In this article we will try to understand the issues of the size of the air group of a modern nuclear-powered aircraft carrier such as "Chester W. Nimitz", as well as the ability of the aircraft carrier to support the activities of carrier-based aircraft on board.
For a long time, the site has continued to discuss the supporters and opponents of aircraft carriers. This dispute began a long time ago, and the end is not visible to it, and it is unlikely that we will be able to witness its end. And all because the question: "What is an aircraft carrier - a prima ballerina or a whitewashed coffin?" was discussed for decades both on numerous Internet resources, and in general long before the advent of the Internet - but there is no definitive answer to this day. The number of aircraft carriers' supporters is very large, but their opponents are not much inferior (if at all inferior) to them in number.
I myself am a staunch supporter of these giant leviathans of the gray ocean, but today I will not in any way agitate you, dear readers, for aircraft carriers in the modern Navy. Within the framework of this article, I will consider several rather specific issues related to the number, preparation for takeoff, lifting and landing of carrier-based aircraft.
It would seem that there could be something unclear here? The number of aircraft assigned to the aircraft carrier is generally known. By the end of the 80s, there were 3 types of air wings, the typical composition of which is given in the table (the "number of squadrons" is indicated - "the number of machines in a squadron"):
There were also other options - for example, on the aircraft carrier "Theodore Roosevelt", which participated in the hostilities against Iraq in January 1991, there were 78 aircraft in the air wing (20 F-14 Tomcat, 19 F / A-18 Hornet, 18 A-6E Intruder, five EA-6B Prowler, four E-2C Hawkeye, eight S-3B Viking and four KA-6D), as well as six SH-3H helicopters. But later the number of air groups was reduced. To date, the standard air wing of carrier-based aircraft includes:
1) 4 squadrons of fighter-attack aircraft (VFA) - 48 vehicles, 2) a squadron of electronic warfare (VAQ) aircraft - 4 vehicles, 3) AWACS squadron (VAW) - 4 vehicles, 4) a squadron of anti-submarine helicopters (HS) - 8 vehicles, 5) a squadron of carrier-based transport aircraft C-2A (VRC) - 2 vehicles
And in total, respectively, 66 cars - 58 aircraft and 8 helicopters. At the same time, the number of electronic warfare and / or AWACS aircraft can be increased from 4 to 6, and if necessary, the air wing can be assigned a fighter-assault squadron or a squadron of marines combat helicopters.
The overwhelming majority of authors writing about aircraft carriers are a priori convinced that an aircraft carrier is quite capable of fully operating the aircraft wing based on it. Indeed, how could it be otherwise? What is the point of basing aircraft on a ship that it cannot use? For a long time, the question of the effectiveness of the use of carrier-based aircraft was not even raised. Moreover, in the press, the normative figure of 140 (or 147 or even 149) sorties per day for aircraft carriers of the "Nimitz" type has repeatedly slipped. In other words, for an air group of 80 aircraft, the combat tension (the number of sorties per day per aircraft) would be 140/80 = 1.75 (although according to some reports, the standard combat tension for carrier-based aircraft in the US Navy is 2), which is quite corresponds to a similar indicator of land aviation in a normal combat situation. Of course, there are times when a land-based combat aircraft is forced to make 3 and 5 sorties per day. But this happens either when departures are carried out at a very short range, i.e.very short-term, either due to force majeure, and then they cannot continue for any long time, if only due to the fatigue of the pilots - or additional replacement crews will be needed. However, 140-149 sorties per day from a nuclear aircraft carrier were also considered a standard, which, in extraordinary cases, could be exceeded. It is possible that the technical limit for aircraft carriers of the "Nimitz" type was considered to be the figure of 200 sorties per day that I came across more than once. But on the newest American aircraft carriers "Gerald R. Ford" it is planned to achieve even greater values - the norm of 160 sorties per day and up to 270 sorties in critical situations.
However, behind all these considerations, a very important question was somehow lost - what is the rate of aircraft lifting from an aircraft carrier? Why is it important? Supporters of aircraft carriers usually cite devastating results of attacks by an almost complete air group of a nuclear aircraft carrier on the maximum combat radius (48 shock "hornets" * 4 anti-ship missiles "Harpoon" on each = 192 anti-ship missiles that unexpectedly fell on an enemy warrant 1000 km from the American aircraft carrier). It is, of course, beautiful, but …
The same "Hornet" without refueling is capable of staying in the air for about 3 hours (although this time can be increased and decreased - the presence and capacity of the PTB, the weight of the combat load, the flight profile, etc., are of great importance). But if, for example, it took 2 hours to lift the entire Nimitz air group, this would mean that by the time the last plane took off from the deck of the giant ship, the first had only an hour of flight left! What is the departure range here we can talk about? The Hornets that took off first are unlikely to be able to move more than 15-20 minutes of flight from the aircraft carrier … But what if it takes not 2 but 3 hours to lift the air group? Then by the time the last planes take off, the first will have to land, since they are running out of fuel …
During a very lively discussion in the comments to Oleg Kaptsov's article “Convoy to Alaska. Chronicles of a naval battle "https://topwar.ru/31232-konvoy-na-alyasku-hroniki-morskogo-boya.html the author of the article, based on a series of articles by Kabernik. "Assessment of the combat power of aircraft carriers" https://eurasian-defence.ru/node/3602 announced significant restrictions on the use of carrier-based aircraft, namely:
1) The number of aircraft carriers of the "Nimitz" type indicated in the press - 75-85 aircraft - is a theoretical indicator that can be achieved only in clear weather and near the native coast. In reality, the Nimitz air group does not exceed 45 aircraft.
2) The ascent rate of the air group is very low - it takes 45 minutes to lift a dozen cars, and a whole hour and a half to lift 20 cars. Therefore, the maximum combat group that can be lifted from the deck of an aircraft carrier cannot exceed 20 aircraft, but even in this case they will not be able to operate at full radius, since the first vehicles that took off in the air consumed a significant part of their fuel - or they would have to suspend the PTB in damage to the combat load.
I will not now list the arguments of V. V. Kabernik, I will only note that, in my memory, his work is the first attempt to understand the specifics of the work and organization of massive strikes by carrier-based aviation forces (I mean the first attempt in the open press, not I doubt that "where necessary" this issue has been studied for a long time and thoroughly). As such, this attempt deserves respect. But are the conclusions of Kabernik V. V. correct?
What constitutes the lifting cycle of an airplane into the air? Obviously, the plane must be prepared for departure - it must go through all the maintenance it is supposed to do on time, the plane must be lifted onto the flight deck (if it was in the hangar), it must be refueled, the armament must be suspended and put on alert, a pre-flight check must be carried out. …The plane must be delivered to the catapult and hooked onto the booster piston hook, after which one more check of the plane and the catapult is required, and only then - the start!
Again, let's start from the end and see how long it takes to deliver a fully ready-to-take-off plane to the catapult, check before ejection and take off.
What conclusions can we draw from this video? Firstly, in order to enter the catapult, the plane did not need a transporter - he did it himself. Secondly - the plane opened the planes only on the catapult (this is important and we will remember this later) And thirdly - the final check before takeoff takes very little time - the Hornet stopped, having entered the catapult, for about 1 minute 15 seconds from the beginning of the video, and after 2 minutes and 41 seconds (after 3 minutes 56 seconds from the start of shooting) the plane took off from the deck of the ship. And this is not the limit! Watching the second video
Here the work of two catapults is filmed at the same time. In 6 minutes. 26 seconds from the start of the survey, 3 planes were launched from the first catapult (the closest to the operator performing the survey). From a distant catapult - only two, while the second plane took off 3 minutes 35 seconds after the start of filming, but the new plane was not sent to the catapult. In just 6 minutes 26 seconds, 5 aircraft took off from two catapults. The time period between takeoffs is approximately 2 min 13 sec - 2 min 20 sec. This allows us to assume that if another plane were sent to the distant catapult, then during the shooting time we would see not 5 but 6 planes taking off.
What does this mean? Yes, only that one catapult is able to send one plane into the air in 2, 2-2, 5 minutes. Accordingly, two dozen aircraft could be lifted into the air by two catapults in 21-25 minutes. Three catapults would have done this in 15-17 minutes. But! Only if the aircraft are fully prepared for departure - all checks have been carried out (except for the terminal, on the catapult); weapons are suspended and activated, the pilot is in the cockpit, etc.
And what can prevent airplanes from being completely ready for departure? Do you need maintenance? Let's see what it is. In US aviation, all aircraft technical training is divided into pre-flight, post-flight after each flight, post-flight at the end of the flight day, and after a certain number of flight hours.
Pre-flight preparation is carried out before the first flight on the day of the flight and includes a pre-flight inspection, as well as some types of work, the main purpose of which is to prepare the aircraft for departure in accordance with the approved flight task. At the same time, it is allowed not to perform work on the preparation of those types of equipment that will not be used in future flights.
Post-flight training after each flight is carried out to prepare the aircraft for the next flight and includes refueling with fuels and lubricants, equipping with ammunition, etc.
Post-flight training at the end of the flight day involves refueling the aircraft and performing a special (small) list of control and preventive work.
Post-flight training after a certain number of flight hours (several flight days) is carried out in order to maintain the health of the aircraft and its equipment by performing preventive and routine maintenance with extensive use of special equipment.
This preparation, I must say, takes a lot of time. For example, to provide one flight hour of the F-14 Tomcat, the standard required 20 man-hours of maintenance, but in practice this figure sometimes reached 49. The Hornet requires 25 man-hours of service per flight hour. This is a lot - it turns out that in a day on which the plane will make 2 flights of 3 hours each, Tomcat will need 120 to 292 man-hours of maintenance, and Hornet will need 150. But the specialists of the air group are quite capable of this - the fact is that for each aircraft on the aircraft carrier there are as many as 26 maintenance personnel (which is why the number of the aircraft group on the aircraft carrier is 2500 people) and such a team will master 150 hours of servicing the Hornet, not too much and straining in less than 6 hours of teamwork. But if the Tomcat goes awry and requires 49 man-hours per flight hour, it will be more difficult, because the group serving it will have to switch to a twelve-hour working day. Well, or ask for help from specialists freed from the Hornet service.
This is, of course, a joke, but in every joke there is a grain of a joke, and everything else is true, and it lies in the fact that the Nimitz's crew is really capable of providing maintenance for an air group of 75-85 aircraft, provided they are used intensively enough. Especially after the decks of American aircraft carriers left the terribly voracious before maintenance "Tomkats" and were replaced by relatively unpretentious "Hornets".
What else? Please note - refueling and loading ammunition are considered part of aircraft maintenance and were taken into account earlier, but I will still say a few words about them. Alas, I do not know the time for refueling combat aircraft, but refueling huge passenger Boeing 747s and Airbuses (15, 5-18, 5 tons) takes 15-20 minutes, and on an aircraft carrier there is clearly more than one pump. The existing ammunition supply systems are mechanized - from the cellars located below the waterline, special elevators deliver bombs and missiles to the deck below the hangar. From there, two elevators deliver ammunition to the hangar deck, while three elevators deliver it to the flight deck. The system provides ammunition loading for 135 aircraft per day. Is it a lot or a little? To ensure 140 sorties per day is more than enough, since some of the sorties are carried out by aircraft that do not require loading weapons (for example, AWACS "Hawkeye" aircraft)
What conclusions can be drawn from all this?
It is imperative to remember that carrier-based aviation does not conduct battles with spherical horses in a vacuum. Any combat mission is preceded by certain planning and target designation. For example, an American aircraft carrier is moving to a certain area of hostilities, or a hot spot, which is about to become such an area. The leadership of the operation will certainly assign some tasks to the aircraft carrier, for example, the destruction of the large forces of the enemy fleet detected earlier from the satellite and, after they have been neutralized, the destruction of certain stationary targets on the territory of the enemy.
Let's say an aircraft carrier enters the danger zone in the morning. Who is stopping his crew from performing pre-flight preparation at night, refueling and equipping aircraft for a priority mission and preparing them for departure? Nobody. But in the morning, when the aircraft carrier entered the conflict zone, its aircraft are ready for battle, and now it is only necessary to find the forces of the enemy fleet. Duty patrols rise, electronic warfare aircraft detect suspicious activity in square "Alpha 12". Patrol "Hawkeye", which had previously observed the radio silence, turns on its "saucer" and sees an enemy naval strike group, covered by several land-based fighters 800 km from the aircraft carrier. Preparations for the attack begin immediately. But what is it? The attack plan is being finalized, the flight mission is specified for the pilots, and the planes are completing pre-flight training. What does it mean? Well, for example, aviation ammunition has 2 degrees of protection, let's call them (sorry for not knowing the terminology) a fuse and a check. After removing the rocket from the fuse, it will be enough to pull the tape attached to the check and the rocket will be ready for use. Incidentally, this was precisely the reason for the tragedy on the Forrestal - not wanting to fiddle with the fuse on the upper deck, the crew preferred to cock it in the ammunition storage. And the check … well - the check? The wind blew harder, the ribbon sailed, the check jumped out, the rocket got into a combat platoon. And then - static discharge and accidental start. If everything had been carried out according to the instructions, the rocket would have been on safety and nothing would have happened, but … the instructions were not followed.
However, feel the difference - planes do not need to be refueled - they are already refueled. There is no need to hang weapons on airplanes - they are already on them. All you need to do is to cock the fuses and pull out the checks … The preparation time for departure is minimized. I suppose it will not be a mistake to say that the "remnants" of the pre-flight preparation of a group of 30-35 planes described by me will take an hour, at most an hour and a half (this is if you have to change something, add some weapons).
The aircraft carrier goes with full air wing - some of the planes and helicopters in the hangar, and some on the upper deck. But in the evening, a strike group was formed on the flight deck - some extra aircraft were removed to the hangar (say, there were too many Tomkats on the deck, but not enough Hornets), so some of the Tomkats were removed, replacing them with Hornets. From the stowed position
Air group on the upper deck deployed for lifting
What does this deployment mean?
When an aircraft carrier is not actively flying, the aircraft on its flight deck are located something like this
Two catapults of the corner deck are more than enough for takeoff of the patrol, and after takeoff of the patrol, the landing (corner) deck is free. After the patrol has landed, its planes taxi into the bow or to the superstructure in order to refuel, if necessary, rearm, and get other post-flight services. However, due to the large number of aircraft on the flight deck (the Nimitz hangar accommodates approximately 50% of its air group), with such an arrangement, the nose of the aircraft carrier will be fully loaded - there is no possibility of using bow catapults, as, for example, in this photo
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True, in this photo some planes are grouped at the stern, overlapping the angular deck of the aircraft carrier - probably this small group of planes will be launched from the angular deck catapults.
But this is the stowed position. And if we are preparing to send a large air group into battle, then the aircraft on the aircraft carrier should be arranged like this
In this case, the planes are grouped to feed them to the catapults, and 3 out of four catapults are ready for takeoff. On all three catapults, the planes are already in readiness for launch (in diagram 2, the Hokai have already started from the catapults of the corner deck and are about to take off from the deck), two more planes are already standing behind them in prelaunch positions, so that as soon as the first ones start the second ones took their place with minimal delay … What will be the starting order? The first to start are the planes highlighted in black. Flight safety is above all, and if suddenly some plane suddenly needs an emergency landing, it is the planes highlighted in black that will interfere with it - they block the landing pad - the corner deck. After the start of the "black" aircraft, the time comes for "speckled" ones - especially those located in the nose and blocking the fourth catapult. After they are launched, the aircraft carrier is able to use all 4 of its catapults. The rest of the strike group's planes can now be lifted into the air. How long will it take for this?
Not too much. If we assume that the fourth catapult "goes into action" after the start of the 26th plane and remembering (remembering the video!) That one catapult is capable of lifting one plane in 2, 1-2, 5 minutes (we take 2 minutes 30 seconds) then 3 catapults will lift 26 aircraft in about 22 minutes, and the remaining 9 aircraft will take off in another 7.5 minutes - (three catapults will release two aircraft each, one - three). In total, the rise of an air group of 35 aircraft from the position indicated on the diagram will take half an hour at most!
So where, then, did V. V. the figure of 20 planes in an hour and a half was taken? The fact is that this respected author, in my humble understanding, made one, but a fundamental mistake that distorted his calculations. He's writing:
The deck of the aircraft carrier is arranged in such a way that the ammunition lifts are located near the standard prelaunch positions, and there is also all the necessary infrastructure for refueling and prelaunch checks. The delivery of ammunition to non-standard positions takes a significant amount of time, and the number of mobile mechanization equipment is obviously limited. Thus, preparation for the departure of a car in a non-standard position takes hardly twice as long - the very same hour and a half instead of the standard 45 minutes. The maximum number of aircraft in one launch cycle just implies the use of all available resources for preparation. At the same time, the capacity of standard prelaunch positions is 12 aircraft - this is the first echelon squadron that can be in the air in the first 45 minutes …. … The maximum volume of the air group being lifted is no more than 20 vehicles … … The lifting of this compound into the air takes more than an hour and a half, which means that it is impossible to use the full combat load. At least the first 6 aircraft in the launch cycle are forced to use outboard tanks in order to operate in conjunction with aircraft that take off later at the same range. From a tactical point of view, this means that the range of the strike connection can never reach its theoretical maximum, and the combat load will, at best, be half of that stated in the characteristics of the aircraft.
In other words, Kabernik V. V. argues as follows - if there are 20 aircraft on the deck, of which 12 are in 45-minute readiness, then the remaining 8 machines have an hour and a half readiness, because they are located too far from the delivery and refueling infrastructure. This is understandable. But then the most surprising conclusion follows - since 12 cars are in 45-minute readiness, this means that all 12 cars can take off within 45 minutes. If the remaining 8 machines are in an hour and a half readiness, then all these 8 machines will be able to take off in the air within an hour and a half. By the time the 20th car rises into the air, the 1st one has already flown off for an hour and a half above the deck of the aircraft carrier - accordingly, waiting for the 21st car to rise is already pointless, soon the first will run out of fuel.
Mistake of V. V. Kabernik is that he misunderstands the term “readiness to fly”. If 12 cars are 45 minutes ready to take off, this means that in 45 minutes the whole dozen will be ready to take off. If the remaining 8 vehicles are ready for an hour and a half, these 8 vehicles (plus 12 vehicles that had a 45-minute readiness) will be ready for departure one and a half hours after the start of pre-flight preparation. Thus, you DO NOT NEED to lift 12 cars into the air and wait until the remaining 8 undergo pre-flight preparation and take off in an hour and a half - YOU SHOULD WAIT A HALF AN HOUR AND COMPLETE PRE-FLIGHT PREPARATION ON ALL 20 VEHICLES after which all 20 cars will be ready for departure and can be lifted an air group into the air in 15 minutes.
Interestingly, in our calculation (the rise of an air group of 35 aircraft in half an hour), the aircraft that took off first will also lose a fair amount of fuel, waiting for the last aircraft to take off. Is it critical? Completely uncritical. The thing is that planes of different types and with different combat load will go to attack the enemy KUG. If the first to raise AWACS planes (Hokai are able to hang in the air for up to 7 hours without refueling against 2, 5-3 hours of a fighter or attack aircraft) and if they are next to raise aircraft that will perform the air defense functions of the formation (i.e.will rise into the air with 4-6 relatively light air-to-air missiles, and 4 AMRAAMs and a pair of Sidewinder all weigh only 828 kg) then, of course, they will be able to "grab" additional PTBs and at least equalize in range with stormtroopers taking off later, carrying a much heavier load.
However, there is another limitation - this is landing operations. In theory, a plane could land on an aircraft carrier every minute. In this video, we observe the classic Hornet landing and see how quickly the plane clears the runway.
But a minute is ideal. When the weather worsens, the standard increases to one and a half minutes, but it should be remembered that the plane does not always manage to land the first time, and often it is forced to go to another circle. It turns out that a group of 20 planes may well land for half an hour or even more, and a group of 35 planes - even 50-60 minutes. If the dear Kabernik V. V. If I also remembered this, then probably he would have come to the conclusion that group flights of carrier-based aircraft are impossible in principle - an hour and a half - takeoff, half an hour - landing … The only thing left for fuel is to storm some target 200 kilometers from the aircraft carrier.
But in our case (takeoff of a group of 35 aircraft - half an hour), takeoff and landing operations will take a lot of time. Yes, of course, you can always lift several Hornets into the air and refuel the planes returning from the mission (the Super Hornet is able to lift up to 14 tons of fuel in its own tank and five PTBs and work as a refueling tanker, which was the reason for the withdrawal of specialized tankers from the aircraft wings.), but this is also a certain time …
Apparently this is why I have not seen in any source a mention of the actions of an air group of more than 35 vehicles (even theoretically). landing operations. The size of the air group, perhaps, can be increased over 35 aircraft only if a nearby target (say, 350-450 km) is attacked.
And besides that - I believe that the number of aircraft on the flight deck of the Nimitz directly affects the number of air group lifted into the air. Prepared aircraft on the flight deck can take off very quickly - but with the machines standing in the hangars, everything is not so simple. Not only do they need to be lifted onto the flight deck - although the elevator rises / falls quickly enough (the rise takes 14-15 seconds), the plane still needs to be dragged onto this lift, and this is not easy - naturally, the plane in the hangar cannot move on its own and you need a tractor. And most importantly, as far as I know, a car on the hangar deck cannot receive full pre-flight training. In my opinion (I may be wrong) refueling cannot be done in the hangar.
At the same time, it is obvious that it is impossible to place more than 36-40 aircraft at prelaunch positions - we just count the aircraft on the diagram
Of course, some time after the start of their rise, the elevators will be free and it will be possible to lift new aircraft from the hangar, but … the air group leaving into the sky has no time to wait until the raised aircraft refuel, receive pre-flight service, etc. - fuel is expensive! Perhaps, if I am mistaken about refueling in the hangar (or if several refueled cars are lowered into the hangar even at the stage of pre-flight preparation), it is still possible to raise several more cars, in addition to those that were on the flight deck, but it is unlikely that they can be many.
The modern air wing has 58-60 aircraft. If 35 of them went to attack the enemy KUG, four - they are hanging in the air as a patrol, and four more are preparing to change this patrol, and four or six fighters are standing at the catapults, preparing, if an air enemy is detected, to rise into the air and strengthen the air patrol. will we stay? 9-11 cars are not that few. And this, in my opinion, is the main reason for the reduction in the number of promising air groups.
In the days of the USSR, in the event of the outbreak of a global war, American aircraft, fulfilling their tasks, would have suffered very large losses, because a fight with the Air Force and Air Defense of the Soviet Union is, you know, not bombing Libya. In order for at least some time to be able to provide its own air defense and strike at the fleet and infrastructure of the USSR, a hefty supply of aviation was required - therefore, six squadrons of fighters and attack aircraft were planted on the Nimitz (up to 60 aircraft, not counting the AWACS, Electronic warfare and so on). Why now? Much less is enough to carry out police functions and wars with countries like Iraq. And if suddenly the need arises, you can always add a Marine Corps squadron to the 48 regular "Hornets", having received the same 60 strike aircraft for an aircraft carrier …
In addition, it should be borne in mind that aircraft still periodically require in-depth post-flight training after a certain number of hours of flight - and a certain number of aircraft may be on tests in the hangar, when an urgent combat mission suddenly arrives …
Output: In my humble opinion, an air group of 75-90 aircraft is really big for a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier - it would be extremely difficult for it to use all its aircraft and helicopters simultaneously and simultaneously. It is unlikely that a situation can arise in which an aircraft carrier would use 50-60 combat aircraft at the same time (even taking into account those on duty on the deck). But the fact is that these aircraft carriers are designed for a long-term conduct of intensive hostilities, as a result of which the air wing suffers certain losses from downed and damaged aircraft - a certain supply of pilots and aircraft provides compensation for losses and allows maintaining the high combat capability of an aircraft carrier strike group longer than a limited the size of the air group.
(to be continued)
