forces of a coastal fighter aviation regiment from a position of duty on the ground, and it was shown that in the presence of a radar field 700 kilometers deep from the ship group that needs to be protected, the air regiment manages to reach "its" attacked ships at the same time with the attacker if the protected ships are no further than 150 kilometers from the home airfield.
If ships move further from coastal aviation airfields, then the only thing that can disorganize the enemy's attack is the provision of aviation combat duty in the air. As the area in which hostilities are being conducted moves away from the coast, the cost and complexity of such combat duty is constantly growing, in addition, the interceptors on duty in the air lose the opportunity to receive reinforcement upon request, and the enemy will not only launch an attack on the "strikers", but also an escort. And he will be strong
The aircraft carrier makes it possible to have interceptors and AWACS helicopters constantly present in the air above the ship's strike groups, as well as combat aircraft with container radars, which partly replace AWACS aircraft. In addition, during their airborne combat duty, a comparable number of interceptors can be on deck in a minute or so ready for takeoff.
Even if the attacking enemy will have superior numbers, the interceptor counterattack will force him to "break" the battle formation, lead to losses, disorganization of the attack, and,most importantly, an increase in the range of the missile salvo of attacking aircraft (in time), and this will not allow creating such a density of missile salvo that the ship's air defense in the attacked ship group cannot cope with.
In addition, enemy strike aircraft leaving the attack will be faced with the fact that they are attacked by those interceptors from the aircraft carrier who did not have time to enter the battle before the enemy disconnected the means of destruction.
We recall the war in the Falklands: in most attacks the surface ships took the first blow (which proves their ability to survive under the attacks of aviation), but the carrier-based Harriers destroyed the bulk of the Argentine aircraft when the Argentines left the attack, which allowed the British to win the war of attrition between the Royal Navy and the Argentine Air Force. Thus, "shooting" outgoing enemy attack aircraft is critically important, and except for ship MiGs, there will be no one to perform this task if we ever have to fight at sea.
Thus, as an air defense aircraft carrier, Kuznetsov must practice repelling a massive airstrike together with surface ships, and in conditions close to real, that is, a massive enemy attack by forces obviously superior to those that our aircraft carrier can manage to lift into the air by the time the enemy is launched missiles, the introduction of naval aircraft into battle in squadrons, work "in pursuit", the evasion of the aircraft carrier itself from an enemy missile strike. Naturally, all this should take place during the day and at night, and in winter and summer.
Of all this, at best, the 279th okiap performed group interception of air targets, and not with full strength and for a long time. Regularly, such training is not conducted, so that the naval commander on the Su-30SM would actually "fight" against the shipborne aircraft carrier group with "Kuznetsov" and the naval aviation regiment on it never was at all. And without such teachings, there is no, and there will be no understanding of whether we are doing everything right, and how effective these actions are.
Of interest is the use of naval aircraft in escorting anti-submarine Tu-142, operating in the interests of the naval aircraft carrier group. In escorting a salvo of cruise missiles (enemy interceptors may well shoot down slow anti-ship "Calibers", if they are not interfered with), in aerial reconnaissance, both in the form of "pure" scouts and in the form of Avrug, which attack the detected target after it is detected.
In the event of a global war, the main striking force of the Russian Navy will be submarines, and "cleaning" the airspace in the areas of their combat use will be critically important. Modern basic patrol aircraft pose a monstrous threat to submarines, and it should not be over the areas where our submarines will operate. Even if the Russian Federation captures Svalbard and northern Norway during the preparatory measures, there will still be huge gaps over the sea between the air defense zones organized by coastal aviation forces and anti-aircraft missile units, which cannot be closed by anything except surface ships. And it is “Kuznetsov” that will be the most useful of them, and the only one capable of stopping the actions of the Orions and Poseidons against our submarines, as well as ensuring relatively free operations of the Tu-142 and Il-38 against enemy submarines. All of this will be critically important for ensuring Russia's defense capability.
But for this, it is necessary to bring the combat readiness of the ship itself, and its aviation, and the headquarters on the coast, controlling the aircraft carrier group to the highest possible level. By itself, weapons do not fight, people who use them are fighting, and for this they must be trained properly.
These questions have already been raised earlier in the article. Coastal Defense Aircraft Carrier … However, all the tasks of an aircraft carrier are not limited to the tasks of air defense and a hypothetical war with a strong enemy. Before the Syrian campaign, which passed so ingloriously, the storage vaults of aviation weapons on Kuznetsov were modernized to store bombs in large quantities, which had never been done on this ship before.
And the only real combat missions that Russian deck pilots performed in a real war were shock ones.
And it’s not just that.
We, of course, should keep in mind a possible war with the United States and its allies, as a certain maximum of what we might have to face. However, at the same time, the likelihood of such a war is small, moreover, the better we are ready for it, the lower this probability.
But the likelihood of an offensive war in some underdeveloped region is constantly growing. Since 2014, Russia has embarked on an expansionary foreign policy. We are now pursuing a much more aggressive policy than the USSR has ever been since Stalin's death. The USSR has never carried out operations similar to the Syrian one.
And this policy creates a high probability of entering military conflicts far beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. For example, a map of the presence of the Russian Federation in African countries. It is worth remembering that each of them also has broad commercial interests. And this is just the beginning.
And where there are commercial interests, there is also unfair competition on the part of "partners", there are attempts to nullify Russia's efforts and investments by banal organization of a coup d'etat in the client country, which the West has done more than once. Exacerbation of internal conflicts within countries loyal to Russia and military attacks by pro-Western regimes are very likely.
In such a situation, the possibility of rapid military intervention can be very important. Moreover, it may be required, on the one hand, much faster than a stationary air base can be deployed on the spot, and on the other, in an area where there are no corny airfields.
And this is not a fantasy - when our troops arrived in Syria, the fighting was in Damascus itself. It wasn't long before the collapse of the Syrian defense. How would we intervene if there was no way to use Khmeimim?
There can be only one answer to such calls and it is called the word "aircraft carrier". Syria in all its glory has shown that neither Kuznetsov, nor naval aviation are ready for strike missions either.
This means that we will have to work in this direction - aerial reconnaissance over land, a flight to strike by a pair, several links, a squadron, the entire air regiment. Strikes to the maximum range, combat duty in the air 5-10 minutes from the zone of hostilities, practicing a departure with the maximum possible composition, practicing a joint strike by aviation from an aircraft carrier and cruise missiles from URO ships, practicing combat missions at maximum intensity, day and night - we have never done any of this.
And, since we are ready to attack the coast, then it is worth working out the most basic, classic task of the aircraft carrier fleet - air strikes against surface ships.
We'll have to fill this gap too.
Anti-submarine operations are also worth mentioning. During the first campaign of "Kuznetsov" in the Mediterranean Sea, they were worked out, an attempt was made to simultaneously conduct anti-aircraft defense and air defense operations, at the same time it became clear that it was impossible to do these things at the same time - only one thing. This example shows well that theoretical ideas on waging war with the help of an aircraft carrier have to be corrected in practice.
That is, Kuznetsov will have something to do. And, no matter how it turns out that by the time, for example, the carve-up of Libya, the ship will not be ready yet. This will be a big and fat minus for our country.
Infrastructure issue
Alas, in addition to all of the above, there is another chronic problem - infrastructural insufficiency. So, since the entry into service of the first aircraft-carrying combat ship of the USSR Navy, capable of carrying combat aircraft on board, almost FORTY FOUR YEARS have passed. This is a lot. This, frankly, is a lot. And during this rather long time, our country has not mastered the construction of normal berths in different fleets, where ships of this class could moor.
It's a shame. There is an expression according to which all branches of the armed forces are indicators of how a nation can fight, and the fleet is also an indicator of how well it can think. From this point of view, everything is bad with us. Dozens of years of the presence of aircraft-carrying ships in the ranks of the fleet, moreover, in two fleets, did not force the responsible leaders to provide them with an elementary parking space.
Until now, one has to listen to the admirals' opinions that the operation of a large ship in the North is some kind of special problem. But why isn't this a problem with icebreakers? What's the question? The fact that the whole huge Russia cannot put up a berth, build a boiler room, a turbo-compressor shop, a water pumping station and an electrical substation next to it. We can build Sochi, we can forward a many-thousand-kilometer pipeline to China, and raise a new cosmodrome in the Far Eastern taiga. But we cannot make a pier. This is undoubtedly an indicator of both the ability to think and the organizational abilities of our people and we should not be indignant, the individuals from the "near-fleet" not from Mars flew to us, and we and they are part of the same society.
But on the other hand, awareness of the problem is the first step towards starting to solve it, we still have no choice. So, in addition to the titanic task of restoring the aircraft carrier, bringing it to a combat-ready state, bringing the training of air regiments to the "world average" level for carrier-based aviation units, we have an even more titanic task - to finally build a pier.
Another problem is the basing of naval air regiments. The complaints of the responsible commanders are usually as follows - the polar night, skills are not trained, it is cold in the Arctic, I don't really want to serve there, because of all this, planes constantly stick out on the "Thread" in Crimea, and in order to train pilots on real campaigns, you have to drive an aircraft carrier as much to the Mediterranean Sea, where it is warm and light.
Here it is worth recalling again about the "Indicator of how well a nation is able to think." The questions that will need to be asked next time in response to such complaints are as follows:
1. Why are naval air regiments not permanently based in some convenient region for service? Aviation is a mobile branch of power, it will take about a day to transfer the OQIAP from, for example, St. Petersburg with its high living standards to Severomorsk. The regiments should simply be removed from the north altogether - if only because this is a front-line zone and by basing them there on a permanent basis, we risk, if something happens, losing the personnel of all naval aviation in the first minutes of the conflict, without having time to transfer a single aircraft to the aircraft carrier, if the aircraft carrier itself will survive such an outbreak of conflict. This consideration alone is enough to "relocate" the naval air regiments to the south, and redeploy them to the ship if necessary.
2. Why is there a drama about the impossibility of conducting combat training during the polar night? The ship is also mobile. It can be transferred to the North Sea, it can be transferred to the Baltic Sea. What prevents, for example, from transferring Kuznetsov to the Baltic, where to receive air regiments, train pilots to take off and land on an aircraft carrier, day and night, and fly in conditions as close as possible to combat conditions - but in a calm Baltic? Sunrises and sunsets, not a polar night? And only then return with already trained personnel to the north, continuing combat training already there? What's the question? The provocativeness of the aircraft carrier's approach to the Baltic? But, firstly, this process can be as open as possible, and secondly,sooner or later they will get used to it, and thirdly, we already have nothing to lose, we are already accused of everything. Baltika is, of course, one of the options, there are others.
One way or another, and the basing of an aircraft carrier in the North is a purely technical problem and it can be solved.
Let's look into the future
Since we also need aircraft carriers, and we can maintain them, it is worth considering the possibility of building new ships of this type. Everything is very complicated here. At the moment, Russia has two factors that strictly limit the construction of aircraft carriers - the presence of an appropriate shipyard and the presence of an appropriate main power plant (GEM). These factors are interconnected.
Currently, Russia has two main options for creating a power plant. The first one is based on gas turbine engines created on the basis of the M-90FRU GTE, but in a cruising rather than afterburner version, optimized for long-term operation. Such a turbine, of course, will have to be created, but not from scratch, but on the basis of a well-known design that is in serial production. How realistic is such a power plant? Will it be enough for an aircraft carrier?
Answer: enough, but easy. Let's take as an example the Indian “Vikrant”, in the creation of which Russia participated. It is equipped with four General Electric LM2500 gas turbine engines with a capacity of 27,500 hp. each - that is, in terms of power, it is an analogue of the M-90FRU, which also has 27,500 hp. Even rough "estimates" show that the exhaust energy from four such turbines is quite sufficient to obtain the required amount of steam for the catapult with the help of the waste heat boiler, and not even one. The Indians, however, do not have it, but a couple of catapults on a ship the size of the "Vikrant" would stand up quite well, and it would greatly increase its efficiency in this case.
A lyrical digression for "beginners": catapults never freeze over, and because of them, nothing freezes on the ship either, planes fly beautifully from aircraft carriers in a cold climate, you were deceived
Thus, Russia has a chance to get the necessary turbine for a light aircraft carrier in five years. The problem may be in the gearbox - no one makes them except the "Zvezda-Reducer", and she assembles each unit for the corvettes for a year, but we have the opportunity to get around this problem - the latest nuclear icebreakers are equipped with a full electric propulsion system, which means Russia technically capable of creating the same for a gas turbine power plant. This removes the problem of gearboxes - they simply won't be there.
The third problem remains - where to build. I must say that everything is not easy with this - the Baltic Shipyard could be reconstructed for such a ship, but the Western high-speed diameter of St. Petersburg and the presence of a pipeline on the seabed seriously limit any ship or vessel under construction there in height (52 meters, no more) and draft (under normal conditions - 9, 8 meters). Theoretically, it is possible to restore the Zaliv plant in Kerch - its dry dock allows you to build a hull for such an aircraft carrier, outside the dock you will have to do some minimal hull work, this can be solved.
But here the questions of the state of the "Gulf" arise, which is banally not ready to build anything more difficult, God forgive the "patrol ship" of project 22160, and the political issue is the passage of the built aircraft carrier through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. This will happen solely on the goodwill of Turkey, which makes the construction of a ship in Crimea extremely risky.
SSK "Zvezda" in Vladivostok is not suitable for reasons of expensive logistics - the delivery of equipment and components there increases the cost of the finished ship by 1, 5-1, 8 times, which is hardly acceptable.
Thus, the fastest option is the reconstruction of the slipway at the Baltic Shipyard, and the creation of a light (40,000 tons) aircraft carrier with gas turbine engines and full electric propulsion (if it is not possible to solve the problem with gearboxes, if possible, then electric propulsion is optional), with a height and draft that allows go to sea from the Baltic shipyard.
As a last resort, the ship can be withdrawn somewhat unfinished, for example, from a dismantled radar station, which would then be installed elsewhere.
But here the problem of our geography arises: in the Barents Sea, where an aircraft carrier will have to carry out combat missions in the event of a war against the territory of our country, there is usually a strong excitement, and a 40,000 ton aircraft carrier is simply too small to provide continuous use of aviation.
Further, the question arises: is it possible, using the developments, for example, of the Krylov State Scientific Center in terms of the contours of the underwater part of ships, various types of roll stabilizers and similar tricks, still "force" a 40 thousand-ton aircraft carrier to follow the wave at least at the level of "Kuznetsov " or not. If not, then the idea is dropped.
And then the question arises differently.
Then you will have to build a ship with a displacement of 70-80 thousand tons and a nuclear power plant. I must say right away - it is quite possible that a nuclear power plant for a ship of this class will be able to be created even easier and faster than a gas turbine - nuclear power plants are produced for icebreakers. And such a ship satisfies the climatic conditions of any potential theater of operations much better than the hypothetical "Russian Vikrant". And it is quite possible to create a carrier-based AWACS aircraft for it, as well as a transport and tanker, and the number of sorties per day from such a ship can be effortlessly provided at the same level as from the Khmeimim airbase.
But if the finished production can be reconstructed under the "Russian Vikrant", then for such a ship it will have to be built - there is no dry dock or slipway for such ships in the European part of Russia. There are no cranes with a lifting capacity of 700-1000 tons, there are not many other things.
And, what is most annoying, they are not needed for anything other than aircraft carriers - Russia will manage with what is there for almost any task of building anything. The infrastructure required for the construction of such a ship is in itself non-repayable - it will only be needed for an aircraft carrier, otherwise you can do without these costs.
This is the situation we are in now.
The "large" frigates of Project 22350M and the modernized nuclear submarines of Project 949AM, which are being created now, will be able to become a fully-fledged escort for the future Russian aircraft carrier. But the future of the aircraft carrier itself is very vague for the above reasons.
And while this is so, it is worth stopping all talk about the alleged write-off of "Admiral Kuznetsov". With all the need for such a class of ships, there will not be alternatives to our one and only aircraft carrier for a very long time.
