During the Second World War, the domestic armed forces acquired a wealth of experience in conducting operations in mountainous areas. The battle for the Caucasus, battles in the Crimea, the Carpathians, the Arctic, on the territory of Yugoslavia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Far East have become a confirmation of the possibility of successful large-scale operations in the mountains, both by ground troops and aviation. The number of sorties carried out by Soviet pilots in specific mountainous conditions amounts to hundreds of thousands.
Under these conditions, a wide variety of tasks had to be solved by assault aviation (SHA). Flights in high-mountainous areas (the height of the mountains is 2000 m and more) were especially difficult for attack aircraft, since the similarity of ridges, snow-capped mountain peaks and a small number of characteristic landmarks significantly complicated visual orientation and the search for specified objects. Medium-altitude mountains (up to 2000 m) and low mountains (from 500 to 1000 m) also have a sharply rugged relief, covered with forests and bushes. This made it possible for the enemy to camouflage his troops and equipment well, which prevented their rapid detection. Rare villages located at intersections of roads, in valleys and near water sources, the enemy fortified with engineering structures and covered with a large number of air defense means. Such strongholds, enemy troops and military equipment on the roads, storage sites for fuel and lubricants and ammunition, artillery positions and bridges were the main targets of attack aircraft, since due to the complexity of the terrain, our artillery often could not fire at them.
The actions of Soviet attack aircraft in the mountains were also complicated by the lack of perfect navigation equipment on the Il-2 and a decrease in the working areas of ground radio-technical aircraft navigation. In these conditions, the flight crew had to pay paramount attention to studying the upcoming flight area using relief maps, large-scale maps, as well as photographs of road junctions, mountain ranges, valleys, settlements and other landmarks. In group lessons, those who had previously flown over the mountains shared their observations with the rest. To consolidate knowledge, each pilot from memory reproduced in a specially prepared box with sand the relief of the planned combat area, depicting all the characteristic landmarks. Also, in the course of training, the commanding staff of the air units and the leaders of the strike groups went to the front line, where they got acquainted with the terrain, targets, the enemy's fire system, and also clarified the signals of interaction with ground forces.
In the interests of the actions of ground attack aviation, a number of additional measures were envisaged. To ensure the withdrawal of aircraft to the combat area located close to the front line, drive radio stations were installed. To ensure quick and reliable identification by attack aircraft crews of settlements on their territory, most of them carved conventional signs on the ground (the first letters of the names of the settlements measuring 20x40 m). The directions of the exit of the strike groups to the targets were indicated by signal panels, as well as colored smoke. In the forward ground units, aircraft controllers with radio stations were located, which carried out target designation, guidance and did everything necessary to prevent accidental air strikes on their troops.
It is worth noting that the difficult mountainous terrain not only created difficulties, but also often helped the actions of the attack aircraft. Its competent use by the pilots made it possible to stealth the flight and surprise the attack. Therefore, the leaders of the groups, together with the wingmen, before a combat sortie, in addition to a thorough study of the relief and characteristic landmarks, carefully selected the flight route, determined the order of maneuvering over the target and exit after the attack on their territory.
Very often, weather conditions made their adjustments to the actions of the attack aircraft. Mountain weather is highly dependent on factors such as altitude, geographic location, proximity to sea basins or deserts, etc. Mountain ranges are powerful barriers that hold back the horizontal movement of warm and cold air masses and force them to rise upward. The consequences of such movements are the formation of fog and clouds, sudden precipitation, etc. In the morning, valleys and gorges are usually covered with fogs and thick haze, and in the afternoon, heap clouds develop at heights of one to two kilometers. All these factors required the pilots to be able to perform instrument flights and launch assault strikes from behind the clouds, guided by guidance commands from the ground. For example, in the fall of 1944 in the Carpathians, a six IL-2 from the 8th VA, led by Art. Lieutenant Makarov, went to a given target, which turned out to be covered by clouds. Then the control of the group was taken over by the aircraft pilot Major Kazakov, who observed the enemy from his position visually. The leader clearly followed his instructions, and the Il-2 carried out a successful bombing, suppressing the fire of several artillery batteries.
When preparing for combat missions, the pilots also took into account temperature fluctuations (high temperatures during the day, and frosts are frequent at night and in the morning hours), wind variability, the presence of powerful ascending and descending air currents, sharp weather contrasts (cloudless in the foothills, and rain or snow). At the same time, the commanders and staffs of the assault aviation units, in order to collect data for a comprehensive assessment of the current situation and take into account all these factors, increased the number of crews conducting reconnaissance and additional reconnaissance of the weather. Only the most experienced pilots were trained to carry out individual tasks, the composition of the strike groups, routes and flight profiles were carefully determined (due to the remoteness of the basing, the depth of action of the assault aviation decreased).
On ordinary, flat terrain, aircraft were usually located at a distance of 30 to 50 kilometers from the front line. But in mountainous areas such basing conditions could not be achieved by the command, which is easily explained by the difficulty of choosing and technical equipment of airfields. So, during the period of the defense of the Caucasus, the airfields of the assault aviation were located 120-150 km, and during the offensive in the Carpathians - 60-250 km from the front line. And only during operations in the Arctic they were closer (at a distance of about 50 km). This circumstance has repeatedly led to the crowded basing of aircraft. So, in April 1944, during the liberation of the Crimea, 2-3 air regiments were deployed at each of the airfields of General K. Vershinin's 4 VA. The issue of airfield maneuver acquired particular urgency during the offensive of ground forces. In flat terrain, attack aircraft relocated on the third or fourth day, while advancing ground forces for 50-80 km. In the mountains, despite the slowdown in the pace of the offensive, their lag was significant. So, in the Debrecen offensive operation in October 1944, the commander of the 5th VA, General S. Goryunov, due to the lack of sites suitable for airfields, managed to carry out only one redeployment of air army units, including assault units. Moreover, it was possible to do this only when the forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front had already crossed the Main Carpathian ridge, i.e. passed up to 160 km. Such difficulties increased the reaction time of the attack aircraft to the orders of the troops and reduced the average time over the target by 1, 5-1, 7 times to 20 minutes.
The effectiveness of Soviet attack aircraft strikes in the mountains depended significantly on the competent organization of interaction with units of the ground forces. Combined arms formations operated mainly in isolated areas, so interaction was carried out within the framework of army operations. The command of the combined-arms armies in their decisions determined, among other things, the tasks, objects, as well as the time of action of the assault aviation. The instructions of the combined-arms command were reflected in the planned interaction table, which was further refined according to the evolving situation and the combat missions of the ground forces that arose.
In some cases, even special special instructions were developed for the interaction of air forces with ground forces. For example, in the order of the commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, General of the Army I. Petrov, dated October 16, 1944, the task was set for officers and generals of all branches of the armed forces to study the "Instructions on the interaction of aviation with ground forces in the mountains", instructions defining the procedure for interaction, and to achieve effective using the results of our aviation's actions.
In addition, by the same order, the commander of the 8th VA, Lieutenant-General V. N. Zhdanov was ordered to organize a three-day training session with specially selected officers, who should then be sent to the troops in order to provide practical assistance in organizing target designation from the ground and control over the designation of their positions; and also to conduct training sessions with regular aircraft controllers in order to improve the skills of guiding assault aircraft to ground targets.
Certain issues of interaction (clarification of the targets of strikes, the order of designating the leading edge, mutual identification, target designation, communications, etc.) were worked out directly on the ground. If it was impossible to do this, then large-scale maps were used, as well as relief schemes and photo schemes. Indicative, for example, is the experience of air assault formations of the 8th Air Army, in which, in preparation for flights in the Carpathians, special relief layouts, diagrams of the most characteristic landmarks and targets of strikes were made. At the end, the leaders of the groups flew around the area of the planned hostilities in order to consolidate knowledge of the terrain, landmarks and clarify routes.
The situation often developed in such a way that attack aircraft became the only means that could provide support for ground forces. To accomplish this task, the attack aircraft had to operate in the immediate vicinity of the forward edge. This required high accuracy of reaching a given area, reliability of detecting and identifying landmarks and targets, building maneuvers for an attack that would exclude the delivery of erroneous strikes to friendly people.
The assault aviation units conducted mainly echeloned operations in groups of up to 10-12 aircraft. Ahead, as a rule, at a temporary distance of 10-15 minutes, an additional reconnaissance officer followed under the cover of fighters, clearing the airspace and suppressing the air defense of the target. After completing his task, the additional reconnaissance officer returned, met the planes of the strike group in the established place and, acting as a leader, took them to the target. Difficult flight conditions forced the groups to approach at an altitude of about 1,500 meters in a "column" of links (pairs) dispersed over the depth of battle formations, which then rebuild to a bearing and descend to heights of about five to six hundred meters. Significant assistance to the attack aircraft was provided by the air controllers, who, by radio, reported to the presenters information about the air, ground and meteorological situation, carried out target designation, guidance, and, if necessary, retargeting.
The pilots attacked targets on the move, singly or in pairs, from a gentle dive at an angle of 15-20 °, firing at them first from cannons and machine guns, dropping high-explosive or high-explosive fragmentation bombs afterwards, equipped with shock fuses. The Il-2 pilots took their vehicles out of the attack along the valleys and mountain gorges and, having reorganized into a "circle" battle formation, carried out several more attacks on the target. To increase the duration of the impact on the enemy, they alternated combat approaches with idle ones. After finishing the attack, the planes climbed out towards their territory. The gathering of groups was carried out on a "snake" or on a straight line, thanks to a decrease in the speed of the leaders.
In mountainous areas, concentrated strikes were also made by large groups of attack aircraft against enemy strongholds located at heights, accumulations of enemy troops on roads and in wide valleys, and counterattacking and counterattacking groupings. So, on the territory of Romania on September 22, 1944, the Nazis, repeatedly going over to counterattacks, stubbornly resisted the troops of the 27th Army advancing in the Kaluga direction (commander Colonel General S. G. Trofimenko). By order of the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Malinovsky, assault aviation units of the 5th VA in groups of up to 24 Il-2 aircraft inflicted several concentrated strikes on a number of heights. The pilots made 230 sorties. Their effective action ensured the further advance of the Soviet troops. During the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, 63 attack aircraft of the 7th Air Force of General I. Sokolov on October 7, 1944 struck a massive blow at the location of the 137th German Mountain Rifle Regiment, which had positions at heights along the section of the road from Mount B. Karanvaisch to the village of Luostari. As a result, the defense system was disrupted, the enemy was demoralized, and units of the 14th Army quickly captured his strongholds.
When operating in the interests of ground forces in the mountains, the anti-aircraft maneuver of attack aircraft was significantly difficult, and often impossible. Therefore, the pilots fought with the enemy's air defense systems in active ways. Aircraft controllers were of great help to them. They uncovered the location of the anti-aircraft artillery positions in advance and transmitted the coordinates to the leading shock groups. Depending on the situation, the tasks of suppressing enemy air defense before striking the assigned targets were performed by all the crews of the groups or only specially trained ones. During the attack, the air gunners fired on the slopes of the surrounding mountains, from where it was possible to fire at the aircraft from guns and machine guns.
In mountainous terrain, ground attack aircraft also carried out the tasks of pursuing a retreating enemy, disrupting traffic, isolating the area of hostilities, as well as aerial reconnaissance. Il-2 attacked groups of forces that were trying to break away or broke away from our forward units, railway stations, echelons and motor transport convoys of the enemy. The target designation to the strike groups was given by the additional reconnaissance crews that had departed a little earlier. But in some cases, this did not provide surprise. That is why flight routes were often chosen in such a way that the strike groups would reach a characteristic landmark located 15-20 km away from a given object. Having found the enemy, the leader performed a turn, and the attack aircraft suddenly appeared over the target. For example, in Manchuria, in the Guggenzhen region, six IL-2, led by Art. Lieutenant Chernyshev, acting in this way, attacked from behind the hills a Japanese convoy of vehicles consisting of 60 trucks. The attack aircraft delivered the first blow in pairs on the move, with a 60 ° turn along the valley. The next attacks were carried out from the "circle". After eight calls, about ten vehicles were destroyed. The further fifty kilometers of the convoy's path to the Fozlin railway station were also accompanied by assault strikes by several more groups. Six group raids resulted in the destruction of 30 enemy vehicles.
While isolating the area of hostilities, "free hunting" was actively practiced. Using difficult meteorological conditions and terrain relief, attack aircraft "hunters", acting alone or in pairs, very often suddenly attacked targets. It should be noted that not only troops on the march, railway echelons and transport convoys, but also boats and barges on large rivers were subjected to strikes.
Attack aircraft carried out aerial reconnaissance along the way with the implementation of other tasks. There were almost no separate flights for aerial reconnaissance, since with rare exceptions, the Il-2 aircraft lacked the appropriate reconnaissance equipment. At the same time, flights for visual reconnaissance were carried out, ending, in most cases, with striking the enemy.
Thus, the peculiarities of the actions of ground attack aircraft in mountainous areas were mainly determined by the physical, geographical and weather conditions of the latter. These included: specificity of preparation and performance of flights; limited maneuver, the choice of types and forms of battle formations, methods of aiming and bombing, destructive means. Significant difficulties in visual orientation and detection of target objects of impact, the use of ground-based radio equipment; the complexity of organizing all-round support for strike groups, as well as their control and their interaction with ground forces. At the same time, the results of the actions indicate that the attack aircraft effectively performed their tasks and in many respects contributed to the success of the actions of the ground forces. The experience gained by the Soviet Il-2 attack aircraft during the war years was later widely used by the crews of the Su-25 attack aircraft during combat operations in the mountainous regions of Afghanistan.
