The orgy of humiliation of the cavalry reached sheer ecstasy in the 90s. Ideological blinders fell, and everyone who was not lazy considered it necessary to demonstrate their "professionalism" and "progressive views." Previously, the well-known Russian researcher of the initial period of the war V. A. Anfilov turned to outright mockery. He writes: "According to the saying" Whoever hurts, he talks about it, "the inspector general of the Red Army cavalry, Colonel-General OI Gorodovikov spoke about the role of cavalry in defense … ". [40 - P.48] Further - more. Having looked through several pages of the same work, we are surprised to read about S. K. Timoshenko at a meeting of the command staff in December 1940 made the following commentary by Viktor Aleksandrovich: “Of course, the former head of a division in the Cavalry Army, Budyonny, could not fail to pay tribute to the cavalry. “The cavalry in modern warfare occupies an important place among the main types of troops,” he declared contrary to common sense, “although little was said about it here, at our meeting (they did the right thing. - Author). In our vast theaters, cavalry will find wide application in solving the most important tasks of developing success and pursuing the enemy after the front has been broken through. " [40 - p.56]
Was there a boy?
The thesis about the overestimation of the role of cavalry in the USSR is simply not true. In the pre-war years, the proportion of cavalry formations was constantly decreasing.
The document that quite unambiguously characterizes the plans for the development of cavalry in the Red Army is the report of the People's Commissar of Defense in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), dated in the fall of 1937, on the long-term plan for the development of the Red Army in 1938-1942. I quote:
a) The composition of the cavalry in peacetime by 1.01.1938. Peacetime cavalry (by 01.01.1938) consists of: 2 cavalry divisions (of which 5 mountain and 3 territorial), separate cavalry brigades, one separate and 8 reserve cavalry regiments and 7 departments of cavalry corps. The number of peacetime cavalry on 01.01.1938–95 690 people.
b) Organizational measures for the cavalry 1938-1942.
In 1938:
a) it is proposed to reduce the number of cavalry divisions by 7 (from 32 to 25), disbanding 7 cavalry divisions using their cadres to replenish the remaining divisions and to strengthen mechanized troops and artillery;
b) to disband the two administrations of the Cav [Alerian] corps;
c) to disband two spare cavalry [Alerian] regiments;
d) in 3 cavalry [Alerian] corps to form one anti-aircraft artillery battalion (425 people each);
e) to reduce the composition of the cavalry division from 6,600 to 5,900 men;
f) to leave the cavalry divisions of the OKDVA (2) in a reinforced composition (6800 people). The number of mountain cavalry divisions should be 2,620 people. " [25 - Book 2, p.536]
The number of directorates of the cavalry corps was reduced to 5, cavalry divisions - to 18 (of which 4 in the Far East), mountain cavalry divisions - to 5 and Cossack (territorial) cavalry divisions - to 2. As a result of the proposed transformations cavalry in peacetime as a result reorganization will be reduced by 57,130 people and will include 138,560 people”(ibid.).
It can be seen with the naked eye that the document consists entirely of proposals of the form "reduce" and "disband". Maybe after 1938, rich in repression in the army.these plans, reasonable from all sides, were consigned to oblivion? Nothing of the kind, the process of disbanding the cavalry corps and reducing the cavalry as a whole went on without stopping.
In the fall of 1939, plans for the reduction of cavalry were put into practice.
The proposal of the People's Commissariat of Defense on November 21, 1939, approved by the government, provided for the presence of five cavalry corps consisting of 24 cavalry divisions, 2 separate cavalry brigades and 6 reserve cavalry regiments. At the suggestion of the NKO on July 4, 1940, the number of cavalry corps was reduced to three, the number of cavalry divisions - to twenty, the brigade remained one and reserve regiments - five. And this process continued until the spring of 1941. As a result, of the 32 cavalry divisions and 7 corps departments available in the USSR by 1938, by the beginning of the war, 4 corps and 13 cavalry divisions remained. Cavalry formations were reorganized into mechanized ones. In particular, such a fate befell the 4th Cavalry Corps, whose command and control and the 34th Division became the basis for the 8th Mechanized Corps. The commander of the cavalry corps, Lieutenant General Dmitry Ivanovich Ryabyshev, led the mechanized corps and led it in June 1941 into battle against German tanks near Dubno.
Theory
The theory of the combat use of cavalry in the USSR was studied by people who looked at things quite soberly. For example, Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, a former cavalryman of the tsarist army who became chief of the General Staff in the USSR. It was he who wrote the theory that became the basis for the practice of the combat use of cavalry in the USSR. It was the work "Cavalry (Cavalry Sketches)" in 1923, which became the first large scientific study on cavalry tactics, published after the Civil War. The work of B. M. Shaposhnikova caused a lot of discussion at the meetings of the cavalry commanders and in the press: whether the cavalry in modern conditions retains its former importance or is it just a "riding infantry".
Boris Mikhailovich quite intelligibly outlined the role of the cavalry in the new conditions and the measures for its adaptation to these conditions:
“The changes introduced under the influence of modern weapons in the activities and organization of the cavalry are as follows:
In tactics. The modern power of fire made it extremely difficult to conduct equestrian combat with cavalry, reducing it to exceptional and rare cases. A normal type of cavalry battle is a combined battle, and the cavalry should not wait for action exclusively in the equestrian formation, but, starting up a rifle battle, must conduct it with full tension, trying to solve the problems if the situation is not favorable for the production of horse attacks. Horse and foot fighting are equivalent methods of action for cavalry today.
In strategy. The power, destructiveness and range of modern weapons made the operational work of the cavalry difficult, but did not diminish its importance, and, on the contrary, in it they open up a true field of successful activity for the cavalry as an independent branch of troops. However, the successful operational work of the cavalry will be possible only when the cavalry, in its tactical activity, shows independence in solving tasks in accordance with the current situation of combat, without deviating from decisive actions on foot.
In the organisation. The fight against modern weapons on the battlefield, bringing that in the cavalry closer to infantry operations, requires a change in the organization of the cavalry closer to the infantry, outlining the numerical increase in cavalry formations and the division of the latter for foot combat similar to that adopted in infantry units. Giving the cavalry infantry units, even if they move quickly, is a palliative - the cavalry must independently fight the enemy's infantry, gaining success on their own, so as not to limit their operational mobility.
Armed. The modern power of firearms to fight them requires the presence of the same powerful firearms in the cavalry. Because of this, the "armored cavalry" of our day must adopt rifles with a bayonet, similar to infantry ones, a revolver, hand grenades and automatic rifles; to increase the number of machine guns in both divisional and regimental commands, to strengthen artillery, both in number and in caliber, by introducing a howitzer and anti-aircraft guns; reinforce yourself by adding auto-armored means with cannons and machine guns, light vehicles with the same means of fire, tanks and the assistance of the fire of air squadrons. " [41 - P.117]
Note that the opinion expressed in hot pursuit after the Civil War (1923) was in no way influenced by the euphoria from the use of cavalry in 1918-1920. The missions and scope of the cavalry are clearly delineated and defined.
The opinion of S. M. Budyonny, often represented as a hardened stupid cavalryman, an enemy of the mechanization of the army. In fact, his position on the role of cavalry in the war was more than balanced:
“The reasons for the rise or decline of the cavalry should be sought in relation to the basic properties of this type of troops to the basic data of the situation in a certain historical period. In all cases, when the war acquired a maneuverable character and the operational situation required mobile troops and decisive actions, the horse masses became one of the decisive elements of the armed force. This is manifested by a certain regularity throughout the history of the cavalry; as soon as the possibility of a maneuver war developed, the role of the cavalry immediately increased and one or another operation was completed with its blows. " [42 - P.180]
Semyon Mikhailovich points to the field of application of cavalry - mobile warfare, conditions for which may arise at any stage in the historical development of tactics and technology. The cavalry for him is not a symbol taken from the Civil, but a means of warfare that meets modern conditions:
"We are stubbornly fighting for the preservation of a powerful independent Red Cavalry and for its further strengthening solely because a sober, real assessment of the situation convinces us of the undoubted need to have such a cavalry in the system of our Armed Forces." [42 - P.181]
No exaltation of the cavalry is observed. "The horse will still show itself" is the result of an analysis of the current state of the Armed Forces of the USSR and its potential opponents.
What do the documents say?
If we turn from theoretical research to documents, the preferred course of action of the cavalry becomes quite unambiguous. The cavalry combat manual prescribed an offensive in horse formation only if "the situation is favorable (there is cover, weakness or absence of enemy fire)." [43 - Part 1, P.82] The main program document of the Red Army of the 30s, the Field Regulations of the Red Army in 1936 read: “The power of modern fire often requires cavalry to conduct foot combat. Therefore, the cavalry must be ready to operate on foot. " [44 - P.13] Almost word for word, this phrase was repeated in the Field Regulations of 1939. As we can see, in the general case, the cavalrymen had to attack on foot, using the horse only as a vehicle.
Naturally, new means of struggle were introduced into the rules for the use of cavalry. The field manual of 1939 indicated the need to use cavalry in conjunction with technical innovations:
“The most expedient use of cavalry formations together with tank formations, motorized infantry and aviation is in front of the front (in the absence of contact with the enemy), on the approaching flank, in the development of a breakthrough, behind enemy lines, in raids and pursuit. Cavalry units are able to consolidate their success and hold the terrain. However, at the first opportunity, they should be freed from this task in order to keep them for maneuver. The actions of the cavalry unit must in all cases be reliably covered from the air. " [45 - p.29]
Practice
Maybe all these phrases have been forgotten in practice? Let's give the floor to the veteran cavalrymen. Ivan Aleksandrovich Yakushin, lieutenant, commander of the anti-tank platoon of the 24th Guards Cavalry Regiment of the 5th Guards Cavalry Division, recalled:
“How did the cavalry act in the Patriotic War? Horses were used as a means of transportation. There were, of course, battles in the equestrian formation - saber attacks, but this is rare. If the enemy is strong, sitting on a horse, it is impossible to cope with him, then the command is given to dismount, the breeders take the horses and leave. And the horsemen work like infantry. Each horse breeder took five horses with him and took them to safety. So there were several horse breeders per squadron. Sometimes the squadron commander said: "Leave two horse breeders for the entire squadron, and help the rest in a chain." The machine-gun carts preserved in the Soviet cavalry also found their place in the war. Ivan Aleksandrovich recalls: “Cars were also used only as a means of transportation. During horse attacks, they really turned around and, like in the Civil War, they were scalded, but this was infrequent. […] And as soon as the battle began, the machine gun was removed from the carriage, the horse breeders took the horses away, the carriage also left, but the machine gun remained”.
N. L. Dupak (8th Guards Cavalry Rivne Red Banner Order of Suvorov, Morozov Division) recalls:
“I went to the attack in the cavalry formation only in the school, and so to chop - no, and I did not have to meet with the enemy's cavalry. There were such learned horses in the school that, even after hearing a pitiful "hurray", they were already rushing forward, and only hold them back. Snoring … No, I didn't have to. They fought on dismounted. The breeders took the horses to shelters. True, they often paid dearly for this, since the Germans sometimes fired at them from mortars. There was only one horse breeder for a squad of 11 horses. " [46]
Tactically, the cavalry was closest to the motorized infantry units and formations. Motorized infantry on the march moved on cars, and in battle - on foot. At the same time, no one tells us scary tales about trucks with infantrymen ramming tanks and bumping bumpers into Krupp's steel. The mechanism of the combat use of motorized infantry and cavalry in World War II was very similar. In the first case, the infantrymen disembarked from the trucks before the battle, the drivers drove the vehicles to cover. In the second case, the cavalrymen dismounted, and the horses were driven back to cover. The field of application of the attack in the equestrian formation was reminiscent of the conditions for using armored personnel carriers like the German "ganomag" - the enemy's fire system was upset, his morale was low. In all other cases, cavalry in horse formation and armored personnel carriers did not appear on the battlefield. And the Soviet cavalrymen with their sabers bald, and the Germans attacking on coffin-like "ganomag" are nothing more than a cinematic cliché. Armor armored personnel carriers were designed to protect against fragments of long-range artillery at their initial positions, and not on the battlefield.
1941 Bird Phoenix of the Red Army
After all the reductions, the cavalry of the Red Army met the war in 4 corps and 13 cavalry divisions. The 1941 cavalry divisions had four cavalry regiments, a horse-artillery division (eight 76-mm cannons and eight 122-mm howitzers), a tank regiment (64 BT tanks), an anti-aircraft division (eight 76-mm anti-aircraft guns and two batteries of anti-aircraft machine guns), a communications squadron, a sapper squadron, and other rear units and institutions. The cavalry regiment, in turn, consisted of four saber squadrons, a machine-gun squadron (16 heavy machine guns and four 82-mm mortars), regimental artillery (four 76-mm and four 45-mm guns), an anti-aircraft battery (three 37-mm guns and three quadruple "maxims"). The total staffing of the cavalry division was 8,968 people and 7,625 horses, the cavalry regiment, respectively, 1,428 people and 1506 horses. The cavalry corps of the two-divisional composition roughly corresponded to the motorized division, having a slightly lower mobility and less weight of an artillery salvo.
In June 1941, the 5th Cavalry Corps was deployed in the Kiev Special Military District as part of the 3rd Bessarabian them. G. I. Kotovsky and the 14th named after Parkhomenko cavalry divisions, in the Odessa district there was the 2nd cavalry corps as part of the 5th named after. M. F. Blinov and the 9th Crimean Cavalry Divisions. All these formations were old formations of the Red Army with stable combat traditions.
The cavalry corps turned out to be the most stable formations of the Red Army in 1941. Unlike the mechanized corps, they were able to survive in endless retreats and encirclements in 1941. P. A. Belova and F. V. Kamkov became the "fire brigade" of the South-West direction. The first one later took part in an attempt to unblock the Kiev "boiler". Guderian wrote the following about these events:
“On September 18, a critical situation developed in the Romny area. Early in the morning, the noise of battle was heard on the eastern flank, which became more and more intense during the following time. Fresh enemy forces - the 9th Cavalry Division and another division, together with tanks - advanced from the east to Romny in three columns, approaching the city at a distance of 800 m. the enemy was advancing, the 24th Panzer Corps was instructed to repel the enemy's advance. To accomplish this task, the corps had at its disposal two battalions of the 10th motorized division and several anti-aircraft batteries. Due to the superiority of enemy aircraft, our aerial reconnaissance was in a difficult condition. Lieutenant Colonel von Barsewisch, who personally flew out for reconnaissance, barely escaped the Russian fighters. This was followed by an enemy air raid on Romny. In the end, we still managed to keep in our hands the city of Romny and the forward command post. […] The threatened situation of the town of Romny forced me on September 19 to transfer my command post back to Konotop. General von Geyer made it easier for us to make this decision with his radiogram, in which he wrote: "The transfer of the command post from Romna will not be interpreted by the troops as a manifestation of cowardice on the part of the command of the tank group." [37 - P.299-300]
This time, Guderian shows no undue contempt for the attacking cavalry. Romny was not the last battle of the 2nd Cavalry Corps. In late autumn 1941, P. A. Belova played an important role in the Battle of Moscow, where he received the rank of Guards.
At the beginning of July 1941, the formation of the 50th and 53rd cavalry divisions began in the camps near the village of Urupskaya and near Stavropol. The main personnel of the divisions were conscripts and volunteers of the Kuban villages of Prochnokopskaya, Labinskaya, Kurgannaya, Sovetskaya, Voznesenskaya, Otradnaya, Terek Cossacks of the Stavropol villages Trunovskoye, Izobilnoye, Ust-Dzhegutinskoye, Novo-Mikhailovskoye, Troitskoye. On July 13, 1941, loading into echelons began. Colonel Issa Aleksandrovich Pliev was appointed as the commander of the 50th division, and the brigade commander Kondrat Semenovich Melnik of the 53rd. On July 18, 1941, the divisions unloaded at Staraya Toropa station, west of Rzhev. Thus began the history of another legendary cavalry corps - the 2nd Guards L. M. Dovator.
Not only proven formations with long-standing combat traditions won guards ranks, but also newly formed corps and divisions. The reason for this, perhaps, should be sought in the level of physical training required for every cavalryman, which inevitably had an impact on the moral qualities of a soldier.
1942 Instead of a breakthrough - a raid
In the winter campaign of 1942, the newly formed cavalry divisions were actively used in battles. A typical example is the battles in the southern sector of the front. E. von Mackensen, who fought there, later recalled:
“At the time of taking command of the group in Stalino on the afternoon of January 29, the enemy was already dangerously close to the Dnipropetrovsk-Stalino railway and thus to the vital (since it was the only) railway supply line of the 17th Army and the 1st Panzer Army. Based on the circumstances, initially it could only be about keeping the necessary communications and organizing the first defense. " [48 - S.58]
Only in the course of a stubborn struggle against the throwing of sappers from the pontoon battalions into battle did the Germans manage to resist. His opponent was almost one cavalry: "The corps in the past eight weeks of battles fought with the Russian 9 rifle, 10 cavalry divisions and 5 tank brigades." [48 - S.65] The German commander in this case is not mistaken, he really opposed more cavalry than rifle divisions. The divisions of the 1st (33rd, 56th and 68th), 2nd (62nd, 64th, 70th) and 5th (34th, 60th) fought against the von Mackensen compound. I, 79th) Cavalry Corps, as well as the 30th Separate Cavalry Division of the Southern Front. The reasons for such a widespread use of cavalry in the battle of Moscow are quite obvious. At that time, there were simply no large mobile units in the Red Army. In the tank forces, the largest unit was the tank brigade, which could be used operatively only as a means of supporting the infantry. The unification under one command of several tank brigades, recommended at that time, also did not give a result. Cavalry was the only means of deep engagement and detours.
According to the same scenario, the introduction of cavalry into a deep breakthrough, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps of P. A. Belova. The ups and downs of the actions of the Western Front in the winter of 1942 are fairly well covered in the memoir and historical literature, and I will only allow myself to draw attention to a few important details. Belov's group was given really large-scale tasks. The directive of the command of the Western Front of January 2, 1942 stated:
"A very favorable situation was created for the encirclement of the 4th and 9th enemy armies, and the main role should be played by the Belov strike group, operatively interacting through the front headquarters with our Rzhev grouping." [TsAMO. Form 208. Op. 2513. D.205. L.6]
However, despite the losses incurred during the Soviet counteroffensive in December 1941, the troops of Army Group Center remained manageable.
The breakthroughs, in which the cavalry corps entered, and then the 33rd army, were closed by the Germans by flanking attacks. In fact, the encircled troops had to go over to semi-partisan actions. The cavalrymen in this capacity acted quite successfully. Belov's group received an order to enter its units only on June 6 (!!!) 1942. Partisan detachments, of which P. A. Belov formed rifle formations, again split into separate detachments. The mobility of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, supported by horses, played an important role in the general development of events. Thanks to this building, P. A. Belov managed to get to his own not the shortest way, breaking through the Germans' barrier with his forehead, but in a roundabout way. On the contrary, the 33rd Army of M. G. Efremova, not possessing the maneuverable capabilities of the cavalrymen, in April 1942 was defeated while trying to break through to her own in the zone of the 43rd Army. Horses were transport and, as cynical as it sounds, self-moving food supplies. This ensured greater stability of the cavalry in the not always successful offensive operations of 1942.
1942 Stalingrad - a forgotten feat of the cavalry
The Battle of Stalingrad became one of the decisive battles of World War II, the name of the city on the Volga became known to the whole world. The cavalry corps played a role in the offensive phase of the Battle of Stalingrad that cannot be overestimated. In any encirclement operation, it is required not only to cut off the path to retreat and the supply line to those surrounded, but to ensure the outer front of the ring. If you do not create a strong external front of the encirclement, then by blows from the outside (usually an external bypass with mechanized formations), the enemy can unblock the encircled, and all our efforts will go to waste. They break through behind the backs of those surrounded as deep as possible into the rear of the enemy, seize key positions and take up defensive positions.
At Stalingrad in November 1942, this role was assigned to three cavalry corps. The choice fell on the cavalry, since the Red Army at that time had few well-trained mechanized formations. It must be said that the terrain in the Stalingrad region was not favorable for the use of cavalry. Large forests, in which horsemen usually took refuge, were absent. On the contrary, the open terrain allowed the enemy to influence the cavalry corps with aviation.
The heaviest battles fell to the lot of the 4th Cavalry Corps. In an ironic twist of fate, he was the least equipped with men and equipment of all three involved in the operation. The corps arrived in the concentration area after a long march (350–550 km). In parentheses, we note that the same march for a tank formation in the same period would have ended with a massive breakdown of tanks even before they were put into battle. According to the decision of the front command, two mobile units were to be introduced into the breakthrough in a train: the 4th Mechanized Corps, and the 4th Cavalry Corps was to follow on its heels. After entering the breakthrough, the paths of the mechanized and cavalry corps diverged. The cavalrymen turned south to form an external encirclement front, the tankmen moved towards the shock grouping of the Don Front to close the ring behind Paulus's army. The cavalry corps was introduced to the breakthrough on November 20, 1942. The Romanian units were the enemy of the horsemen, and therefore the first target - Abganerovo - was captured on the morning of November 21 by an attack in horse formation.
At the station, large trophies were taken, more than 100 guns, warehouses with food, fuel and ammunition were seized. The losses of the corps were scanty in comparison with the results achieved: the 81st division lost 10 people killed and 13 wounded, the 61st - 17 people killed and 21 wounded. However, the next task assigned to the 4th Cavalry Corps - to capture Kotelnikovo - required to overcome 95 km in a day, which is a non-trivial task even for a mechanized formation. This rate of advance was actually achieved, perhaps, only by the motorcycle units of the Germans in the summer of 1941. On the morning of November 27, the 81st Cavalry Division reached Kotelnikov, but could not capture the city on the move. Moreover, here the cavalrymen were in for an unpleasant surprise in the face of the fresh 6th Panzer Division arriving by rail from France. In Soviet literature, divisions from France often appeared on the battlefield, out of nowhere, but in this case everything is absolutely reliable. At the end of November 1942, the 6th Panzer Division arrived at Kotelnikovo on November 27 after rest and manning in France (the division suffered heavy losses in the winter of 1941-1942). After completing and re-equipping the 6th Panzer Division, it was a serious force. In November 1942, the division included 159 tanks (21 Pz. II, 73 Pz. III with a long-barreled 50-mm cannon, 32 Pz. IIIs with a short-barreled 75-mm cannon, 24 Pz. IV With a long-barreled 75-mm cannon and 9 command tanks). The overwhelming majority of the division's tanks were of the newest designs, capable of withstanding the T-34.
In fact, the Soviet 4th Cavalry Corps found itself in an extremely piquant situation. On the one hand, the formation of an external front of encirclement required our cavalrymen to go on the defensive. On the other hand, this allowed the Germans to freely accumulate people and equipment of the 6th Panzer Division unloading at railway stations in the Kotelnikov area, or even simply in the steppe from platforms. First, the command issued an order to attack. At 21.15On November 29, the commander of the cavalry corps received a second cipher telegram from the headquarters of the 51st Army: “Continue the battle for Kotelnikovo all the time. Until 12.00 30.11 bring up the artillery, conduct a reconnaissance. Enemy attack in Kotelnikovo at 12.00 30.12.42.
But on November 30, the commander of the 51st Army N. I. Trufanov suspended the operation, ordering units of the 4th Cavalry Corps to stand on the defensive, conduct reconnaissance to the west and south, deliver fuel and prepare for the capture of Kotelnikov.
Until December 2, parts of the corps strengthened the occupied lines, brought up fuel. The enemy pulled up reserves and fortified Kotelnikovo, Semichny, Mayorsky, Pokhlebin. At 3 o'clock on December 2, an order was received from the commander of the 51st Army:
“The 4th cavalry [Alerian] corps (without the 61st [avalerian] d [Ivisia]) with the 85th t [ankov] br [igada], covering itself from the river. Don, by 11.00 on 2.12 to reach the line Mayorsky - Zakharov and by the end of 2.12 to seize the western part of Kotelnikov. One reinforced regiment to take possession of the Meliorativny patrol. Having mastered Kotelnikov, develop a strike along the railway to Dubovskoye. To the left comes the 302nd S [trelkovaya] d [Ivisia], which by the end of December 2 should capture the eastern part of Kotelnikov."
The corps commander responded by informing the 51st Army commander about the lack of fuel in the 85th Tank Brigade. N. I. Trufanov on December 2 ordered "to suspend the action of the order for the capture of Kotelnikov until further notice."
On December 2 and 3, parts of the corps and the 85th Tank Brigade were refueled to one refueling. The headquarters of the 51st Army transmitted the order: in the morning of December 3, to begin to carry out the order of the army commander from December 1 to capture Kotelnikov.
This delay was truly fatal. The commander of the 6th Panzer Division, Erhard Raus, later recalled: “I could not understand why the Russians stopped their advance as soon as the first German units arrived, despite the fact that they had an order to capture Kotelnikovo. Instead of immediately attacking while they still had a quantitative advantage, the Russians passively watched the accumulation of our forces in the city. " [50– P.144]
Finally, on December 3, the 4th Cavalry Corps (without the 61st Cavalry Division of Y. Kuliev), reinforced by the 85th Tank Brigade and the Katyusha Guards Mortar Division, set out from the occupied area. At 7 o'clock, the advance units of the 81st Cavalry Division met stubborn resistance in the Pokhlebin area, but threw back the enemy and captured the village. According to German data, the losses of the attackers amounted to six tanks at the cost of completely destroying a platoon of the latest 75-mm anti-tank guns. A cavalry division with reinforcements crossed the Aksai River and moved south in order to reach Kotelnikov from the rear. But further attempts to attack were repulsed by the enemy. By that time, prisoners from the 6th Panzer Division were at the disposal of the Soviet command, indicating the arrival of this unit from France.
Assessing the situation and fearing the encirclement of the 81st division in the Pokhlebin area, the commander of the 4th cavalry corps, Major General Timofei Timofeevich Shapkin, asked the commander of the 51st army to withdraw the corps. The commander of the 51st Army ordered: “To carry out the previously assigned task, having captured Mayorsky, Zakharov, Semichny before dawn. The beginning of the offensive - 7.00 on 4.12.42.
The corps commander could not make a secondary report on the morning of December 4 to the commander of the 51st Army about the need to withdraw, since neither commander General N. I. Trufanov, nor the chief of staff of Colonel A. M. Kuznetsov was not there. As early as 19:00 on December 3, the corps units received an order to continue the offensive. But by that time, the Germans managed to concentrate sufficient forces for a counterattack, and accumulated on the flanks of the Soviet cavalry that had broken through into the depths of their defenses. In fact, a full-blooded tank division lined up around a cavalry division reinforced with artillery, possessing both qualitative and quantitative superiority. Already at 10 o'clock on December 4, they opened high-density artillery fire. In the middle of the day, all 150 tanks of both tank battalions of the 6th Panzer Division with the infantry of the 2nd Battalion of the 114th Motorized Infantry Regiment on the Ganomag armored personnel carrier attacked the location of the 81st Cavalry Division in the Pokhlebin area. All artillery took part in repelling the tank attack, including the 1113th anti-aircraft artillery regiment that arrived at night, as well as anti-tank rifles.
By 14:00 the 81st Cavalry Division was completely surrounded, the tanks and motorized infantry of the Germans began to squeeze the resulting "cauldron". The cavalrymen fought throughout the day, and with the onset of darkness they began to make their way out of the encirclement in small groups.
Subsequently, Erhard Routh described the battle of his 6th Panzer Division with the surrounded 81st Cavalry Division and 65th Armored Brigade:
“By 10.00 the fate of the IV Cavalry Corps was decided. There were no longer any ways to retreat, despite this, the surrounded enemy offered fierce resistance for several hours. Russian tanks and anti-tank guns fought the companies of the 11th Panzer Regiment rolling down the hills. The stream of tracers of armor-piercing shells continuously swept up and down, but soon more and more tracers flew down and less and less in response to them from below. One volley after another fell on Pokhlebin, raising the sultans of the black earth. The city began to burn. A sea of fire and smoke hid the terrible end of the brave garrison. Only a few shots of anti-tank guns were met by our tanks entering the city. The grenadiers following our tanks were forced to use hand grenades to break the resistance of the enemy, who fought hard for every house and trench. " [50– P.150–151]
The losses of the 11th Panzer Regiment of the 6th Panzer Division amounted to 4 tanks, irretrievably lost (plus one more, destroyed before December 3), and 12 temporarily out of order.
The losses of the 81st cavalry division in the battle at Pokhlebin in killed, wounded and missing amounted to 1,897 people and 1,860 horses. Parts of the division lost fourteen 76, 2-mm guns, four 45-mm guns, four 107-mm mortars, eight 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. The division commander, Colonel V. G. Baumstein, chief of staff, colonel Terekhin, chief of the political department, regimental commissar Turbin. All this happened a few days before the events described in Bondarev's "Hot Snow". Despite the tragic outcome of the battles for Kotelnikovo, Soviet cavalrymen played an important role in the initial stage of the defensive battle against attempts to unblock Paulus's army. The 81st Cavalry Division waged an isolated battle in the depths of the enemy's formation, 60–95 apart from the neighbors against a large reserve of Germans. If it did not exist, nothing prevented Routh's 6th Panzer Division from wasting time and, already with the arrival of the first echelons, to move closer to Stalingrad, unloading at stations north of Kotelnikov. The presence of the Soviet cavalry forced to pause for the period of arrival of the main forces of the division in Kotelnikovo and then spend time on defensive and then offensive battle with it.
Only on December 12, German troops, with the main forces of their Kotelnikovskaya grouping, went over to a counteroffensive in order to break through from the south-west the encirclement ring, compressing the 6th army of F. Paulus at Stalingrad. In the period 12-17 December, the 4th Cavalry Corps, together with other formations of the 51st Army, provided the concentration of the 2nd Guards Army with heavy battles.
Despite the lengthy story about "Cannes at Pokhlebin", the commander of the 6th Panzer Division, Routh, seriously assessed the threat from the remnants of the 4th Cavalry Corps:
“It was also impossible to ignore the remnants of the 4th cavalry corps, concentrated in the area of Verkhne-Yablochny and Verkhne-Kurmoyarsky (on the flank of the 6th tank division. - AI). In our estimation, it was dismounted cavalry, reinforced by 14 tanks. These forces were not enough for a tank division, but they threatened our supply lines. " [50– P.157]
It so happened that the feat of the 2nd Guards Army on the Myshkovka River was glorified many times in literature and on the movie screen. The actions of those who ensured the deployment of the 2nd Guards Army, unfortunately, remained unknown. To the greatest extent, this applied to the cavalry, in particular the 4th Cavalry Corps. Therefore, for many years the cavalry bore the stigma of an outdated and non-pathos type of troops. Without him, in fact, the encirclement of Paulus's army at Stalingrad could fail.
1945 The last battle
The cavalry found a use even in such a fortified area as East Prussia. Here is what K. K. Rokossovsky: “Our horse corps N. S. Oslikovsky, rushing forward, flew into Allenstein (Olsztyn), where several echelons with tanks and artillery had just arrived. With a dashing attack (of course, not in horse ranks!), Stunning the enemy with the fire of guns and machine guns, the cavalrymen captured the echelons. It turns out that the German units were relocated from the east to close the gap made by our troops. " [52 - P.303] We see that Konstantin Konstantinovich, just in case, for hearing enough stories about checkers on Krupp's armor, specifies - “not in horse ranks”, with an exclamation mark. Indeed, the already familiar 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps was brought in after breaking through the enemy's defenses and moved to Allenstein on horseback, then joining the battle on foot. From the air, the body of N. S. Oslikovsky was supported by the 230th Assault Aviation Division, covered by the 229th Fighter Aviation Division. In short, the cavalry corps was a full-fledged mobile unit, the "obsolescence" of which consisted only in the use of horses instead of cars.
German cavalry
The motorization of the Wehrmacht is usually greatly exaggerated, and worst of all, they forget about the purely cavalry units that existed in every infantry division. This is a reconnaissance detachment with a staff of 310 people. He almost completely moved in horse ranks - it included 216 riding horses, 2 motorcycles and only 9 cars. The divisions of the first wave also had armored cars, in general, the reconnaissance of the Wehrmacht infantry division was carried out by a completely ordinary cavalry squadron, reinforced with 75-mm light infantry and 37-mm anti-tank guns.
In addition, there was one cavalry division in the Wehrmacht at the start of the war with the USSR. In September 1939, she was still a cavalry brigade. The brigade, included in the Army Group North, participated in the battles on Narew, the storming of Warsaw in mid-September 1939. Already in the fall of 1939 it was reorganized into a cavalry division and, in this capacity, participated in the campaign in the West, ending it on the coast Atlantic. Before the attack on the USSR, she was included in the 2nd Panzer Group of Heinz Guderian. The division operated quite successfully in conjunction with tank formations, maintaining their rate of advance. The only problem was supplying her 17,000 horses. Therefore, it is in the winter of 1941-1942. was reorganized into the 24th Panzer Division. The revival of cavalry in the Wehrmacht took place in the middle of 1942, when one cavalry regiment was formed as part of the Army Groups North, Center and South.
A feature of the regiment's organization was the presence in its composition of an armored battalion with a company of motorized infantry for 15 half-track armored personnel carriers "ganomag". In addition, by the middle of 1942, cavalry appeared among the troops who are usually associated with the "tigers" and "panthers" - the SS.
Back in 1941, the 1st SS Cavalry Brigade was formed in Poland, deployed by the summer of 1942 into the 1st SS Cavalry Division. This division took part in one of the largest battles of Army Group Center - repelling the Soviet offensive in the Rzhev area, conducted as part of Operation Mars in November-December 1942. The appearance of the "tigers" and "panthers" did not lead to the destruction of the German cavalry …
On the contrary, in 1944, separate army cavalry regiments were reorganized into the 3rd and 4th cavalry brigades. Together with the 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division, they formed the Von Hartenek Cavalry Corps, which took part in the battles on the border of East Prussia, in December 1944 it was transferred to Hungary. In February 1945 (!!! - AI) the brigades were reorganized into divisions, and in March of the same year they took part in the last offensive of the German troops in World War II - the counterstrike of the SS Panzer Army at Lake Balaton. In Hungary, two SS cavalry divisions also fought - the 8th "Florian Geyer" and the 22nd "Maria Theresia", formed in 1944. Both of them were destroyed in the "cauldron" near Budapest. From the remnants of the divisions that jumped out of the encirclement in March 1945, the 37th SS Cavalry Division "Lyuttsov" was formed.
As we can see, the Germans did not disdain such a kind of troops as the cavalry. Moreover, they ended the war with several times more cavalry units at their disposal than at the beginning.
***
The stories about stupid, backward cavalrymen throwing swords at tanks are, at best, a delusion of people who are poorly versed in tactical and operational issues. As a rule, these delusions are a consequence of the dishonesty of historians and memoirists. The cavalry was a completely adequate means of maneuvering combat operations in 1939-1945. This was most clearly demonstrated by the Red Army. The cavalry of the Red Army in the pre-war years underwent a sharp reduction. It was believed that she could not seriously compete with tank and motorized formations on the battlefield. Of the 32 cavalry divisions and 7 corps directorates available by 1938, 4 corps and 13 cavalry divisions remained by the beginning of the war. However, the experience of the war showed that they were in a hurry with the reduction of cavalry. The creation of only motorized units and formations was, firstly, overwhelming for the domestic industry, and secondly, the nature of the terrain in the European part of the USSR in many cases did not favor the use of vehicles. All this led to the revival of large cavalry formations. Even at the end of the war, when the nature of hostilities changed significantly compared to 1941–1942, 7 cavalry corps were successfully operating in the Red Army, 6 of them bore the honorary titles of the Guards. In fact, during its decline, the cavalry returned to the standard of 1938 - 7 directorates of the cavalry corps. The Wehrmacht cavalry underwent a similar evolution - from one brigade in 1939 to several cavalry divisions in 1945.
In 1941-1942. the horsemen played a crucial role in defensive and offensive operations, becoming the indispensable "quasi-infantry" of the Red Army. In fact, before the appearance of large independent mechanized formations and formations in the Red Army, cavalry was the only maneuverable means of an operational level. In 1943-1945, when the mechanisms of tank armies were finally fine-tuned, cavalry became a delicate tool for solving especially important tasks in offensive operations. Tellingly, the number of cavalry corps was approximately equal to the number of tank armies. There were six tank armies in 1945, and seven cavalry corps. Most of both of them bore the rank of guards by the end of the war. If tank armies were the sword of the Red Army, then cavalry was a sharp and long sword. A typical task for cavalrymen in 1943-1945. there was the formation of an external front of encirclement, a breakthrough deep into the enemy's defense at a time when the old front was crumbling, and the new one had not yet been created. On a good highway, the cavalry certainly lagged behind the motorized infantry. But on dirt roads and in wooded and swampy areas, it could advance at a pace quite comparable to that of motorized infantry. In addition, unlike motorized infantry, the cavalry did not require itself the constant delivery of many tons of fuel. This allowed the cavalry corps to advance deeper than most of the mechanized formations and ensure a high rate of advance for the armies and fronts as a whole. Cavalry breakthroughs to great depths made it possible to save the forces of infantrymen and tankers.
Only a person who does not have the slightest idea of the tactics of cavalry and has a vague idea of its operational use can argue that the cavalry is a backward branch of the army, which remained in the Red Army only through thoughtlessness of the leadership.
