He was the strongest ship in the theater of operations. A lone ghost of the northern seas, whose name terrified opponents: in just the years of the war, Soviet and British pilots flew 700 sorties to the Tirpitz mooring sites. The German battleship pinned the home fleet in the North Atlantic for three years, forcing the British to drive squadrons of battleships, aircraft carriers and cruisers along the Norwegian fjords. Submarine formations were looking for him, aviation and special operations forces hunted him. Because of him, convoy PQ-17 was dismissed. The German monster survived a mini-submarine attack, and was finally finished off with 5-ton bombs in the parking lot in Tromsø in November 1944. That was the kind of guy he was!
She was a tiny, half-blind shell, slowly crawling through the cold water. A spray-covered periscope eyepiece, a hydroacoustic sailor and a gyrocompass showing where the north is under this damn water - that's, perhaps, all that Nikolai Lunin was guided by when intercepting the German battleship.
The Tirpitz was great. An invincible 50,000-ton giant with eight 15-inch guns, 320-mm armor belt and a speed of 30+ knots.
But the Soviet submarine K-21 cannot be called an innocent participant in those events. The stealthy submarine cruiser is one of the most modern and heavily armed ships in its class, capable of sneaking up on its victim and grabbing it with the fangs of 6 bow and 4 stern torpedo tubes.
Their meeting took place on July 5, 1942. At 17:00 a German squadron consisting of the battleship "Tirpitz", accompanied by the heavy cruisers "Admiral Scheer", "Admiral Hipper" and 9 escort destroyers, was discovered by a Soviet submarine. The events of the next hour formed the basis of the plot of a real naval detective, which has not left the minds of researchers and historians of the Navy for more than 70 years.
Did Lunin hit Tirpitz or not?
After a phase of active maneuvering, the boat was not in the most advantageous position - on diverging courses, at a distance of 18-20 cables from the German squadron. At this moment, a four-torpedo salvo was fired from the stern apparatus. The target's speed was determined at 22 knots, its true course was 60 ° (according to German data, the squadron at that moment was moving at a speed of 24 knots, heading 90 °).
An acoustician of the K-21 submarine recorded two separated explosions, and then, when the German squadron was already hiding in the distance, a series of explosions was weaker. N. Lunin suggested that one of the torpedoes hit the battleship, the second hit the destroyer, and the subsequent series of explosions - the detonation of depth charges on the sinking ship.
According to German documents, the Tirpitz and its escort ships did not notice the fact of the torpedo attack and did not even see the traces of the torpedoes fired. The squadron returned to base without casualties.
Outdoor furniture-21
However, three hours later, at 21:30, the military campaign was interrupted. German heavy ships laid down on the opposite course - the submarines and the Luftwaffe began to search for and destroy the ships of the abandoned PQ-17 convoy.
These are, in brief, the initial data of this problem.
Today we will not discuss the K-21 maneuvering schemes and its position at the time of the attack of the German battleship - hundreds of articles have been written about this, but their authors have not come to a single conclusion. It all ultimately boils down to assessing the likelihood of a torpedo hitting a battleship.
The explosions heard by acousticians also cannot be a reliable confirmation of the success of the attack: according to the most realistic version, the torpedoes, having passed the maximum distance, sank and detonated when they hit the rocky bottom. A series of weaker explosions in the distance belong to depth charges dropped by the Germans on an unidentified submarine (according to some, it was the British submarine HMS Unshaken, which also tried to attack Tirpitz that day).
Such a rapid curtailment of Operation Knight's Move has a simple explanation: by the evening of July 5, 1942, the Germans received clear confirmation that the PQ-17 convoy had ceased to exist. Chasing single transports is the lot of submarines and airplanes. The large surface ships immediately took a return course.
However, not everything is so simple here either. Around the same time, alarming information came on board the Tirpitz - the Germans intercepted the K-21 radiogram, in which Nikolai Lunin reported on his meeting with the German squadron and the results of the attack. A report from a Russian submarine, the appearance of a British submarine … To say that cowardly German sailors were shaking their knees would be unfair. But the very fact of the appearance of an underwater threat should have alarmed the command. And who knows, the Germans would have risked continuing the operation even if the convoy PQ-17 was still moving towards the ports of destination under the protection of a powerful escort?
The command of the Northern Fleet meets the K-21 returning from the campaign
There can be many versions and explanations …
Instead of all this, I would like to draw your attention to a more reliable and obvious fact. For example, on the destructive effect of a torpedo warhead on a ship's structure.
The Germans could falsify all the magazines, with their usual pedantry rewrite the payroll and applications for the supply of materials and tools from Germany to repair the damaged ship. Take a nondisclosure agreement from all crews of the squadron. Fake photos. Let the Fuhrer sleep peacefully - nothing happened to his favorite toy …
The Germans could falsify any documents. But could they hide the damaged Tirpitz from prying eyes? The Tirpitz's base was under daily surveillance by British reconnaissance aircraft; the movements of the battleship were monitored by agents of the Norwegian Resistance, directly connected with British intelligence.
Was there any chance that the Royal Air Force Mosquito would not notice the repairs and the brightly colored oil spills from the damaged tanks?
There is no doubt that the elimination of damage from a torpedo will require large-scale work. During World War II, many battleships from different countries fell under the attacks of submarines and torpedo aircraft. And every time the consequences turned out to be monstrous - from the detonation of the cellars and the instant death of the ship to the torn sides, bent shafts, jammed steering gears, ripped off the turbine beds and mechanisms in the engine room. Underwater explosion of 300 kilograms of explosives is not a joke. A dry dock is indispensable here.
The 450 mm torpedo hit the stern of the starboard side above the right outer propeller (approximately six meters below the waterline). The explosion of the 227-kg combat loading compartment of the torpedo led to enormous destruction: a hole measuring 9 by 3, an intensively flooded corridor of the right outer propeller shaft, a deformed and jammed shaft (along with the auxiliary rudder of the starboard side), leaks in longitudinal and transverse bulkheads in the area of the fourth power plant … Despite the alert, several watertight hatches and necks in the damaged area were not battened down. By 15:30, the battleship had stopped: by that time, 3,500 tons of seawater had penetrated the stern, the ship had a trim aft of about three meters and a roll to starboard about four and a half degrees.
- the result of a torpedo hit on the Italian battleship "Vittorio Veneto", March 28, 1941
The torpedo exploded on the port side in the area of the aft 381-mm turret. The force of the explosion of 340 kg of TNT broke through the constructive underwater protection: a hole with dimensions of 13x6 meters was formed in the outer skin, and the ship received 2032 tons of outboard water and received a roll of three and a half degrees to the starboard side and a trim to the stern of about 2.2 meters. Several dozen people were killed, about the same number were injured. The roll was reduced to one degree, but it was not possible to eliminate the trim until returning to base.
- the result of the meeting of "Vittorio Veneto" with the British submarine HMS Urge, December 14, 1941. Semi-annual repair is provided.
Battleship Maryland damaged by an aviation torpedo off Saipan
The battleship "North Caroline". The result of a torpedo hit by a Japanese submarine I-19
Incredibly, just three months after the events of July 5, 1942, "Tirpitz" also required complex repairs!
On October 23, 1942, the Tirpitz moved from Narvik to Trondheim. The floating workshop "Hauskaran" also arrived there. The Germans built a caisson and over the next three months carried out … preventive replacement of the rudder of the battleship. It's time to exclaim "Eureka" and toss the hat up. Have we found proof of Lunin's successful attack?
Experienced experts and investigators on especially important cases ask you to remain calm and not rush to conclusions - to find a connection between the torpedo attack on July 5, 1942 and repair work during the autumn-winter period of 1942-43. not so easy. If the torpedo caused damage to the rudders, how did the Tirpitz avoid repeating the fate of its fellow Bismarck? Despite the fact that the British 457 mm aircraft torpedo Mk XII is just a funny firecracker against the background of the Soviet steam-gas 53-38, which was fired by the K-21 boat (mass 1615 kg versus 702 kg, explosive charge - 300 kg versus 176 kg for Mk XII). Such a thing was supposed to smash the "Tirpitz" all the aft part and damage not only the steering wheel, but also the propellers.
Tirpitz returns to base after operation to intercept convoy PQ-17
However, it is known that from the campaign "Tirpitz" returned on its own, the transition to Trondheim was also carried out independently. No noticeable repair work was carried out at the side of the battleship during its stay in Bogen Bay. There were no oil spills and no trim at the stern. Is there a connection between the repair and Lunin's torpedo attack? Or is the renovation a consequence of some other event?
The version with a navigation incident can be discarded as untenable. One glance at the location of the rudders of the battleship is enough to make sure that they can only be damaged if the hull is first ripped against the rocks along its entire length. However, there remains a version with damage to the rudders when reversing while mooring - this could happen if all the crew members of the super battleship got drunk like Untermenschs.
Could there have been any combat damage? Alternatively, the rudder blade could have been damaged during one of the numerous bombing raids on the battleship's anchorage:
March 30-31, 1941 - 33 "Halifax" raid on Trondheim (to no avail, six were shot down);
April 27-28, 1941 - raid of 29 Halifax and 11 Lancaster (to no avail, five were shot down);
April 28-29, 1941 - 23 "Halifax" and 11 "Lancaster" raids (to no avail, two were shot down);
The close explosions of dozens of bombs could not harm the armored monster, but underwater hydrodynamic impacts could well damage the rudder drive and mutilate its feather. Finally, the stress of the metal, cracks and dents that had arisen completed the job - the ship needed complex repairs six months later. There can be many versions. But none of them look like a torpedo hit - the damage should be much more serious than the ones that brought the battleship to Trondheim for a three-month repair.
But what happened to the second torpedo?
Four torpedoes fired, the submariners heard two explosions … Who did the second torpedo hit?
Official Soviet historiography linked the second explosion to a hit on one of the escort's destroyers. But who got the gift from Nikolai Lunin? Is there any evidence of damage to destroyers?
Imagine there are!
If you trace the combat path of each of the destroyers that took part in Operation Horseback Ride, it turns out that just 10 days later, on July 15-17, 1942, the transfer of destroyers Z-24 and Friedrich In from Norway to Germany took place. What the transfer of the ships was connected with is not reported. Is it really to eliminate combat damage ?!
But here, too, there are a number of questions. Even before sailing to their native shores, on July 8-10, destroyers Z-24 and Friedrich In, with the support of torpedo boats T7 and T15, carried out an operation to transfer the damaged TKR Lutzov from Narvik to Trondheim (how the Lutzov was damaged - about (see this just below). On this "wounded" did not calm down and carried out another operation to plant a minefield in the North Sea (July 14-15, 1942)
Something does not look like a ship full of / and a little over 3000 tons withstand the impact of a 533 mm torpedo, and after that calmly "walked" along the northern seas, exposed mines, and under its own power traveled around Scandinavia to Germany.
Even huge, well-protected battleships suffered severely from torpedoes - what awaits a small destroyer in this case? Even if it is not torn in half, the damage will be so severe that it is unlikely to go out to sea in a month. You can quickly weld on sheets of damaged skin, but what to do with bent shafts of screws and turbines ripped from their places?
In fact, the Germans had pretty good reasons to send their destroyers to Kiel for repairs. Operation Knight's Ride did not go well from the very beginning - during maneuvering in narrow fjords, the Lutzov TKR together with the destroyers Hans Lodi, Karl Galster and Theodor Riedel hit the rocks and were damaged in the underwater part of the hull. Alas, none of these ships appear on the lists "sent for repairs to Germany."
Epilogue
Two explosions heard aboard the K-21. Suspiciously fast return of the battleship. October translation of Tirpitz to Trondheim. Three months repair. Caisson. Replacing the rudder feather. Urgent transfer of destroyers from Narvik to Germany. Are there too many coincidences for an ordinary story?
There are other "matches" too:
Nikolai Lunin conducted only one successful (confirmed) torpedo attack during his career - the transport "Consul Schulte", 1942-05-02
The K-21 crew had no experience in attacking fast-moving warships.
Attack from a maximum distance of 18-20 cab. on divergent courses.
How did a torpedo, installed at a depth of 2 m, end up at a depth of 5-8 meters (at such a depth below the waterline there were rudders). Turbulent propeller flows? Let's say …
Despite all the guesses and coincidences, it is highly likely that the K-21 submarine still missed the target. Further events related to the autumn-winter repair of the battleship also poorly fit into the event outline with a torpedo hit. And who, in that case, was hit by the second torpedo?
One thing is certain: the K-21 crew demonstrated exceptional courage, for the first time in the Soviet fleet, carrying out an attack on such a complex and well-guarded target. Having received the intercepted K-21 radiogram, the officers of the largest ship Kriegsmarine probably experienced unpleasant excitement when they learned that they had been attacked by a Soviet submarine, while the submarine went unnoticed from board German ships.
Damaged Tirpitz after Operation Wolfram. The ship was hit by 14 medium and large-caliber bombs, and the concussions dispersed the old wounds inflicted on the beast a little earlier by the XE series mini-submarines. The stains from the oil spread on the water are clearly visible. Renovation in full swing, July 1944
Submarine K-21 in the eternal stop in Severomorsk
