Continued, start here: Part 1
Defending Stalingrad
A new stage in the history of the detachments began in the summer of 1942, when the Germans broke through to the Volga and the Caucasus. On July 28, the famous order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I. V. Stalin was issued, which, in particular, prescribed:
“2. To the military councils of the armies and, above all, to the commanders of the armies:
[…] b) form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (200 people in each), put them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them in case of panic and indiscriminate withdrawal of divisional units to shoot on the spot alarmists and cowards, and so help honest fighters of divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland "(The Stalingrad Epic: Materials of the NKVD of the USSR and military censorship from the Central Archives of the FSB RF. M., 2000, p. 445).
In pursuance of this order, the commander of the Stalingrad Front, Lieutenant General V. N. Gordov, on August 1, 1942, issued his order No. 00162 / op, in which he prescribed:
5. The commanders of the 21st, 55th, 57th, 62, 63, and 65th armies should form five barrage detachments within two days, and the commanders of the 1st and 4th tank armies - three barrage detachments of 200 people each.
Subordinate the defensive detachments to the military councils of the armies through their special departments. At the head of the barrage detachments to put the most experienced in a combat relation special officers.
The defensive detachments will be manned with the best selected fighters and commanders from the Far Eastern divisions.
Provide roadblocks with vehicles.
6. Within two days, restore in each rifle division the barrage battalions formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 01919.
To equip the defensive battalions of divisions with the best worthy fighters and commanders. Report about the performance by August 4, 1942 (TsAMO. F.345. Op.5487. D.5. L.706).
From the message of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR dated August 14, 1942 "On the progress of the implementation of order No. 227 and the response of the personnel of the 4th Panzer Army to it":
“In total, 24 people were shot during the specified period of time. So, for example, the commanders of the 414 SP, 18 SD, Styrkov and Dobrynin, during the battle, chickened out, abandoned their squads and fled from the battlefield, both were detained by the barriers. by a detachment and a resolution of the Special Division, they were shot in front of the formation.
A Red Army soldier of the same regiment and division Ogorodnikov self-injured his left hand, was exposed for the crime, for which he was brought to trial by a military tribunal. […]
On the basis of Order No. 227, three army detachments were formed, each with 200 men. These units are fully armed with rifles, machine guns and light machine guns.
Operational workers of special departments were appointed as the heads of the detachments.
By the indicated detachments and barrage battalions on 7.8.42, in units and formations in the army sectors, 363 people were detained, of which: 93 people. left the encirclement, 146 - lagged behind their units, 52 - lost their units, 12 - came from captivity, 54 - fled from the battlefield, 2 - with dubious wounds.
As a result of a thorough check: 187 people were sent to their units, 43 - to the staffing department, 73 - to special camps of the NKVD, 27 - to penal companies, 2 - to the medical commission, 6 people. - arrested and, as indicated above, 24 people. shot in front of the line"
(The Stalingrad epic: Materials of the NKVD of the USSR and military censorship from the Central archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation. M., 2000. S. 181-182).
In accordance with the order of the NKO No. 227, as of October 15, 1942, 193 army barrage detachments were formed, including 16 on the Stalingrad front armies) and 25 on the Donskoy.
At the same time, from August 1 to October 15, 1942, the detachments detained 140,755 servicemen who had escaped from the front line. Of those arrested, 3980 people were arrested, 1189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and to transit points.
The largest number of arrests and arrests was carried out by the barrage detachments of the Don and Stalingrad fronts. On the Don Front, 36,109 people were detained, 736 people were arrested, 433 people were shot, 1,056 people were sent to penal companies, 33 people were sent to penal battalions, 32,933 people were returned to their units and to transit points. On the Stalingrad front, 15649 people were detained, 244 people were arrested, 278 people were shot, 218 people were sent to penal companies, 42 to penal battalions, 14,833 people were returned to their units and to transit points.
During the defense of Stalingrad, barrage detachments played an important role in putting things in order in the units and preventing an unorganized withdrawal from the lines they occupied, and the return of a significant number of servicemen to the front line.
So, on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by the enemy tanks that had broken through, parts of the division, having lost control, retreated in panic to the rear. A detachment under the command of State Security Lieutenant Filatov, taking decisive measures, stopped the retreating servicemen in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied lines of defense. In another sector of this division, the enemy tried to break through into the depths of the defense. The detachment entered the battle and delayed the advance of the enemy.
On September 14, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Rifle Division of the 62nd Army. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd Rifle Regiments began to retreat in panic. The head of the detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Elman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. As a result, the personnel of these regiments was stopped and two hours later the regiments occupied the former lines of defense.
On September 20, the Germans occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The composite brigade, under the onslaught of the enemy, began an unauthorized retreat. The actions of a detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces put things in order in the brigade. The brigade occupied the previous lines and, on the initiative of the political commander of the company of the same blocking detachment, Pestov, by joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was thrown back from Melekhovskaya.
At critical moments, barrage detachments entered directly into battle with the enemy, successfully restraining his onslaught. So, on September 13, the 112th Rifle Division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. A detachment of the 62nd Army, under the leadership of the chief of the detachment, Lieutenant of State Security Khlystov, took up defensive positions on the approaches to an important height. For four days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of the enemy machine gunners, inflicting heavy losses on them. The detachment held the line until the arrival of the military units.
On September 15-16, a detachment of the 62nd Army successfully fought a battle with superior enemy forces in the area of the Stalingrad railway station for two days. Despite its small number, the detachment not only repulsed the attacks of the Germans, but also counterattacked, inflicting significant losses on the enemy in manpower. The detachment left its line only when units of the 10th rifle division came to replace them.
In addition to the army detachments created in accordance with Order No. 227, during the Battle of Stalingrad, restored divisional barrage battalions operated, as well as small detachments staffed with NKVD servicemen under special divisions of divisions and armies. At the same time, army barrage detachments and divisional barrage battalions carried a barrage service directly behind the combat formations of units, preventing panic and mass exodus of servicemen from the battlefield, while security platoons of special divisions of divisions and companies under special divisions of armies were used to carry barrage services on the main communications of divisions and armies with the aim of detaining cowards, alarmists, deserters and other criminal elements hiding in the army and front lines.
However, in an environment where the very concept of rear was very conditional, this "division of labor" was often violated. So, on October 15, 1942, during fierce battles in the area of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off from the main forces of the 62nd Army the remnants of the 112th Infantry Division, as well as the 115th, 124th and 149th separate rifle brigades. At the same time, among the leading command staff, there were repeated attempts to abandon their units and cross over to the eastern bank of the Volga. In these conditions, to combat cowards and alarmists, a special department of the 62nd army created an operational group under the leadership of senior operative lieutenant of state security Ignatenko. Having united the remnants of the platoons of special departments with the personnel of the 3rd Army Barrier Detachment, she did an exceptionally great job of restoring order, detaining deserters, cowards and alarmists who, under various pretexts, tried to cross to the left bank of the Volga. Within 15 days, the operational group detained and returned to the battlefield up to 800 privates and command personnel, and 15 servicemen were shot in front of the formation by order of the special agencies.
In a memo dated February 17, 1943 of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Don Front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR "On the work of special agencies to combat cowards and alarmists in parts of the Don Front for the period from October 1, 1942 to February 1, 1943", a number of examples of actions are given barrage detachments:
“In the fight against cowards, alarmists and restoring order in units that showed instability in battles with the enemy, an exceptionally large role was played by army detachments and divisional barrage battalions.
So, on October 2, 1942, during the offensive of our troops, individual units of the 138th division, met by powerful artillery and mortar fire of the enemy, wavered and fled in panic through the battle formations of the 1st battalion 706 SP, 204 SD, which were in the second echelon.
By the measures taken by the command and the detachment battalion of the division, the situation was restored. 7 cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the formation, and the rest were returned to the front line.
On October 16, 1942, during a counterattack by the enemy, a group of Red Army men of 781 and 124 divisions, in the amount of 30 people, showed cowardice and in panic began to flee from the battlefield, dragging along other servicemen.
The army detachment of the 21st Army, located in this sector, liquidated the panic by force of arms and restored the previous position.
November 19, 1942, during the offensive of units of the 293st division, during the enemy's counterattack, two mortar platoons of 1306 joint venture together with platoon commanders, ml. Lieutenants Bogatyryov and Egorov, without an order from the command, left the occupied line and in panic, throwing their weapons, began to flee from the battlefield.
A platoon of submachine gunners of an army blocking detachment located in this area stopped the fleeing and, having shot two alarmists in front of the formation, returned the rest to their former lines, after which they successfully advanced forward.
On November 20, 1942, during a counterattack of the enemy, one of the companies of 38 p.divisions, which were at a height, without offering resistance to the enemy, without an order from the command, began to indiscriminately withdraw from the occupied area.
The 83rd detachment of the 64th Army, carrying the barrage service directly behind the battle formations of the 38th SD units, stopped the running company in panic and returned it back to the previously occupied section of the height, after which the personnel of the company showed exceptional endurance and perseverance in battles with the enemy (Stalingrad epic … P.409-410).
End of the road
After the defeat of the Nazi troops at Stalingrad and the victory at the Kursk Bulge, a turning point came in the war. The strategic initiative passed to the Red Army. In this situation, the barrage detachments have lost their former significance. On August 25, 1944, the head of the political department of the 3rd Baltic Front, Major General A. Lobachev, sent to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Colonel-General Shcherbakov, a memorandum "On the shortcomings of the activity of the front line detachments" with the following content:
“On my instructions, the front command control officers checked the activities of six detachments in August (a total of 8 detachments).
As a result of this work, it was established:
1. The detachments do not fulfill their direct functions established by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense. Most of the personnel of the barrage detachments are used to protect the headquarters of the armies, guard communication lines, roads, combing forests, etc. The activity of the 7th detachment of the 54th army is characteristic in this respect. According to the list, the detachment consists of 124 people. They are used as follows: the 1st submachine gun platoon guards the 2nd echelon of the army headquarters; 2nd submachine gun platoon attached to 111th armament with the task of protecting communication lines from the corps to the army; a rifle platoon was attached to 7 sk with the same mission; the machine-gun platoon is in the reserve of the detachment commander; 9 people work in the departments of the army headquarters, including the platoon commander of Art. Lieutenant GONCHAR is the commandant of the rear services department of the army; the remaining 37 people are used at the headquarters of the detachment. Thus, the 7th detachment is not at all involved in the obstruction service. The same situation in other detachments (5, 6, 153, 21, 50)
In the 5th detachment of the 54th army of 189 people. staff only 90 people. are guarding the command post of the army and the barrage service, and the remaining 99 people. used in various jobs: 41 people - in the service of the Army Headquarters AXO as cooks, shoemakers, tailors, storekeepers, clerks, etc.; 12 people - in the departments of the army headquarters as messengers and orderlies; 5 people - at the disposal of the commandant of the headquarters and 41 people. serve the headquarters of the detachment.
In the 6th detachment of 169 people. 90 fighters and sergeants are used to protect the command post and communication lines, and the rest are on housekeeping work.
2. In a number of detachments, the staffs of the headquarters were extremely swollen. Instead of the prescribed staff of 15 people. officer, sergeant and rank-and-file staff of the 5th detachment consists of 41 people; 7th detachment - 37 people, 6th detachment - 30 people, 153rd detachment - 30 people. etc.
3. The headquarters of the armies do not exercise control over the activities of the detachments, left them to themselves, reduced the role of the detachments to the position of ordinary commandant companies. Meanwhile, the personnel of the detachments were selected from the best, proven fighters and sergeants, participants in many battles, awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union. In the 21st detachment of the 67th army of 199 people. 75% of the participants in the battles, many of them were awarded. In the 50th detachment, 52 people were awarded for military merit.
4. Lack of control on the part of the headquarters has led to the fact that in most of the detachments military discipline is at a low level, people are dismissed. Over the past three months, 30 penalties were imposed on soldiers and sergeants in the 6th detachment for gross violations of military discipline. Not better in other units …
5. Political departments and deputy. The chiefs of staffs of the armies for political reasons have forgotten about the existence of detachments, they do not lead party political work …
On the revealed shortcomings in the activities of the detachments 15.8 reported to the Military Council of the front. At the same time, he gave instructions to the chiefs of the political departments of the armies about the need to radically improve party-political and educational work in the detachments; revitalizing the internal party activities of party organizations, strengthening work with party and Komsomol activists, conducting lectures and reports for personnel, improving the cultural services for soldiers, sergeants and officers of detachments.
Conclusion: Most of the detachments do not fulfill the tasks defined by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227. The protection of headquarters, roads, communication lines, the performance of various economic work and assignments, the maintenance of commanders-chiefs, the supervision of the internal order in the rear of the army is in no way included in the functions of the detachments of the front troops.
I consider it necessary to raise the question before the People's Commissar of Defense on the reorganization or disbandment of the barrage detachments, as they have lost their purpose in the present situation (Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal. 1988. No. 8. P.79-80).
Two months later, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense JV Stalin No. 0349 of October 29, 1944 "On the disbandment of separate barrage detachments" was issued:
“In connection with the change in the general situation at the fronts, the need for further maintenance of the barrage detachments has disappeared.
I order:
1. Separate barrage detachments should be disbanded by November 13, 1944.
Use the personnel of the disbanded detachments to replenish rifle divisions.
2. To inform about the disbandment of the barrage detachments by November 20, 1944”(Ibid. P. 80).
So, the barrage detachments detained the deserters and a suspicious element in the rear of the front, stopped the retreating troops. In a critical situation, they themselves often engaged in battle with the Germans, and when the military situation changed in our favor, they began to perform the functions of commandant companies. Carrying out its direct tasks, the detachment could open fire over the heads of fleeing units or shoot cowards and alarmists in front of the formation - but certainly on an individual basis. However, none of the researchers has yet been able to find in the archives a single fact that would confirm that the barrage detachments fired to kill their troops.
Such cases are not cited in the memoirs of the front-line soldiers.
For example, in the "Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", an article by the Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army P. N. Lashchenko, says the following about this:
In almost the same words, the knight of the Order of Alexander Nevsky A. G. Efremov described the activities of the blocking detachments in the newspaper "Vladimirskie vedomosti":
If you wish, more than a dozen more memories of this kind can be cited, but the ones given along with the documents are quite enough to understand what the barrage units actually were.
