The Russian military has recently begun to sharply criticize the products of the domestic defense-industrial complex. Alexander Postnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, spoke negatively about the T-90 tank. According to him, the T-90 does not meet the modern requirements of the military, and its price is much higher than similar armored vehicles of foreign production. Later Konstantin Makienko, deputy. Director of the Center for Analysis of Technologies and Strategies, suggested that Russia may soon lose its leading position in the international armored vehicle market, if it does not offer its customers truly competitive products. But against the background of all this, a number of well-grounded questions arise. What are Russian tanks criticized for? Are domestically produced tanks really inferior in their technical characteristics to similar NATO and Chinese vehicles? Real prospects for the T-90 in the international market? Will Russia be able to offer foreign customers a modern competitive tank in the near future? For what reason was the project to develop a tank "Object 195" canceled?
The main reason why in Russia today there is even no such thing as a technical assignment for the development of a completely new MBT for the RF Armed Forces is the anti-state approach of most officials to work with the defense industry. The basic principle of work is "give us a completely finished car, and we will think about whether to buy it and pay the costs of its development." Obviously, not a single design bureau will agree to work on such conditions. The country's government is also to blame for the fact that the enterprises of the military-industrial complex have fallen into decay. Today, most of the previously powerful enterprises are on the brink of survival, and what kind of creation of new armored vehicles can we talk about. Each design bureau and each manufacturing plant had its own unique approaches and schools, each had its own advantages. In the event that only one developer remains, only its pluses and its minuses remain, and over time, with the absence of competition in the domestic market, a real danger of degradation may well appear. One can, of course, object to this with an argument about the, one might say, paradoxical situation that was present in the USSR with three main battle tanks of different designs, but with similar characteristics. Of course, this is so, but in that case the problem was largely connected not with the designers, but with the decision-making at the highest level of military-political management.
Many argue that the main problem of domestic tank building is that there is not only a coherent state policy, but the military themselves cannot specifically indicate what they want, what the tank should be in their opinion. In the 1930s and 1940s, there was the USSR, and no matter what or whoever said, wise Stalin, who clearly said, we need new tanks with such and such technical characteristics and indicators. Stalin said - industry made them. It must be admitted that, to our great regret, now the military is far from the same and is completely differently engaged in resolving these issues. Reforming under the control of "effective management" usually boils down to optimizing financial costs, and cost optimization - to reducing the number of equipment under the slogan of quality. When using such approaches, in the near future there will be a large reduction in tank units, including the mobilization stock of tanks in Russia. But this will by no means be accompanied by a transition to a significantly high quality level, on the contrary, the equipment will remain the same, and the personnel will be extremely unmotivated.
Since the Great Patriotic War, the USSR army was built under the significant influence of the theory of deep penetration, preferring the versatility, mobility and reliability of tanks, where they were, perhaps, the main striking force in the ground forces. Unlike the USSR, the smaller armies of NATO countries since the 70s have preferred more expensive and heavier tanks for tactical offensive and fire support.
Remains unclear and the decision to curtail the work on "object 195". Many representatives of the army accuse the creators of the new tank of too long development time, but there is a living example - the T-64 tank. Many people scolded its developers for being innovative, due to which the development took a very long time, the machine was worked out in production for several years. But, as a rule, few people remember that this tank gave a real impetus to the development of enterprises, institutions and entire industries - automated systems, hydraulics, electronics, optics. Why was the T-72 so "easily" created and put into production afterwards? Because there was no need for testing and testing the BKP and the transmission hydraulic system, sighting complexes, surveillance systems and weapons were already there, PAZ and PPO complexes were available.
Of course, the T-90, as the successor to the T-72, is a fine enough machine for any potential theater of operations. But it has significant drawbacks. The existing controllability of the vehicle in motion, the lack of duplication of directional control by other crew members, as well as firing, and an obsolete running gear, which negatively affects firing immediately, does not satisfy modern requirements. The main problem is the practical lack of integration into modern tactical information systems on the battlefield. At the moment, the media is hotly discussing the development of a new tank codenamed "Armat". It is likely that, unlike the completely new Object 195, this will be an evolutionary path that will continue the T-72 line. True, in terms of the level of modernization, this will be a new machine, significantly ahead of both the prototype of the T-72 and its modification of the T-90. At the same time, it is noted that while maintaining the current approach of the political and military leadership to joint work with industry, there are two possible options for the development of tank production. The first option is that by 2015 something really new, modern and truly worthwhile in the form of experimental models will appear in Russia, but there will be no one and nowhere to produce them in the future. The second option - in 2015, a new modification of the existing T-90 - T-90N (N - "with Nourishment") - will be called "Armata", and almost everyone will be happy.
Taking into account the experience of previous years, it is safe to say that "Object 195" could become a really good reason for a breakthrough in many branches of the military-industrial complex. If the effectiveness of the country's management is assessed only by minimizing costs, then the decision taken by the leadership is probably correct, and if it is based on the contribution to the future of the state as the main player in the international armored vehicle market, then it is unlikely. Although, of course, many states live well as raw materials appendages.
In the overwhelming majority of armed conflicts involving American and Soviet technology, the side that used American, often inferior quality technology, won. And victory came not due to the quality and perfection of technology, but due to the ability to coordinate and correctly use its actions, to manage troops and logistics. For example, at the beginning of the Second World War, German tanks were losing to the Soviet ones both in quantity and quality, but at the same time, due to the presence of a professionally trained tank commander, communication systems and a well-oiled command, the Germans achieved victories.
Our commanders are fighting for the fact that they should only be given modern technology - new super-developments, on which a huge amount of money must be spent (and cut off). Is there a need for this? The Americans from 1990 to the present day have not produced a single new main tank of their army - "Abrams"!
It is quite realistic to install on the existing T-80 and T-90 tanks a combat echelon control system, new communication systems, viewing / aiming complexes, etc. Provide active protection for an armored vehicle such as "curtain", "thrush" so that the crew is not in constant fear of the possibility of an ammunition explosion. There are a large number of tanks that not only can, but also need to be upgraded. This is what the Americans and Germans do, who do not develop and manufacture new tanks, but are gradually improving the existing equipment.
Moreover, in the event of a global conflict with NATO or with the same Chinese, tanks are unlikely to play a decisive role. "Heavy artillery" will be used. At the same time, in order to participate in local conflicts similar to the war in Ossetia, why does Russia need a new tank, which in all respects will surpass the German Leopard?
For example, the Omsk Design Bureau has developed a program for the modernization of the mothballed T-54 tanks. According to the plant workers, the output will be a completely new machine, which, in terms of its military potential, will not be inferior to modern tanks. As a result, the Russian army can get a modern combat vehicle at minimal cost.
There is a lot of controversy around the ownership of the copyright for the production of T-brand tanks. According to the Russian side, the copyright belongs to the Ural Design Bureau of Transport Engineering, and in Kharkov, when creating a modern Oplot tank, copyright was practically violated.
In the publication "Fighting vehicles of the Uralvagonzavod. Tank T-72" its authors, based on legal terms, prove that from all that has been said follows "… first of all, that, in accordance with the current international and Russian legislation, all copyrights to the designed in Nizhny Tagil, the T-34-85, T-43, T-44 and T-54 tanks belong only to the modern FSUE Ural Design Bureau of Transport Engineering, created on the basis of department 520 and experimental workshop 540 in the period 1971. Moreover, UKBTM is the legal owner of copyright for combat vehicles T-34-76, BT of all modifications, T-24, that is, for all tanks developed in Kharkov in the 1930s, since legally UKBTM is the direct and immediate successor of the pre-war tank KB of Kharkov plant number 183 ". Of course, from the formal, legal point of view, they are right, but it must be borne in mind that legal assessment is the field of activity of lawyers, and in most cases they are soulless scoundrels. There is a human assessment and not only - there is history. Humanly, the created T-34, T-34-85, T-44 and T-54 are as Nizhny Tagil as they are Kharkov. It's time to admit that this is a common story, and it is simply ugly to take as an example all sorts of fighters for "independence".
But this is all, one might say, lyrics, but what awaits Russia as a state-leader in the sale of armored vehicles in the world? Everybody sells weapons. In the event that Russia refuses this, the vacant place will immediately be taken by others. And above all, it will be immoral only in relation to the families of Russian workers who, as a result of political games, will lose their jobs. Limiting ourselves only to the needs of the army and navy means agreeing that 99% of these current needs will be met by foreign suppliers (for example, the Mistral project). For the most part, the defense industry remains afloat thanks to foreign orders, without them there will be no one to produce weapons and military equipment for the domestic market.
