The Russian army has long ceased to meet modern challenges. This obvious fact has been repeatedly spoken about by both military analysts and representatives of power structures. However, no really serious steps for a large-scale reform have been taken so far. Some external impulse was needed that could force the military department to speed up decision-making on the modernization of the Russian army. And such an impulse really appeared. Moreover, this manifestation took place in those regions where it was least expected. We are talking about North Africa, on the territory of which several bloody coups have taken place at once within one year, with the change of seemingly permanent regimes. It was this North African political-military fever that stirred up our power circles. Immediately, proposals appeared that were aimed at abandoning the archaism of the Russian armed forces and changing the guidelines for further development.
The most daring decision can be considered a project to introduce new military regulations in Russia. It's no secret that everything connected with the army, as usual, turns bronze, grows maturing and is not prone to any changes. The army is such an inert system that making any, even the most modest, changes to it is accompanied by endless agreements, negotiations, orders and cancellations of orders. And now - a real bolt from the blue: Russia is changing military regulations. What will now be contained on the pages of the main military document? The main changes, as it became known from the words of the authors of the new statutory realities, will affect the management of army units. If earlier the chain of subunits looked like “battalion-regiment-division-army”, now it has been decided to completely abolish the regimental component. The chain now looks like battalion-brigade-operational command. Why was it decided to make such epochal changes? The fact is that the long chain of subunits of the Russian armed forces also implies a multi-stage form of transmission of orders from high officials to junior commanders. The new army system, military officials say, will be more adequate to the new challenges. The existence of modern communication systems will allow officers of the battalion level to communicate quickly with the higher command. This is necessary in order to exclude unnecessary intermediate links and increase the mobility of executing orders. At the same time, junior commanders have a relative freedom of action in combat conditions. If earlier every step of the company commander was thought out from above and without an order from the leadership the captain had no opportunity to manage the personnel entrusted to him, then, according to the letter of the new Russian charter, he has such an opportunity. This is easy to illustrate with the following example: during a battle with a terrorist group that has settled in one of the city's basements, now you do not have to consult with the leadership at the moment when the enemy is taking active steps to break through the ring. This will make it possible not only to more adequately withstand the emerging threat, but also to increase the effectiveness of hostilities.
As you can see, the new charter of the Russian army is aimed more at solving local problems. In the old charter, all power was given to high ranks, since the war was seen as a copy of the Great Patriotic War. In those days, it was necessary to think strategically, directing tank units from one front to another, and to think, as they say, on a large scale. New forms of warfare indicate that open conflicts are practically not found today. That is why even a small group of militants can deliver a crushing blow to an entire division. If so, then why use outdated rules of warfare that will definitely not lead to success.
The main provisions of the new charter are already being tested at the ongoing exercises "Center-2011" and "Shield of the Union-2011". The teachings are truly large-scale, and perhaps there is no analogy to them in the recent past. Conducting military operations in the Kazakh water area of the Caspian Sea, at training grounds near Chelyabinsk, Nizhny Novgorod, in the Astrakhan region, near the Tajik-Afghan border and in Kyrgyzstan are designed to unite the armies of the CSTO countries in confronting new global threats. According to the officers and generals participating in the exercises, both Shield and Center are mainly aimed at suppressing rebel groups in localized areas. At the same time, the progress of the exercises can be monitored on special widescreen monitors at the central headquarters of the command of the entire operation. This will make it possible to conduct more operational control over the conduct of certain combat operations, as well as create a unified information and coordination field.
The teachings are held according to new principles. The Central Command does not impose its point of view on commanders who are at the epicenter of events, but allows them to find the most appropriate solutions for a particular task themselves. This can be called the complete opposite of the Soviet method of managing army units. Some oppose such liberalization, but the Chechen wars, as well as the war in Afghanistan, show that the Soviet system of control became obsolete in the 1980s.
According to some experts, such innovations should have been implemented 10-12 years ago. We will count on the fact that innovations in the Russian army will remain not only on paper.
