There are many stories and assessments about the tsarist shipbuilding of the late XIX - early XX centuries, both enthusiastic and very impartial. The main complaints about the domestic shipbuilding are the slow speed of ship construction, the low quality of construction and, most importantly, the significant high cost, which forced time after time to turn to foreign countries for help. And somehow these claims settled down and turned into a generally accepted opinion and an axiom that does not need confirmation. And if we approach this issue from a scientific point of view and try to determine: were our shipyards really more expensive to build overseas? Let's try to find out.
Theory
For the convenience of analysis, the article will use a special concept - unit cost, i.e. the cost of a ton of displacement of the ship. This will allow you to compare the "price tags" of ships of different sizes and classes with the greatest accuracy. If possible, for comparison, the "price tags" of foreign "classmates" will be used for each ship separately. Among the entire set of Russian ships, those that were built in the Baltic will be considered. This is due to the fact that the cost of the Black Sea ships also included significant logistics costs, which are absent in the Baltic shipyards and most shipyards in the world (at least on such a scale). Thus, the comparison conditions will be as close to each other as possible, although there will still be certain differences. There will also be some assessment of the pace and quality of construction, but more on this at the end of the article. All calculations regarding both total and unit value of ships will be made in pounds sterling. There are several reasons for this, but the main one is the convenience of comparison with foreign contemporaries and analogues.
The resulting figures for the unit cost of ships may differ from the official ones due to different methods for calculating these same prices. As far as I can tell, the unit cost could have been calculated from the "dry" displacement, normal or full, resulting in different figures per ton for the same cost. In addition, the official unit costs could be calculated both according to the design price tag and displacement, and according to the actual, and in addition to this, there were also two different approaches to determining the cost of a ship - with or without weapons. Within the framework of the current article, only one of the above methods will be used - dividing the total final cost of the ship by the actual normal displacement. This will minimize inconsistencies, although it will not rid us of them at all. In cases where it will be impossible to determine the full cost, this will be discussed separately.
It is especially worth noting that not in all cases it is possible to accurately determine the normal displacement of the ships in question, and in some cases it is not clear whether it is given in "long" tons, or metric. In the case of an unclear normal displacement, this will be indicated separately, but the difference in the cost of ships, depending on the type of tons, may differ by 1.016 times, which is a perfectly acceptable "backlash". In addition, depending on the sources, the figures for the cost of ships may also differ - for Novik alone, I happened to see several distinguishable values, therefore in such cases the choice of certain sources as the main ones remains entirely on the conscience of the author of the article.
State enterprises
State-owned enterprises of the Baltic Sea mean two factories that were the main shipyards of Russia in the region until the very beginning of the 20th century. This is about New Admiralty and Galley Island … Both enterprises were rooted in the times of Peter the Great, and initially were engaged in the construction of a rowing fleet. Of the ships they built, a number of ships can be distinguished that will be useful to us for analysis.
- the first Russian battleship with rapid-fire artillery under smokeless powder, was built at the New Admiralty. The cost of construction is 762.752 pounds, or 87 pounds per ton. However, different sources give different estimates of the displacement figures, therefore, depending on whom to focus on, the unit cost of the Sisoy can also be 73 pounds per ton. For comparison, the French battleship Charles Martel, laid down in 1891, had a unit cost of 94 pounds per ton, and the American Indiana - 121 pounds per ton.
- belonged to the "Poltava" type, was built on Galerny Island. The cost of construction was 991,916 pounds, or 86 pounds per ton. Comparison with analogs will be given below, using the example of "Poltava".
- the strongest battleship of the Baltic coastal defense, the lead ship of the series (although this title is disputed by "Admiral Ushakov"). The cost of construction is 418,535 pounds, the unit cost is about 100 pounds per ton. The comparison will be given below.
… It belonged to the "Admiral Senyavin" class, but had a number of differences, the main of which was 3,254-mm guns instead of 4. It was built at the New Admiralty. The cost of construction is 399.066 pounds, or 96 pounds per ton.
- battleship-cruiser, he is a battleship of the II rank, he is a squadron battleship, belonged to the "Peresvet" type, although it had a number of differences. Built at the New Admiralty. The cost of construction is 1,198,731 pounds, or 83 pounds per ton. The comparison will be given below.
- the head cruiser of the "goddesses" series. It had a significant number of 75-mm anti-mine guns, large size and moderate travel speed. Built on Galerny Island. The cost of construction is 643,434 pounds, or 96 pounds per ton. The much larger British cruiser Diadem had a unit cost of 53 pounds per ton, but excluding weapons. The comparable size German cruiser "Victoria Louise" cost the treasury 92 pounds per ton. The slightly lighter French Juren de la Graviere had a unit cost of £ 85 per tonne. The one-type "Aurora", built at the New Admiralty, cost 93 pounds per ton.
- the lead ship of the largest and most famous series of Russian squadron battleships. It had a high degree of technical complexity, good protection and armament, outstanding survivability. Built at the New Admiralty. The cost of construction is 1.540.169 pounds, or 107 pounds per ton. The single-type "Eagle", built on Galerny Island, had a unit cost of 100 pounds per ton. The ships for comparison are the French Republik (108 pounds per ton), the Italian Regina Elena (89 pounds per ton), the German Braunschweig (89 pounds per ton), the Japanese Mikasa (approximately 90 pounds per ton, exact full cost is unknown). The progenitor of "Borodin" - "Tsarevich", cost 1,480,338 pounds, or 113 pounds per ton.
- a slightly modified cruiser of the "Bogatyr" class, was built at the New Admiralty. The cost of construction is 778,165 pounds, or 117 pounds per ton. For comparison - "Bogatyr" cost 85 pounds per ton.
It is worth noting that most of these ships had some kind of problems with the quality of construction - in particular, the Orel and Borodino suffered from poorly assembled steam engines, and the Oslyabya had a significant overload. In addition, many ships built by state shipyards turned out to be long-term construction (up to 8 years).
Private enterprises
It will be appropriate to walk through private enterprises separately. This will also include formally private enterprises, de facto controlled by the state (we are talking about the Baltic Shipyard). First, let's take Society of Franco-Russian Factories, which rented the territory of state shipyards for the construction of ships.
- was the development of the British battleships "Trafalgar" and "Nile", was considered at the time of laying one of the most powerful in the world, but by the time of entry into service it was morally obsolete. Built at the New Admiralty. In pounds sterling, the ship was worth 837.620 - respectively, the unit cost was 82 pounds per ton. For comparison, the battleship Royal Sovereign, built in Great Britain and laid down in the same year as Navarin, cost 913,986 pounds, or 65 pounds per ton, and the French Brennus had a unit cost of 89 pounds per ton.
- at the time of the laying, a rather powerful type of battleship, well armed and protected, but by the time of entry into service it was morally obsolete. Built by the Society of Franco-Russian factories. The cost of construction is 918.241 pounds, or 80 pounds per ton. The foreign "peer" - the French "Massena", also laid down in 1892 - had a unit cost of 94 pounds per ton.
Next on the list is, of course, Baltic plant, about which you can talk a lot and mostly good. By ships:
- development of the traditional Russian concept of an armored cruiser-raider. The cost of construction was 874.554 pounds, or 75 pounds per ton. Comparison with contemporaries is difficult, because the boom of armored cruisers had not yet come, and quite a few of them were built. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to make a comparison with the Spanish armored cruisers (81-87 pounds per ton), the Italian Marco Polo (71 pounds per ton, but unarmed) and the American New York (67 pounds per ton, unarmed).). Also, I can't help but recall the American armored cruiser, aka the Maine class II battleship, which cost the American taxpayers £ 173 per ton, excluding weapons (the figure is unreliable, perhaps this is the unit cost including weapons).
- the same type as "Admiral Senyavin", although I had some differences (the most significant were the length of the chimneys). The cost of construction is 381,446 pounds, or 82 pounds per ton. For comparison, the same type "Senyavin", built by a state-owned enterprise, cost 100 pounds per ton, and "Apraksin" - 96. It would also not be superfluous to indicate the unit cost of the French BBO "Henri IV", although it was laid down 5 years later and much larger - 91 pounds per ton.
- development of "Rurik" with better characteristics, new artillery and a larger area of armor protection. The cost of construction is 1,140,527 pounds, or 94 pounds per ton. For comparison, the American "Brooklyn" cost the treasury 49 pounds per ton, excluding weapons, and the Spanish "Emperador Carlos IV", devoid of an armored belt, at 81 pounds per ton (excluding numerous alterations that raised additional costs of 1.5-2 million pesetas).
- the founder of a series of battleships-cruisers, and in fact battleships of the II rank. The cost of construction is 1.185.206 pounds, or 86 pounds per ton. For comparison, the Rianaun pledged 2 years earlier had a unit cost of 58 pounds per ton, the modern Majestic for Peresvet - 68 pounds per ton, the German Kaiser Frederick III - 95 pounds per ton, the French Charlemagne - 97 pounds per ton, pledged a year later by the American "Kearsarge" - 100 pounds per ton.
- the development of "Russia", the last ship of its concept. It was built in a record 2, 5 years for its size and with a minimum overload (65 tons). Construction cost - 1,065,039 pounds, unit cost - 87 pounds per ton. For comparison, one can cite the British "Cressy" (65 pounds per ton, but without weapons), the German "Prince Heinrich" (91 pounds per ton), the French "Montcalm" (95 pounds per ton) and the British-Japanese "Asama" (about 80-90 pounds per ton, determining the cost is difficult due to the availability of only an approximate cost of construction).
- slightly improved "Peresvet". The cost of construction is 1,008,025 pounds, or 76 pounds per ton. The same type "Peresvet" and "Oslyabya" turned out to be more expensive (87 and 83 pounds per ton), foreign-built ships were also not very cheap in comparison with the "Pobeda" (German "Wittelsbach" - 94 pounds per ton, British "Formidable" - 76 pounds per ton).
were built over a period of 5 years, and were slightly different in price. Accordingly, their unit cost fluctuated - from 104 pounds per ton for "Alexander" to 101 pounds for "Slava". It would be appropriate to compare these ships (especially "Glory") with the ships laid down in 1902-1903 - "King Edward VII" (94 pounds per ton) and "Deutschland" (91 pounds per ton). The cost of American battleships of this period, alas, was never found.
Also, do not forget about Nevsky Plant, who built rank II cruisers and destroyers.
- the first destroyers ("fighters") of the Russian Imperial Navy. They differed in a relatively low speed with strong hulls. They cost an average of 40.931 pounds, or 186 pounds per ton. For comparison - the head "Falcon" of British construction cost 36 thousand pounds (without weapons), a comparison with other destroyers will be given below.
- development of Sokolov. They were distinguished by their increased size, more powerful armament, and theoretically higher speed. Cost an average of 64.644 pounds apiece, or 185 pounds per ton. For comparison - the British class C destroyers had a unit cost of 175-180 pounds per ton, the Spanish "Furors", built by the British - 186 pounds per ton. It will also be interesting to compare with foreign-built destroyers for the needs of Russia - the British "Catfish" (182 pounds per ton), the German "Kit" (226 pounds per ton), the French "Attentive" (226 pounds per ton).
- development of "Novik" with a lower travel speed, but a stronger hull and an additional pair of 120-mm guns. The cost of construction is 375,248 pounds, or 121 pounds per ton. For comparison - “Novik” cost 352.923 pounds, or 130 pounds per ton, and “Boyarin” - 359.206 pounds, or 112 pounds per ton.
It should also be added that most often private shipyards built ships with a relatively small or even meager overload, the quality of work rarely caused criticism, and most importantly, in the absence of external obstacles (such as constant project adjustments or underfunding), private shipyards were able to build ships at a speed, which was not inferior to the best shipbuilding enterprises in the West. Vivid examples of this are "Pearls" (27 months from the start), "Emperor Alexander III" (41 months), "Prince Suvorov" (31 months), "Thunderbolt" (29 months).
Outcomes
The voiced conclusions are nothing more than my personal opinion, expressed on the basis of the figures voiced above. In fact, these numbers could have been much smaller, but the more numbers, the more accurate the conclusions, and the more weighty the evidence base. So what happened as a result of all this word-and digital-sounding? And it turns out that the generally accepted point of view, which for years was perceived as an axiom, looks shaky in practice and is applicable only in individual cases, when the design of the Russian ship itself implied a significant high cost, or there were some other factors that influenced the final cost. In almost every case, there were both cheaper “peers” and more expensive ones in the world.
However, it should also be understood that the shipyards themselves played a role in pricing, as well as in the quality of construction and timing. And here traditional Russian conservatism showed itself with might and main - and the main forces of the fleet were traditionally built at state-owned enterprises, with significant delays, and without the necessary reorganization, which could significantly speed up and reduce the cost of the process. Something similar to the reorganization began to be carried out during the construction of battleships of the Borodino type, and finished after the end of the RYA, but up to this point, state-owned shipyards in the Baltic, and on the Black Sea, too, were built more expensively, longer, and alas - often of lower quality than private ones. shipyards, for the most part, free from such shortcomings. Even the Franco-Russian plant, about which I had a chance to read a lot of bad news, was able to build the Navarin and Poltava at very average prices, much cheaper than only the products of the world's best British shipyards. Such ships as "Pearl", "Rurik", "goddesses", destroyers of domestic construction were not "expensive" either. Yes, some of them were really expensive, costing a pretty penny to the treasury - but much more expensive, for example, foreign-built destroyers cost the treasury. In some cases, the cost of the ships turned out to be really huge - the same "Oleg", for example, surpassed even "Borodino" in specific cost (but it was also built in the shortest possible time by a state-owned enterprise, which could not but have a price).
Alas, not all claims can be dismissed so easily. The claim for the quality of construction remains valid, albeit with the proviso that mainly state enterprises suffered from this, these problems did not always appear, and this phenomenon was fought and gradually dealt with (as soon as experienced personnel began to be appreciated at state-owned factories, before that there was a constant Labor turnover). Most often, the low quality of construction was expressed in unreliable ship mechanisms and construction overload. The problem of long-term construction also remains valid, which was very characteristic not only of state-owned enterprises, but also of private enterprises in the early 1890s. However, one must understand that this is not only a time of rapid scientific and technological progress, when the initial projects were constantly "killed" by dozens and hundreds of rationalizations and alterations introduced, but also the time of total savings: despite constant growth, the fleet had to save on literally everything, in including stretching the financing of shipbuilding, which was a priority for the fleet, even to the detriment of rearmament. Had the Naval Ministry more freedom with finances, it would have been possible to build ships faster. Plus, we will be a little consolation that the European record for long-term construction belongs not to us, but to the Spaniards - having refused broad support from foreign industry and British capital, they built three cruisers of the Princess de Asturias class at their own state-owned shipyards for 12-14 years.
It is also worth throwing one more stone into the state shipyards of the Russian Empire regarding the cost of construction and the delay in deadlines. The fact is that the "slowness" of state-owned enterprises was typical not only for Russia, but also for other countries of the world. In many ways, these were problems of growth and progress - when, under the new conditions, enterprises continued to work with the old organization, which led to a drop in the speed of construction, a decrease in quality and an increase in cost. Almost all the "old" fleets of the world went through these problems: the Americans suffered from this for some time, the French actively fought against this, the British also had a chance to sip grief, and even after the reorganization, state shipyards often lagged behind private shipyards in terms of productivity. Claims against Russia here may be relevant only in the sense that the much-needed reorganization of state-owned enterprises, such the same cost savings.
As an epilogue to the article, I can only cite a popular expression: everything is learned in comparison. Those who put forward the thesis that construction in Russia under the tsar was more expensive, either did not make such comparisons, or made them superficially, having seen what they wanted. As a result, one more tale was added to the history of the Russian Empire, which does not fully correspond to reality. The other two tales, about the quality and timing of construction, have much more reason to live, but the reality is still much more complicated than the simple theses "in Russia it takes a long time to build" and "in Russia it is of poor quality." At certain times, the same could be said about any other fleet in the world.
