The week before last, on October 20, 2016, in the translated materials of the information and analytical resource "Military Parity", a small news article was published on the development of the APKWS program of light tactical guided aircraft missiles of the "air-to-ground" class, while the title of the article ended with "Analogues in the Russian Federation No". With all due respect to the promptness of posting fresh news material on the military-political situation in the world on the pages of militaryparitet.com, it is simply impossible to agree with the title of this publication even with a stretch.
As it became known, on October 14 this year at the White Sands test site (New Mexico), the last stage of tests of the light two-seat subsonic attack aircraft / tactical attack aircraft Scorpion, developed by Textron AirLand (as part of Cessna and "Bell") with technical support from the US Air Force. The last stage consisted in practicing the use of air-to-ground missiles, where the AGM-114F "Interim Hellfire" missiles with a tandem cumulative warhead, as well as promising short-range tactical missiles WGU-59 / B APKWS-II, showed their best side. which were previously tested on board the combat training version of the Bell 407GT helicopter.
APKWS missiles (Advanced Precision Kill Weapon) are the most famous modification of the 70-mm unguided missile (NUR) Hydra, which BAE Systems specialists equipped with a semi-active laser homing head, and therefore the modernization of tens of thousands of Hydras with semi-active laser homing systems will cost dozens of times cheaper than the resource-intensive production of a smaller or similar number of Halfire missiles. At the moment, 7,000 laser kits have already been delivered to the US Navy, ILC and the US Air Force, and the rate of further deliveries will increase to 5,000 units. in year. The missiles will become one of the most important "tactical assets" of the US assault and helicopter attack aircraft.
In rapid strike operations, APKWS-II missiles can become the most serious threat to our Tor-M2E and Pantsir-S1 military anti-aircraft missile and anti-aircraft missile-gun systems: WGU-59 / B has an initial speed of about 1500 m / s (5400 km / h) and a low deceleration coefficient, which is why the target (when firing at a maximum range of 12-15 km), it remains at the level of 850-900 m / s. This is faster than the official speed limit of the Tor-M1 / 2 family complexes (700 m / s), and almost corresponds to the speed limit for interception of the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system. In addition, the RCS of APKWS-II missiles barely exceeds the radar signature of a compact reconnaissance hexacopter, i.e. approximately 0, 003 - 0, 005 m2. To shoot down such an airborne object moving at almost hypersonic speed is tantamount to being intercepted by a needle bullet flying at the speed of sound. And not every air defense system will be able to effectively counteract such an air attack means. Of course, it will be easier to shoot down the WGU-59 / B APKWS-II carrier than to work on a missile, but there are circumstances: an attacking Scorpion, Thunderbolt or any other tactical aircraft can approach the Thor at an ultra-low altitude, and if there is no S-300PS, S-400 Triumph or friendly aviation within a 35 km radius, the Torah operators will have big problems. Even taking into account that APKWS, like any other missiles with semi-active laser guidance, provide for the location of an enemy laser designator near the target (it can be used both by the state special operations forces of the Special Operations Forces, and by regular units of the Army or ILC), to eliminate the target designator, and its operators will be very difficult for two reasons.
Firstly, they will turn it on to illuminate the target only a couple of seconds before the WGU-59 / B flight, and there will simply be no time for retaliatory measures. Why for such a short time? Yes, because the coordinates of the target will be transferred to the missile carrier in advance either from its own airborne radar, or from the E-8C "J-STARS" or "Global Hawk" aircraft optical and electronic reconnaissance systems, and to open the positions of the laser target designation source in advance (before approaching rocket) will not make sense. Secondly, modern ground-based target designators are compact and provide for radio command control via wires or radio communication channel at a distance of up to several kilometers from the control device. Destroy one target designator, and then use the second, third, and so on.
A more or less proven and effective way of dealing with APKWS-II will remain active defense systems with positional detection radars and protective anti-missiles of the "Afghanit" type and more modern means. The speed of the targeted targets for the Arena KAZ is only 700 m / s, and therefore the interception of the controlled 4-5-swing “Hydra” will be difficult to execute. Also, a good effect of countering the American APKWS will be realized by complexes of optoelectronic active protection of the Shtora-1 type. But there is also a drawback here: delivered a couple of seconds before hitting, the smoke screen will not allow WGU-59 / B to hit the target with a circular probable deviation of 1-2 m, but even hitting the ground or a structure next to the target can cause significant damage to lightly armored units, the incapacitation of self-propelled air defense systems' radar and personnel losses. APKWS has a huge future.
The main reason for such a rapid and trouble-free development of the APKWS program is that since 2008, the Americans have had many developments on a similar ambitious project "Talon LGR" ("Laser-Guided Rocket"). The project was launched in the American city of Tucson 8 years ago, and its goal was to equip the armed forces of the allied states in Western Asia with light and 70-mm guided missiles based on the NUR "Hydra-70", unified with M-260 and M-261 aircraft launchers. The development and fine-tuning of tactical missile systems was carried out by the American and Emirates corporations "Raytheon" and "Emirates Advanced Instruments". At the same time, only the UAE Armed Forces showed interest in the Talon LGR rocket and its mobile launcher based on the 6x6 Nimr armored vehicle.
The Talon LGR missile is equipped with a weaker than APKWS solid-propellant rocket engine weighing 6, 2 kg, which accelerates it to a speed of 700 m / s, and the missile becomes vulnerable to military air defense systems. The range of this rocket due to the ground launch is no more than 8000 m, but thanks to the advanced on-board computer and the data exchange bus with the carrier, it has several flight modes. The standard mode, using difficult terrain, is a "slide": a mobile launcher approaches a hill (hill), and then launches a Talon LGR rocket at a large angle relative to the earth's surface, the rocket rises to a height of 1.5-2 km and along a semi-ballistic trajectory approaches the calculated coordinates of the target, after which semi-active laser guidance is turned on to the spot of a ground-based or air-based target designator. The Talons, like the WGU-59 / B APKWS-II, have a great future not only in the American, but also in the Middle East, Asian and European arms markets, and then in theaters of war. And what can we oppose? What promising and inexpensive missile systems can Russian engineering in the new century boast?
The main strike weapons of modern Russian tactical aviation, as well as combat helicopters should be represented by rather expensive high-performance missile systems with anti-radar missiles Kh-31P and Kh-58UShKE, anti-ship missiles Kh-31AD and Kh-35U "Uran", as well as multi-purpose tactical missiles of the X family -38, Kh-59MK and the Hermes helicopter complex. But practically all of these missiles are quite an expensive pleasure, which is why very often new Sushki and MiGs can be seen with old X-25ML / MR / MPU PRLRs, and Black Sharks with the Whirlwind complex. And some helicopter regiments and IAP, due to a small budget, do not have high-precision weapons at all. Nevertheless, the chance to quickly rectify the situation is still in our hands.
17 years have passed since the MAKS-1999 air show. Nevertheless, it is impossible to say for sure whether at least one helicopter regiment of the Russian Air Force entered service with the most interesting example of that long-standing air show - the threat aviation missile system developed by ZAO NTK Ametekh (Automation and Mechanization of Technologies).
This complex was conceived by the developer as an inexpensive and high-precision short-range strike weapon for destroying strong points, training camps, shelters, as well as enemy armored vehicles of all types in the most weakened upper projections of the hull and turret. The main emphasis was placed on the unification of promising missiles with most types of aircraft launchers such as UB-16 / 15-57UM, B-8 and B-13, due to which virtually any attack and attack transport helicopter (from Mi-8 to Mi-24PN and Mi-35) can be turned into an inexpensive high-precision complex for direct support of troops with a large ammunition stock of 3 types of compact missiles.
Three types of missiles were developed on the basis of the well-known NAR S-5, S-8 and S-13, and therefore have similar calibers: 57 mm (S-5kor), 80 mm (S-8kor) and 120 mm (S-13kor); "Cor" - adjustable. The main difference between these missiles and unguided variants is a two-stage design, where the first stage is a starting accelerator with a solid propellant charge and petal stabilizers, and the second is a combat one, with an integrated semi-active laser homing head, nozzles of a pulsed gas-dynamic control system, as well as petal stabilizers similar to the first stage. In fact, the combat stage is an adjustable ammunition, similar to artillery counterparts. The reloading of the guides in the launchers is significantly simplified in comparison with the reloading of heavy tactical missiles of the Kh-29T / L type. So, the S-5kor missiles (weighing about 7 kg) can be delivered to the launch container by only one person from the aircraft wing's maintenance personnel. S-8kor (weight 15, 2 kg) can also be placed in the PU with the help of one employee of the service personnel.
For the safe loading of 122-mm S-13kor with a mass of 70 kg, 2 people are needed. The total reload time of the entire ammunition of the "Threat" complex is several times less than that of heavy missiles. The launch of the S-5/8 / 13kor missiles is carried out according to the principle of their unguided options, then the acceleration stage is separated and after a slight deceleration, the petal stabilizers are opened (in the light S-5Kor, their deployment is carried out using a spring mechanism, in the heavy S-8kor and S -13kor - due to more powerful gas pistons). The design of the missiles of the "Threat" complex is much more complicated and advanced than that of the American WGU-59 / B APKWS and Talon-LGR. Target illumination is also carried out 1 second before approaching, which practically guarantees the target hit, especially during salvo missile launch. Any sea, land or airborne means, like American missiles, can act as target designators. Now about the launchers of the combat qualities of the "Threat" complex.
The S-5kor missile can be used from the widest list of unguided missile blocks (from UB-8-57 with 8 guides to UB-32M and UB-40 with 32 and 40 guides, respectively). This makes it possible to transform into a high-precision aviation complex not only any attack helicopter, but also fighter aircraft of the 2nd and 3rd generations, some of which are under conservation. The cumulative warhead of this missile has a mass of more than 3 kg and is capable of penetrating a steel armor plate with an overall dimension of 200 mm. The flight speed of the S-5kor is 1620 km / h, which theoretically refers it to the list of targets of modern air defense systems, but in practice it is practically impossible to intercept it, since the 57-mm diameter and EPR in ten thousandths of a square meter does not allow to capture the combat stage of the BM- 5 for accurate auto tracking even with modern radar stations with AFAR. In addition, the small caliber of the adjustable combat stage can lead to the fact that the radar systems of modern KAZ such as "Trophi" or "Iron Fist" or AMAP-ADS may detect BM-5 too late. The maximum range of the S-5kor is 7 km, which will protect the carrier from interception by self-propelled air defense systems "Avenger" or MANPADS "Stinger".
The S-8kor rocket can be launched from various variants of the NUR blocks of the B-8 family, the main of which are the B-8M-1 (for front-line fighters) and the B-8V-20 (helicopter version). The cumulative warhead installed on the combat stage of the BM-8 is almost 2 times heavier than that of the BM-5, which provides the S-8kor with 400 mm armor penetration. This missile is capable of easily penetrating the side and stern armor plates of modern modifications of the Western Leopard-2A7 and M1A2 SEP main battle tanks. The speed of this rocket is 1728 km / h, and the range reaches 8 km due to the longer operation of the first stage solid-propellant engine (1.28 s versus 0.84 s for the S-5kor). The speed of the carrier aircraft for launching all three types of "Threats" should not exceed 330 m / s, apparently due to the beginning of the formation of a shock-wave structure of the air flow around the carrier and the NUR unit at supersonic speeds.
The S-13kor corrected rocket weighing 70 kg has a more massive warhead (about 15 kg), a more powerful solid-propellant booster charge and, accordingly, a range of 9 km, the speed of this rocket reaches 1800 km / h. Official sources do not report anything about its armor penetration, but taking into account standard anti-tank missiles of this caliber, it ranges from 800 to 1000 mm of steel dimensions. The radar signature of the larger BM-13 combat stage no longer allows it to break through the protection of modern active defense systems, and therefore, specialized tactics are needed to destroy a combat unit. It is necessary to fire two S-13kor volleys: the leading combat stage can be equipped with tungsten shrapnel, which, 2-3 seconds before the approach of the slave cumulative or powerful high-explosive fragmentation combat stage, will disable the radar sensors of the active protection complex. This is the most advanced method of combating KAZ of modern Western tanks, since the American long-range KAZ from Raytheon, capable of intercepting attacking projectiles with shrapnel (anti-radar type) at ranges of up to 850 m, has not entered serial production, i.e. before scattering "deadly" tungsten balls. The S-13kor missiles are used from the B-13L type blocks (for tactical fighters) and B-13L1 (for attack helicopters); the nose of the B-13L has the shape of a pointed oval for ideal aerodynamic qualities at transonic and supersonic speeds, the B-13L1 is "blunt", completely cylindrical in shape.
According to information from various sources, it is known that the "Threat" complex has a multi-channel combat information and control system, and several (exact numbers are not given) channels of operation are present both on the missile and on the target. For example, the Su-35S with 4 B-13L blocks carries 20 S-13kor guided missiles, and in a very short period of time can guarantee the destruction of an entire tank platoon.
At the beginning of the review, the Talon LGR ground mobile missile system was described with an upgraded guided version of the Hydra-70 tactical missile. This complex fit well into the Armed Forces of the United Arab Emirates. In our country, the situation is even simpler: over the many years of combat use of unguided missiles S-5/8/13 in both friendly and now enemy camps. For example, among the military formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, we observe a makeshift alteration of the tracked launcher of the Strela-10M3 air defense missile system into a multiple launch rocket system. On the combat module of the 9K35M3 machine, instead of 4 TPKs with 9M333 anti-aircraft guided missiles, 2 NUR B-8M-1 units were installed with 20 guides in each. The Kiev junta uses these "products" against the civilian population and the Armed Forces of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics. It is also known about an earlier, simplified, Ukrainian MLRS based on a small SUV LuAZ-969M with an installed NUR UB-32-57 unit with 57 guides for S-5 missiles. To the horror, the "oak" guidance mechanism of the UB-32-57 was represented by a small "table" on a bearing rotating in azimuth with a gear mechanism changing the elevation angle. A lot of similar machines get into the lenses of amateurs and reporters preparing material in hot spots in the Middle East and Central Asia. In close confrontation, MLRS based on unguided aircraft missiles are often several times more effective than systems such as BM-21 Grad or BM-27 Uragan, since their minimum range is limited to several hundred meters.
In view of these circumstances, Russian developers of missile weapons have many different configurations for the design of a short-range tactical missile system with S-5/8 / 13kor guided missiles. Ground-based missile data causes some tactical and technical disadvantages. So, their range will not exceed 5-7 km, and the approach speed of the combat stages will barely reach the sound one, which will facilitate their interception. But there are also many operational and technical advantages.
The first of them is the relatively small mass of missiles and NUR blocks for them, thanks to which the combat modules can be installed on almost any vehicle: from a light SUV or armored personnel carrier to MTLB or BMP. This allows the forces of military transport aviation to deliver dozens of such systems to the theater of operations at once.
The second advantage is the higher, than that of such BMs as MLRS and HIMARS, the speed of transfer to one or another section of the theater of operations, which, with a high saturation of the enemy's armored personnel carriers and infantry units, can become a decisive factor for an advantage in a separate section of the front line.
The accuracy of the three types of missiles of the Threat complex is absolutely not inferior to the American WGU-59 / B APKWS and Talon-LGR missiles. The circular probable deviation (CEP) of our products is about 1.5 m. The speed characteristics of the American APKWS, on the contrary, give it a head start in the potential for a breakthrough of military air defense with interception speeds of up to 1000 m / s, but the standard non-detachable head increases both optical and and the missile's radar signature.
In the Syrian company, the flight personnel of the tactical aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces more often use standard bomb weapons, relying on the accuracy of the specialized computing subsystem SVP-24 "Hephaestus". Nevertheless, no matter how accurate and efficient the computerized sighting system is, free-fall bombs continue to remain unguided weapons, which can only successfully hit the enemy's stationary military targets. The more frequent use of unguided weapons indicates a partial shortage of it in our Aerospace Forces. And the only most correct solution is to "unfreeze" the production branch of the excellent complex of guided missile weapons "Threat".
