How secure is the Atlas crypto phone?

How secure is the Atlas crypto phone?
How secure is the Atlas crypto phone?

Video: How secure is the Atlas crypto phone?

Video: How secure is the Atlas crypto phone?
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How secure is a crypto-protected phone?
How secure is a crypto-protected phone?

Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Science and Technology Center“Atlas”solved the problem of secure communications for 115,000 rubles, when any fool could solve it for 1,000,000.

Ensuring the security of communications for government agencies and enterprises of the military-industrial complex (MIC) is one of the most important components of the overall system of measures to preserve state and military secrets.

This year, the Ministry of Defense of Russia joined the number of departments that use mobile phones with cryptographic protection of information in their activities. For officers who have access to documents of the highest category of secrecy, Russian-made M-633S Atlas ciphers were purchased at a price of 115 thousand rubles. The news instantly spread throughout the media, causing a controversial response from the public.

Some argue about the paramount importance of maintaining military secrets. Another part of the public expresses dissatisfaction with the inexplicably high cost. “Chiffon” is reproached for its primitive functionality (not a smartphone), forgetting that every phone has one key function. The phone must be able to ring. The chiffon, in addition to making a call, must be able to maintain the confidentiality of conversations. And this is the main value and purpose of the Atlas device.

On the pages of Voennoe Obozreniye, there has already been a discussion of the $ 2,000 “cipher phone”, but, in my opinion, that discussion was conducted on the wrong plane. The scandalous comparison with the cheap Chinese “analogue” did not make sense. Even if there is an outwardly similar model among the goods from China, the very purpose of Atlas, as well as its manufacturer (before renaming - “STC Atlas” of the FSB of Russia”), clearly indicate non-standard hardware and software of the device.

The main question of interest to all: how high is the crypto-resistance of the domestic "chiprophone"? Is he able to carry out the functions assigned to him related to the protection of highly classified information?

In 2012-13, when the matter did not yet concern the orders of the Ministry of Defense, an order of magnitude less attention was riveted to the “cipher phone”. Interviews with developers and more detailed information about the M-633S periodically appeared in the open press. At least, this designation is found in the news of that time.

In 2013, in an interview with the Izvestia newspaper, Alexander Alferov, deputy director of the Atlas FSUE, commented on the decision to purchase ciphers for Roscosmos enterprises. The most unexpected was the announcement of the use of foreign electronics in devices intended for conducting secret negotiations of national importance.

- The phone works in usual GSM networks, is equipped with a sapphire crystal, color display and even an mp3-player. At the same time, the hardware and the operating system are completely our own development. Although, we will not hide, we use a foreign element base.

Among other features: crypto protection is provided only for the voice channel, SMS are sent in clear text. It also becomes clear from the publication that the M-633C chiffon has been supplied to various law enforcement agencies since at least 2012. This is confirmed by other, earlier information about the purchase of "spy mobile phones" for the Investigative Committee of Russia (see link).

In this regard, as a person inexperienced in the field of crypto protection and information security, I had two interrelated questions.

1. How safe is the use of foreign-made chips in domestic ciphers intended for negotiating secret topics?

2. If the "filling" does not matter, and it can be safely purchased in Taiwan, then what is the point of such a cipher phone? If crypto protection is provided by a special program, then why can't it be installed as an application on any smartphone?

From the description of "Atlas" it is clear that it is not intended for making calls on the battlefield, where there is no mobile communication. Moreover, any mobile connection will not work - only Megafon is required for the "spy mobile" to work. М-633С is designed for daily use in conventional GSM networks. It does not differ in any exceptional technical capabilities, signal strength, operating ranges or computing abilities. The only difference from other mobile phones and smartphones is conversation encryption.

There are many available (and free) applications for the secure exchange of information in the civilian market. Among the most famous: Signal (rumored to be cooperating with the US authorities), Silent Phone (quiet phone, the hint is clear), WhatsApp (standard description: end-to-end encryption), domestic Telegram and a great variety of monotonous Chat Secure, SecureChat, etc. Available for all smartphones and platforms.

(Not an advertisement!)

Most secure messengers use end-to-end encryption technology, in which decryption keys are available only on the two devices on which the connection was created. Keys are used only once, and with each new session, new ones are automatically generated. The seriousness of the level of information hiding in these programs is evidenced by the loud bickering of their creators with government agencies around the world.

The US authorities tried to bribe the creators of Telegram.

Obviously, the all-seeing and terrible NSA simply did not have the capacity and computing power to decrypt messages.

Returning to the domestic cipher telephone with Taiwanese electronics, let us note: was it possible that the Atlas Scientific and Technical Center was unable to create a set of secure applications for negotiating and exchanging text messages? Of course, without placing them in the public domain (AppStore). Access and download of such applications - only from secure servers of government agencies.

As practice shows, this is the most obvious, simple and fairly effective solution.

Ilya Kostylev, a State Duma deputy and a member of the security committee, is of approximately the same opinion. In his opinion, in modern conditions, the protection of the contextual analysis of conversations is more important. Foreign intelligence services do not have the ability to listen to each one individually, but they are able to analyze thousands of calls by keywords, getting a large-scale picture of what is happening. It is in this direction that you need to build protection.

“It's easier to use ordinary cell phones by checking them with special equipment and installing encryption programs. This is what the Ministry of Defense did. It's much cheaper. And there will be a lot of such phones to give out to a large enough circle of employees. And in remote places it is better to use satellite communications at all”, -

In other words, even five years ago, when the Atlas cipher was a "novelty" and had just appeared on the market for secure communications, the Ministry of Defense was not interested in purchasing such devices. The expert talks about ordinary mobile phones with special programs. Now, after five years, the opinion of the Ministry of Defense has changed dramatically.

The production of the same model of a cipher phone for at least 6 years can hardly help to maintain the required level of security. Over the years, US intelligence has certainly had the opportunity to study the element base, having received information and samples of "secret" chips directly from the manufacturer.

We do not deny the importance of conducting confidential negotiations, but the listed features and the history of the appearance of the M-633S "Atlas" cause concern for the preservation of state secrets.

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