From the very first days of the Khmer Rouge in power, relations between Kampuchea and neighboring Vietnam continued to be tense. Even before the Communist Party of Kampuchea came to power, there was an ongoing struggle in its leadership between the pro-Vietnamese and anti-Vietnamese factions, which ended in victory for the latter.
Khmer Rouge anti-Vietnam policy
Pol Pot himself had a very negative attitude towards Vietnam and its role in Indo-Chinese politics. After the Khmer Rouge came to power, a policy of “cleansing” the Vietnamese population began in Democratic Kampuchea, as a result of which a significant part of the Vietnamese fled across the border. At the same time, the official Cambodian propaganda blamed Vietnam for all the country's problems, including the failures of the economic policy of the Pol Pot government. Vietnam was presented as the complete opposite of Kampuchea, there was a lot of talk about the alleged Vietnamese individualism, which is opposed to Kampuchean collectivism. The image of the enemy helped to unite the Kampuchean nation and strengthen the mobilization component in the life of Kampuchea, which already existed in constant tension. All negative moments in the life of Cambodian society, including the "excesses" of Pol Pot's repressive policies, were attributed to the intrigues of the Vietnamese.
- "Grandpa Pol Pot" and children
The anti-Vietnamese propaganda was especially active in influencing the peasant youth, who constituted the main support of the Khmer Rouge and their main mobilization resource. Unlike adult Cambodians, especially representatives of the urban population, many young residents of remote villages did not even see the Vietnamese in their lives, which did not prevent them from considering them their sworn enemies. This was also facilitated by official propaganda, which broadcast that the main task of Vietnam was the extermination of the Khmers and the seizure of the territory of Kampuchea. However, behind the anti-Vietnamese rhetoric of the Kampuchean authorities were not only Pol Pot's personal hatred of the Vietnamese and the need to create an image of an enemy to mobilize the population of Kampuchea. The fact is that Vietnam was the main conductor of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia, which China did not like very much. With the hands of the Khmer Rouge, China actually probed Vietnam for strength and declared its claims to leadership in Indochina and in the revolutionary communist movement in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, for Pol Pot, the confrontation with Vietnam was a chance to expand the volume of Chinese material, technical, financial and military support. The Khmer Rouge leadership was convinced that in the event of a conflict with Vietnam, China would provide all-round assistance to Democratic Kampuchea.
The formal provision of the anti-Vietnamese rhetoric of the Cambodian authorities was based on confessions of alleged Vietnamese agents of influence knocked out in the prisons of Kampuchea. Under torture, the arrested people agreed with all the charges and testified against Vietnam, which allegedly recruited them to conduct sabotage and espionage activities against Kampuchea. Another justification for the anti-Vietnamese position of the Khmer Rouge was territorial claims. The fact is that Vietnam included territories inhabited by "Khmer Krom" - ethnic Khmers who, after the proclamation of independence of Vietnam and Cambodia, became part of the Vietnamese state. The Khmer Rouge sought to revive the former power of the Khmer Empire, only in the form of a communist state, so they also advocated the return of the Khmer-inhabited lands to Democratic Kampuchea. These lands were part of Vietnam in the east, and Thailand in the west. But Thailand, unlike Vietnam, did not occupy an important place in the aggressive policy of Democratic Kampuchea. The Minister of Defense of Democratic Kampuchea Son Sen constantly reminded Pol Pot that his troops were unhappy with the presence of the Khmer lands in Vietnam and were ready to return them to Kampuchea with arms in hand. In the agricultural communes of the country, meetings were regularly held at which psychological treatment of the peasants was conducted in order to set the population up for the coming war with Vietnam. At the same time, already in 1977, the Khmer Rouge launched the tactics of constant armed provocations on the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. Attacking Vietnamese villages, the Khmer Rouge hoped that in the event of a serious military confrontation, Kampuchea would use China's help. For this, Chinese military advisers and specialists were invited to the country - according to various sources, from 5 to 20 thousand people. China and Kampuchea in every possible way emphasized the importance of bilateral relations and declared the special character of the Sino-Kampuchean friendship. Pol Pot and members of his government visited the PRC, met with the country's top leadership, including Marshal Hua Guofeng. By the way, the latter, at a meeting with the leaders of the Khmer Rouge, said that the PRC supports the activities of Democratic Kampuchea in the direction of further revolutionary transformations.
Against the background of maintaining friendly relations with China, relations with Vietnam and the Soviet Union that stood behind it continued to deteriorate. If after the coming of the Khmer Rouge to power, the Soviet Union reacted rather positively to them, since the communist forces nevertheless won the victory, albeit with a slightly different ideology, then by the end of 1977 the Soviet leadership, realizing the anti-Vietnamese and anti-Soviet nature of Pol Pot regime, distanced itself from the development of relations with Democratic Kampuchea. Increasingly, criticism of the Khmer Rouge government, which was openly accused of Maoism and the conduct of a pro-Chinese policy in the country, began to sound criticism in the Soviet media and regional literature. Nevertheless, the leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party made attempts to normalize relations with neighboring Kampuchea, for which, back in June 1977, the Vietnamese side turned to the Khmer Rouge with a proposal to hold a bilateral meeting. However, the government of Kampuchea in a response letter asked to wait with the meeting and expressed hope for an improvement in the situation at the borders. In fact, the Khmer Rouge did not want any normalization of relations with Vietnam. Even though China preferred to keep a certain distance and not openly interfere in the Cambodian-Vietnamese confrontation.
Cambodian-Vietnamese War 1978-1979
On December 31, 1977, the leadership of the Khmer Rouge announced to the whole world that Vietnam was taking acts of armed aggression against Democratic Kampuchea on the country's borders. Naturally, after this demarche, the hope for normalization of relations was completely lost. The inevitability of an open confrontation between the two states became obvious. Moreover, an air base was built in Kamponchhnang, from which aircraft could attack Vietnamese territory in the event of hostilities. Border provocations against Vietnam also continued. So, on April 18, 1978An armed group of the Khmer Rouge invaded the Vietnamese border province of Anzyang and attacked the village of Batyuk. The total destruction of the local population began in the village. 3157 people died, including women and children. Only two villagers managed to escape. After conducting this raid, the Khmer Rouge retreated to the territory of Kampuchea. In response, Vietnamese troops launched several raids on Cambodian territory. It became clear that a large-scale military clash between the two states was not far off. Moreover, slogans were raised in Kampuchea about the need for the complete destruction of all Vietnamese and the genocide of the Vietnamese population of the country began. The attack on Batyuk and the killing of more than three thousand civilian Vietnamese citizens was the last straw of patience for the Vietnamese authorities. After such a sortie, it was not possible to endure the antics of the Kampuchean Khmer Rouge, and the Vietnamese military command began direct preparations for an armed operation against Kampuchea.
However, without the support of at least part of the Khmer population, Vietnam's actions could be perceived as aggression against Kampuchea, which potentially entailed the danger of China entering the war. Therefore, the Vietnamese leadership stepped up work to find those political forces in Kampuchea, which could be considered as an alternative to the Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge. First of all, the Vietnamese leadership entered into negotiations with a group of old Cambodian communists who had lived in Vietnam for a long time and enjoyed the confidence of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party. Secondly, the representatives of the "Khmer Rouge" who, for whatever reason, in 1976-1977, became a possible support of Vietnam. fled to the territory of Vietnam, fleeing political repression. Finally, there was hope for an armed uprising against Pol Pot by a part of the Khmer Rouge, dissatisfied with the policy of the leadership of Kampuchea and located on the territory of Kampuchea itself. First of all, it was the head of the Eastern Administrative Zone So Phim, about whom we wrote in the previous part of our story, and his political associates. The Eastern Administrative Zone retained de facto independence from Pol Pot and in every possible way obstructed the policy of Phnom Penh. In May 1978, troops subordinated to So Phimu raised an uprising in the east of Kampuchea against Pol Pot. Naturally, this action was carried out not without support from Vietnam, although Hanoi openly did not dare to oppose Kampuchea. However, the uprising was brutally suppressed by the Khmer Rouge, and So Phim himself died. The hopes of the Vietnamese to move into opposition to Pol Pot Nuon Chea, who occupied one of the most important places in the Khmer Rouge hierarchy and was traditionally considered a “pro-Vietnamese” politician, did not come true either. Nuon Chea not only did not go over to the side of Vietnam, but also remained with Pol Pot almost to the end. But Vietnam has an ally in the person of Heng Samrin.
Heng Samrin (born 1934) came from a poor peasant family who from an early age participated in the national liberation and communist movement in Cambodia. After the victory of the Khmer Rouge, Heng Samrin, who commanded one of the regiments of the National Liberation Army of Kampuchea, was appointed to the post of political commissar of the division, then - division commander. At the time of the uprising in the Eastern Administrative Zone, Heng Samrin served as deputy chief of staff of this zone. In 1978 he refused to obey Pol Pot and led a subordinate division against the Khmer Rouge. He managed to capture part of the province of Kampong Cham, but then the Khmer Rouge were able to push Heng Samrin's troops to the Vietnamese border. The Vietnamese leadership decided to use Heng Samrin and his supporters to give legitimacy to their further actions - they say, we are not just invading Kampuchea in order to overthrow its government, but we support the sane and moderate part of the Kampuchean communist movement. For this, on December 2, 1978, in the province of Kratie, on the border with Vietnam, the United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea was created. Its founding congress was attended by seventy people - pro-Vietnamese veterans of the Kampuchean communist movement. Heng Samrin was elected chairman of the front.
Preparations for the invasion of Kampuchea intensified in the fall of 1978, which was also notified to the Soviet side, which did not take a direct part in organizing the invasion, but actually supported the Vietnamese line towards Kampuchea. The Vietnamese military command was not afraid of China's quick entry into the war, because, according to the Vietnamese, China simply would not have had time to react to the lightning rush of Vietnamese troops. The Vietnamese People's Army outnumbered the Cambodian armed forces in numbers, weapons, and combat training. Therefore, the outcome of the collision, in principle, turned out to be a foregone conclusion from the very first days of the conflict. Starting the hostilities, the Vietnamese did not even doubt their own victory, as the Soviet political and military leadership assured. At the head of the Vietnamese troops preparing for the invasion of Kampuchea was General of the Army Van Tien Dung (1917-2002) - a veteran of the national liberation war in Vietnam, who developed and implemented the plan for the 1975 Spring Offensive, which resulted in the fall of South Vietnam. Van Tien Dung was considered one of the most successful generals in Vietnam, second after Vo Nguyen Gyap.
On December 25, 1978, tank and motorized rifle units of the Vietnamese army moved out of the Vietnamese city of Banmethuot. They swiftly crossed the border with Kampuchea and entered its territory. 14 Vietnamese divisions took part in the offensive. The Khmer Rouge detachments stationed on the border did not offer serious resistance, so very soon the Vietnamese troops advanced deep into Kampuchea - to Phnom Penh. Despite loud statements by the Kampuchean leadership about the inevitable defeat of the Vietnamese and the victory of the Kampuchean people, very soon the Vietnamese managed to advance to the capital of the country. On January 1, 1979, battles were already taking place in the vicinity of the capital. On January 5, 1979, Pol Pot called on the Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people for a popular war against "Soviet military expansion." The mention of Soviet military expansion was obviously made to attract the attention of China, as well as the possible intervention of the West. However, neither China nor Western countries provided military support to the Pol Pot regime. Moreover, on the advice of the Chinese, Pol Pot facilitated the evacuation of Prince Norodom Sihanouk from the country, allegedly in order for the prince to represent the interests of Democratic Kampuchea at the UN. In fact, the Chinese were much more interested in Norodom Sihanouk in this situation than Pol Pot. Sihanouk was the legitimate head of the Cambodian people and, as such, was recognized by the world community. Naturally, in the event of a successful enticement of Sihanouk to its side, China, even in the event of the collapse of the Pol Pot regime, could count on the restoration of control over Cambodia in the future. Pol Pot's position became more and more precarious. On the morning of January 7, 1979, a few hours before Vietnamese troops entered the capital of Democratic Kampuchea, Phnom Penh, Pol Pot left the city along with his closest associates. He flew by helicopter to the west of the country, where military units that remained loyal to the leader of the Khmer Rouge retreated. Khmer Rouge Foreign Minister Ieng Sari fled from Phnom Penh "on his own" and only on January 11 reached the border with Thailand, torn off and even losing his shoes. He was dressed and shod at the Chinese Embassy in Thailand and sent to Beijing. Vietnamese troops, having entered Phnom Penh, officially transferred power in the country to the United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea, headed by Heng Samrin. Formally, it was the EFNSK and Heng Samrin who were positioned as the forces that liberated Kampuchea from the Pol Pot dictatorship.
Fall of Democratic Kampuchea and the People's Republic of Kampuchea
On January 10, 1979, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (NRC) was proclaimed. In the part of Cambodia occupied by the Vietnamese, the formation of new power structures under the control of the United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea began. The backbone of these structures was made up of representatives of the "middle echelon" of the Cambodian communists, who went over to the Vietnamese side. At first, the power of the new government was based on direct military support from Vietnam. The world community never recognized the People's Republic of Kampuchea. Despite the war crimes of the Pol Pot regime that became known, it was the representations of Democratic Kampuchea that for a long time were considered legitimate by most countries of the world, while the NRC was recognized only by the countries of pro-Soviet orientation that were members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. For the NRC, a serious problem was the lack of real power on the ground. It was planned to form people's committees, but this process was slow and with great difficulties. In fact, only in Phnom Penh did the central authorities of the EFNSK operate, relying on the help of Vietnamese advisers, both military and civilian. The core of the new regime was the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CCP), backed by Vietnam and representing an alternative to Pol Pot's Communist Party of Kampuchea. In almost all regions of the country, not only were units of the Vietnamese People's Army stationed, which remained the main power support of the regime, but also Vietnamese civilian administrative and engineering advisers were stationed who helped the new government to establish a system of management and organization of the national economy.
A serious problem for the new government was also the contradictions between the two groups of the new elite - the former military and political leaders of the Eastern zone of Democratic Kampuchea, who went over to the side of Vietnam, and the old veterans of the Cambodian Communist Party, who had lived in Vietnam since the 1950s - 1960s. and never recognized Pol Pot as the leader of the country's communist movement. The interests of the latter were represented by Pen Sowan (born 1936). Pen Sowan was not only a veteran of the Cambodian revolutionary movement, but also a major in the Vietnamese People's Army. In early 1979, a group under his leadership held the "third congress" of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (NRPK), thereby not recognizing the "illegitimate" congresses in 1963, 1975 and 1978 Pen Sowan was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the NRPK. However, the creation of the NRPK until 1981 was kept secret. Heng Samrin was appointed head of the People's Revolutionary Council. Formally, he was considered the head of the new revolutionary government, although in fact he was subordinate to Vietnamese advisers.
Thus, by 1980, the most significant positions in the leadership of the NRC and the NRPK were occupied by Heng Samrin, Pen Sowan and Chea Sim - also a former "Khmer Rouge" who, together with Heng Samrin, went over to the side of the Vietnamese. In the summer of 1979, the sessions of the People's Revolutionary Tribunal of Kampuchea began, at which on August 15-19, Pol Pot and Ieng Sari were sentenced in absentia to death for committing numerous crimes against the Cambodian people. It was during this period that extensive coverage of the repressive policy of the Khmer Rouge, carried out in 1975-1978, began. The new leaders of Kampuchea have announced the number of Cambodian citizens killed during the three years of Khmer Rouge rule. According to Pen Sowan, 3,100,000 people were killed under Pol Pot. However, this figure - over 3 million people - is denied by the Khmer Rouge themselves. So, Pol Pot himself in the last interview that the leader of the Khmer Rouge gave in December 1979, said that during his leadership more than a few thousand people could not have died. Khieu Samphan later stated that 11,000 of the dead were Vietnamese agents, 30,000 were Vietnamese infiltrators, and only 3,000 Cambodians died as a result of the mistakes and excesses of the Khmer Rouge policies on the ground. But, according to Khieu Samphan, at least one and a half million residents of the country died as a result of the actions of the Vietnamese troops. Of course, no one took the last words seriously.
After the occupation of Phnom Penh by Vietnamese troops and the formation of the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge troops controlled by Pol Pot retreated to the western part of the country, to the border with Thailand. This region became the main stronghold of the Khmer Rouge for many decades. In the first months after the fall of Phnom Penh, the Vietnamese surrendered, and about 42,000 Khmer Rouge soldiers and officers were killed or captured. The troops loyal to Pol Pot suffered serious losses and lost their positions in the country. So, were destroyed: the general headquarters of the Khmer Rouge in Amleang, bases in the province of Pousat and the river fleet, based in the province of Kahkong.
Jungle War. Khmer Rouge against the new government
However, gradually the Khmer Rouge managed to recover from the attacks inflicted by the Vietnamese. This was facilitated by the general change in the military-political situation in Indochina. If before Democratic Kampuchea enjoyed the support of only China, then after the invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnamese troops, Thailand and the United States behind it were on the side of the Khmer Rouge, which sought to prevent the strengthening of Vietnamese, and therefore Soviet positions in Indochina and Southeast Asia … In the partisan resistance of the Khmer Rouge, the American leadership saw an obstacle to the further advance of the USSR in Indochina. There were secret agreements between China and Thailand, according to which China refused to support the Communist Party of Thailand, which waged a guerrilla war against the country's royal regime, and Thailand, in turn, provided its territory for the base of the Khmer Rouge.
Tacitly, the position of Thailand was welcomed by the United States, which also supported the preservation of the representation of Democratic Kampuchea in the UN by the Pol Pot delegation. With the support of the United States, China and Thailand, Pol Pot intensified hostilities against the new Cambodian government and the Vietnamese troops supporting it. Despite the fact that China was formally defeated in the short-term Sino-Vietnamese war, it continued to provide military and logistical assistance to the Khmer Rouge. By 1983, Pol Pot managed to create nine divisions and form the Ronsae group to operate in the rear of the new Cambodian government. Steps have been taken to break out of international isolation. In particular, representatives of the Khmer Rouge, together with supporters of Son Sanna and Norodom Sihanouk, became part of the coalition government of Cambodia, recognized by the United Nations and most states that were not among the countries of the pro-Soviet orientation. In 1979-1982. The coalition government was headed by Khieu Samphan, and in 1982 he was replaced by Son Sann (1911-2000), a veteran of Cambodian politics, a longtime associate of Norodom Sihanouk, who remained as head of the coalition government until 1993. Khieu Samphan himself in 1985was proclaimed the official successor of Pol Pot as leader of the Khmer Rouge and continued to lead the activities of the Khmer Rouge guerrilla units in the jungles of Cambodia. Prince Norodom Sihanouk was proclaimed the formal president of Democratic Kampuchea, Son Sann became prime minister, Khieu Samphan became deputy prime minister. At the same time, the actual power over the rebel formations remained in the hands of Pol Pot, who remained the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Khmer Rouge and the leader of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.
Pol Pot's control remained an impressive number of military units - about 30 thousand people. Another 12 thousand soldiers were listed in the monarchist group of Sihanouk and 5 thousand soldiers - in units subordinate to Son Sannu. Thus, the new government of Kampuchea was opposed by about 50 thousand fighters based in the western regions of the country and on the territory of neighboring Thailand, supported by Thailand and China, and indirectly by the United States. China provided military assistance to all groups fighting against the pro-Vietnamese government of Kampuchea, but 95% of the assistance fell on the Khmer Rouge units. Only 5% of Chinese weapons and equipment were received by troops directly controlled by Sihanouk and Son Sannu. The latter were largely assisted by the United States, however, preferring to act not openly, but through controlled funds. Singapore and Malaysia also played an important role in helping anti-government groups in Cambodia. At some point, it was the assistance of Singapore that was decisive. The important role of refugee camps should not be forgotten either. On the territory of Thailand in the 1980s. there were tens of thousands of Cambodian refugees who were housed in camps set up under the control of the UN and the Thai government. However, many refugee camps were in fact the bases of the Khmer Rouge military forces. From among the young refugees, the Khmer Rouge recruited militants, trained and deployed them there.
Throughout the 1980s-1990s. The Khmer Rouge fought a guerrilla war in the jungles of Cambodia, periodically making attacks and attacks in major cities of the country, including the capital Phnom Penh. Since the Khmer Rouge were able to regain control over a number of rural areas of the country, transport links between its regions, including between the country's most important cities, were seriously hampered in Kampuchea. In order to deliver the goods, it was necessary to organize a powerful escort by Vietnamese military units. However, the Khmer Rouge failed to create "liberated areas" in the provinces of Kampuchea far from the Thai border. The insufficient level of combat training of the Khmer Rouge, and the weakness of the material and technical base, and the lack of broad support from the population also affected. In 1983-1984 and 1984-1985. large-scale military operations of the Vietnamese army against the Pol Pot troops were undertaken, which led to the defeat of the Khmer Rouge bases in a number of regions of the country. In an effort to increase support from the country's population, the "Khmer Rouge" gradually abandoned purely communist slogans and switched to the propaganda of Khmer nationalism. The main emphasis was placed on the seizure of the country's territory by Vietnam and the imaginary prospects of the Vietnamese settling the Cambodian territory, as a result of which the Khmers would be expelled or assimilated. This propaganda resonated with a significant part of the Khmers, who traditionally had a very cool attitude towards the Vietnamese, and lately were very dissatisfied with Vietnam's interference in the country's internal affairs and the virtually complete control of the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea by the Vietnamese leadership. The fact that Norodom Sihanouk, the heir to the royal dynasty, who was considered by many Khmers to be the only legitimate ruler of the Cambodian state, also played a role.
The decline of the Khmer Rouge and the death of Pol Pot
But by the second half of the 1980s. The Khmer Rouge began to gradually lose the previously conquered positions. This was due to the beginning of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from the country and the transition of the role of the main opponent of the Khmer Rouge to the Kampuchean army. In 1987, there were about 54 thousand people in the formations of the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea, including 39 thousand people in combat units. Over 20 thousand militants operated on the territory of Kampuchea, the rest were stationed in Thailand. The armed forces of Kampuchea numbered over 100 thousand people in regular units and 120 thousand people in militias. Gradually, the parties to the conflict came to the realization of the need for peace negotiations. The leadership of the Soviet Union was also inclined to this opinion. Mikhail Gorbachev turned to a policy of constant and unjustified concessions to his political opponents, which ultimately contributed to undermining the political influence of the Soviet Union and strengthening the position of the United States. Kampuchea was no exception - it was Moscow that pressed hard on the government of Heng Samrin in order to pursue the latter's policy of "reconciliation". The Soviet Union actually turned into a mediator between Vietnam and People's Kampuchea on the one hand and Democratic Kampuchea, China and the United States on the other hand, while in the negotiations the USSR actually lobbied the interests of the Chinese and American sides. US Secretary of State J. Schultz sent a letter to Moscow, USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, in which he affirmed the need for international observation in Cambodia and the proclamation of Norodom Sihanouk as head of state. The Soviet leadership forwarded this letter to Hanoi and Phnom Penh without comment, which actually meant the Soviet Union's support for the American proposals. At the same time, the USSR continued the policy of providing military assistance to the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. However, the Cambodian leadership was forced to make concessions. The new Prime Minister of the country, Hun Sen, in April 1989 renamed the People's Republic of Kampuchea into the State of Cambodia. In September 1989, the last units of the Vietnamese army were withdrawn from the territory of Kampuchea, after which an armed invasion of the opposition began from the territory of Thailand. However, the Cambodian army managed to repel the attacks of the Khmer Rouge. In 1991, at the International Conference on Cambodia in Paris, the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, the Agreement on Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Integrity, Neutrality and National Unity, and the Declaration on Reconstruction and Reconstruction were signed. On September 21, 1993, the National Assembly adopted a new constitution for the country, according to which Cambodia was declared a constitutional monarchy, and Norodom Sihanouk returned to the royal throne.
These political events in the life of the country dealt a decisive blow to the positions of the Khmer Rouge and contributed to a serious split within the guerrilla movement itself. After China finally abandoned its support for the Khmer Rouge, the latter received funds only from the smuggling of timber and precious metals to Thailand. The number of armed forces controlled by Pol Pot dropped from 30 thousand to 15 thousand people. Many "Khmer Rouge" went over to the side of the government forces. However, at the end of January 1994, Khieu Samphan called on the people to revolt against the illegal government of Cambodia. On the territory of a number of provinces of the country, bloody battles began between government troops and the formations of the Khmer Rouge. A successful move by the government was a decree on amnesty to all Khmer Rouge fighters who surrendered within six months, after which another 7 thousand people left the ranks of the Pol Pot residents. In response, Pol Pot returned to a policy of harsh repression in the ranks of the Khmer Rouge, which alienated even former supporters. In August 1996, the entire Pailin Khmer Rouge grouping under the command of Pol Pot's closest ally Ieng Sari went over to the side of the government. Having lost all touch with reality, Pol Pot ordered the assassination of his Defense Minister Son Sung, who was killed on June 15, 1997, along with 13 members of his family, including babies. Pol Pot's inadequacy led to the separation of the last supporters from him - Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea, who surrendered to government forces. Pol Pot himself was deposed and placed under house arrest. In fact, Ta Mok, once the favorite and closest henchman of Pol Pot, who, twenty years later, directed his overthrow and arrest, took over the command of the Khmer Rouge.
Under the leadership of Ta Mok, a small number of Khmer Rouge units continued to operate in the Cambodian jungle. April 15, 1998 Pol Pot passed away - according to the official version, which was voiced by Ta Mok, the cause of death of the 72-year-old Khmer Rouge leader was heart failure. Pol Pot's body was cremated and buried. In March 2000, the last Khmer Rouge leader, Ta Mok, was arrested by government forces. He died in 2006 at the age of 80 in prison without ever receiving a court verdict. In 2007, Ieng Sari and his wife, Ieng Tirith, were arrested and charged with genocide against the Vietnamese and Muslim population of the country. Ieng Sari passed away in 2013 in Phnom Penh at the age of 89. His wife Ieng Tirith died in 2015 in Pailin at the age of 83. Khieu Samphan is still alive. He is 84 years old, and on August 7, 2014 he was sentenced to life imprisonment. A life sentence is currently serving and 89-year-old Nuon Chea (born 1926) is also one of Pol Pot's closest associates. On July 25, 2010, Kan Kek Yeu, who was in charge of Tuolsleng Prison, was sentenced to 35 years in prison. Currently, 73-year-old "Brother Dut" is in prison. Pol Pot's first wife, Khieu Ponnari, received an amnesty from the government back in 1996 and calmly lived out her life in Pailin, where she died in 2003 from cancer at the age of 83. Pol Pot has a daughter from his second marriage - Sar Patchada, she is Sita. Sita is secular in a city in the northwestern part of the country. On March 16, 2014, the wedding of the daughter of the Khmer Rouge leader was announced. Many rank-and-file Khmer Rouge chose to continue their political activities in the ranks of the National Salvation Party of Cambodia, which acts from the standpoint of Khmer nationalism.
“Brother number two” Nuon Chea (pictured - in the courtroom), sentenced to life imprisonment, turned his word into a statement of the official position of the “Khmer Rouge.” According to the politician, Vietnam is to blame for all the troubles of Cambodia, Nuon Chea compared the neighboring countries with the neighborhood of a python and a deer.”The second culprit of the tragedy of Cambodia, Nuon Chea called the United States and its imperialist policy, which led to the death of millions of people.“Revolutionary purges,”according to Nuon Chea, were justified by the need to get rid of traitors and carried out their people, killing only those who actually collaborated with the Americans or were a Vietnamese agent.
