I was forced to write a sequel about the BMP-1 by a discussion in the comments, in which many wondered why motorized riflemen prefer to ride on top of the armor, and not sit in the troop compartment. Many explained this by the fact that the BMP-1 and similar vehicles are extremely insufficiently protected from shelling and explosions on mines, but the Israeli super-armored personnel carriers …
I will say again that armored vehicles and, in general, any weapon is created for certain tactics. The BMP-1 is one of the brightest examples of the specialization of armored vehicles for very specific tactics. Only, here's the bad luck, this tactic is little known. A well-known article on "VO" 2012 by Oleg Kaptsov "Landing on armor. Why no one trusts domestic infantry fighting vehicles?" opens with a statement by the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army N. E. Makarova: "BMD-4 is a version of BMP-3, no protection, again everything is on top, but it costs more than a tank." Very, I must say, a telling statement. "Again, everything is at the top" - General of the Army N. Ye. Makarov sees a drawback in this. Meanwhile, this is tactics, and tactics of a completely definite kind.
What are the advantages of a tank for a tank trooper?
Not so long ago I read the memoirs of E. I. Bessonov "To Berlin!" This is the memoir of a platoon / company commander from the 49th Mechanized Brigade, 4th Tank Army. Why platoons / companies? Because Bessonov was the platoon commander, but almost always commanded the entire company, since the company commander appeared and disappeared in a completely unpredictable way, and for some reason he was not appointed as a company commander.
The memoirs are good. The author had a tenacious memory, good style and the ability to tell interesting stories. The most interesting thing is different: Bessonov commanded a tank landing, infantry units, planted on tanks, which entered the breakthrough of the defense and rushed forward, tearing apart the enemy's rear. In this capacity, he marched from Lvov to Berlin, in almost continuous battles, and was a successful and fortunate commander; only once was he seriously injured. In his memoirs, he, using the example of a number of episodes, he described in some detail the tactics of the tank marines and their features.
In general, the task of the tank landing force was to move forward as quickly as possible in a certain direction after breaking through the enemy's defenses, capturing settlements, important roads, bridges along the road, as well as destroying enemy screens, columns and detachments. Bessonov most often acted at the forefront of this movement, 5-7 km ahead of his mechanized brigade, and had to clear the way for the main forces of the mechanized brigade and prevent the enemy from intercepting it. Due to this circumstance, defensive tasks were sometimes set before him.
In my opinion, these memoirs are very important for understanding the tactics of the tank landing and understanding why, since then, motorized riflemen prefer to ride on armor, and not in the troop compartment.
While pondering this article, I was faced with the difficulty of explaining the difference between motorized infantry riding in tanks and armored personnel carriers. She clearly was and is well felt in Bessonov's memoirs, but he does not give her a definition due to the self-evidence of this moment for himself. At first glance, it seems that an armored personnel carrier is better than a tank, but the tank troops of the 49th mechanized brigade did not think so, and preferred the T-34. When they were given the IS-2, they liked it better: the wider stern - more comfortable to sit, and the gun. 122mm cannon - that was the argument. Bessonov described how, in one of the not very successful attacks, the tankers came to their aid and their IS-2 pierced two German assault guns with one shell. "I have never seen such a miracle," Bessonov wrote.
Reviewing the descriptions of the battles in Bessonov's memoirs, I came to the conclusion that the tank had three important advantages for motorized riflemen over any armored personnel carrier, even over the Sd Kfz 251.
First, the ability to instantly jump off the tank. Many battles began like this. They drove along the road, then they were fired upon with rifle and machine-gun fire, the infantry jumped from the tanks and turned into a chain. The fighters specially trained and knew how to jump on the move, jumped in different directions, so that the chain was obtained by itself. You can't jump out of an armored personnel carrier like that. The exit of ten people from the same German Sd Kfz 251 takes much longer, and the soldiers inevitably crowd for some time behind the car, where they can be mowed down by a successful machine-gun burst, where they can be hit with a mortar or even a hand grenade. The armored personnel carrier for the disembarkation of the soldiers must stop, that is, become a target. Then, even if a shell hit the tank, the infantry had the opportunity to jump and run away. If a shell hit an APC with infantry, it almost always led to the death of most of the soldiers, or even all of them.
Secondly, the fighters rode a tank, sitting along the sides behind the tower or, sometimes, in front of it, with weapons in their hands (it was impossible to do otherwise, there were no mounts for the tank troops' weapons on the tank). The tank usually carried 7-8 people, and this meant that the crew of the tank received observers who saw everything that was happening around. This is an important point. The view from the tank (and any other armored vehicle) was poor, and the tank marines saw farther and better than the tankers, why they noticed an ambush or faustics earlier. Then the butt on the armor to warn the tankers, jump to the ground and fire. In the APC, the soldiers sat inside, with their backs to the sides, and, of course, saw nothing. Only the gunner of the machine gun could observe the APC, sometimes the soldiers could get up on the seat and look over the sides. But even in this case, the visibility was worse than that of the tank landing party.
Thirdly, tank marines could shoot directly from the armor if they saw an enemy nearby. Bessonov writes that they very often fought such battles, without leaving the tanks, with all the firepower of the unit landed on the tank. They galloped across the street at speed, firing at the enemy, caught unawares on the move. This was done more often at night - a favorite time for tank landing troops to ride. If they saw that the enemy was strong, had fortified positions, armored vehicles, or opened strong fire, then the tank marines dismounted and fought a normal infantry battle with the support of tanks. In the armored personnel carrier, the possibility of using weapons by the landing force was significantly limited. Of course, you could stand on the seat and shoot over the side, but much less comfortable, especially on the move. When leaving the armored personnel carrier, the soldiers stopped shooting, self-suppression of fire took place, which gave an advantage to the enemy.
It was precisely because of the ability to see, shoot and jump off that the tank landing fighters drove the tank and did not try to change it to an armored personnel carrier. If we formulate the main difference between a tank landing and an armored personnel carrier, then it is as follows. In a tank landing, a fighter could actively participate in a battle at any time. In the armored personnel carrier, for some time, soldiers were targets that were not able to participate in combat. While the armored personnel carrier stops, while the doors are opened, while everyone leaves, scatters and unfolds in a chain - how long will it take? A minute or so. During this time they will have time to be riddled.
The armored personnel carrier in its classic German version (in the USSR there were similar samples) is suitable against a weak and low-initiative enemy with only rifles. Then the armor protects from bullets, the machine gun suppresses the enemy, the infantry gets out, turns into a chain and completes the attack. It was created for such tactics of battle and such an enemy.
If the enemy has large-caliber machine guns, cannons and tanks, and he is fighting evil and assertively, then the armored personnel carrier is a target. At infantry dismounting distance, the APC will be within reach of these guns and tanks, and the thin armor will not protect it. If you land the infantry earlier, then he does not need armor either. Armor against an armed and determined enemy is a very conditional defense. The Germans realized this in the middle of the war, and therefore used the Sd Kfz 251 as a passable truck and a mobile firing point, armed with a machine gun, sometimes a flamethrower or even rockets.
Tank marines and BMP-1
In my opinion, the BMP-1 inherited exactly the tactics of the tank landing party, and adapted to it. Therefore, the motorized riflemen had to ride from above in a regular manner, while the airborne squad acted only as a temporary shelter, when the enemy defense broke through with a nuclear strike, and the armored vehicles went under the nuclear fungus.
In order to sit out the shock wave of a nuclear explosion, hide from penetrating radiation, and then drive through a cloud of radioactive dust, the cramped and low troop compartment of the BMP-1 was enough. There could be battles in the nuclear explosion zone (for which the troop compartment was equipped with observation devices and embrasures for firing), but with a low probability. Then, as already mentioned, the tanks had to finish off everything that survived the nuclear strike.
But the war did not end there, but, on the contrary, entered its most bizarre phase. Breaking through the defenses or destroying the enemy grouping blocking the road, Soviet troops went out into the operational space of the enemy rear. Here they faced tasks exactly the same as those of the tank landing troops in the war: to drive forward, knock down barriers, destroy enemy units, capture bridges, villages, cities. After the passage of the nuclear explosion zone, the BMP-1 was driven into the nearest river or lake, doused with water to wash away the radioactive dust, then the motorized riflemen sat down on the armor and rushed forward.
The BMP-1 was much more convenient for tank troops than the T-34. Firstly, the almost flat roof of the hull and the low height of the car; more comfortable to sit and more comfortable to jump. Secondly, buoyancy relieved motorized riflemen from the need to look for ferry means and allowed them to cross rivers and canals at any convenient place. The tank marines did not have this, and therefore sometimes had to swim, and one IS-2 Bessonov's fighters drowned in the crossing and could not get it. Thirdly, the troop compartment.
What the tank marines did not have during the war was the BMP-1 airborne squad. That was the real blessing. It was possible to sleep part of the soldiers in shifts and the commander. Bessonov writes that when he fought 200 km across Poland and Germany, sleep constantly knocked him down. At night, he climbed to the stern of the tank, lay down between the soldiers and slept. Several times he slept through fleeting night contractions in motion. The ability to sleep dramatically increases combat effectiveness, especially sleeping in a warm, relatively comfortable and safe place.
Further, in Germany it is not uncommon for cold and damp weather, with rain or sleet. In the troop compartment, you can also warm up and dry yourself in shifts. On a long, many-day offensive almost non-stop, with frequent dismounting for battle, crawling through mud and snow, such an opportunity would be very valuable.
The troop compartment can also accommodate the wounded, especially the heavy ones. There were many wounded in the tank landing party. Bessonov writes that the losses due to the almost continuous fighting were high. After the raid, 23 remained in the company of 100 people. On average, every three kilometers of movement cost the wounded or killed. The fact that the BMP-1 could carry the wounded in the troop compartment was a very valuable quality. An extra chance to survive.
So, speaking of the BMP-1, one must always remember that this model was created for a specific tactics, for a specific enemy and for certain typical battle conditions. These conditions were to be realized in a war, which, fortunately for us, did not happen.
