They say that the winners write history. The lot of the vanquished is to try to rewrite history, but Hitler's commanders took it up long before the final defeat of the Third Reich.
“They began to lie almost immediately” - for the first time I heard such a soldierly straightforward definition of the German memoirists in my early childhood from my cousin, Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Fedorovich Sokolov. He went through the entire war with his Katyushas, marched at the Victory Parade in the column of the 3rd Belorussian Front, but at first he dealt with German officers only as prisoners. However, even he, experienced, was literally struck by the very first acquaintance with the memories of former opponents. “They don’t even try to write the truth, even about the forty-first year, when they drove us all the way to Moscow,” the veteran shared his impressions of the memoirs of Erich von Manstein and Heinz Guderian, just published in the USSR, without hiding his indignation.
Particularly distinguished in this field was Franz Halder, the authoritative chief of the general staff of the Wehrmacht. A classic staff officer, nicknamed "Kaiser Franz" for his arrogance, Halder meticulously recorded day after day not only events at the front, but also the operational work of the headquarters entrusted to him. However, this did not in the least prevent him from building a truly monumental monument to military-historical falsehood.
The basis for the less capital, but hardly less saturated with fake memoirs of two more top Nazi officers - the very same Manstein and Guderian - were not diaries, but mostly personal documents and letters to relatives. Both are front-line commanders, although they also served in the headquarters. Manstein, whose real name - Lewinsky more than once became a reason for doubts about his origin, was a nephew of Hindenburg himself, but made a brilliant career only on the Eastern Front. Despite the fact that he allowed himself to argue with the Fuhrer, he eventually rose to the rank of field marshal, but was dismissed already in 1944. Guderian, on the other hand, was rightfully considered the best among German tankers, which was only facilitated by the fact that he studied at the Soviet armored academy before the war.
On account of both, there are enough victories and defeats, although, judging by the memoirs of Manstein and Guderian, anyone else is to blame for the latter, but not the authors themselves. Manstein even named his memories appropriately - "Lost Victories." Especially gets from the beaten commanders, of course, their supreme leader - the corporal Adolf Schicklgruber, who never finished his studies, whom the whole world knows only as the Nazi Fuhrer Hitler. In this regard, Halder agrees with Manstein and Guderian. Against this background, their obligatory, even habitual references to the "Russian winter" and the notorious numerical superiority of the Soviet troops simply fade.
It is clear that in their attempts to get to the bottom of the truth - why the brilliant Wehrmacht, who conquered the entire continental Europe, could not cope with red Russia, the generals immediately turned to the origins - to the beginning of the summer campaign of 1941. And it is no coincidence that it is in relation to the battles of the summer of 1941 that the general's "falsification" is packed especially carefully, and it is presented to the reader with utmost care. It is all the more important to bring, let's say, not the most objective authors to clean water. But not only.
Even a very short "debriefing" of their fantasies helps to understand well how the German army, as a result of the seemingly successful summer-autumn campaign, came to its first, so sad for it "intermediate finish" - the battle of Moscow.
Describing the situation shortly before the start of the campaign on the Eastern Front, tanker Guderian, unlike his colleagues, no longer hesitated to blame everything on the Fuhrer.
“The underestimation of the enemy's forces was fatal. Hitler did not believe either the reports about the military might of a huge state presented by the military authorities, especially our exemplary military attaché in Moscow, General Kestring, or the reports about the power of industry and the strength of the state system of Russia "(G. Guderian" Memories of a Soldier "Smolensk, Rusich, 1998) … The fact that no one argued with the Fuhrer, only silently carrying out his orders, Guderian does not conceal, but mentions it somehow casually, in passing, as something insignificant.
In parallel with this, Manstein, at that time only the commander of the 56th motorized corps, very characteristic let slip about the confrontation with the USSR: "Hitler gave half of Poland and the Baltic states to the Soviet Union - a fact that he could eliminate only at the cost of a new war" (E. Manstein "Lost Victories", M. 1999). What - "gave", no more, no less - like his own! All further arguments of Manstein about the Soviet threat, or about the defensive position of the Red Army, which could easily be turned into an offensive, do not change the essence of the matter.
But the chief of the General Staff was still quite self-confidently declared: "Soviet Russia is like a window glass: you only need to hit with your fist once, and it will all be blown to pieces." materials in 7 volumes. Vol. 2. M., 1958). However, Soviet Russia did not fall to pieces, and the tonality in the recordings of the chief of the General Staff changes surprisingly. It changes almost instantly, soon after the rapid offensive began to stall: “The general situation shows more and more clearly that the colossus Russia, which was consciously preparing for war, despite all the difficulties inherent in countries with a totalitarian regime, was underestimated by us … This statement can be extended to all economic and organizational aspects, to the means of communication and, in particular, to the purely military capabilities of the Russians. By the beginning of the war we had about 200 enemy divisions against us. We now have 360 enemy divisions. These divisions, of course, are not as armed and not as staffed as ours, and their command in tactical terms is much weaker than ours, but, be that as it may, these divisions are. And even if we defeat a dozen such divisions, the Russians will form a new dozen. " (F. Halder "War Diary", vol. 3).
Manstein, who these days on the march to Leningrad at the head of his corps was literally collecting victories, by the end of the summer of 1941, too, was by no means overwhelmed with optimism.
Rather, he is already inclined towards sober analysis: “The mistake that Hitler fell into, underestimating the strength of the Soviet state system, the resources of the Soviet Union and the fighting efficiency of the Red Army. Therefore, he proceeded from the assumption that he would be able to defeat the Soviet Union militarily in one campaign. But in general, if this was possible, it would be only if it was possible to simultaneously undermine the Soviet system from within.
But the policy that Hitler, contrary to the aspirations of the military circles, pursued in the occupied eastern regions, could only bring the opposite results. While Hitler in his strategic plans proceeded from the fact that he set himself the goal of a quick defeat of the Soviet Union, politically he acted in a diametrically opposite direction ….
Perhaps Manstein's pessimism was associated with a transfer to a promotion - he was supposed to lead the 11th Army, intended to storm Perekop and break through to the Crimea. However, the very fact that the euphoria of the first triumphs has been left behind, and the final victory can still only be dreamed of, is quite indicative.
A little later, Guderian echoed Halder: “Our troops are suffering, and our cause is in a disastrous state, for the enemy is gaining time, and we, with our plans, are faced with the inevitability of fighting in winter conditions. Therefore, my mood is very sad.
Best wishes fail due to the elements. The one-of-a-kind opportunity to strike an enemy with a powerful blow is fading faster and faster, and I'm not sure if it can ever return. God alone knows how the situation will develop in the future. It is necessary to hope and not to lose courage, but this is an ordeal … Let's hope that soon I will be able to write in a more joyful tone. I'm not worried about myself. However, it is difficult to be in a good mood nowadays. This is from a letter from the general home, dated November 6, 1941, and is it not because he is much more verbose than his colleagues.
But even before that, through the lips of the memoirists, the well-known myth of Hitler's fatal miscalculation was actually being created, who, instead of attacking Moscow, turned the 2nd tank group to the south - to encircle the Russians on the left bank of the Dnieper.
Manstein, who fought in the north at that time, limited himself to stating a miscalculation. But he still noted at the same time that a lot of controversy was also caused by the subsequent transfer from Leningrad to the south of the 4th Panzer Group. Halder simply tried to absolve himself of responsibility, blaming the commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Rundstedt, for all sins, along with Hitler.
But Guderian is not shy in expressions, which is understandable - after all, in order to strike the Russians in the rear, it was he who was removed from the main strategic direction - the 2nd tank group: “Until now, all the measures carried out by my tank group were based on our idea that both the Army Group Command and the OKH consider the attack on Moscow to be the most decisive operation. I still hoped that, despite the results of the Borisov meeting on August 4, Hitler would eventually agree to what I thought was the most reasonable plan. However, on August 11, I had to bury this hope. OKH rejected my plan to attack Moscow by delivering the main attack from Roslavl to Vyazma, considering this plan "unacceptable."
The OKH did not draw up any other, better plan, displaying over the next days a series of endless hesitations, which made it completely impossible for any long-term planning by the lower headquarters … Unfortunately, I did not know then that a few days later Hitler agreed with the idea of an attack on Moscow, and his consent depended on the fulfillment of certain preconditions. In any case, the OKH could not then take advantage of this fleeting consent of Hitler. A few days later, things turned differently again”(G. Guderian, p. 262).
And after this, the restless general is already dissatisfied with the fact that he was not allowed to escape from the attack of Zhukov's troops near Yelnya. And again, Guderian had others to blame for everything - in this case OKH (an abbreviation for das Oberkommando des Heeres - OKH, High Command of the Ground Forces): “After my proposal to attack Moscow was rejected, I made a quite logical proposal to withdraw troops from the Elna arc, which we no longer needed, where we suffered heavy losses all the time. However, the command of the Army Group and OKH rejected this proposal of mine, which was based on the need to save human lives. It was rejected under the absurd pretext that “it is even more difficult for the enemy on this sector of the front than for us” (G. Guderian, p. 263).
Meanwhile, none of them has heard anything about how flawed the Barbarossa plan itself was, which scattered the German forces in three diverging directions.
And even more so, the Hitlerite generals categorically did not want to admit the fact that there could be no question of the existence of any really winning strategy in the war with the Soviet Union.
As the front draws closer to Moscow, there are less and less hopes for a quick victory. Even the finest members of the German military caste such as Manstein, Halder and Guderian. Halder, as if in a belated nightmare, is already dreaming of a second Russian company, for which he, as a serviceable campaigner, is simply obliged to carefully prepare: “B. Forecasts for the winter. The final situation cannot yet be determined. The enemy is unable to launch a major offensive. Nevertheless, he is very active in places (Moscow) …
Q. 1942: a) Russian forces? At present, there are 80-100 (normal manning rifle divisions); 50 rifle divisions were re-formed. In total - 150 divisions and 20-30 tank brigades.
b) Our forces are approximately 90 infantry, light infantry and mountain divisions.
Mobility! 12 armored divisions, 9 reserve divisions in Germany. In total - about 20 divisions.
7 motorized, 4 SS divisions, 2 separate regiments. In total - about 12 divisions.
Fuel! Hence, no numerical superiority. And no surprise. Not only on the ground, but also in the air "(F. Galde" War Diary ", vol. 3, entry of November 19, 1941).
It is characteristic that shortly before this Halder considered it necessary to make a duty reference to bad weather as the main reason for stopping the offensive. “In addition to the successful offensive of the 11th Army in the Crimea and the very slow advance of the 16th Army in the direction of Tikhvin, our entire operation to pursue the enemy after a double battle in the Bryansk, Vyazma region has now stopped due to unfavorable autumn weather (entry from November 3) … At this time, Manstein was already fighting far from the Soviet capital (just at the head of the still advancing 11th Army in Crimea), but he also buried himself in the Sevastopol bastions, and had a good idea that things were unlikely to be much better near Moscow.
At the turn of November and December 41, Guderian continued senseless attacks near Tula, and day after day he was counting the last remaining tanks at his disposal, realizing that he could not dream of any rush to Moscow until next spring. The recollected Guderian, as a rule, is more stingy in his assessments than his colleagues - the maximum that he allows himself in the books is a strict and impartial analysis of operational-strategic calculations. However, in personal correspondence, the general is much more frank and broad in his judgments. He even allows himself to criticize the leadership for geopolitical mistakes: “Military specialists these days were surprised by the fact that, despite Hitler's declaration of war on the United States, Japan did not declare war on the Soviet Union.
In this regard, the Russians had the opportunity to free their troops in the Far East and use them against Germany. These troops were sent to our front at an unprecedented speed (echelon after echelon). Not a relaxation of the situation, but a new extremely heavy tension, was the result of this strange policy.
Our soldiers had to pay for it. The war has now become truly "total". The economic and military potential of most of the countries of the world united against Germany and its weak allies”(from G. Guderian's letter to his family, December 8, 1941).
The first days of December turned the strategic situation 180 degrees, the initiative goes to the Red Army. And this is what we almost immediately read in the notes of the chief of the German General Staff: “The myth of the invincibility of the German army has been broken” (F. Halder “War Diary”, vol. 3, entry of December 8).
Tank genius Guderian almost literally echoes his chief of staff: “Our attack on Moscow has failed. All the sacrifices and efforts of our valiant troops were in vain. We suffered a serious defeat, which, due to the stubbornness of the High Command, led to fatal consequences in the coming weeks. The main command of the ground forces, being far from the front of East Prussia, had no idea about the actual position of their troops in winter conditions, although they received numerous reports about this. This ignorance of the situation all the time led to new impossible demands."
From the memoirs, one can imagine how dramatically the situation is changing in the headquarters, and in general in the ranks of the German generals. By the evening of December 5, Guderian reported to the commander of Army Group Center F. von Bock that his troops were not only stopped, but also forced to withdraw. Von Bock himself, in a telephone conversation with Halder, was forced to admit that "his strength was exhausted." And as a logical result, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Walter von Brauchitsch informed the Chief of General Staff of his decision to resign.
The request for resignation was not satisfied, or rather, it remained unanswered, but it was at these hours that the Soviet troops were already beginning their counteroffensive near Moscow. By the evening of the next day, December 6, it became clear that a large-scale retreat of Army Group Center could no longer be avoided, and on December 7 von Brauchitsch once again asks Hitler to resign. Very soon, the Fuhrer will personally replace him as commander-in-chief, and the German generals-memoirists will receive a very suitable “guilty” for their "Memoirs". Literally in everything …
Once upon a time, the first publications of the memoirs of German military leaders often made a much stronger impression than the frankly "official" memoirs of some of our high-ranking veterans.
It is no coincidence that among military historians there is a version that the publication of the memoirs of Zhukov and Rokossovsky, Baghramyan and Shtemenko largely contributed to the high level of military history literature of their opponents. But today, when you reread precisely the memoirs of German generals more critically, the feeling that they so quickly began to distort and falsify the history of World War II is by no means accidental.
It seems that the whole point is that their notorious confidence in the coming victory was nothing more than bravado, in fact, all the top fascist commanders, I emphasize - everyone, from the very beginning of the war against the USSR, did not leave the latent feeling of the inevitability of defeat.
That is why they did not just lay straws for the future, rather they were immediately seized by the willingness to look for at least some kind of excuse for themselves in advance. Or maybe the generals, unwillingly, tried to remind the descendants of the behest of the great chancellor Bismarck - "Never go to war against Russia!"
Today, reality once again, and too harshly, confirms that the falsification of history is a powerful propaganda tool.
It is no coincidence that all the latest works of American and English historians of the Second World War are literally overflowing with references to exclusively punctual German memoirists. Perhaps only the French still observe at least some decency. So, the beaten Germans are being replicated, and the textbook works of Zhukov and Rokossovsky, not to mention professional Russian studies, have been pushed to the farthest shelves.
