We live in an era of change. They did not bypass the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the creation of which was announced in 1992. Their construction began with a simultaneous reform. But, as you know, any reform must bring the rebuilt structure to a new, higher quality level. This is the meaning of the reform, otherwise it should not be started.
Have you adopted it without thinking it over?
Unfortunately, over two decades, the Russian army not only failed to improve the quality level, but, on the contrary, began to show signs of failure. This causes serious concern and concern for the fate of the entire military component of the country's security. Our task is to try to understand: what is happening with the army, where did it come and where is it going? Why did the country and the army, which won the most brutal war of the twentieth century, who went through a difficult path from defeats in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War to brilliant victories in a whole series of operations that became classic from the point of view of military art, suddenly abandoned their own invaluable experience and began to borrow the experience of another country - the United States of America. Moreover, to transfer it blindly, in separate fragments, torn out of the system that has developed there.
An illustrative example is the introduction of civilian control over the Armed Forces, which allegedly appeared together with the civilian minister of defense. At the same time, no one was embarrassed by the fact that in the United States there are clearly delineated functions between the civilian minister of defense and the Committee of Chiefs of Staff, whose members are all de facto commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces. This collegial body is in charge of all issues related to the construction and development of the army and navy, which are resolved by the professional military. And the civilian secretary of defense is the liaison between the president and Congress and is mainly involved in the processes of financial support of the adopted weapons programs. In our country, the General Staff remained in the role of executor. In any case, there is no such evidence or public statements by the General Staff leadership with a clear statement of scientific research in the construction and development of the Armed Forces, the expected forecast of their condition.
Take the creation of four United Strategic Commands (West, East, Center, South) on Russian territory instead of six military districts. Here they will again adopt the experience of the United States, where at one time six USCs were formed. But the fact is that four of them are located outside the national territory of America. In the zone of US national interests - Germany, Japan, Korea, Hawaii, the Pacific region. This practice is justified. It makes it possible to use the once and for all established troop command and control system in these theaters of military operations without changing it during the executive period, and to use troops whose training and weapons and military equipment remained in the hands of the most powerful command and control departments of the Armed Forces. By the way, the US Army Directorate has about 2,500 operational personnel. We have, according to the latest data, a little more than 90 people remained in the main command of the Ground Forces.
In the presence of a civilian secretary of defense, the US Armed Forces Service Directorates (regardless of the presence of the USC) also retained the functions of building and developing troops, full responsibility for their condition with complete independence of the technical policy within the allocated budget allocations.
Our USCs, enlarged in composition and territory, located on national territory, and therefore outside the zones of possible military clashes, are responsible for everything and everyone. But without leverage to influence the state of affairs. Other structures and officials will take care of equipping the troops, providing them with material reserves, equipping the control system, but at the same time they will not bear any responsibility, except moral, for the final result. This practice has no perspective.
Or take the example of the reduction in the number of officers. In the American manner, we decided to minimize it to 15 percent of the number of troops. But they did not take into account that the Americans have up to five highly professional contract service sergeants for each officer and commander, who are not inferior in their training and experience, if not superior to the officer corps. Now sergeants in the US Army are represented in all structural divisions, in each type of the Armed Forces. Their career development is due to equal opportunities with officers. In our country, the institution of sergeants exists formally, only on paper.
What did this lead to? With the reduction in the number of officers, an exorbitant burden fell on the remaining junior commanders. The situation of loss of control by subordinates began to mature. This is where you need to look for the reason for the growth of hazing relationships. Nothing and no one, except the commander, will solve this problem: neither the renaming of educational structures, devoid of levers of influence, nor the introduction of the institution of clergy. Moreover, today you will not even find time for these structures to work with people in the typical daily routine of servicemen. Only the commander educates his subordinates in everyday life. This is a single and indissoluble process. Therefore, the commander must be freed from numerous petty tasks, putting trained sergeants interested in the service to help him.
The recent decision to increase the number of officers by 70 thousand people is connected, of course, with this. It is good that the error is recognized and corrected. But there are many such miscalculations. I remember how in 1998 the High Command of the Land Forces was once again abolished. And three years later they restored it again. Interestingly, the abolition and restoration took place under the same leadership of the Ministry of Defense. The act on the restoration of the high command was evidence of the recognition of a major mistake in military development. In any country, such miscalculations are followed by organizational conclusions. With us, it is permissible to experiment without bearing any responsibility. By the way, the idea is now being circulated to again reduce the main commands of the branches of the Armed Forces and form main directorates in their place.
The US Army has a clear system for serving as sergeants. It provides for their career development with intermediate retraining in sergeant schools. Each time they are appointed to a new position, they undergo a training course of 5 to 12 weeks. We do not have a system of career development for sergeants. They are supposed to fulfill their duties only in lower positions: squad leader, tank commander, deputy platoon commander. But then why spend 34 months on their training in higher military educational institutions? This is an impermissible luxury.
This begs the question: if the structure of the American army is so good and it is blindly transferred to our reality, then why does this copying bypass the social package of servicemen? In the transition to US standards, obviously, it is necessary to raise the monetary allowance of our military to the American level, to establish the same benefits (and there are about 100 of them). Pay junior officers from lieutenant to captain inclusive, respectively, from 2.5 to 3.5 thousand dollars. Major - 4.5 thousand dollars. To the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces - 15 thousand dollars. Pay 100 percent compensation for sub-rent housing. Organize trade in goods and food in military camps at prices 10 percent lower than outside the military unit.
A government program is needed
Naturally, the American military does not live in poverty even after going into the reserve. For example, the former military attaché of the US Embassy in Russia, Brigadier General Kevin Ryan, receives a pension of $ 8,500 and continues to work as a teacher at Harvard University.
Previously, the large gap in payment between them and ours was explained by the difference in prices. But now in Russia the cost of consumer goods and food is higher than in the United States. Why, then, the same military work of an officer in our country is paid several times lower than abroad? Why does the country keep the officer corps in a black body, which has always been the mainstay of the state?
It is stated that from January 1, 2012, the platoon commander (lieutenant) will earn from 40 to 80 thousand rubles. That is, someone is 40, and someone is 80? Separation again. Is it really incomprehensible that officers preparing themselves for war should receive the same money for the same job? Tomorrow they may end up in the same trench and what will they figure out there: who received how much and who would be the first to raise people to attack? But what about the motto: perish yourself, but help your comrade out? In the army, where the war is always near, all sorts of carve-ups decompose the military collective.
There is very little objective information about the progress of the reform in our army. In my opinion, its quality is affected by the absence of a state program for reforming the Armed Forces. Unfortunately, all recent and previous programs were of a departmental nature. In addition, they were subjected to subjective interpretation with the change in the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. Judge for yourself. Since 1992, six defense ministers of the Russian Federation and seven chiefs of the General Staff have been replaced. And everyone revised the previous plans. But the main thing is that the departmental program does not allow to involve science with its fundamental research, industry with its defense industries, education, the construction complex for reforming the Armed Forces …
… Official media reports on the reforms being carried out in the Armed Forces are mainly reduced to structural transformations (instead of divisions - brigades), the abandonment of the maintenance of formations and units of reduced strength, the transition to permanent combat readiness structures, methods of staffing the troops with contract soldiers, solving social issues, etc. etc.
Today the strength of the RF Armed Forces is one million. Obviously, for the time being, this will be enough, if we do not take into account the experience of the national tragedy of our people. In my opinion, the country's nuclear missile shield, taking into account which such a number was established, is an important factor of inter-strategic containment only in the political rhetoric of the parties.
More recently, we learned about a threefold increase in the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of the army after the transition to brigade structures. But if so, why not demonstrate these achievements? For example, suddenly raise an alarm on one of the brigades, take them to a training center 20-40 kilometers from the deployment point, and perform firing exercises at battalion tactical exercises. Invite representatives of the media, members of the Public Chamber and the Public Council under the Ministry of Defense, activists of various committees to this event and clearly demonstrate the mobility of the brigade, its controllability, training of personnel, combat equipment, and the state of technology. If the outcome is successful, critical remarks about the Armed Forces of Russia will immediately cease, the authority of the army will become higher.
The officer is not a plasterer
The military education system cannot be ignored either. From the first steps of the reform, they began to talk about the unprofitability of small schools. No one was interested in the fact that they graduated specialists with special qualities and special purposes, whose training requires an individual approach. The enlargement of universities has led to the depersonalization of individuals. And the restructuring of the country according to the laws of the market crippled the spiritual component of the cadets. With the transition to a system of bachelors and masters, the military education system will be completely ruined.
In species academies, students are taught today for two years. No matter how hard we fought to get back to the three-year deadline, nothing came of it. Exactly the same amount of time - two years - is allotted in vocational schools for mastering the craft of a plasterer, turner, and other working specialties. But after all, graduates of military academies have the prospect of growing up to brigade commander inclusive, and in such educational institutions they will train mediocre officers with mediocre results of their work in the troops. The way out of the situation, of course, is to revise the terms of training and increase the study time in favor of the military component.
Officers of all armies of the world once dreamed of studying at the Academy of the General Staff - the training school created there was so effective. But last year only 11 people were recruited from the Armed Forces. This year, apparently, it will be the same. The General Staff refers to an overabundance of command personnel. But what does the command staff have to do with it? I graduated from VAGSh in 1985. At that time, about 70 people were trained on the course, and more than half of them were operator officers assigned to work in the General Staff itself, in the directorates of armies and districts. Not all of them received general's shoulder straps. However, they competently worked on the creation and development of operational plans for the use of troops, were engaged in operational training. Has the need for these officers decreased today? Of course not.
It is clear that many of these problems are not being solved within the walls of the Ministry of Defense, since they go beyond its capabilities. And they require government intervention. It is also clear that any structure cannot reform itself. But after all, there were proposals to create a Main Military Council for Reforms under the chairmanship of the President of the Russian Federation, on an inspection independent of the military department, which would periodically check the real state of the Armed Forces and report on the results to the country's political leadership. Unfortunately, these proposals were not heeded.
