Israel's anti-missile defense will "choke" when repelling missile strikes and will collapse at the decisive moment. The reasons for this "ending" were named by the Israeli expert in the field of missile defense systems, Dr. Nathan Faber.
Dr. Nathan Faber, a renowned expert on missile defense systems (ABM), believes that the Israeli missile defense system will not withstand missile strikes in a 20-30 day war. This is stated in a critical article published in Magen LaOref magazine, PostSkriptum reports. Below are the main provisions of the article and very unpleasant conclusions for Israel. (entry)
The expert's opinion is based on the words of Ehud Barak. Earlier, the former defense minister said that on a "typical" day of a war lasting 20-30 days, 50 tons of explosives will detonate in Israel. Approximately this amount of explosives (53 tons) can be carried by 20 ballistic missiles (BR) with 800 kg warheads, 30 BR - 500 kg each, and 1200 Grad-type projectiles - 18 kg each. When asked about Israel's readiness for such a scenario, Faber gives a negative answer, since "everyone knows that Israel will use up its stock of interceptor missiles in the early days of the war."
He came to this conclusion when analyzing the concept of creating a multi-level (layered) Israeli missile defense system, which provides for the combination of anti-missile systems with different capabilities. This presupposes an increase in the efforts of long-range missile defense systems with medium and short-range complexes, subject to effective target allocation to prevent overspending of interceptor missiles. Further, Faber examines the main missile defense assets and their capabilities.
The existing Arrow-2 missile defense system is capable of intercepting mainly Syrian Scud missiles (B, C, D) with a range of 300-700 km. They can be shot down over the territory of Israel and the West Bank of Jordan at an altitude of 30-100 km. The Arrow-3 system under development will be capable of intercepting Iranian Shihab missiles (range of 1300 km) at an altitude of 250-300 km, hundreds of kilometers (over Jordan) from the Israeli border. In the future, Arrow-3 will also have to intercept Sejil missiles with a range of up to 2,000 km.
The Sling of David system (range 70-300 km) is designed to intercept tactical missiles from Syria and Hezbollah (Fateh-100 and M-600) with a range of 200-300 km at altitudes up to 15 km. The last missile defense line will be the Patriot system, which intercepts missiles at an altitude of 10-12 km.
Rocket artillery shells of the Grad type (up to 40 km) and Iranian Fajr missiles (up to 70 km) will be intercepted by the Iron Dome missile defense system at altitudes of 2-3 km directly above the covered object. But, despite the statements of the manufacturer (concern Rafale), the technical capabilities of the system will not ensure the protection of areas adjacent to Gaza. A temporary alternative to the Iron Dome, according to Faber, may be the American naval defense system against Phalanx CIWS anti-ship missiles.
Faber considered that in the next war Israel would be threatened: about 800 Iranian ballistic missiles, about 400 Syrian "Scuds" (some were used in the civil war), 500-1000 tactical missiles "Fateh" and "Fajr" of the Hezbollah movement and more than 100 thousands of rocket artillery shells from Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas. But only a third of these missiles will reach targets in Israel, and the rest will be intercepted by the Israeli Air Force and will not be used for technical reasons, Faber said.
The analyst calculated the total cost of the interceptor missiles, taking into account the fact that two interceptor missiles are needed to reliably defeat the attacking missiles. Thus, to defeat 400 ballistic missiles, it is necessary to have 800-1000 Arrow-2 (3) interceptors worth 2.4-3 billion dollars (one missile costs 3 million dollars). The cost of the required number of missiles of the anti-missile defense system "David's Sling" may amount to 1-2 billion dollars per million dollars per one, and taking into account the costs of deploying the entire system, this amount may double.
The cost of the Iron Dome interceptors could be $ 6 billion at a price of $ 100,000 per missile and the required quantity of at least 30,000 pieces. This does not include the cost of deploying additional batteries of "several hundred thousand dollars each." At the same time, Faber claims that the probability of interception of this system is 66% versus 85% according to the claims of the developers and the military. To justify the latter, that 66% is better than zero, the specialist reasonably states - "The lives of people are saved not by the Iron Dome, but by the bomb shelters in which they hide during a missile attack."
But “it doesn't end there,” writes Faber. In his opinion, ballistic missiles and rockets are being produced today "at an accelerated pace." And in the event of the outbreak of war "not today, but in a few years, we will be faced with an arsenal 2-3 times larger than the current one." From all that was said, Faber drew financial and operational conclusions.
The first, financial, speaks of the need for Israel to have interceptors, which could cost $ 10 billion. The Israeli specialist has no doubts that in the current confrontation, the state is using all the means of protection at its disposal. But the post-war process of restoring stocks may last for several years and will cost at least $ 10 billion. Faber asks: "Can anyone believe in the rationality of an event of this magnitude?" and he himself answers - “Nobody can believe. It's about nonsense."
The second, operational, says that today Israel is not protected from ballistic missiles and "the effectiveness of such protection in the future is questionable." Faber confirms this conclusion by the fact that ballistic missile interception systems have not been tested in combat conditions and their effectiveness has not yet been evaluated. Another negative factor, he considers the construction of a missile defense system based on the fight against missiles such as "Scud", "Shihab" and "Sejil". But today the number of more advanced missiles is constantly growing, which reduces the overall effectiveness of the current Israeli missile defense system. In addition, all known anti-missile tests were conducted in an interceptor versus one attacking missile. Therefore, today no one can assess the possible result and possible behavior of various missile defense systems during the massive use of missiles of various types. And the system "David's Sling" has not yet been tested and its operational capabilities are unknown.
