Southern front. In the previous part, the vision of the leaders of the spacecraft was considered about the number of German divisions that Germany can put up against the USSR, about intelligence information and about the impossible Directive No. 3. Let's continue our consideration of events that are indirectly related to the organization of the Law Firm.
Separation of responsibilities
On March 8, 1941, the NPO sent a document to the government, on the basis of which the Decision on the division of responsibilities between the deputy people's commissars of defense was prepared. On March 15, the corresponding order of the People's Commissar was issued.
The 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Budyonny was entrusted with the management of quartermaster supplies, non-defensive construction, planning and distribution of material assets of non-profit organizations, housing and maintenance issues, sanitary and veterinary state of the spacecraft troops. Budyonny was taken aside from the issues of combat training, planning, production and development of military equipment, etc. Marshal Budyonny became a logistician …
How often did the KA leadership and Marshal Budyonny visit Stalin's office in 1941? Except for the meeting on the evening of June 21, the military (the people's commissar of defense and the chief of the General Staff) were in Stalin's office 33 times, of which 11 times before the above order was issued. S. M. was present with them six times. Budyonny (55%). By inertia, Marshal Budyonny got to the meeting on March 17 and was present, among a large number of the military, at the meeting on March 23. Next time S. M. Budyonny will get to the leader only at the last peaceful meeting with the participation of the military.
The last peaceful meeting in the office of Comrade Stalin
Soviet intelligence officer "KhVTs" (trade attaché of the German embassy in Moscow G. Kegel) on June 21 transmitted two messages. The information for the first message was received by the KhVTs while still at home: G. Kegel arrived at work at 12 o'clock in the afternoon.
The scout was able to transmit the second message only at 19:00:
After reading the last message, the head of the Intelligence Directorate, General Golikov, by 20-00 orders the commander of the special communications to urgently deliver the report Stalin, Molotov and Tymoshenko. The envelopes state: “ Only to the addressee. Do not open the device to employees ».
After the end of the meeting at 20:15, this package was to be brought to Stalin's office. After reading the message, Stalin was simply obliged to summon the highest command staff of the NCO to himself again in order to understand how to proceed. No information is received from the embassy in Berlin during the day …
If we accept this version, then the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff did not know about the reason for the call to Stalin. Therefore, the Chief of the General Staff could not take with him a draft Directive for sending to the troops. The phrase about this in the memoirs is fiction, like the entire previous text about the events of June 21. This version is confirmed by the diary of S. M. Budyonny.
I assume that Marshal Budyonny was summoned to the last meeting only because Stalin did not understand what position the military was taking and what was really happening on the border. Stalin needed military adviserwhom he would trust more than the summoned leaders. That is why Marshal Budyonny was summoned to a meeting with Stalin in first time after March 23, 1941.
CM. Budyonny:.
It may be said that Marshal Budyonny was summoned to a conference as commander of the armies of the second line. He was appointed to this post 35 minutes ago. But then it turns out that Zhukov was summoned to the meeting as the head of the direction, which included the SWF and the SF. He was also appointed to this post 35 minutes ago. To lead the indicated fronts, he had to travel south. Additional position of G. K. Zhukova could not be the basis for a call to Stalin due to the absence of Deputy People's Commissar Meretskov, who was also entrusted with the overall leadership of the Northern Front with a visit to the site.
Maybe Deputy People's Commissar Meretskov has already left for Leningrad? General of the Army K. A. Meretskov:.
This conversation could take place only after the end of the second meeting at 22-20. About similar words of the People's Commissar of Defense "" says the commander of the OdVO, whom Tymoshenko will call at 23-00. Around this time, the chief of staff of the Western Military District calls back to the headquarters of the 4th Army and says similar words. He is probably retelling the instructions of the People's Commissar of Defense. It turns out that before the expiration of June 21, the SC leadership does not transmit anything specific about bringing the troops to combat readiness …
The son of General Meretskov, Vladimir Kirillovich, cited the testimony of one of the participants in the departure of S. A. Panova on the night of June 22:"
The Red Arrow train set off for 23-55 … Travel time - 9-45 (according to other sources - 10 hours). The deputy commissar could not arrive at the headquarters of the LMO before the start of the war at dawn on June 22, in order to correctly assess the situation …
Stalin's meeting ended in 22-20 … The directive will be submitted to the encryption department in 85 minutes. And there will not be a single call to the command of the border troops with instructions to raise troops until 1 am … This is done only if they are sure that they are right …
CM. Budyonny:. It turns out that the question of organizing the headquarters of the armies of the second line was not discussed at all at the last meeting. Otherwise, Budyonny would have expressed his wish for a chief for his headquarters and the issue would have been resolved directly in Stalin's office. Budyonny will have to take his Adjutant General Pokrovsky as chief of staff. Not because of the new appointment, Marshal Budyonny was summoned to Stalin. The meeting took place precisely in connection with the unexpected announcement of the possible start of the war on the morning of June 22, and this was unexpected for Timoshenko and Zhukov.
New chief of Glavpur
How did the draft of the Resolution, prepared on the evening of June 21, affect the appointment of L. Mekhlis to the post of head of the GU PP KA? According to the memoirs of the lieutenant general I. V. Kovaleva (since 21.5.41 - deputy of Mehlis for railway transport) the unofficial appointment did not take place on June 21, but earlier: “[Mehlis]
In mid-June, not only Glavpur, but also many other headquarters worked in a tense regime, preparing for a future war. Troops and materiel were secretly pulled up to the border. The country was preparing for war in the summer of 1941. It turns out that Mekhlis found work in Glavpur in mid-June. But nevertheless, in the afternoon of June 21, A. Zaporozhets remained the head of the GU PP KA. This is evidenced by the order signed by him.
Mehlis arrived at the meeting with Stalin 65 minutes after it began. This could be due to the fact that the Mehlis could not be found after 20-15 for half an hour, which is unlikely. It should be noted that the new chief of the Glavpur on the evening of June 21 has not yet been officially appointed to this position. Perhaps Stalin understood the seriousness of the issue under discussion only at the meeting and ordered to find a new chief of Glavpur later?
On the centenary of the death of Lermontov (1814-1841) Moscow Theater. Vakhtangov staged the drama "Masquerade". On the evening of June 21, the premiere of the performance was to take place. The arrival of Stalin was expected. Security officers of the country's top officials from the NKVD special department arrived at the theater. Unexpected and incomprehensible events near the border, the unclear position of the German government led to the premiere being held without the presence of the USSR leadership. The same employees of the NKVD special department in the morning of June 22 arrived at the Central Telegraph to provide security for the facility, where someone from the country's leadership will speak. At that time it was not yet known that Molotov would act instead of Stalin. This once again underlines the unexpectedness of the events that took place on the evening of June 21.
What the leaders of the spacecraft did not undertake
According to the general's recollections L. M. SandalovaIn the late evening of June 21, the commander of the 4th Army, General Korobov, said: The commander of the 10th mixed air division N. G. Belov. General Korobov was not a proactive commander …
And how many troops in the western border military districts could the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff raise the alarm without Stalin's sanction? If the commander of the army can raise one division, then these comrades are in no way less than ten! And how much did they raise before the expiration of June 21? At the border - not a single one!
They could not raise rifle troops, but order the aviation of the border districts to be dispersed over the field sites! Indeed, in the reports at the meeting of the highest command personnel, it was repeatedly said about strikes on airfields in the event of the outbreak of hostilities! They didn’t. For what reason - we do not know: either they did not believe, or they were afraid … We do not know what they were doing from 19 to 21 June.
The People's Commissar of Defense did not write anything, and the Chief of the General Staff wrote an obvious lie. Something about their actions is systematized in the 17th part of the cycle.
The Chief of the General Staff speaks at a meeting at the Main Artillery Directorate on the evening of June 21 (by 20:00 he had already left the GAU). The People's Commissar of Ammunition wrote about it P. N. Goremykin: Nobody argues that the issue of finalizing the mobilization plan should have been resolved. But on June 21, this question was not among the most urgent if the chief of the General Staff expects a war on June 22!
In addition to the General Staff itself, the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the spacecraft were directly subordinate to the spacecraft fuel supply department, the spacecraft communications department, and the Main Air Defense Directorate of the spacecraft. As a leader who, in addition to the General Staff, was in charge of the fuel supply service, General Zhukov could, on June 19-21, attend to, for example, the transfer of fuel from the Caucasus to the Western Military District.
As a leader responsible for spacecraft communications, he could attend to the issue of deploying communications units, providing them with property at least from the spacecraft's warehouses. Indeed, for some units and formations in June, the assigned composition was called up for training. In PribOVO, the VNOS battalion began to call up the assigned personnel on their own initiative after 20-00 on June 21.
The Chief of the General Staff could attend to or concern the People's Commissar of Defense with the issue of bringing the air defense units to readiness No. 2, and not No. 3, as they actually were on June 21. A similar precedent has also already taken place in the same PribOVO! Or return air defense units from polygons to formations - after all, this issue does not need to be consulted with Comrade Stalin! The training in the camps was carried out according to the plans approved by the General Staff itself!
But nothing special was done by these leaders on June 19-21. They did not even gather to see Stalin until seven in the evening. They didn't even call and it's strange. Find in Zhukov's memoirs at least a word about calling Stalin before seven in the evening on June 21. They are not here.
Why did they do that? Yes, because, in their opinion, June 22-23, there should be no war! And when was the war supposed to start, in their opinion? Yes, in terms of the concentration of spacecraft troops near the border - July 1-10, 1941. They can say: “Lies! These comrades were preparing day and night for war at dawn on June 22! However, there is indirect evidence to the contrary.
For example, the Chief of Staff of the Central Asian Military District, General M. I. Kazakov writes:. The conversation takes place somewhere between June 18-19. In the General Staff at this time it is still not clear whether there will be a war within 15-20 days. And if it does, then it can start before July 3 … 8 … The indicated period is close to the deadline for the completion of the concentration of spacecraft troops near the border. But if this is really so, then all actions of the KA leadership become absolutely understandable: after all, the war is expected in July! And at the moment: the main thing is not to give the Germans a reason for an earlier attack!
It should be noted that General A. M. Vasilevsky, speaking with Kazakov, should have known from RI that there are about 128 German divisions near our border, and many of them are still in places of permanent deployment.
Luck of the Odessa Military District
Many people know about the actions of the chief of staff of the OdVO on the eve of the war, the future Marshal V. M. Zakharov, who took responsibility for the decision to raise the troops of the district. He did not cancel his decision after reading the text of Directive No. 1:. The renowned marshal writes that the order to withdraw troops to the cover areas was in conflict with the Directive! Why was Directive # 1 contradictory? Let's take a quick look at the said document.
… Marshal writes correctly! Nothing intelligible is reflected in the water part. Maybe there is something more intelligible in the order?
… Something incomprehensible is again given in the order. It is difficult to call them even half measures.
Paragraph a) concerns machine-gun battalions of URs - only they have firing points. It is also possible, on personal initiative, to bring the artillery divisions of the URs to positions. You can also pretend to be a dull commander and remove machine-gun crews from rifle units and send them to bunkers …
Paragraph b) concerns the Air Force. Only from the main airfields, in the dark (before dawn), aviation cannot be redeployed to field airfields. Technical personnel and equipment should be relocated to field aerodromes in advance! This should have been done on June 21! As well as raising the personnel of the air regiments late in the evening of June 21. In many units there were no commanders, pilots, the planes did not have time to disperse, etc.
On point v) raise ground units on alarm. To keep the troops "" is to withdraw them from their location and disguise themselves in the areas of concentration on alert. But these places are located near the points of permanent deployment! Some of these areas are even 800 meters from the points of deployment … To the border, these troops, according to the text of the Directive it is forbidden withdraw !! This is what the chief of staff of the ODVO writes about, who sent troops to the border on his orders!
On point G) from Moscow they wrote what they implemented in PribOVO two days ago.
From paragraph e) it follows that further it is necessary to wait for the development of events at the border.
Persons who were withdrawing troops to the border by their orders were at great risk, since their actions contradicted Directive No. 1. Only at about one in the morning, the districts receive clarifying instructions by phone …
The chief of staff of the OdVO has repeatedly appealed to the chief of the General Staff with his initiative. In the memoirs of V. M. Zakharov, it is also said about the appeal through the chief of the General Staff to the People's Commissar of Defense, when he did not agree with the words of G. K. Zhukov. General Zakharov was a too obstinate and proactive chief of staff, which should have responded to him sometime …
Few people know that General Zakharov was supposed to leave his post on the eve of the war and go to the disposal of the NGO cadres. In his memoirs M. V. Zakharov wrote:
It turns out that the rise of troops and the dispersal of aviation in the OdVO might not have happened if the extract had arrived in the district before the war. The events are very reminiscent of the story with the commander of the KOVO Air Force, General E. S. Ptukhin, in whose place General Novikov, the commander of the Air Force of the LMO, was supposed to go. Novikov knew about his appointment to a post in KOVO even before the start of the war. General Ptukhin on June 22 did not yet know that he was being recalled to the disposal of the NGO. On the way or in Moscow, he would have been arrested in the case of aviators …
The commander of the OdVO troops should have known about the replacement of his chief of staff, but he did not say anything to Zakharov … Maybe he was thinking about the possible arrest of Zakharov and did not want to risk it? Suddenly Zakharov will tell during interrogation about this revelation. Perhaps that is why, on the night of June 22, he handed over to General Zakharov all the powers to make decisions on the expected Directive from Moscow? And if not arrest, then where could General Zakharov be needed?
M. V. Zakharov: «
As of 22.6.41, the Chief of the General Staff had two deputies: General of the Army N. F. Vatutin and corps commissar S. K. Kozhevnikov (political). It should not be forgotten that rear issues until the last peaceful meeting with Stalin was engaged First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. Therefore, the question of replacing the chief of the General Staff for the rear could arise only after the appointment of Marshal Budyonny as the commander of the armies of the second line and his departure from Moscow. But this event did not happen on June 19th! They wanted to "push" the initiative general V. M. Zakharova. Maybe to the Main Directorate of Logistics, if not somewhere worse …
Since July 1933 V. M. Zakharov was the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the Belarusian Military District. The chief of staff (from 1932) in this district until December 1934 was General Meretskov. From May to September 1938 K. A. Meretskov and V. M. Zakharov again serve together in the General Staff: in the positions of Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Assistant Chief of the General Staff, respectively. On 23 June 1941, General of the Army K. A. Meretskov was summoned to Moscow and arrested. The leadership of the NKO was supposed to agree on the development of the NKVD of General Meretskov at the end of May - at the beginning of June. Perhaps V. M. Zakharov was lucky that his arrival in Moscow was delayed …
After the discovery of problems in the command and control of the General Staff in the first days of the war, its reorganization began. After the successes in the first days of the war on the front of the 9th Army, General Zakharov's actions were supposed to rise. He was supposed to be "heard" by Stalin - it was the only sector of the Soviet-German front that could boast of an invasion of enemy territory! Inaccuracies in the work of intelligence were revealed a little later.
After Zakharov's arrival in Moscow, G. K. Zhukov offers him the position of his deputy. True to the rear … Two days after the conversation with G. K. Zhukov appointed General Zakharov to the post of chief of staff of the Main Command of the North-West direction. This position is even higher than that occupied by Zhukov's deputy, General of the Army Vatutin, chief of staff of the North-Western Front. In July, it was already problematic to save this front … In August 1941, Zakharov was demoted to the post of deputy head of the Main Directorate of Logistics of the Spacecraft. Maybe this position was already intended for him three days before the war?
Therefore, all the proposals coming from the leadership of the OdVO (it is clear that this will again be the initiative of the chief of staff), the General Staff tried not to accept.
General Zakharov was supposed to voice his opinion on the organization of front-line control on the basis of the OdVO even before sending the Note to the General Staff. However, the chief, who was to carry out the general management of the SWF and LF, did not need a too proactive chief of staff of the LF.
Pre-war documents on the creation of the headquarters of the Southern Front
Consider the documents that mention the formation of front-line management in the Moscow Military District, or, on the contrary, the formation of such a formation as the headquarters of the Law Firm is not supposed. For the first time, the formation of a front-line administration on the basis of the Moscow Military District was mentioned in a Note, which was signed in October 1940.
M. V. Zakharov wrote: “[At the end of February 1941]. Thus, during the development of the "Covering Plans …" as of March 1941, the deployment of the headquarters of the Law Firm was not envisaged.
In the book Mark Solonin and Elena Prudnikova "The Great Patriotic War: Was There a Defeat?" refers to the preparation of command-staff exercises and front-line operational games in KOVO during the period May 12-18, 1941:
Obviously, the "Orange" are the armed forces of Romania, the "Western" are the troops of Germany, the 16th Army is the 9th Army from the ODVO. In the scenario of the operational game at the first stages, the 9th Army is subordinate to the SWF. Only at the last stage in the scenario of the game in the original version was the re-subordination of this army to the Law Firm considered. In the final version of the game, the General Staff decided not to create and leave the 9th Army subordinate to the South-Western Front. Thus, by the beginning of May, the Operations Directorate of the General Staff does not have an accurate understanding that by the beginning of the war and at the stage of border battles with Germany and its allies, the headquarters of the Law Firm is already concentrated and deployed near the border.
In May 1941, a draft Strategic Deployment Plan Considerations were developed.
The Considerations do not consider the participation of the headquarters of the Law Firm in the deployment of the armed forces of the USSR on the eve of the start of the war with Germany and its allies. The troops of the ODVO, as part of one army, should be subordinate to the SWF. There is not a word in the document about the role and place of front-line directorates, which could be formed on the basis of the Moscow Military District or ArVO.
In the directives of the General Staff, which were sent to the KOVO and the OdVO in May 1941 for the development of "Covering Plans" and in the Notes on the Defense Plan developed in the districts, the KOVO and ODVO troops are equivalent. In the Notes there is no mention of the fact that the troops of the ODVO should be included in the SWF and there is no mention of the subordination of the troops of the 9th Army of the JF.
Note on the defense plan for the period of mobilization, concentration and deployment of KOVO troops for 1941:.
In the Certificate on the deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in case of war in the West (13.6.41), there is no information about the formation of front-line command and control on the basis of the Moscow Military District. The document again refers to the inclusion of the ODVO troops in the SWF:.
From the above, it follows that there are no facts about the preparation for the formation of front-line directorates on the basis of ARVO and Moscow Military District in the winter and spring of 1941. The decision to deploy the headquarters of the Law Firm in the General Staff was made only at the beginning of June 1941. However, the date for the deployment of the headquarters of the Law Firm in the southern direction could not be set for June 1941. Probably, the date for the concentration of the headquarters of the Law Firm at the border was planned somewhere in July. By the same time, many of the redeployed spacecraft troops were supposed to complete the concentration.
General A. F. Khrenov (Chief of the Engineering Troops of the Moscow Military District, from June 22 - Chief of the Engineering Troops of the Law Firm) writes:
On the site "Memory of the People" is presented the Map of the position of the troops of the South-Western Front and the Law Office, started by the Law Office on 20.6.41. Not everything is clear with this map. If it was prepared at the headquarters of the KOVO, then everything is clear: the location of the large formations and formations of this district is shown on the map. But why is the deployment of all formations on the territory of KOVO necessary to the headquarters of the Law Firm? With a sufficiently detailed description of the artillery units of the KOVO troops that are at the artillery ranges?
The list does not include artillery units from the ODVO troops and all training grounds are located on the territory of KOVO. Perhaps, when preparing the description for the map, the employees of the archive were embarrassed by the fact that the list of units at the landfills was plotted on the territory of the OdVO? I would assume that the map was developed at the headquarters of the SWF. If the map had been prepared for the headquarters of the Law Firm, then it would have plotted the situation for the deployment of the ODVO troops, indicating the KOVO units along the line of demarcation. This map cannot testify that the headquarters of the Law Firm from June 20 began preparing for war.
In the Fund A. N. Yakovleva there is an interesting document: The control plan for the training of senior command personnel, games, field trips and exercises in the districts in 1941, approved on 4.4.41 by the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the SC, General Malandin. The document contains events with a date of January-March 1941. Therefore, it can be assumed that such a document was developed sometime at the end of 1940, and on April 4 it was clarified.
From the fragment of the document presented below, it can be seen that in the ArVO, in addition to army operations, a front-line operation was also developed. Perhaps, work was carried out in the ARVO to prepare for the deployment of front-line command and control during mobilization. It is not clear only: in what direction this department was planned to participate in hostilities.
The document says about participation in a front-line observation field trip. Participation, or in other words, the presence as observers of the work of the front-line directorate of the border military district. Such mentions are also made in events related to other districts that do not have front-line directorates. These districts have only army administration. For example, the North Caucasian and Volga military districts participate in the exercises conducted by the General Staff: "…".
In the part concerning the MVO, there is not a single event related to the conduct of an independent front-level exercise. It speaks only of participation in such work in the ZAPOVO. All events in the MVO are related only to military-level exercises.
The user correctly pointed out that the command training of the commander of the Moscow Military District I. V. Tyuleneva ordered him to conduct an army defensive operation (100 km along the front, 100-120 km in depth) at prepared lines.
If at the end of 1940 it was proposed to form front-line directorates in the ARVO and in the Moscow Military District, and the front-level exercises in 1941 are planned only in the ARVO, then, therefore, in April 1941, the formation of a front-line command on the basis of the Moscow Military District is not expected. This is partly confirmed by the encryption from 4.5.41: "".
In negotiations outside of 1941, two sheets came across that did not correspond in meaning to the previous text. Telegraphic conversations without specifying belonging to military units, in which he accidentally drew attention to the words about the army trip.
If we assume that "" is Major General V. I. Vinogradov, commander of the 7th mechanized corps from the Moscow Military District, then "" is Major General F. A. Bakunin, commander of the 61st Rifle Corps (Tula, Moscow Military District). - This is the commander of the operations department of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, and - the commander of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff.
All these persons could be together only before the start of the war. The mention of holidays - this can be the holiday of May 1 (non-working days of May 1 and 2, 1941). If we accept this version, then in April 1941 at the headquarters of the Moscow Military District on June 23, a training army field trip is planned. The exercises of the 7th mechanized corps are scheduled for the same date. At this time, the 61st sk is involved in the game on the map. It is not clear only whether these activities were planned separately for each association, or they were related.
On June 23rd, the exercises were planned not only for the above-mentioned formations of ground forces of the Moscow Military District, but also for the 1st Air Defense Corps (from the Moscow Air Defense Zone, which was subordinate to the Moscow Air Defense Forces). YES. Zhuravlev (commander of the 1st Air Defense Corps) wrote:
[With family]
What happened in the units of the 7th mechanized corps, which could be involved in the exercises on June 23? Chief of artillery mechanized corps IN AND. Kazakov writes: "[War]
In the memoirs, the text about the urgent withdrawal of troops from the camps on June 21 is puzzling, since on this day most commanders go home and do not return until noon on June 22. The combat logs of the units of the 7th mechanized corps also do not confirm the fact of the urgent withdrawal of troops from the camps and the cessation of firing.
ZhBD of the 1st Moscow Red Banner Msd: «…».
ZhBD 14th TD:.
ZhBD 28th tp (14th td):.
ZhBD 14th (14th td):.
By the beginning of the war, the 7th MK was stationed in the city of Moscow. The 1st Mechanized Infantry Division, 14th and 18th TD from 5.5.41 were in camps for summer studies with admission to the training of part of the assigned personnel.
Newspaper "The Red Star" (12.11.2005):.
Commander of the 1st Mechanized Infantry Division General I. Kreiser:.
Conducting reconnaissance from June 13 to 20 by the headquarters of the 7th MK in the Kaluga and Tula area, an urgent return to the location on June 20 could be associated with exercises (with the involvement of military unit 1080). Conducting tactical one-day exercises (prior to higher-level exercises) in the corps is consistent with normal post-war military practice. It should be stated that failed find no information about the possible preparation of the exercises of the 7th MK on 23.6.41.
