A previous article about the "miracle" of German engineering, a heavy cruiser of the "Deutschland" class, caused a lively discussion among the readers of the "Military Review". In this regard, I believe it is necessary to hold additional hearings on this topic in order to clarify the details and answer questions. I would like to express my gratitude to everyone who took part in the discussion and helped expand knowledge of the history of German military shipbuilding.
The rapid development of aviation at the turn of 1920-1930, the appearance of aircraft-carrying ships, progress in the field of radio communications or the outlined work on the creation of radars - nothing could confuse the admirals of the Kriegsmarine. Inspired by the successes of the raiders of the First World War, they continued to believe in pirate raids on the merchant fleet by large warships.
As if no one noticed the changed conditions of the new era, aggravated by the traditional numerical superiority of the Royal Navy, which had allies, bases and patrol squadrons in parts of the world.
The Germans still relied on large surface raiders. As it turned out, in vain.
In the very first campaign, "Admiral Graf Spee" was intercepted by a small squadron of one heavy and two light cruisers. During the ensuing battle, the German "pirate" spent most of the ammunition, was damaged (after all, he had no confident superiority in firepower) and scared into the harbor of Montevideo. And, having learned about the arrival of British reinforcements, he immediately self-destructed.
Hmmm … Or did the Germans seriously believe that the British did not have enough ships to deal with the lone robber?
Under the indicated conditions, success could be accompanied only by auxiliary cruisers, disguised as civilian ships … Atlantis, Cormoran and others have achieved notable results. But to release a single combat ship, the size of a heavy cruiser, into communications is tactical madness.
The dead are good or nothing but the truth
"Deutschland" was created not so much for the hunt for the merchant fleet, as for a sense of their own greatness. It all started with the fact that in the 1920s. Germany unexpectedly gained an advantage in the creation of cruisers. Compared to other leading fleets, disfigured by the decisions of the "Washington Conference", the conditions of the "Versailles" limited the standard displacement, but, in fact, did not limit the main caliber for the Kriegsmarine (11 '' - hardly anything more is possible on a 10 thousand ton ship) … There he took this opportunity and ordered unusual ships of the "Panzershiff" class.
Based on the prevailing conditions, the only thing in which superiority could be achieved was firepower. Build a "pocket battleship" (of course, this is not a battleship at all), which would be guaranteed to deal with any "Washingtonian".
The Germans installed 283 mm artillery on a ship the size of a heavy cruiser.
What was the mistake of the Yubermensch?
Based on the laws of nature, it is impossible to build a ship that, with the same displacement (10 thousand tons + permissible violation of 15-20%, to which everyone turned a blind eye) could somehow radically surpass the rivals. The power of the Deutschland's artillery was devalued by the small number of guns: only six barrels, placed by two main turrets. And in terms of other parameters, the "panzershiff" turned out to be a floating disgrace in general.
For example, the medium-caliber artillery of the Deutschland (eight 6 '', which is equivalent to the weapons of a light cruiser!) Did not have a centralized fire control system. Those. was a useless appendage. Hundreds of tons of payload wasted on nothing.
However, there is nothing to be surprised at: many of the decisions of the “gloomy Teutonic genius” smell like undisguised moronism. For example, who remembers what the anti-aircraft fire control system at the aft corners looked like on the battleship Bismarck? Two land "commando" without any stabilization and protection. It is difficult to say what exactly this played a fatal role in the fate of the battleship, but the general trend is recognizable.
The Germans are considered to be the greatest designers. So let's see what was built in other countries, with the same displacement parameters, but even more stringent restrictions on the main caliber. The Japanese were undoubtedly the best. They managed to "squeeze" ten 203-mm guns onto their CMTs, while simultaneously providing extremely high speed (35-36 knots) and a number of other advantages.
Dear readers will point out a noticeable difference between 8 and 11 inches. The increase in caliber by only 30% increased the mass of the projectile by 2, 5 times! The firing range and the flatness of the trajectory have increased (which should have simplified aiming).
All these remarks are undoubtedly correct. But!
We are comparing not the only cannon in a spherical vacuum, but the armament of the ship as a whole. Battery 6x283 mm and 10x203 mm. And the calculation in this case will be completely different.
The dispute over the differences in the power of 8 '' and 11 '' can be limited to the phrase: the protection of any CMT penetrated 283 mm, like plywood, similarly, the protection of the Deutschland was not an obstacle for projectiles of 203 mm caliber. Any hit was capable of inflicting a mortal wound on each of the opponents.
Crystal vases armed with hammers. One has a heavier hammer, the other strikes more frequently.
When the enemy met the "battleship" class, neither one nor the other caliber was also not suitable for hunting such a large "beast".
Let's go back to our empirical battle for the constructors' cup.
Taking into account the larger number of guns and twice the rate of fire of eight-inch guns, the best of the pre-war cruisers were not inferior in terms of the mass of a minute's salvo to the German “Wunderschiff” with its “unique” powerful artillery. In addition, they had an advantage in zeroing speed. And the numerous main battery towers, as well as any measures to disperse and duplicate mechanisms, reduced the likelihood of failures and failure in harsh combat conditions.
The high ballistic characteristics and firing range of the German SKC / 28 remained tabular values. In practice, the firing range was leveled by weather conditions (ideal visibility is rather an exception), the time of day (night battles of the classic genre) and fire control facilities, which could not provide the required accuracy. For all the years of WWII, only a couple of effective shots from a long distance were noted: the first hit on the AV “Glories” and “shot at Calabria”, an accidental hit on the moving “Giulio Cesare” from a distance of 24 km, the result of heavy fire from four battleships.
No other naval duels at a distance of over 100 kbt had any practical result.
At the same time, a smaller caliber contributed to an increase in ammunition (for example, the standard b / c of Japanese cruisers consisted of 1200 shells of the main caliber - against 600 on board the Deutschland). The difference is more than significant.
As a result, we have a simple conclusion. The Japanese projects "Mioko", "Takao", "Mogami" are the best that could be built in conditions of a limited standard displacement (a little more than 10 thousand tons). The most balanced performance with a range of breakthrough parameters.
Supporters of the German engineering genius may justify the ridiculous design of the Deutschland by its formal designation (raider). To give as an argument an unusual classification ("panzeriffe"), to assert that he is completely different from other peers, that other tactical methods work for him.
Gentlemen, yes, as much as you like.
The only irony of fate is that for all possible conditions and tasks under which the Deutschland is trying to fit, a more effective solution was the traditional heavy cruiser with the same protection as the Deutschland, a high 35-knot speed and a battery of 10 eight-inches. The possibility of creating such a ship was brilliantly proved by the Japanese.
"But what about twice the long range, the most important quality of a raider ?!" - those who still consider the German “panzerschiff” to be a specific, but relatively successful design (at least in some special vacuum conditions) will exclaim in despair.
The answer is simple: "Deutschland" was able to travel 16,300 miles at an economic speed of 18 knots. But what's the point if he runs out of ammunition after the first skirmish. Which will have to be replenished somewhere.
By the way, the Japanese SRT with a steam turbine power plant showed in practice no less raider qualities during the voyage to the Indian Ocean, March-April 1942.
The result of the epic with "pocket battleships" was the rejection of the further construction of such ships. The Germans adopted the traditional point of view, having laid in 1935 the "Admiral Hipper" MRT with a steam turbine power plant and 8-inch artillery.
Despite the open and blatant violation of the terms of the “Treaty of Versailles” (the standard w / and exceeded the limit by almost 50%), the next German project again ended in disgrace. "Patchwork" armor, unable to protect the most important compartments of the ship from shells of cruisers and bombs of caliber over 250 kg. Unremarkable characteristics (8 main guns, speed 32 knots). At the same time, it turned out to be 2, 5 times more expensive than the British MCT of the "County" type.
But the main value is people. Many people. During the war years, the crew of an Admiral Hipper-class MCT usually numbered over 1600 people, much more than that of heavy cruisers in other countries. Ask why? The onboard naval specialists, civil engineers and representatives of the contractor firms were engaged in the continuous repair of equipment.
But that is another story.
