The emergence of a full-fledged unmanned aviation complex of the 6th generation, capable of performing the full range of combat missions solved by pilots today, should be expected no earlier than the end of the second half of the 21st century. The service life of the F-35A / B / C alone was recently extended to 2070, not to mention such machines as the stealthy B-21 strategic bomber-bomber under the LRS-B program. Our T-50 PAK-FA, which are much newer and more perfect than the Raptors and Lightnings, will last about the same or even longer. But today the most daring attempts are being made to create advanced tactical drones based on the well-proven 4th generation multipurpose fighters, the developments of which are already being implemented on the example of the network-centric linking of on-board electronic equipment (including the weapons control complex) of the MQ-9 "Reaper / ER "with equipment for exchange of tactical information of the F-35A fighter. But due to the fact that these drones have a serious drawback for jointly with supersonic fighters for the operational performance of a combat mission - a low maximum speed (up to 400 km / h), experts from the US Air Force Research Laboratory decided to resort to a very simple, at first glance, but effective concept.
Representatives of the laboratory announced plans for the modernization of unmanned target fighters QF-16 for a unified system of data exchange and control with multi-role fighters of the 5th generation of the F-35 family, where QF-16 and other versions of Falcon will act as slaves in the theater of operations fighters. According to the ambitious concept of "Loyal Wingman" (from English - "faithful follower"), which has been wandering among the American military departments for about a dozen years, the entire information component monitored by the onboard radar and various passive sensors of the driven machine should in full and with all details are transmitted via radio communication channel to the leading board. Navigational information, the state of the avionics and the power plant, as well as the visual situation around the follower should be displayed with the highest resolution on multifunctional indicators and the pilot-operator's helmet-mounted target designation system, in this case on the F-35. Such a tactical "bundle" provides several wide-angle high-resolution TV cameras on board the aircraft, located on the top, bottom, side, front and rear projections; also do not forget about the super-protected coded radio carrier channel, through which this information will be transmitted to the pilot-operator. For example, in the coverage area of the Krasukha-4 ground-based electronic warfare system, the quality of communication between the master and the slave may decrease to levels at which the continuation of the air operation may become impossible. More or less normal communication between the two aircraft in this case can be maintained over limited distances. As the only effective means of protection against electronic countermeasures of the enemy, the F-35 can use a directional broadband radio channel of the centimeter range MADL. But there is in the application of the bundle "F-35 - modernized QF-16" and a lot of positive aspects.
Firstly, this is the complete absence of any psychological factor that could affect the performance of the operation by an unmanned fighter. On a manned vehicle, everything is completely different: the psychological state of the pilot can be easily influenced by any, sometimes even insignificant, combat incident: a close queue of tracer 30-mm ZAK shells in the night with the simultaneous "beeping" of the warning system about receiving a "capture" warning the enemy's radar aircraft, forcing a sharp maneuver, all these unforeseen moments are always an obstacle to the smooth execution of a combat mission. In the Loyal Wingman concept, the F-35 pilot, who has switched his Lightning to the terrain-following mode, can correct or control the flight of the QF-16 slave, as well as remotely control its weapons in the online computer game mode, much less risking his own life … The only concern is the F-16, which is stuffed with tons of expensive precision weapons.
Secondly, this is a twofold increase in the combat load of a wide variety of missile and bomb weapons, which can be used not only for target designation of the slave F-16, but also for target designation of the leading F-35. And this is an additional advantage, expressed in the high target channelization of the Lightning II Falcon. The total combat load of two vehicles on a mission can reach 18,500 kg, weapons will be placed on 19 suspension points of two aircraft. In addition, if the leading F-35A is lost, the F-16 will be able to go into autopilot mode, or under control of another F-35A, which will preserve the air arsenal.
Thirdly, not only an upgraded version of the QF-16 target aircraft, but also completely new modifications of the 4 ++ generation, including the F-16C Block 60, can be used as a slave aircraft. / APG-80, consisting of 1000 PPMs, can detect a fighter-type target (EPR 3 sq. M) at a distance of up to 150 km, accompany 20 air targets on the aisle and fire AIM-120C-7/8 missiles up to 8 air targets … AFAR allows accurate mapping of the terrain and realizes the detection and defeat of small-sized ground targets in low-altitude flight mode.
One thing can be summed up: the combined use of the F-35A stealth multi-role fighters with various unmanned versions of the F-16C will dramatically increase the combat effectiveness of the US Air Force fighter squadrons. The work of machines in tandem will increase the combat stability of the F-35A during the suppression of enemy air defenses, or during an air strike on point targets protected by various modern air defense systems. Attacking "HARMami" slave F-16C can fire ground air defense systems in a sharp "jump" from a low-altitude flight, and loaded with AGM-88 approaching ground air defense missile systems may not have time to respond to the leading F-35A approaching from an unexpected direction, which will drop a few more units The WTO, for example, is the GBU-39SDB high-precision glide bombs. For an anti-aircraft missile system with semi-active radar guidance and one multifunctional illumination radar, such tactics can have "unpleasant" consequences (S-300PS, etc.); I'll clarify: only if it is used only against one division with one 30N6 RPN, with the participation of a full-fledged air defense system in the 4-6 divisions, it will be much more difficult to “hack” the S-300PS.
There is another cunning US Air Force tactic that they can use in the combined actions of the F-35A and F-16C - the use of a decoy missile "MALD-J", which is capable of simulating the effective surface / scattering area (EPR) of many tactical aircraft and WTO … This false target can create enormous difficulties for the selection of real missile-hazardous air objects by ground-based radars of air defense systems, as well as "overload" the carrying capacity of the multifunctional radar of the anti-aircraft missile system, which can lead to the defeat of the latter.
The only visible retaliatory measure is the creation and adoption of more productive anti-aircraft missile systems with excellent all-round capabilities of firing not only at the system level, but also at the divisional level, with which the next brainchild of the Almaz-Antey Concern VKO - SAM S-350 "Vityaz".
