Last week, a large number of articles appeared in the press, mocking the Ukrainian Navy, full of skepticism about their future. So, the author of the article "$ 210 thousand and four leaks: Ukraine will buy decommissioned boats" Lydia Misnik is clearly amused by Ukraine's plans to buy decommissioned Polish missile boats, which will soon sink right at the pier from old age and related leaks, as well as receiving from the United States practically unarmed Island-class patrol boats, which are so bad that they cannot be shipped to Ukraine. But Viktor Sokirko, author of Free Press, echoes the Chinese edition of Sohu in an article "The collapse of the Ukrainian fleet: Kiev came out to scare Russia on fishing boats" and pokes fun at the "joint maneuvering" of a Ukrainian-made Gyurza project boat and an Arleigh Burke-class US Navy destroyer. We agree with the Chinese and with Viktor Sokirko - it looks really funny.
However, don't be complacent. Even a sharply sharpened pencil in the hands of a weak and unprepared person can become a murder weapon if you hit it where it is necessary and at an unexpected moment. The Ukrainian Navy really almost does not exist anymore - they have no ships, no application doctrine, no shipbuilding, there is even no reason to exist - if we start from some hypothetical interests of Ukraine (who and how would not understand them). They do not pose any military threat to the warships of the Russian Navy - in the most ideal version, they will be able to disable any warship with a sudden suicidal strike, provoking a truly terrible response to their country. The Ukrainian Navy is almost a corpse. But even a deceased person can become a source of danger, exuding cadaveric poison, dangerous for those who are still alive. Especially when there is someone nearby who wants exactly this and is able to organize it - and with this someone, in the case of Ukraine, there are no problems.
A bit of history
The Ukrainian Navy "grew" from the section of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. From the very beginning, the leadership of Ukraine was motivated not by the desire to have a naval defense adequate to the country's defense tasks, but by a set of multidirectional desires to squeeze as much money from the Russian Federation as possible, to please the USA and NATO, and partly to show the "goat" to the Muscovites. As a result, the Ukrainian Naval Forces existed “on autopilot”, without meaning and purpose, representing a set of ships, often unable to act together with each other, and in terms of total strength, unable to perform any complex combat missions. At the same time, however, it was the Ukrainian Navy and the Marines that interacted with NATO as much as possible during various joint exercises, training programs and the like, indoctrinating and adopting a "Western" view of things.
"Maidan" and the subsequent events knocked down the Naval Forces of Ukraine as a fighting force completely. First, a government consisting of potential clients of psychiatric clinics came to power in Ukraine, then with the participation of the RF Armed Forces Crimea seceded, whose residents did not want to have anything in common with the “new” Ukraine (as well as with the “old”). Some of the ships of the Naval Forces of Ukraine remained in the Crimea, the rest were left without remnants of funding, which, in the conditions of a crumbling society, was inevitable. All this reduced the naval power of Ukraine to zero.
I must say that the Ukrainian Navy and the Ukrainian shipbuilding were trying to take the sane path of development. They were connected, first of all, with attempts to start the construction of ships of project 58250, Ukrainian analogues of the Russian project 20380, but equipped with high-quality weapons and various equipment of Western production. At the time of the start of this project, Ukraine could still "master" it, subject to stable funding. It must be said that this was a very interesting project, as a result of which Ukraine could receive warships, not bad in terms of their capabilities. So good that the Black Sea Fleet would not have been able to ignore the fact of their existence in the same way that the fact of the existence of the Ukrainian Navy as a whole is now being ignored.
But, as we know, degrading societies are incapable of such efforts as naval development. The construction of the lead ship Volodymyr the Great has been stopped and, apparently, will never be resumed.
But Ukraine is building boats - "heroes" of the provocation under the Kerch bridge, river armored boats of project 585155 "Gyurza" and the same small landing boats of project 58503 "Centaur LK". The latter have so far been built with serious design and manufacturing defects, but this can be eliminated in future boats, and their combat effectiveness has decreased slightly from this. These boats do not pose any threat against an enemy ready to fight, although if the Ukrainians had decided to die heroically at the Kerch Bridge, they could have inflicted serious and offensive losses on the ships and crews of the FSB. The FSB coast guard was clearly not ready to "resolve the issue" without loss if the Ukrainians started shooting. But it happened as it happened.
Now the Naval Forces of Ukraine can only dream of better times and receive gifts such as American Coast Guard patrol boats of the Island class, which will now have to buy spare parts for money, and which Ukraine cannot really use for infrastructural reasons - even the parameters of electric current on them are such that none of the bases of the Ukrainian Navy will be able to supply the boats with electricity from the pier. However, milking the natives, taking the last away from them, is quite an organic part of American politics, so let the Ukrainians get used to it, in the end, they died en masse in order to allow themselves to be used in different ways, and boats are the most insignificant example of "use" of all that have already taken place, and it will still be.
But in this story we are interested in something else, namely, the degree of danger of the Naval Forces of Ukraine for Russia. Alas, this danger is far from zero.
Combat hopak with flippers
Currently, the Ukrainian Navy can be used with great effect as a tool of provocations against the Russian Federation. So, there is an opportunity to operate in the area of the Kerch Bridge in the same way as the Naval Forces of Ukraine operated there earlier. Similarly, the ships and boats of the Ukrainian Navy can behave in the territorial waters of the Russian Federation, washing the coast of the Crimea. At the same time, the Navy does not have to sacrifice more new armored boats, they include quite old boats and auxiliary vessels of Soviet construction, which will still not be able to go to sea anyway.
It is quite rational to spend them in provocations against the Russian Federation, if there is a need for such, and the losses among the crews, if any, will allow "broadcasting" a very "juicy" picture with the evil Russian barbarians who attacked (again!) In nothing guilty Ukrainian boat. All this can be useful both for the current Ukrainian authorities and their Western patrons. In fact, the authorities in Kiev have a tool to influence global politics right now. It is enough to try and organize the shooting of their own ships by Russian ships before a significant international event, and the collapse of the mass of Russia's foreign policy initiatives is guaranteed. These possibilities of using the Naval Forces of Ukraine already exist.
It must be understood that for the Kiev authorities the value of the life of an ordinary Ukrainian is equal to zero, including a military one, and if it turns out to be possible to derive any benefits from his death, he will die. And this is also without taking into account the position of American "decision-makers" for whom Ukrainians are not people at all, even if they themselves, being under the pressure of their own propaganda and political correctness, are afraid to admit it to themselves. So the question of using the Ukrainian Navy in various forms of suicides harmful to our country is only a matter of time.
The Navy and the FSB Coast Guard must be prepared to counter this kind of antics. This applies both to situations when Ukrainians become "unrequited victims", as was the case at the Kerch Bridge, and in a situation where they will have to open fire to kill in order to call back fire and die colorfully and vividly.
The latter should not be considered unrealistic - in all sorts of Ukrainian "volunteer" formations there are a lot of ideological contingent, which, if necessary, can shoot from a machine gun or a weapon mounted on a boat. And if the regular Ukrainian sailors from some artillery boat "Rivne" suddenly lose the desire to die and open fire on Russian ships or the shore, then suddenly unnoticeable (and they are very unobtrusive) "Gyurza" with an "ideological" crew (not even from the Navy), may well resolve all doubts, starting to shoot herself, and then trying to move away. The participants in the process may simply not have a choice. And the Western press will be able to make a good picture for news out of Ukrainian corpses without any problems, as well as once again present it as "white black", presenting the case as if there was an unprovoked aggression from the Russian Federation.
In the future, solving the problems of organizing such provocations will become even easier, since the young generations of Ukrainians who have grown up under the influence of "post-Maidan" propaganda will be complete degenerates who can believe in anything, for example, it will be enough for them to promise that the Russians ships as one are incapable of combat, and all that Russia shows about its fleet and aviation is a bluff and nothing more. And they will easily agree to participate in a self-destructive operation. It is also realistic to use amphetamine-containing drugs as an additional motivating agent, such as, for example, Captagon, which was successfully used both in Ukraine and in the ranks of ISIS strike groups (a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation).
Such steps of the Ukrainian Navy should not come as a surprise to our forces. The Navy and military intelligence must carefully monitor any measures for which the Ukrainian Navy is preparing, track the exit from boats and ships to the sea, and be ready to work proactively, up to the preemptive sinking of Ukrainian ships and vessels, in order to prevent the commission of a provocation in the Ukrainian (or American) scenario. It is especially worth noting the fact that the FSB is absolutely not ready to fight against Ukrainian violators. So, the guns of the PSKR "Don", which was making a bulk on the Ukrainian tug "Yani Kapu" at the time of the bulk and detention of Ukrainian ships, were not in readiness to open fire. This is unacceptable.
Ultimately, the Navy and the FSB must be ready to disrupt any provocation of the Ukrainian Navy, having established in advance the very fact of its preparation, and then, when the ships or boats of the Ukrainian Navy go to sea, disrupting its conduct, in extreme cases, by shooting them, but "not on camera" … A successful provocation will cost us too much to let it happen.
Other risks
On August 7-8, 2016, FSB Lieutenant Colonel Roman Kamenev and Airborne Forces corporal Semyon Sychev were killed in a battle with two Ukrainian sabotage groups on the territory of Crimea. One of the Ukrainian sabotage groups was detained (two of its members were killed on the spot), but the other managed to escape to the territory of Ukraine. At the same time, fire was fired at the paratroopers of the 7th Airborne Assault Division from the territory of Ukraine. It is worth noting the following - the evacuation of such sabotage and terrorist groups by land from the main resort areas of Crimea would be impossible. But a raid of high-speed boats from the sea for the removal of saboteurs would be quite real. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that in the course of hypothetical future acts of terrorism and sabotage, the task of evacuating sabotage and terrorist groups of Ukraine from the territory of Crimea may be entrusted to the Ukrainian Navy. And the Ukrainian Navy, oddly enough, is ready to perform such tasks.
In Ochakov, the 73rd Naval Special Operations Center of the Ukrainian Navy is located, one of the consequences of the fact that almost all of the naval special forces went “under the Ukraine” during the division of the Black Sea Fleet. The personnel potential of this formation is quite sufficient to carry out sabotage on the territory of Russia. Certain questions are raised by the possibility of transferring and evacuating special groups. Helicopters, which usually perform such tasks, can be detected by Russian air defense systems. But the new Ukrainian "landing" boats of the project 58503 "Centaur LK" are precisely the means for the rapid transfer of small units, and it is unlikely that their entry into the sea right now will force the Navy or the Coast Guard to fly towards on a combat alert, and indeed it can go unnoticed. The boats are small, their ESR is really low. And they are certainly not made for landing operations. We should also mention the active assistance of the United States in the development of the Ukrainian naval special operations forces. So far they have not shown themselves, but such investments are not made just like that.
Another threat that the Ukrainian Navy is able to implement is mining. In 2014, Christopher Donnelly, co-director of the British Institute of Public Administration (Instutute of statecraft), whose task was to analyze the possibilities for a military response to Russia's actions in Crimea, proposed the following in the proposed package of measures:
Military measures CND 2014-01-03 (Military measures, CND, 2014-01-03) …
2. Bottom mines in the Sevastopol Bay. Can be easily delivered from a civilian ferry if they do not have special minelayers. It does not take many minutes to achieve the required efficiency. They could easily buy them.
This is essentially what the British advisor is proposing. A person who receives money from the state for such advice, including, perhaps, personal participation in their implementation. And Ukraine in 2014 could well have done it. In the future, it cannot be ruled out that this will nevertheless become a reality.
Alas, the state of the anti-mine forces of the Russian Federation is not even critical - they are simply dead at the moment and the Russian Navy cannot give an adequate answer to the installation of modern bottom mines. At best, we can talk about the preventive detonation of cord charges throughout the entire water area where mines are suspected, in the hope that none of them will survive it. Moreover, in our conditions it will be, apparently, after undermining the minesweeper, who tried to wipe the mines in the old fashioned way, with a trawl. Our potential opponents are well aware of this. In the course of the naval intelligence of Western countries, and the command of the Naval Forces of Ukraine. In such circumstances, laying mines can be extremely successful, and, what is most dangerous, Ukraine does not have to take responsibility for it.
The example of a US-sponsored mine war against Nicaragua shows that pro-American groups may well carry out "offensive mining" without taking responsibility for it. Such a covert operation is also fully consistent with the Ukrainian mentality.
Alas, Russia is not even close to meeting such a threat. In the absence of anti-mine forces and means, we have only one hope - for reconnaissance, which will not "oversleep" the organization of such an operation.
If chaos comes
A special set of threats is the “pulling away” of the forces and means of the Ukrainian Navy in the event that the Ukrainian statehood finally collapses. This option is quite realistic, especially after a difficult reality will again collapse on the hopeful after the election of V. Zelensky as president of the citizens of Ukraine. In the form, for example, of stopping gas transit and reducing revenues for it to the Ukrainian budget. The latter will definitely remove from the Russian Federation the need to endure the bloody antics of the Ukrainian regime and maintain some trade relations that are vital for it. As a result, the standard of living in Ukraine will fall even more than it is now, and this is simply inevitable.
The combination of the existing political chaos with a sharp collapse in the quality of life of people, in principle, can cause any consequences, including de facto loss of statehood. And if such a negative scenario for the future of Ukraine is realized, then the units and subdivisions of the Ukrainian Naval Forces will be ruled by all sorts of field commanders, regional bosses and the like uncontrollable contingent. This is fraught with a sharp increase in the threat of piracy, armed smuggling, organized kidnapping, and much of what we saw on the borders of the Chechen Republic during the years of the militants' rule there, but with a naval bias.
At the same time, the threat of various kinds of covert operations against the Russian Federation will not decrease, since any hostile government will be able to freely hire Ukrainian mercenaries to conduct them, and at first the forces and means of the former Naval Forces will be at their service.
For Russia, in this case, it is worth considering the possibility of conducting a preventive offensive military operation aimed at the complete destruction of all forces and assets of the Ukrainian Navy, which may pose at least some kind of threat in the future. In some cases, you will have to go to the destruction of personnel, too, at least in some units. In other cases, it may be more correct to recruit him and even solve the problem of destroying means dangerous for the Russian Federation by the hands of the former military men of Ukraine themselves.
conclusions
The naval forces of Ukraine ended their existence precisely as a military fleet. With the highest degree of probability, they will never be reborn in this capacity. However, they still have great potential as a means for carrying out armed anti-Russian provocations, sabotage and terrorist acts on the territory of Crimea, and the remnants of the shipbuilding industry of Ukraine produce equipment that is suitable ONLY for these operations (boats "Centaur LK"), even if this the technique has not yet been used for its intended purpose. Also, a serious threat is posed by Ukraine's ability to carry out mining, or rather, the inability of Russia to resist such.
Both the Russian Navy, the FSB, and other power structures are obliged to identify in advance the preparation of the Ukrainian Navy for such actions and be ready to suppress them at the very beginning of Ukrainian operations, whatever their nature.
In the event of the collapse of the Ukrainian statehood, it is necessary to destroy in advance all the forces and assets of the former Ukrainian Navy that are potentially dangerous to Russia.
The above threats from the Ukrainian Navy are quite real and should not be neglected in any case.
A condescending and dismissive attitude towards this seemingly weak enemy can cost us very dearly.
