In the future, the rocket will be deeply upgraded to the Aster-30 Block 1NT version (NT, - New Technology). This modification will be able to operate on medium-range ballistic missiles (up to 1500 km). A promising modification of the Aster-30 Block II will be developed over the next 5-12 years. The flight performance of this interceptor missile can reach the level of interceptor missiles of the 40N6 or THAAD type, which will make it possible to intercept endoatmospheric targets at altitudes of 100 km and ranges of 300-500 km. The agreement on the development of the version "Aster-30 Block 1NT" between France and Italy was signed in early November 2016. The specialists of the French and Italian divisions of Thales and MBDA are faced with the task of increasing the power and operating period of the 1st (booster) stage of the Aster-30 missile, as well as developing a completely new high-potential X-band MRL with a detection range of up to 500 km to meet the long-range characteristics of the new generation Aster missiles. Obviously, developments on radars such as "SMART-L" and "Sampson" will be used. SAMP-T is regularly modernized and its deployment in Georgia poses a real threat to our air attack weapons, including Iskander.
In addition, even the existing version of the air defense missile system can become much more dangerous due to the pairing of the combat control point (PBU) and the Arabel radar with powerful radar detectors of the decimeter range of the LANZA and RAT-31 DL / M type. Detecting ballistic and aerodynamic targets at much longer distances (100-150 km), these radars have the ability to issue target designation to the SAMP-T PBU much earlier than the Arabel radar does, and this will significantly reduce the response time for high-speed targets …
As you can see, even 3 or 4 SAMP-T batteries radically change the alignment of forces in the airspace of the Caucasian theater of military operations in terms of the defense of NATO military facilities that will be located on the territory of Georgia. To counter such a missile defense system, a significant number of Iskander missiles are required in the Southern Military District, as well as equipping tactical fighters at airbases in the Krasnodar Territory and the Republic of Crimea with tactical missiles of the Kh-59M2 / MK2 Gadfly type. The missiles of this family have tremendous advantages in the destruction of command posts and multifunctional SAMP-T radars. Almost the entire flight of the Gadflies of various versions takes place in the terrain enveloping mode at an altitude of 30 to 100 m. The Arabel radar has great restrictions on the radio horizon here, since the SAM equipment usually does not provide for lifting the antenna post to a universal tower with a height of 22-27 m (the station is located directly on the van with the FCU, Fire Control Unit). The height of the HEADLIGHT web above the surface is 6-7 m, and therefore the radio horizon for low-altitude cruise missiles does not exceed 30 km.
It is quite possible to suppress the SAMP-T batteries, but only with the integrated and massive use of various classes of military equipment, both ground-based and air-based.
ARMENIAN DEFENSE DOESN'T Lag behind
As it was found out during the detailed review, the strike potential of the Armed Forces of Armenia is one of the strongest in the South Caucasus. In addition to a huge number of multiple launch rocket systems of various calibers, as well as an even larger number of barreled artillery units and operational-tactical missile systems "Elbrus", "Tochka-U" and "Iskander-E", which are in service with the Armenian army, a considerable contribution to this artillerymen of the 992nd artillery regiment, attached to the 102nd Russian military base, located in the city of Gyumri, also contribute to the component. The main purpose of this base is to contain the military formations of such unpredictable states as Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia on the southern borders of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, as well as joint military operations with the Armenian Armed Forces if Baku decides to conduct a large-scale offensive operation on the lands of Nagorno- Of the Karabakh Republic.
A feature of the arsenal of artillerymen of all units of the 102nd military base of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus is the predominance of artillery installations. Thus, the 922th artillery regiment is armed with: 3 batteries of 122-mm D-30 howitzers (18 guns), the BM-21 Grad MLRS rocket battalion (18 PU vehicles); and in service with three motorized rifle regiments (123rd, 124th, 128th), a total of: an artillery battalion of 18 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled guns, as well as three D-30 battalions (54 guns). In total, the entire 102nd base is armed with 108 units of MLRS, self-propelled guns and transportable howitzers. All this arsenal needs excellent cover with a layered air defense system. Does Armenia have such a cover?
First, in June 2016, Armenia ratified an agreement on the formation of a common air defense system with the Russian Federation within the framework of the CSTO. This means that in the event of an aggravation of the situation in the NKR or the threat of air strikes from the Azerbaijani Air Force or rocket artillery strikes, the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces may urgently transfer to Armenia the required number of anti-aircraft missile divisions S-400 "Triumph", S-300V4, "Buk-M2", as well as batteries of self-propelled anti-aircraft missile and anti-aircraft missile-artillery complexes "Tor-M2E" and "Pantsir-S1". These air defense systems are capable of easily intercepting 300-mm NURS launched by the T-300 "Qasirqa" system. MLRS T-300 Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense has been purchasing from the Turkish company ROKETSAN since January 2013. The Qasirqa's range is 100 km, and its combat qualities are similar to the Smerch MLRS.
There are other options for the development of events. For example, many Armenian observers are alarmed by the opinion of Ivan Konovalov, director of the Center for Strategic Conjuncture, who in May this year noted many ambiguities in the Azerbaijani defense program. He claims that in addition to 12 launchers of OTRK 9K79-1 "Tochka-U", Azerbaijan could have time to include in the "Israeli contract" a decent number of 306-mm operational-tactical ballistic missiles "EXTRA" Chinese design "Polonaise". The range of high-precision missiles "EXTRA" is estimated at about 150 km, and one launcher can accommodate up to 8 missiles in 2 quadruple transport and launch modules. No one doubts the appearance of these missiles from the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, since at the beginning of July 2014, the entire Middle East and the Caucasus flew a video report from the AzTV TV channel, in which the Azerbaijani crew fires these missiles from a Lynx modular launcher on their own range, hitting targets at a distance of 42 km. It is known that Extras are manufactured by Israel Military Industry (IMI) and have a circular probable deviation (CEP) of 10 m, plus a heavy high-explosive fragmentation or cluster warhead designed to destroy manpower and lightly armored vehicles. Given the large caliber of the rocket, more serious equipment can be used, represented by self-aiming cumulative ammunition capable of destroying heavy armored vehicles. Such a configuration of the "Extra" brings it to the same dangerous level as the MLRS "Smerch". OTBR guidance is represented by the satellite correction module.
Theoretically, "EXTRA" is capable of causing significant damage to the infrastructure of the Armenian Armed Forces. But its large caliber and radar signature make it easier to intercept by modern Russian anti-aircraft missile systems. At the moment, "EXTRA" is the only ballistic missile that poses a certain threat to the population and strategic objects of Armenia when it is massively used by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. But another “surprise” may appear on the “foggy horizon” in the form of the Hatf-4 medium-range ballistic missiles purchased from Pakistan. Today there is no official information on the availability of these missiles in Azerbaijan, but various sources have long been reporting on plans or even the implementation of such a strategic deal between Islamabad and Baku.
If the presence of "Hatf-4" ("Shahin-1A") at the Azerbaijani Armed Forces is confirmed, you need to be prepared for the most unexpected turn of events. The fact is that the Hatf-4 is no longer an operational-tactical ballistic missile, it is a full-fledged modernized version of the Shahin-1 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). The range of "Hatf-4" can be from 2 to 3 thousand km. Interestingly, the distance from Baku to Yerevan is only 460 km. Why Azerbaijan might need an MRBM is not yet quite clear …
One of the options under consideration is threats towards Russia and its military-industrial capacities in the Eastern European part after Moscow intercepts for Yerevan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But here we also see a complete lack of logic, since the entire European part of Russia is very quickly overgrown with "fresh" divisions and brigades of S-400 "Triumph", and will soon be replenished with divisions "Buk-M3" and S-300V4, which are capable of shooting down "Hatfs" with an efficiency of more than 85% ("Shahin-1A" are not equipped with advanced complexes of means of overcoming missile defense, as well as gas-dynamic systems for performing anti-aircraft maneuvers). And the Azerbaijani Armed Forces will never dare to fire at us, because, firstly, they know the retaliatory measures, and secondly, most of Baku's defense contracts are concluded directly with Rosoboronexport, including further maintenance of equipment and the supply of spare parts (as you know, the Russian Federation sells weapons to Azerbaijan to maintain parity in the region). From that moment on, the purpose of the possible deliveries of Hatf-4 to Azerbaijan becomes even less clear, and everything begins to resemble a large theater of absurdity. Next, let's return to the air defense of Armenia.
In addition to the Russian missile defense systems, which can be quickly deployed on the territory of Armenia at the time of the escalation of the conflict, there is already a fairly powerful anti-aircraft component on duty there, represented by anti-aircraft missile defense divisions of the Russian contingent at the 102nd military base, as well as anti-aircraft missile launchers belonging to the Military air forces of Armenia. The vicinity of the 102nd military base is covered by 2 divisions of the S-300V air defense missile system. According to the resource "Caucasian Knot", the composition of each division is represented by 2 launchers 9A83 for launching medium-range anti-aircraft interceptor missiles 9M83, as well as only one launcher (ROM) 9A85, which also serves to store and launch missiles 9M83. Thus, there is a significant lack of range indicators of these "Anteyevs", since there are no launchers and launchers 9A82 and 9A84, designed to store and launch the "large caliber" of the S-300V complexes - 9M82 interceptor missiles, which have a longer range (100 km) and speed (6M). The battery turns out to be incomplete. And this indicates another drawback - a smaller target channel of incomplete batteries.
The fact is that for the illumination of aerodynamic and ballistic targets in the S-300V complex, it is not the multichannel radar that, regardless of the number of launchers, provides simultaneous firing of 6 targets (this principle is implemented in the S-300PS family), but specialized single-channel continuous-radiation radars located directly on launchers 9A82 and 9A83. The two Anteyevs defending the 102nd military base have only 4 launchers with 9A83 illuminated radars. In other words, the S-300V in this configuration is a 4-channel, and even with the absence of the "main caliber" - SAM 9M82. This is extremely insufficient to provide a powerful missile defense system of the allied state, with which Turkey and Azerbaijan are neighbors.
The situation is saved by two modifications of the "Three hundred", which are in service with the Armenian Air Force. The first modification is the S-300PT-1 in the amount of 3 divisions with 12 transportable launchers of the 5P851A type. The total ammunition stock of the 3 divisions is 144 anti-aircraft guided missiles, which is quite enough to cover large transport junctions, as well as strategic objects of Armenia from attacks by Azerbaijani T-300 MLRS and Tochka-U missiles. Three S-300PT-1 divisions have a total target channel - 18 simultaneously fired air attack weapons. The range of the S-300PT-1 for aerodynamic targets is 75 km, and the speed of the struck objects is 1200 m / s. Ballistic objects can be destroyed at a range of 35-40 km. Considering that the S-300PT-1 have semitrailer transportable elements, they were deployed as a stationary multi-channel missile defense system in the vicinity of the capital of Armenia - Yerevan. Three S-300PT-1 divisions are combined into a single air defense system, and are also capable of issuing target designation to auxiliary complexes "Kub", "Osa-AKM", "Shilka", as well as "Strela-10". The last three are involved in the defense of the "dead zones" of the "Three hundred" divisions.
The second modification is the more advanced S-300PS. This system has similar fire characteristics, similar to the 5В55Р interceptor missiles, as well as identical parameters of the radar equipment. The Air Force of Armenia has 2 S-300PS divisions with 24 launchers of 5P85D and 5P85S types with a total number of ready-to-fight missiles - 96 units. (not counting the unknown number of 5В55Р arsenals in warehouses). The range of the complexes is 75 km, although some sources claim to increase it to 90 km. Similarly to the S-300PT-1, the function of long-range radar detection is performed by a highly automated two-way S-band 36D6-M radar. The station is capable of detecting "Tochka-U" -type ballistic missiles even over the territory of Azerbaijan, not to mention larger objects of the "fighter" type, which are detected at a distance of 240-270 km.
The main advantage of the S-300PS divisions is their mobility, as well as the time to bring from the marching position to the combat position and back (5 minutes). This became possible due to the placement of radar, fire and command facilities of the complex on its own off-road chassis of the MAZ-543M / 537 types. Due to the high mobility of the S-300PS, it was decided to deploy their divisions in the vicinity of the cities of Goris and Sisian, which is about 40-50 minutes drive from the NKR. If necessary, 2 divisions can be quickly transferred closer to the NKR to protect the territory of the republic from the attacks of the WTO of the Azerbaijan Air Force. And even being near these cities of Armenia, the calculations have the ability to fire control of the airspace of most of the NKR without the need to perform a 60-kilometer march to the east.
An important detail of all S-300PT-1 / PS divisions of the Armenian air defense is the presence of low-altitude detectors (NVO) 5N66. The station can detect and track up to 180 low-altitude targets with an RCS of 0.02 m2 moving at a speed of 2665 km / h within the radio horizon increased to 30 km. Thanks to these stations, the possibility of detecting Azerbaijani reconnaissance UAVs appearing in the NKR mountains is increasing. At the moment, the air defense of Armenia has a balanced structure with the capabilities of a territorial missile defense: the ability to intercept almost all air attack weapons of neighboring states has been implemented. At the same time, there is some lag behind the air defense forces of Azerbaijan, which are armed with the S-300PMU-2 and the Iron Dome, which have much smaller restrictions on the minimum target EPR (0.05 m2 - for the S-300PS, 0.02 m2 - for S-300PMU-2 and less than 0, 01 - for "Iron Dome"). All the air defense systems in service with the Armenian Air Force should receive an elementary upgrade package to the S-300PM1 level, as well as new Buk-M3 complexes.
"EYES" OF THE AZERBAIJAN RADIO ENGINEERING INTELLIGENCE
Let's go back to the Azerbaijani air defense. It has excellent capabilities in the fight against enemy tactical aircraft, low-altitude air attack weapons, and unmanned reconnaissance and strike aircraft. The basis is formed by the S-300PMU-2, Buk-M1-2 and Barak-8 complexes. The first two complexes are highly effective in the destruction of operational-tactical ballistic missiles 9M79-1 "Tochka-U", as well as 8K14 (R-17) "Elbrus". The Armenian army is armed with 32 8K14 missiles with 8 9K72 Elbrus complexes and the Tochka-U OTRK division. All these missiles are not equipped with gas-dynamic maneuvering systems on approach to the target and built-in electronic warfare modules, and therefore can be destroyed in the air by the existing air defense systems of Azerbaijan.
In terms of the availability of tactical missile attack warning systems, as well as radar-AWACS, the air defense of Azerbaijan is distinguished by their large abundance, technological excellence and flexibility of use. Firstly, these are the radar facilities attached to the Favorit and Iron Dome complexes. The "Trehsotki" 64N6E radar detector, presented by a two-way PFAR, operates in the decimeter S-band and is capable of detecting an R-17 type OTBR on the ascending trajectory at a distance of more than 500 km (including airspace over Armenia), the main MRS of the complex has similar parameters Iron Dome - EL / M-2084. But this did not seem enough to the Azerbaijani General Staff: back in 2012, a contract was signed for the purchase of the Israeli EL / M-2080 "Green Pine" early warning and targeting radar, and then the Belarusian "RADAR-50" surveillance radars and Ukrainian 80K6, built based on a digital antenna array (CAR). The last station 80K6, developed by the Ukrainian NPK Iskra, operates in the S-band and is capable of detecting a fighter-type target (EPR about 3 m2) at a distance of about 350 km. Its carrying capacity reaches 200 m, and the height of the detected targets is 40 km.
AND AGAIN THE "TRACE" OF ISRAEL
A more interesting acquisition is the Israeli Green Pine. In Israeli missile defense systems of the Arrow-2 family, the Green Pine radar acts as an early detection and targeting system for Hetz-2 interceptor missiles. In Azerbaijan, it will be used as the main radar control device for the aerospace area over the NKR and part of Armenia. It is this radar that will become the main element of notification in the early warning system of Azerbaijan in the event of the forced use of "Tochki", "Elbrus" and "Iskander" by Armenia. Green Pine automatically becomes the No.1 target for Russian and Armenian Iskander in case of aggression from Baku.
The EL / M-2080 "Green Pine" radar complex, developed by the "Elta" company, is represented by an active phased array of 2300 PPMs operating in the decimeter L-band with a frequency of 1-2 GHz and a wavelength of 15-30 cm. This is not enough to use the complex is in the illumination of air targets, but it is quite acceptable for target designation to the combat control points of the air defense missile system, or to the automated control systems of an anti-aircraft missile brigade. Computing means "Green Pine" allow you to track targets moving at speeds up to 11,000 km / h. Its capacity is over 30 air targets.
The territory of Azerbaijan is an ideal place to control vast areas of aerospace over Iran, about 600-700 km inland, and therefore in the future Israel may well deploy improved Super Green Pine stations in this country.
Looking at such an excessive generosity of the Department for the Export of Arms of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, which sells anti-missile and radar systems of strategic importance to Azerbaijan, many speculations and questions begin to spin in my head. One such question is: what is the reason for such generosity on the part of Tel Aviv, which usually preserves its defense technology like the apple of its eye? You can find the answer to this by looking at the news reports for 2012, while at the same time starting from the fact that the 1.6 billion defense contract with Baku (taking into account the delivery of "Green Pine") was concluded in 2011.
As the American Foreign Policy magazine reported at the end of March 2012, the Israeli Defense Ministry secretly rented one of the Azerbaijani airfields for the needs of Hel Haavir. The purpose of owning an airbase off the coast of the Caspian Sea, without any doubt, is a 5-minute flight time to the airspace of Iran, against which the power departments of the Jewish state have been developing an air strike strategy for the destruction of the military-industrial and nuclear infrastructures of Iran for many years. The thing is that Tehran, knowing the main missile-hazardous (western and north-western) air directions, formed a "belt" of early radar warning near the western borders of the state. Such attention was not paid to the northern VN. And tiny Israel decided to try to catch Iran by surprise. Tel Aviv could not find other ways, except for a request for the use of military facilities of corrupt Azerbaijan. But here's the bad luck: the entire cleverly done "secret" operation of Israel was trumpeted with fanfare by the American administration, which received information from its own special services. As we know, the States are trying to prevent arbitrariness on the part of their "sheep" in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the deals were carried out, and today a kind of "barter" has been established between Israel and Azerbaijan, which is strategically important for both sides. Israel keeps under conditional control all northern air borders of Iran, and Azerbaijan receives modern weapons that can partially repel powerful retaliatory artillery strikes from the Armenian Armed Forces.
Meanwhile, neither Azerbaijan nor Israel were able to 100% achieve the assigned tasks. Over the past 3 years, Iran's air defense and missile defense system has been strengthened several times: 5 S-300PMU-2 divisions were finally received from Russia, which almost completely blocked the western and north-western air defense systems of the country, and on the northern air defense system Iran now has the opportunity to deploy its own long-range air defense missile systems. range of the "Bavar-373" type, the characteristics of which are not inferior to the S-300PS or even the S-300PM1. It will be extremely difficult for the Israeli Air Force to "break through" this level of air defense even with the help of the F-35I "Adir" stealth fighters of the 5th generation purchased today, not to mention the more noticeable F-15I "Ra`am" and F-16I "Sufa".
The plan of Baku to establish an impenetrable aerospace "shield" both over Azerbaijan itself and over the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was partially covered with a copper basin: one battery of the "Iron Dome" complex will provide only positional protection of individual units of the ground forces from moderate artillery strikes of the Armenian Armed Forces, and 3 divisions S-300PMU-2 and Buk-M1-2 will be protected from attacks by Scad (Elbrus) and Tochka-U. The Azerbaijani air defense forces will have nothing to repel the decapitating strikes of Iskander-E / M missile systems: this is such a strategic failure due to the rejection of the French SAMP-T.
The modern theater of operations of the South and North Caucasus is distinguished by numerous intricacies of various weapon systems of the sides, which are often designed to "play" on several fronts at once due to the fact that several regional military-political superpowers have purely personal interests here. Our plans, however, remain to keep the situation under complete control, preventing countries such as Turkey, Israel, Azerbaijan and Georgia from shifting the strategic balance in their favor.
