During the Great Patriotic War, special attention was paid to the organization of reliable and continuous interaction of ground attack aviation (SHA) with ground forces. Which is quite logical, since the pilots of the ShA made almost 80% of the sorties with the aim of destroying and suppressing objects located at a depth of 10 km behind the front line, i.e. operated mainly in the same area with ground fire weapons. In order for the ground forces to effectively use the results of attacks by ground attack aircraft, it was necessary to clearly organize their joint actions. Let us consider some issues related to the organization and implementation of tactical interaction of large formations (formations) of ground forces and ground attack aircraft in breaking through the tactical zone of enemy defense, as well as the main directions of its improvement during the Patriotic War.
In the first period, interaction was organized on the basis of the views that had developed in the pre-war years. Until May 1942, the assault aviation regiments were included in the combined arms armies and were subordinate to their commanders. It would seem that there were all the possibilities to ensure high-quality tactical interaction. However, a number of objective and subjective reasons prevented this. One of them was the fact that the command and staff had no practical experience in organizing interaction. The situation was aggravated by the lack of reliable communication between the headquarters and a clearly marked front line, a significant distance from the front edge of the command posts (CP).
According to the instructions for the field service of the headquarters of the Soviet Army in 1939, the organization of interaction was the function of the combined-arms headquarters. In his decisions, the army commander during the operation set daily tasks for both ground forces and aviation, and the operational and aviation departments of the headquarters agreed on their implementation in place and time. The Army Air Force commander made his decision on the basis of the assigned tasks, and his headquarters planned the combat actions of the air units and was engaged in organizing interaction. It was not always possible to plan military actions, taking into account all the features of the situation, since preparation for them, as a rule, was carried out in conditions of an obvious shortage of time. Therefore, the interaction was organized in a general way and for a short time. Special plans were not drawn up, and individual issues were reflected in orders, instructions and other documents.
Sometimes the headquarters could not provide the commanders with the necessary data and operational-tactical calculations before making a decision. Due to the low throughput of the telegraph and wire means used for communication, information from the combined-arms command did not arrive in time, and the duration of the passage of commands from the Army Air Force headquarters to the aviation units was up to eight, and sometimes up to ten hours. Thus, taking into account the time of preparation of attack aircraft for a combat mission, the requests of the command of the ground forces could often be fulfilled only the next day.
It was also important that the command posts of troops and aviation were deployed far from the forward edge and from each other. For example, in January 1942, the Air Force control of the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front was located at an airfield located fifty kilometers from its headquarters. As a result, even in the presence of radio communication, the necessary information and combat missions were delivered to the aviation with a delay. The remoteness of the command posts also made it difficult for the commanders to communicate personally, because of which the aviators did not know the details of the ground situation in detail. Therefore, when the attack aircraft worked along the front edge of the enemy defense, there was a danger of striking the positions of their troops. The situation was aggravated by the unreliable designation of the front line by our troops, which was carried out with the help of special panels laid out in the units of the first echelon. However, the panels quickly fell into disrepair or were lost. Radio communication was practically not used. In such conditions, attack aircraft sought to operate further from the forward edge. As a result, the supported troops could not properly use the results of attacks by ground attack aircraft.
The quality of interaction was also affected by the difficulties associated with material and technical support. Due to the shortage of the necessary materiel and ammunition at the airfields, the combat loading of the aircraft participating in the support of the troops sometimes did not correspond to the nature of the assigned tasks and objects of action. There were cases when attack aircraft did not have the opportunity to complete missions at all. For example, from October 21 to November 2, 1941, units of the 19th mixed air division of the Air Force of the Western Front did not make a single sortie, since there was no fuel and ammunition at the base airfields.
To eliminate the existing shortcomings and improve tactical interaction, it was required to drastically reduce the time required for the passage of applications for the use of attack aircraft, improve the organization of the front line designation, identification and target designation. Therefore, aviation representatives began to be sent to the combined arms headquarters - liaison officers, who were entrusted with the following duties: control over the designation of the front edge and providing the troops with the necessary means for this, collecting and transmitting information about the current air and ground situation to the aviation command, information from the combined arms commanders about the state of their aviation, control of the checkpoint. The general management of the liaison officers was carried out by a representative of the operational department of the Army Air Force, who was at its headquarters. Through him, tasks were set for assault aviation, information about the results of actions was received to him. Thus, it was possible to somewhat improve contact between the combined arms and air command and reduce the duration of applications for the use of attack aircraft to two to four hours.
Aviation representatives conducted classes in the troops to study the silhouettes of Soviet and enemy aircraft, trained personnel in special teams to send identification and target designation signals to pilots, and, if necessary, advised combined-arms commanders on the use of aviation forces. As a result, the actions of the assault aviation units began to be more focused and more actively influencing the overall course of the battle and the operation.
In the second period of the war, a significant impact on the further improvement of interaction was exerted by: the accumulated experience, the creation of large assault aviation formations (divisions and corps), an increase in the firepower of the ground forces, qualitative changes and quantitative growth of communications. The experience of military operations has shown that the organization of interaction should be personally dealt with by the commander. This provision was enshrined in the 1942 Manual on the Field Service of the Headquarters of the Soviet Army.
When the enemy's tactical defense zone was broken through, the interaction of combined-arms formations with assault formations was organized not only by the commanders of the armies, but also by the commanders of the front forces. The higher, in comparison with the previous stage, the level was due to changes in the organizational structure of front-line aviation. Since May 1942, the ShA was included in the air armies (VA) of the fronts. The commander set tasks for the front and aviation forces, and also determined the order of interaction. Its headquarters prepared the data required for making a decision, and then developed the necessary documentation (interaction and communication plans, tables of mutual identification signals, target designation, etc.). The decision made was a guide for the lower authorities. Using it, the commanders of the assault air divisions determined the appropriate measures in their decisions. Their headquarters coordinated in detail with the command and the headquarters of the combined arms formations the order of joint actions.
The tactical interaction of ground forces with formations (units) of the Shah acquired more advanced forms in connection with the introduction into practice of the air offensive, which included air preparation of the attack and air support of the troops. From the middle of 1943, it began to be planned and carried out to the full depth of the ongoing offensive operation. At the same time, interaction was organized by the command of the combined-arms armies and assault air corps (divisions). For example, the plan for the interaction of the armies of the Southern Front with the 8th Air Force in the Miusskaya operation, which took place from July 17 to August 2, 1943, was developed by their headquarters together with representatives of the assault air divisions. This made it possible to plan in detail the air support of the troops to the depth of the enemy tactical defense zone, to distribute the flight resource in such a way that the support was carried out continuously.
Depending on the current situation, the interaction began to be organized according to options, taking into account the likely actions of the German and domestic troops, meteorological conditions. When agreeing on various issues, representatives of the headquarters determined: targets and the composition of strike groups of assault aviation; time of strikes and sections of the flight of the front line; the procedure for suppressing enemy air defense systems by ground forces; the order of communication between aircraft and supported troops at various stages of the battle; the procedure for giving signals of mutual identification and target designation. Along the way, the locations of deployment of command posts were specified, as well as the approximate time and direction of their movement.
The planning results were reflected on a unified goal map, interaction plans and planning tables. On the map of targets (as a rule, on a scale of 1: 100000), a single numbering of characteristic landmarks and important objects was applied to all. The planning tables revealed the issues of tactical interaction between ground armies and ground attack air formations by stages of the operation, tasks of ground forces and other provisions. The plans for interaction with front-line and army mobile groups determined the procedure for calling attack aircraft and performing specific measures aimed at ensuring their combat operations (searching for and equipping landing sites and airfields, creating special stocks of fuels and lubricants and ammunition). The plan for the interaction of aviation forces with artillery determined: the sequence of strikes against the same targets; sections and time of flight of assault aviation units across the front line; the time of the ceasefire of artillery or the limitation of its types, range, direction; the order of mutual target designation.
Detailed planning of interaction with large formations (formations) of the ground forces made it possible to reduce the duration of preparation of SHA units for departure, due to the advance study by the flight personnel of the area of upcoming actions, the nature of targets, identification signals and target designation. This increased the efficiency of meeting the requests of the combined-arms command by attack aircraft. By the beginning of 1944, subunits and units of the ShA began to reach the target after an hour and a half from the moment they were called. This time was distributed as follows: receipt of the task by the aviation representative - 3 minutes; its coding according to the negotiation table and the card - 5 min; transmission by technical means of communication - 5-10 minutes; clarification of the task at the headquarters of the assault aviation unit - 10 minutes; direct preparation of the assigned unit for departure (routing, issuing instructions to crews) - 20 minutes; launch, taxiing and takeoff of the Il-2 six - 15 min.
A further increase in the efficiency of actions of formations (units) of the ShA in the interests of ground forces was facilitated by the improvement of the organization of communications and the approach of airfields to the front line. The problem of ensuring timely strikes by attack aircraft on targets located on the front edge of the enemy defense was also solved by redirecting groups of aircraft in the air to perform newly emerging missions. This was achieved by improving the organization of mutual identification of the crews of attack aircraft and ground forces, as well as increasing the stability of air communications. Improved radio equipment appeared at control centers and aircraft, which were distinguished by greater reliability and better quality of communication. The front edge of the Soviet troops, in addition to panels, was marked with the help of pyrotechnic means (rockets, smoke).
The improvement of communications and the accumulated experience made it possible to improve the control of formations (units) of assault aviation during the period of performing combat missions. Aviation representatives began to aim aircraft (groups) at ground targets, retarget and call attack aircraft. They were, in most cases, deputy commanders and chiefs of staff of assault aviation formations. They were allocated officers of the headquarters of the air divisions and aircraft controllers. Thus, gradually operational groups began to represent ground attack aircraft in the ground formations of the troops. Each group consisted of 6-8 people, had its own means of communication and was engaged in the organization and implementation of interaction between attack aircraft and ground forces. The operational groups deployed their launchers in the main areas of action of the ground forces, in the vicinity of the forward command posts (PKP) of the combined-arms commanders. At a number of the most crucial moments at the observation posts of the supported formations, the commanders of the air assault formations with their operational groups were present. They informed the pilots about the situation and directly directed their actions.
In the third period of the war, the combined arms and aviation command and their staffs were no longer limited to joint planning of the forthcoming military operations. Interaction was worked out and refined on the ground or its layout, during joint command-staff exercises on maps. So, when preparing an offensive in the Yass direction, the commander of the 37th Army, with the participation of the commander of the 9th mixed air corps, conducted a drawing of possible options for the actions of troops and aviation on August 10, 1944 on a terrain model. Four days before the start of the offensive operation of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in the Gumbinn direction at the headquarters of the 5th and 11th Guards. armies held classes on a mock-up terrain with the commanders of aviation divisions, regiments and leaders of the 1st VA groups on the topic "Actions of ground attack and bomber aviation in cooperation with ground forces in the upcoming operation." The next morning, the commanders organized an overflight of the upcoming combat area by the leading strike groups, bombing the front edge of the German defenses.
Comprehensive training of the flight personnel, careful development of issues of joint actions allowed attack aircraft to support the advancing troops by the method of direct escort, combining echeloned actions of small groups with concentrated strikes by forces of regiments, divisions, and sometimes corps. Moreover, concentrated strikes were inflicted sporadically, and echeloned actions were carried out continuously. Groups of 8-10 Il-2s each, successively replacing each other, on commands from the ground suppressed artillery, tanks and centers of enemy resistance. To solve the newly emerging tasks, the commanders of the assault air formations allocated up to 25% of the forces, which made it possible to fulfill the requests of the ground forces immediately.
Interaction was organized on the basis of two basic principles: direct air support of the ground forces and the allocation of air assault formations to the operational control of the commander of the ground armies. The first was used more often, the second was used only at some stages of operations. For example, to support the troops during the crossing of the Oder, the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front K. K. Rokossovsky on April 14, 1945, transferred to the operational subordination of the 65th Army an assault aviation division from the 4th VA. In making such a decision, he took into account the fact that the fire capabilities of the army artillery to suppress the German defense before its crossing to the other side of the river would be significantly limited.
As we can see, the experience of the war testifies that the organization and implementation of interaction between the formations (formations) of ground forces and ground attack aircraft have been continuously improved. Particular attention was paid to increasing the effectiveness of the actions of attack aircraft, their purposeful use to destroy those objects on the battlefield that at the moment directly impeded the advance of ground forces. These and other problems were solved thanks to: detailed planning and careful joint preparation of all forces for the operation; improving the means, as well as the organization of communication; clear and operational control of aircraft with command posts of aviation and combined-arms commanders who are close to each other; the deployment in the troops of a wide network of aircraft controllers; rational distribution of targets between all fire weapons; a significant increase in the number of Il-2 aircraft and the improvement of the organizational structure of assault aviation formations (units); the development of SHA combat methods; the use of the accumulated experience and the growth of the skill of the flight crew.
The continuity of interaction was determined by: the optimal distribution of forces according to the days of the operation, the presence of a reserve in the hands of the front (army) commander, constant duty of assault aviation units in the air and at airfields, and the timely redeployment of assault aviation units following the advancing troops. As a result, the effectiveness of air support has increased significantly. Due to this, as well as the action of other factors, the average rate of breakthrough of the enemy tactical defense zone increased from 2-4 km / day in the first period of the war to 10-15 km / day in the third.
