In 1919, Afghanistan became the first state with which the RSFSR established diplomatic relations and in which the first Soviet embassy was opened. It was headed by Ya. Z. Surits [1].
The first military attaché of the Soviet state was also appointed here: BN Ivanov became him in August 1919 [2]. In December 1919, he was replaced by E. M. Ricks [3], who described the activities of his predecessor as follows:
“The military attaché B. Ivanov, despite all the difficulties, was actively collecting the necessary information in Kabul. He had a large sum of gold and silver at his disposal. Subsequently, he recalled: “This presence of the amount (as in the document. -) gave me the opportunity to conduct intelligence, despite the special isolation measures taken against us. Soldiers (Afghan -) fought, which of them should go with me, because the guards received five from me, for this they allowed us to do whatever they wanted …”[4].
However, not everything went as smoothly as B. Ivanov described. He asked the emir (Amanullah Khan. -) three times to allow him to enter the zone of the Pashtun tribes, but each time he was refused. In October 1919, military advisers headed by Ivanov were forced to leave Kabul, without fulfilling their main task - the conclusion of a military treaty with Amanullah against England”[5].
Only in 1926 plenipotentiary L. N. Stark [6] signed in Paghman (the summer residence of the Afghan kings) the Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression [7].
The results of the work of the 4th (intelligence) Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters in Eastern countries by the end of the 20s can be judged by the report of the head of the 3rd (Information and Statistical) Department A. M. Nikonov [8] at a meeting of intelligence workers of military districts in 1927:
“Countries of the East. A huge amount of material has been accumulated on these countries, which has only been partially processed and is continuously replenished with new materials. The countries of the East can be sufficiently illuminated on the basis of the available materials …”[9].
A direct confirmation of the effective work of military intelligence during that period was the successful invasion of Afghanistan in April-May 1929 by Soviet troops to restore the throne of Amanullah Khan, who became king in 1926, and was overthrown as a result of the anti-government uprising of 1928-1929. led by the "son of a water-bearer" Bachai-Sakao, who was supported by Great Britain. [ten]
Y. Tikhonov writes about the reasons for the overthrow of Amanullah Khan:
“The Soviet military attaché in Kabul I. Rink [11] was … straightforward when describing the reasons for the rebellion in Afghanistan:“The self-confidence of Amanullah Khan, his clumsy foreign policy, overestimation of his which was enough for the slightest impulse in order to cause an uprising in any region of southern Afghanistan. Almost all strata of the population turned out to be against Amanullah Khan and his reforms”[12]” [13].
It is noteworthy that, returning in 1928 from a tour of European countries, "from the USSR, Amanullah went to Turkey, accompanied by a representative of the Intelligence Agency, a former military attaché in Kabul, Rink …" [14].
The OGPU also recommended at first to support Bachai-Sakao in connection with the fact that the agents of the Foreign Department of the OGPU (foreign intelligence) reported on the precarious position of Amanullah Khan. “Appearance in local (Afghan.-) the Chekists took the figures from the lower classes (Bachai Sakao) almost with optimism in the political horizon. They even repeatedly offered to recognize the new ruler and help him”[15]. Soon, however, it became known that the Basmachi sided with the opponents of Amanullah Khan, whom the kurbashi complained about for good-neighborly relations with the Soviet Union. [16] They had a chance in the future, with the support of the new Afghan authorities, to carry out their plans to sever Turkestan from the USSR. [17]
V. Korgun writes that, when deciding to invade Afghanistan, Stalin and the Soviet command intended to outpace the impending invasion of Ibrahim-bek's Basmach detachments [18] into Soviet territory and to prevent the implementation of the plans of the Basmach leader, which envisaged the creation of Turkestan, independent of Moscow, in Central Asia. … [19] However, as can be seen, the Basmachi in this game were on the sidelines.
A detachment of Soviet troops disguised as Afghans under the command of the former military attaché in Kabul, Divisional Commander VM Primakov [20], acting under the guise of a Turkish officer Rakhim Bey [21], fought occupied the cities of Mazar-i-Sharif, Balkh and Tash-Kurgan: "The capture of Mazar-i-Sharif was so unexpected and sudden that the Afghan government found out about it only a week later" [22].
In the second half of May, Primakov was recalled to Moscow, and brigade commander A. I. Cherepanov [23], acting under the pseudonym Ali Avzal-khan [24].
On May 23, Amanullah Khan, deciding to end the struggle, left Afghanistan forever. Stalin, upon learning of this, immediately ordered the withdrawal of the Soviet contingent. In addition, “this decision was influenced by the British ultimatum. The MacDonald government [25], having received detailed reports on the actions of the Soviet detachment in the north of Afghanistan, warned that if the USSR did not withdraw its units from Afghan territory, it would also be forced to send troops to Afghanistan. The Kremlin, on the verge of restoring diplomatic relations with Great Britain [26], decided not to complicate the situation”[27].
Yes, and the British themselves, according to Y. Tikhonov, did their best to keep “their” border tribes from helping Amanullah Khan, but this was mainly limited. Even intelligence officers were forced to admit:
“The participation of England, which is objectively interested in the triumph of Afghan reaction, can be regarded only as an auxiliary moment, accompanying the goals of the feudal lords and clergy” [28].
It is noteworthy that by that time the already very well-known Colonel Lawrence of Arabia [29], to whom Primakov devoted several pages in his book "Afghanistan on Fire", took an active part in this:
“Lawrence is one of the most famous and dangerous agents of British intelligence.
This specialist in the establishment of royal houses in the East and in organizing civil strife in Muslim countries … was again needed by the secret service of the British General Staff and was summoned to India. The Afghan War of Independence [30] and the new situation on the northwestern border of India drew the attention of the British General Staff to the problem of the defense of India, to the possibility of organizing an invasion of the British armies into Soviet Turkestan.
The invaluable experience of Lawrence, a connoisseur of Muslim countries, fluent in Arabic, Turkish and Persian, was necessary in this tangled knot of controversy that was tied on the northwestern border of India.
The experienced hand of Lawrence … established contacts, and when the time came, these propaganda ties began to operate: the agitation of the mullahs fanned unrest in Afghanistan …”[31].
In January 1929, Bachai-Sakao was proclaimed king of Afghanistan under the name of Habibullah-ghazi. He canceled the progressive reforms of Amanullah Khan. However, after the troops of Mohammed Nadir entered Kabul in October 1929, Bachai-Sakao was dethroned and executed on November 2, 1929.
After Nadir Shah came to power, a kind of military-political cooperation developed between the USSR and Afghanistan, when the Afghan authorities turned a blind eye to the raids of Soviet armed detachments in the northern regions of the country against the Basmachi [32]. “The defeat of the Basmachi detachments in the northern provinces contributed to the strengthening of the power of Nadir Shah, which had support only in the Pashtun tribes that controlled the provinces south and southeast of the Hindu Kush” [33]. As a result, in 1931 the USSR signed a new Treaty on Neutrality and Mutual Non-aggression with Nadir Shah, which was extended until 1985 [34].
Thus, Soviet diplomacy and military intelligence in Afghanistan in the 1920s and 1930s contributed to the establishment of a peaceful life and the strengthening of Soviet power in Central Asia.
Here you can draw an analogy with the current anti-terrorist struggle in Syria, that is, on the distant approaches to the borders of Russia.
