This article is dedicated to the current state of the Russian Marine Corps. To be honest, the author pondered for a long time whether it was worth taking on it, because, alas, he did not seriously study the development of this branch of the Russian Navy. Nevertheless, considering the state of the Russian navy, it is absolutely impossible to lose sight of such an important component of it, which is our marines.
We will not consider in detail the history of the emergence of this type of troops in our Fatherland, we will only note that the marines in one form or another were periodically created, then abolished back. It was introduced on a permanent basis by Peter I - today there are polar points of view on the role of this sovereign in Russian history, however, there can be no ambiguous opinions about the usefulness of organizing marines as a separate branch of the army. To "cut a window to Europe" by conquering access to the Baltic Sea and consolidating their positions on the Black Sea coast, the marines were, of course, absolutely necessary.
Then, at the beginning of the 19th century (on the eve of the invasion of Napoleon), the marines were abolished. It was not that the Russian Imperial Navy considered actions on land unnecessary and no longer characteristic of the fleet, but it was believed that members of the crews of warships, armed on land, could cope with this, and if their forces were insufficient, then the Cossacks or ordinary infantry. Of course, such an approach cannot be considered to be any reasonable. A seaman, even an ordinary sailor, requires a fairly long and serious preparation for service on a ship, where land combat skills, in general, are not needed. Accordingly, its use in land operations can be justified only in some exceptional, atypical cases, but not on a permanent basis. As for the Cossacks, they, of course, could do a lot on land as scouts-scouts, but they did not know the specifics of the sea.
The understanding that something was going wrong came only at the beginning of the twentieth century, when in 1911 they tried to revive the marines. Several battalions were created, but still, it did not work out and we can say that the USSR did not inherit this type of troops, but had to create it independently and, in general, from scratch. In fact, the birth of the marines in the USSR took place during the Great Patriotic War, where they covered themselves with unfading glory.
However, after the war, in the period up to 1956, all marines were gradually disbanded. And only in 1963 the revival began - the 336th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 120th Guards Motorized Rifle Division was reorganized into the 336th Guards Separate Marine Regiment of the Baltic Fleet.
Probably, we can say that it was then that the view of the marines was finally formed as troops with special training and specialized landing craft, despite the fact that military equipment was to a certain extent unified with land, and with the one that was used by air. -landing troops. The brigade was considered the main formation of the Marine Corps, there were three of them in the USSR - in the Baltic, Black Sea and Northern Fleets, but the Pacific Fleet was staffed with a division. The states of the brigades could differ significantly, on average, with a number of 2,000 people, they were armed with up to 40 T-55 tanks, 160-265 armored personnel carriers, 18 122-mm self-propelled self-propelled guns "Gvozdika", 24 self-propelled mortar and artillery installations "Nona -C "and, of course, 18 MLRS" Grad "installations. As for the small arms, then, as far as the author could figure it out, it was not too different from what was supposed to be the state for ordinary motorized riflemen.
The marines were directly involved in the combat services of the USSR Navy. For the Marines, it looked like this - landing ships were sent to the same Mediterranean Sea with their assigned unit of marines and, of course, their equipment. There they were in constant readiness to land on someone's coast.
I must say that the Soviet marines have never been an analogue of the American one. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) is essentially an expeditionary force of over 180,000 people. capable of independently conducting large military operations outside the territory of the United States. Hence the divisional structure of the USMC, the presence of its own aircraft wings, etc. At the same time, the Soviet marines had more local tasks, such as:
1. the landing of tactical amphibious assault forces to solve independent tasks and to assist the formations of ground forces;
2. use as the first echelon of an assault force during the landing of operational assault forces;
3. defense of basing points and other objects from air and sea landings, participation, together with ground units, in antiamphibious defense.
Accordingly, the number of the USSR Marine Corps was, according to some sources, no more than 17,000 people. as of 1988. Without a doubt, the marines in both the USSR and the USA were an elite branch of the military, but comparing their numbers, one should not think that the USSR treated such troops with disdain. It's just that within the framework of the concept of a global nuclear missile war, for which Soviet military leaders were preparing, the airborne troops played an extremely important role, and it was on them that the stake was made - by 1991, the Airborne Forces consisted of 7 divisions and 11 separate brigades. For the Americans, the Airborne Forces were practically undeveloped (one division).
After the collapse of the Union, almost all units of the Marine Corps ended up on the territory of the Russian Federation. Unfortunately, even the elite status of some of the most combat-ready troops of the Russian Federation did not save them from various kinds of “optimizations”. Although … the first, rather dubious organizational measure for the marines was taken back in the USSR in 1989 - the formation of the Coastal Forces of the Navy. On the one hand, it looked logical - to bring under a single command all the forces involved in the defense of the coast, that is, the BRAV and the marines (we will talk about additional reinforcement later), but on the other hand, according to some reports, it led to the fact that the marines were subordinate the coastal missile and artillery troops, who, in general, did not understand the specifics and needs of the Marine Corps very well. It is believed that the first problems in equipping the Marines began precisely after their inclusion in the Coastal Forces.
And then came the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed on November 19, 1990, according to which the USSR, which remained in existence for just over a year, was to (together with other ATS and NATO countries) significantly reduce the number of conventional weapons. In fact, in 1990, on the territory from our western borders to the Ural Mountains, the Ural River and the Caspian Sea, the USSR had 20 694 tanks and 29 348 armored combat vehicles (AFV), 13 828 artillery systems with a caliber of 100 mm or more. According to the CFE Treaty, it had to be reduced to 13,150 tanks, 20,000 armored combat vehicles and 13,175 artillery units. But … as we already said, it was a quota for the USSR, and it soon disintegrated - as a result of this, the total amount of weapons was divided between the newly formed states. The share of the Russian Federation got 6,400 tanks, 11,480 armored vehicles, 6,415 artillery systems. In general, it was necessary to reduce …
It would seem that if a country is forced for some reason to abandon a part of its armed forces, then it is necessary to reduce first of all the least professional, militarily weakest formations. After all, it is obvious that in this case, the overall combat effectiveness of the armed forces will decrease, but not at all in proportion to the reduction in their numbers. But no - we in Russia, as you know, are not looking for easy ways. In an effort to comply with the provisions of the CFE Treaty, we undertook to cut the equipment of the marines - one of the most efficient arms of our armed forces. We managed to transfer part of the MP battalions from armored personnel carriers to MTLB and … GAZ-66 vehicles. At the same time, with MTLB they also diligently cut down the mounts for installing machine guns, so that, God forbid, no one took them for an armored combat vehicle …
The tanks were taken from the Marines. Apparently, being guided by the principle: "Guys can tie the Abrams cannon with a naval knot with their bare hands, why do they also need some kind of tanks?" The author of this article, unfortunately, no longer remembers and could not find what the responsible persons said about this, but such a “justification” appeared on the Internet - they say, a tank is a very heavy thing, cannot swim on its own, respectively, can be unloaded on the coast only from the landing ship's ramp. And there are not so many areas where this landing ship can approach the coast, so it turns out that the Marines do not need a classic tank, but a floating combat vehicle, perhaps something like the 2S25 Sprut self-propelled anti-tank gun.
What can you say about this?
The first thing to be understood is that today the tank is the most powerful and best protected land combat vehicle. He is not some kind of invincible wunderwaffe, of course, and he can be destroyed, but with all this in battle, the side that has tanks will receive an undeniable advantage over the one that has no tanks. In general, everything here is in full accordance with the famous lines of Hillar Belloc (often mistakenly attributed to R. Kipling):
There is a clear answer to every question:
We have maxim, they don’t have it.
That is, the presence of tanks gives the Marines tremendous advantages, and even if the tanks can be used not in all landings, but only in some of them, this is more than sufficient reason to leave them as part of the Marine Corps.
Second - in fact, the fleet has the means, although there are not as many of them as we would like, with the help of which heavy armored vehicles can be landed, including where a displacement tank landing ship cannot approach the coast. For example - "Bison"
This small amphibious assault ship can carry three main battle tanks in one go.
Third. For some reason, those who campaign for "only amphibious equipment" for the Marine Corps forget that the amphibious assault is an important, but far from the only task of the Marine Corps. And that the marines should not only land ashore, but also participate in anti-amphibious defense, as well as protect important naval and other coastal facilities of the country, and for these tasks, of course, there are no restrictions on the use of tanks and are not expected.
And finally, the fourth. Suppose, on all the previous points, the author is completely wrong, and in fact, the Marines do not need classic tanks, but they need … yes, the same "Octopus", for example. Well, where are they, may I ask? After all, it is quite obvious that in this case it would make sense to remove tanks from the armament of the Marines only when lighter combat vehicles begin to come to them. That is, in this case, it was necessary not to reduce the tank formations in the MP, but to re-equip them with new equipment. With us, everything is as usual: the tanks were taken, but nothing was given in return.
In the period of the wild 90s and not much different from them in the early 2000s, the marines, apparently, found themselves in the “stepchildren” of the fleet, in which they were listed and which chronically did not receive at least a quarter of the funds that they needed for normal combat training, not to mention the procurement of weapons. That is, for the leadership of the Navy, obviously, the priority turned out to be the ships, not the marines, and, probably, our admirals cannot be blamed for this. After all, the fleet is part of the triad of our strategic nuclear forces, and the provision of SSBN operations was still a top priority. To the credit of the marines, we can only say that, despite the obvious lack of funding, they showed themselves excellently in the battles in Chechnya.
But then, it seemed, it became easier, money was found, and, it seemed, on the eve of the re-equipment of the army and navy, the marines, having just confirmed their high professionalism by deeds, could finally breathe a sigh of relief and prepare for the better. But no - the "crazy hands" of Mr. Serdyukov, who miraculously became the Minister of Defense, reached the very Pacific Ocean. In his ineradicable quest to optimize everything that is possible and what is impossible - to optimize twice, he managed to disband our only 55th Marine Division, reducing its staff and turning it into the 155th Separate Marine Brigade.
Just think about it for a second. Far East. Billion-dollar China at your side. Japan, with which we have not yet signed a peace treaty. USA, whose AUG and other naval forces are at home in Japanese bases. And we, whose land forces in the Far East, frankly speaking, did not boggle the imagination with our numbers even during the Soviet era, and even in the years of the Russian Federation, they were completely reduced to regrettably small values. But the 55th Marine Division is still with us. Although badly battered by the dashing inter-time, it is still elite, which has confirmed its high fighting qualities in the Chechen wars. And what are we doing? Are we restoring her combat capability? Are we using its cadres, who have gained invaluable combat experience, to form new units? No, we are reducing it to the size of a brigade … Well, well, we decided then that we did not need divisions, that the brigade structure of the armed forces is everything. But who prevented the 55th division from turning into at least two brigades, and not one?
And this is against the background of the experience just gained at a high price. Still fresh was the memory of how the Marines were "pushed" in terms of financing and equipment to the background, they say, the type of troops is specific, not to fat and all that. And then, when trouble came - the first Chechen one - who had to be sent into battle? It would seem that they have just become convinced on their own skin how important highly professional, well-trained troops are, and that they, quite possibly, will have to be sent into battle in the wrong place and not in the way it was originally planned.
Of course, we must be fair, something useful was done under Serdyukov. So, for example, in 2008, the 810th Marine Regiment (Black Sea Fleet) was again reorganized into a brigade (which it was until 1998). This is certainly a good and necessary deed, but why was it necessary to simultaneously disband the marine brigade of the Caspian Flotilla, leaving two battalions from it ?!
Well, today … Today, I want to believe, the worst for our marines is over. Numerically, it includes five brigades, one each in the Northern, Black Sea and Baltic fleets and two brigades in the Pacific Fleet, in addition, there are other, separate units, from the battalion and below. The total number of Russian marines is unknown, presumably about 12,000 people.
At the beginning of 2018, common sense finally prevailed in equipping the Marines with tanks - the Ministry of Defense announced the inclusion of a tank battalion in each brigade. This decision was made based on the results of an experiment - in December 2017, a marine brigade in Kamchatka received a tank company. According to the results of the exercises, it became quite obvious that with tanks the capabilities of the marines increased significantly (who would doubt …).
The marines are armed with new equipment. This and the new BTR 82A
According to some reports, as of 2017, the Marines received 600 of these armored personnel carriers. Almost all personnel received the "Ratnik" equipment, while the difference from the combined arms kit is that for the marines it is equipped with a floating (!!) body armor "Corsair"
The means of communication and control have not been forgotten either. So, for example, the complex of tactical level of intelligence, command and communications (KRUS) "Strelets" entered service of the marines. It includes: a personal computer for the commander, a satellite radio station, a VHF radio station, a rangefinder-goniometer, a portable short-range reconnaissance radar "Fara-VR", unified data transmission equipment, an individual and group navigation system capable of operating in GLONASS and GPS …
A commander, whose unit is equipped with a "Sagittarius", knows at every moment where his soldiers are, and any of them, in order to mark the enemy equipment (automatically falling on the commander's tablet), needs "two clicks" with a finger. The "Archer" identifies the detected objects, checks them for "friend or foe", calculates their coordinates and movement parameters (if the target is moving), and also gives target designation for any means of destruction, starting from cannon artillery, both land and naval, and ending with tactical aircraft and cruise missiles "Caliber" and "Onyx". "Strelets" is universal, since it is able to interface with all domestic reconnaissance means, radar stations, sights, UAVs, etc.
In general, KRUS "Strelets" is a network-centric means of control of a battalion-tactical group with any soapy means of amplification that the latter can get. At the same time, the creators of "Strelets" did not forget about ergonomics - if the first products had a mass of over 5 kg and interfered with when overcoming the obstacle course, then modern, modernized individual complexes have a mass of 2, 4 kg and their operation in the troops (and KRUS was adopted on armament in 2007 and has been constantly improving since then) did not reveal any significant claims.
But, of course, one should not think that all the problems of the military equipment of the Marine Corps have been solved. In fact, in terms of equipping with military equipment, the Marines found themselves in about the same position as the rest of the ground forces - it seems that supplies are going on, but … quite often it turns out that new military equipment is “better than nothing, but a lot worse than what is actually required."
For example, the same BTR-82A. Yes, this is a new technique, but in fact it is nothing more than a modernized BTR-80, the serial production of which began in 1984. And no upgrades are able to correct the extreme vulnerability of the design of this BTR to the effects of almost any means of destruction and mines. Alas, we can only dream of Boomerangs. Or, for example, the decision to equip the Marine Corps brigades with tanks. It can only be welcomed, yes, but the MP will not receive the latest modifications of the T-90 (we are already silent about the "Armata", although, it would seem, where else to "run in" the newest and most complex armored vehicles, as in the elite troops?), But only "modern" T-72B3 and T-80BV, the latter will go into service with brigades operating in low temperatures (Northern Fleet, Kamchatka).
As we said earlier, in the USSR the Marines were armed with self-propelled mortar and artillery installations "Nona-S". Today their place, in theory, should have been taken by the 2S31 "Vena", a 120-mm self-propelled gun of a similar purpose based on the BMP-3, but … so far, only an initial batch of such machines has entered service. And about the BMP-3 themselves … The author in no way positions himself as an expert on armored vehicles, and heard many critical reviews about this vehicle, but, in any case, it should be assumed that the BMP-3 is noticeably better and more efficient than the BMP-2, which to this day is in service with the marines. As for the BMP-3, if it entered service with the MP, then in small quantities.
Now let's see how things are going with the main means of delivering the marines to the battlefield: landing ships and boats.
Large landing ships
BDK project 11711 ("Ivan Gren") - 1 unit.
Displacement - 5,000 tons, speed - 18 knots, range - 3,500 miles, armament - 2 * AK-630M, 1 * AK-630M-2 "Duet", two helicopters. Airborne capacity - 13 main battle tanks weighing up to 60 tons, or up to 36 armored personnel carriers / infantry fighting vehicles and 300 paratroopers.
The only newest large landing craft of the Russian Navy, the well-known long-term construction, was laid down in 2004, but was adopted by the fleet only on June 20, 2018, that is, in fact, 14 years later. The landing is supposed to be through the ramp, but, unlike the previous types of large landing craft, "Ivan Gren" is able to do it in a "contactless" way. The fact is that landing through the ramp requires a coast slope of at least 3-5 degrees, otherwise the equipment can only be landed by swimming. So, the new method involves the use of specialized engineering pontoons, like those used by ground forces to ferry military equipment - they become a link between the coast and the Ivan Gren's ramp. Thus, the requirements for the slope of the coast disappear, and the BDK itself does not have to go directly to the coastline. It is also noteworthy that with a larger displacement than that of the BDK project 1171, the Ivan Gren has a slightly lower landing capacity, but it should be borne in mind that helicopters are based on the Gren, and, in addition, much more attention is paid to the comfort of the crew and landing.
BDK project 1171 - 4 units.
Displacement - 3,400 tons (normal), speed - 17 knots, range - 4,800 miles at 16 knots, armament - 1 * 57-mm ZIF-31B, 2 * 25-mm 2M-3M, 2 MLRS A installations -215 "Grad-M", MANPADS "Strela". Airborne capacity - up to 50 units of armored vehicles (22 tanks or 50 armored personnel carriers), as well as 313 paratroopers (on "Vilkovo" and "Filchenkovo" - up to 400 people).
The history of the creation of this type of warship is not entirely common. The fact is that simultaneously with the order of the Navy for the BDK project with a bow ramp, the Ministry of the Navy ordered the development of a civilian dry cargo ship of similar dimensions and characteristics, which, in case of war, could be used as a warship. As a result, they tried to unify the ships, so that the BOD of Project 1171 represented a compromise between a civilian and a military ship. Alas, nothing sensible came of this - meeting the requirements of the military led to the fact that civilian transportation on such a ship became unprofitable. As a result, the Ministry of the Navy was forced to abandon this ship, and thus did not receive the dry cargo ship they needed, and the military received a ship that was not as good as it could have become if it were not for an attempt to unify it with a civilian ship.
BDK of this type entered service in 1966-1975. and today, obviously, the last days are being served.
BDK project 775 - 15 units.
In fact, we are talking about ships of three "subprojects" - 775 (3 units), 775 / II (9 units) and 775 / III (3 units). All of them were built at Polish shipyards, as part of the cooperation of the ATS countries. But their main characteristics are quite similar, so we allowed ourselves to combine them into one type.
Displacement - 2,900 tons standard, speed - 17, 5 knots. cruising range - 3,500 miles at 16 knots, armament - 2 * AK-725 (or 1 * 76-mm Ak-176 on 775 / III), 2 * 30-mm AK-630M (only on the 775 / III project), 2 installations of MLRS "Grad-M", 2 MANPADS "Strela" or "Igla". Airborne capacity - up to 13 medium tanks or 20 armored personnel carriers, as well as 150 paratroopers.
It is interesting that 2 ships of this type took part in the hostilities for their intended purpose: during the war on 08.08.08, the Black Sea Yamal and Saratov, under the cover of the Suzdalets MPK, landed troops in the Georgian port of Poti.
All large landing craft of the indicated type are quite "mature" - three ships of subtype 775 entered service in 1976-1978, nine 775 / II - in 1981-1988. and only three ships 775 / III are relatively young - they entered the fleet in 1990-1991.
Today, it is the BDK of this type that are the backbone of the amphibious assault ships of the Russian Navy. But I would like to note that all ships of this class have demonstrated their extraordinary usefulness in the daily service of the fleet. The BDK, in addition to its main function, turned out to be quite capable of performing the role of naval supply transports, and in this incarnation they became indispensable, for example, for the supply of domestic forces conducting hostilities in Syria.
Small landing ships and boats
MDK project 1232.2 ("Zubr") - 2 units.
Displacement 555 tons, speed - 63 knots, cruising range - 300 miles at full speed. Armament - 2 * 30-mm AK-630M, 2 NURS MS-227 "Fire" launchers, 4 "Igla" launchers. Airborne capacity - 3 tanks, 10 armored personnel carriers, up to 140 paratroopers. In case of refusal to transport equipment, the number of paratroopers can be increased to 500 people.
This type of ship causes very conflicting feelings. On the one hand, it is the world's largest hovercraft, and its ability to travel at speeds in excess of 116 km / h and its ability to "go" to the coast provides tremendous tactical opportunities. On the other hand, such a technique is quite expensive and, what is much more important, fragile - the Zubr's body is made of an aluminum alloy. Accordingly, such a ship has minimal combat stability - some serious combat damage, and even at a speed of over 100 km / h, can lead to the death of the entire crew and landing force. On the other hand, the Airborne Forces are at no less risk during the landing.
In general, such ships are unlikely to ever become the main landing craft of any fleet in the world, but they certainly have their own tactical niche.
The ships entered service in 1990 and 1991, respectively.
DKA project 21820 ("Dugong") - 5 units.
Displacement (full) 280 tons, speed up to 35 knots (at wave heights up to 0.75 m), cruising range - 500 miles, armament - 2 * 14.5 mm machine gun. Airborne capacity - 2 tanks or 4 infantry fighting vehicles / armored personnel carriers or up to 90 paratroopers.
Modern ships that use the principle of an air cavity during movement, which consists in creating an artificial air gap with excess pressure under the bottom of the boat. Commissioned in 2010-2015.
DKA project 11770 ("Serna") - 12 units.
Displacement (full) 105 tons, speed up to 30 knots, cruising range - 600 miles, no weapons. Airborne capacity - 1 tank or 2 infantry fighting vehicles / armored personnel carriers or up to 90 paratroopers.
Modern representatives of their class use the principle of an air cavity when moving, like the Dugongs. They entered service in the period from 1994 to 2010.
DKA project 1176 ("Shark") - 13 units.
Displacement (full) - up to 107.3 tons, speed 11.5 knots, cruising range 330 miles, no weapons. Airborne capacity - 1 tank or 1 infantry fighting vehicle / armored personnel carrier or up to 50 paratroopers.
These boats were commissioned in the USSR and the Russian Federation in the period from 1971 to 2009. They were supposed to be used both independently and as a landing craft for large landing ships of Project 1174 "Rhino" and an unrealized project of the universal amphibious assault ship of Project 11780, also known as "Ivan Tarava" (nicknamed for the similarity to an American ship of similar purpose).
