On June 21, 1941 at 18:27 the first visitor entered Stalin's office - V. M. Molotov.
At 19:05, the first meeting began, at which a draft of the Decree on the creation of the Southern Front was prepared, on the appointment of persons who were entrusted with the general leadership of the South-Western (SWF) and Southern (SF) fronts, the Northern Front, on the appointment of L. Z. Mekhlis as the head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army (GU PP KA).
In some articles, this event is directly related to the expectation of the start of the war with Germany on June 22, 1941, by the leadership of our country and the spacecraft, as well as with the preparation of the USSR armed forces to repel an attack precisely at dawn on June 22. The proximity of the dates of the preparation of the draft and the beginning of the war, it seems, should testify to this.
In the book “Stalin. The secret "scenario" of the beginning of the war "appointment of Mehlis is also unambiguously connected with the expectation of war:.
It is difficult to argue with this, since the draft of the Resolution is being prepared on June 21 from 19:05 to 20:15, and 35 minutes later a meeting is being held in the same office, at which a draft of the well-known Directive No. 1 is being written. There was a point of view that this Directive should be called “directive without number”. This is somewhat strange, since the next Directive has a very specific number 2! Therefore, the previous Directive should have No. 1. This is what she was called in Soviet history. After all, it never occurs to anyone to call the first sheet in a document or in a book a sheet without a number.
At the beginning of the year, the Internet again showed interest in the creation of the Law Firm, which was associated with the placement of documents on the operational department of military unit 1080. Military unit 1080 is the headquarters of the Law Firm, which was separated from the headquarters of the Moscow Military District (MVO). Below is one of the specified documents. The date of the resolution "" aroused interest.
It may seem that the document presented underlines the connection between the following events: the anticipation of the start of the war on June 22, the organization of the headquarters of the Law Firm and the invasion of German troops. Such reasoning casts doubt on the memories of the participants in the war. For example, the commander of the Moscow Military District, General Tyulenev, who indicates that he learned about the creation of the headquarters of the Law Firm only in the morning of June 22. It turns out that General Tyulenev deliberately keeps silent or distorts the events on the eve of the war, and where such "distortions" are revealed, one can begin to look for a "second bottom" in the events. Versions appear that can distort real events. It is only strange that General Tyulenev is not believed in this statement, but they believe in another statement about the deployment of air defense units on June 21. Although it is the second statement that is refuted by other memoirs and documents. It turns out that to create versions, it is enough to select the desired memories, and simply not write about others. At the same time, it is not even necessary to double-check the memoirs: if the veteran got it wrong, then let the critics refute …
The article will present the memoirs of war veterans, documents and reasoning of the author, who claim that the draft of the Resolution, prepared before 20-15 June 21, is not connected with the expectation of war by the country's leadership and the spacecraft at dawn on June 22. If so, then at the first meeting with Stalin on June 21, an irrelevant issue on the eve of the war is being considered. This issue has nothing to do with the measures to prepare the troops of the western border districts to repel an attack in 8, 5 hours. It is also not connected with the operational notification of the troops of the western districts about the beginning of the war. It is clear to everyone that the headquarters of the Law Firm cannot be on the 23rd of June already at the border.
But if at the first meeting an irrelevant issue is considered on the eve of the outbreak of the war, then perhaps the war is not expected? Those of the readers who agree with my version will once again be convinced of the correctness of the considerations expressed by the author Victoria in the cycle "The Unexpected War of Hitler's Germany and the USSR" (hereinafter referred to as the cycle). It is better to get acquainted with the cycle starting with part 11 (part 11) and part 12. At the end of the 26th part there are links to all subsequent parts (link). For the convenience of acquaintance with the material, I will try to use the presentation style adopted by the author of the cycle.
The first visitor came to Stalin only at 18:27. Until that time, the top leadership of the KA did not come to Stalin. There is also no information about their calls to Stalin. Wasn't Stalin doing anything relevant on the eve of the war until the evening of June 21? I did. In Moscow there were intensive attempts to negotiate with the German government. There is practically no information about this period. V. M. Molotov said that before meeting with the German ambassador, he should have consulted Stalin over the phone about this.
View from the embassy in Berlin
I suggest you take a look at the events taking place in Moscow from the side of the embassy in Berlin. In his memoirs, the translator V. M. Berezhkov writes:.
V. M. Berezhkov was unable to contact either Ribbentrop or his deputy. The officer on duty at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not help him. They call from Moscow several times and rush to meet. Probably, the caller reports the situation to Molotov, who, in turn, reports to Stalin.
By 7 pm [8:00 pm Moscow time], the embassy staff went home, as they do not expect the war to start at dawn the next day. Berezhkov continues to call the German Foreign Ministry every 30 minutes.
V. M. Berezhkov:.
At about one in the morning, an encrypted message arrives from Moscow to the embassy, which reported the content of the conversation between the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and Schulenburg and listed the questions posed by the Soviet side during this conversation. The Soviet ambassador is again invited to meet immediately with Ribbentrop and put the same questions to him. However, it is also not possible to arrange a meeting. Only at 3 am (Berlin time) the Soviet ambassador was invited to the Foreign Ministry.
We see that Stalin, Molotov and, probably, other leading officials tried in vain to somehow clarify the situation and begin negotiations with the German government. At least learn about the claims or receive an ultimatum. They do not yet know that Berlin has already made an erroneous decision for Germany: to start a war with the USSR.
It should be noted that the German ambassador could not answer V. M. Molotov for the reason that he learned the summary of the memorandum, in which the claims were made against the USSR, a little later.
Roland Gottlieb (shift chief of the telegraph bureau of the German Foreign Ministry):.
The atmosphere of pre-war events
I suggest you, readers, to plunge into the atmosphere of pre-war events. The cycle provides a detailed analysis of intelligence information (RI), which was received from the fall of 1940 to June 1941. Let me remind you of a few interesting points from this material.
At the beginning of September 1940, our intelligence services noted up to 90 German divisions that could take part in the war with the USSR. These divisions were stationed in East Prussia, Poland, Slovakia and in Germany near its eastern border. There were no German troops in Romania at that time. The RI does not mention the presence of German troops in Hungary either. When processing RI, some divisions were made up of brigades, regiments and battalions discovered in bulk. In other words, these were calculated divisions.
By 21.6.41, our reconnaissance on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea counted up to 129 estimated German divisions that can take part in the attack on the USSR. Compared with September 1940, the number of divisions has increased by 43%. This increase takes into account the appearance of German divisions in the border areas in Hungary and Romania.
If we consider only the territory that was considered for September 1940, then the number of divisions increased by only 20%. Pay attention to this number. For 10, 5 months, the number of divisions against the troops of the PribOVO, ZAPOVO and part of the KOVO increased by only 20% !
According to intelligence, a significant part of these troops were located at a distance of 20-30 to 100-280 km from the border. Some of the divisions, which, according to the RI, were intended to attack the USSR, were deployed even at a distance of 280 to 424 km in Germany, as in September 1940. This is discussed in detail in parts 13-16 of the cycle. It also provides information that the intelligence of the NKVD border troops even more overestimated the number of German troops in the spring of 1941 in comparison with the data of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft.
There is a version that the Soviet command believed that up to 130 German divisions would be deployed in the war with Germany. However, there is not a single Soviet document that would say about this. All available documents say something completely different!
Note of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army (09/18/40):.
Later (until November 8, 1940), a note prepared by the chief of staff of KOVO, General Purkaev, indicated the number of German troops during their deployment. This quantity, by the simplest calculation, turns into 152-166 divisions. This number does not include German troops in Romania, the number of which in the Note is estimated at 25-27 divisions.
In January 1941, command and staff games were held. According to the scenario of the first game (link) the North-Eastern and Eastern fronts of the "Western" (before 60 infantry divisions), operating north from Demblin to the Baltic Sea, launched an offensive "in the interests of the main operation" carried out south of Brest, where the main forces of the "Western" are deployed - to 120 infantry divisions, and together with their allies - up to 160 infantry divisions. For the first time, 180 German divisions are mentioned.
In the plan of the General Staff of the spacecraft on the strategic deployment of the armed forces (11.3.41), the number of German divisions increases even more: “Until 200 divisions, of which up to 165 infantry, 20 tank and 15 motorized divisions, will be directed against our borders …"
The draft document, drawn up no earlier than 15.5.41, again mentions 180 German divisions. This number was originally estimated at 189 divisions.
Reconnaissance report No. 1 of the Reconnaissance Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft (22.6.41): 100% of the specified number of divisions will be from 167 to 173 … You should pay attention to the phrase "", since according to intelligence data, part of the forces intended for the attack on the USSR was very far from the front. Probably, taking into account their number, the total number of German divisions intended for an attack on the USSR may also reach 180 or more. For eight months, the documents say about the number of German divisions in the war with Germany, significantly more than 129 divisions, concentrated by June 22! Up to 180 divisions June 21 is still missing 28% of the troops.
At a meeting of the highest command personnel of the spacecraft in December 1940, various reports said that during military operations in Poland and in the West German troops used 3 to 5 tank groups … In a Note prepared by General Purkaev in November 1940, it is said about the presence in the armed forces of Germany 8-10 mechanized corps (the term mechanized corps is used in the Memorandum). Thus, the Soviet command knewthat the Germans will use tank and mechanized troops as part of tank groups uniting several mechanized corps (motorized corps).
German strike groups intended to attack the USSR were formed long before the start of the war:
- The 1st tank group (TGr) was created on November 16, 1940, The 1st TGr included: the 3rd MK (formed on 21.3.41), the 14th MK (26.8.39) and the 48th MK (15.12. 40);
- 2nd TGr was created as Guderian's group on 1.6.40 (16.11.40 was reorganized into the 2nd TGr). The 2nd TGr included: 24th MK (16.11.40), 46th MK (25.10.40) and 47th MK (14.12.40);
- 3rd TGr was established in November 1940. The 3rd TGr included: the 39th MK (early 1940) and the 57th MK (15.2.41);
- 4th TGr was created in February 1941. The 4th TGr included the 41st MK (24.2.40) and the 56th MK (15.2.41).
Before the start of the war and even a little later our intelligence failed to open a single German tank group (out of 4), no motorized body (out of 10) from the specified shock groups. On the eve of the war against our troops, intelligence found only separate scattered German tank units:
- against the troops of the PribOVO - one full-fledged tank division. The rest of the tank divisions were conditionally obtained from the discovered 5 tank regiments and 9 tank battalions;
- against the troops of the ZAPOVO - one tank division. 4 tank divisions were converted from 7-8 tank regiments. There was an RI about the possible presence of two more tank divisions on the Suvalka ledge. However, for the period from June 1 to June 21, intelligence was unable to confirm or deny their presence.
From the memoirs of the commander of the operational department of the headquarters of the 5th Army General A. V. Vladimirsky it also follows that the German tank formations were not completely revealed by our intelligence:.
Some authors do not analyze the RI published in open sources and operate with phrases from the memoirs of war veterans, which have very vague wording. A typical example is the memoirs of the commander of the 2nd cavalry corps, General P. A. Belova:
Let's take a closer look at what information General Belov could get acquainted with in the intelligence department of the district headquarters.
Intelligence department information
The Note on the "Covering Plans", which had been prepared at the headquarters of the ODVO since May 1941, said that on the territory of Romania there were: 40-45 infantry and motorized divisions, 4 cavalry divisions, 4 mountain rifle brigades and 2 tank divisions, of which 17 were German infantry and motorized divisions and 2 tank divisions.
This information is close to the RI given in the summary at the beginning of 1941: [parachute] It turns out that, according to intelligence, there were up to 28 German divisions in Romania, 17 of them in the border zone with the USSR. The presented data fit well with each other.
According to the information of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the OdVO on 17.6.41, from 31 to 34 divisions, including up to 16 German divisions, including up to two tank and six motorized divisions, were concentrated against the troops of the district in the Lipkany-Reni sector. The information on the number of German divisions is close to the information provided at the end of May - beginning of June 1941. Consequently, there simply cannot be any other RI as of June 17. In fact, there were only 9 German infantry divisions in the border zone, two of them in the 1st echelon.
In the first summary of the General Staff Intelligence Directorate (at 20-00 on 22.6.41) regarding the German troops in Romania it is said:. A significant number of German troops appear and move through the territory of Romania to our border. Among them there are new (relative to RI as of 17.6.41) German shock formations: two tank and five motorized divisions.
On June 30, in accordance with the Scheme of the balance of forces against the troops of the Law Firm, there are 29 Romanian and German divisions. Probably, this number is given without the troops of the 2nd echelon. On July 4, there are 35 divisions (taking into account the RGK in the form of 4 MD, but 4 infantry divisions of the RGK are not taken into account). On the 10th of July, taking into account reserves - 30-34 divisions. In all cases, the Schemes do not include 3rd echelon divisions. The opposing troops in the Republic of Ingushetia have up to 900-960 tanks in two tank divisions. In fact, only one Romanian mechanized brigade (up to 60 tanks) was concentrated against the forces of the Law Firm from June 22 to July 10.
It can be seen that the maximum number of German-Romanian divisions of the 1st and 2nd echelons fluctuates in the range of 30-34 and practically does not differ from the pre-war RI (as of 17.6.41). This does not take into account all the Romanian divisions (throughout the territory of Romania), of which, according to the RI from 5.6.41, there are about 30. These include only one motorized infantry division and one mechanized brigade. The rest of the motorized and tank divisions in Romania, according to our intelligence, are German troops.
Thus, RI, from the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the OdVO (later the 9th Army) and the Law Firm, misinformed the leadership of the front and the General Staff until the beginning of July. In reality, there were:
- on June 22 - 18, 5 divisions in the 1st and 2nd echelons (including 7 German ones). Taking into account the troops of the 3rd echelon, the total number of divisions reached 24;
- by July 10 - the total number of divisions in three echelons was about 30.
Taking into account the tendency to build up the enemy grouping against the troops of the Law Firm, the once inflated intelligence data and their real numbers should have come closer to each other …, to pin down the opposing enemy troops, making them appear to have large forces.
Therefore, the words of General Belov that "" are erroneous. Perhaps these words are based on the concept adopted at that time that intelligence supplied only truthful information and in full, and only I. Stalin was to blame for all the failures of the initial period of the war. In this case, the quote in the memoirs deliberately distorts the real picture on the eve of the war.
Thus, by 22.6.41, the number of German divisions near our border, according to RI, turned out to be close to their actual number. This coincidence was an accidental event, since the distribution of German divisions along the border from the Baltic to the Black Sea actually turned out to be different from what was indicated in the reports. This is evidenced by three facts (in addition to those given in the cycle), which I present for your consideration.
Have not given due importance
As the first fact, consider the recollection of the head of the KOVO operational department, General THEIR. Baghramyan:
Of interest are the following words of Ivan Khristoforovich:
The chief of the operational department of the SWF headquarters writes that the war began unexpectedly. The concentration of two motorized corps near the border and their introduction into battle also turned out to be unexpected for the front headquarters. Our divisions were not concentrated at the border. The Germans then beat them separately …
Consider a message from scout NKGB Sedova from 20.6.41, which was supposed to go to the leadership on June 21 (individual settlements mentioned in the RI are shown in the figure posted above):
There is not a single mention of motorized or tank units in the report, which were already partially in the area in question. These units, not to mention the formations of shock groups, were not found by other scouts either. This once again confirms the memoirs of generals I. Kh. Baghramyan and A. V. Vladimirsky.
In addition, the report notes that at 23-05 June 20, there are 7 aircraft at one airfield (6 light single-engine aircraft - perhaps these are Storh messengers, and one three-engine one is clearly the Yu-52), and at the second constructed airfield there are no airfield buildings and aircraft. We know that a significant part of the aircraft flew to airfields near the border only on the evening of June 21, and this information could not have time to reach the country's leadership and the spacecraft, even if it had been opened …
Intelligence
Consider the RI of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff at 23-00 on 28.6.41. What's so interesting about it?
Intelligence report: [army corps]
Only a week after the start of the war, our intelligence was able to obtain reliable information about the 2nd and 3rd TGr, which are called armies in the summary. According to the 3rd TGr, even on June 28, our intelligence does not know about the presence of the 57th MK (12 and 19 TD, 18 MD) in its composition.
In RI it is noted in relation to the 6th Army that "". Then it turns out that the previously available data about the rest of the German troops is still (or not at all) confirmed …
The figure shows that in addition to the 9th, 75th and 299th infantry divisions, there are 11th, 57th and 297th infantry divisions, which are not identified by our intelligence, operating in the indicated area. In addition, the 175th MD is absent in the Wehrmacht. It should be about the 25th MD of the 3rd MK. Of the four tank divisions, only the 14th division is mentioned. The other three are impersonal: "". It is not clear from the message: whether these are three depersonalized tank divisions, or a scattering of separate units …
It should be noted that, according to the data of interception by radio intelligence, it was only by June 26 that the very presence of the 1st TGr was established as part of the 16th TD, 63rd and 79th MD (there was no information about the remaining formations and motorized corps). Agree that only from the documents presented it is clear that the entire pre-war RI about the deployment of German tank forces on our border was incorrect …
In the 13th and 14th parts of the cycle, various RIs were considered in sufficient detail. I will give only one drawing from the indicated materials. Pay attention to the highlighted period in purple.
And if there is a war?
After the second decade of April in the Republic of Ingushetia, the number of German divisions near the border increases by almost half. Let's take a look at a fragment of the General's memoirs D. D. Lyulyushenko about this period:
In the 20th of May, the mechanized corps of the second stage (42 and 46 TD, 185 MD) is not planned to participate in hostilities with Germany, despite a significant increase in German troops near the border in a month. At the end of April, units of the 21st MK were withdrawn to summer camps: the 42nd and 46th divisions in the areas of Idritsa and Opochka, respectively. The 185th MD was originally formed in the city of Idritsa on the basis of the 185th SD.
Plans for the mechanized corps in June are changing. D. D. Lyulyushenko:
On June 21, a corps commander of an understaffed corps is called to Moscow, parts of which are in camps in the Kalinin region and on the territory of the Leningrad Military District. A peaceful mood reigns in the joints of the hull. For example, on June 22, the grand opening of summer camps of the 46th TD was planned. A festive concert began, during which a message was received about the beginning of the war.
The call of the corps commander to Moscow cannot help our troops on the border in any way during the invasion of German troops at dawn on June 22. This is a third-rate event in terms of importance if war is expected in the NCO and in the General Staff on the morning of June 22. And if they do not expect it, then this is ordinary military affairs. The transfer of the mechanized corps to the territory of PribOVO, if necessary, is already being considered. Let me remind you that General Vatutin on June 20 until the evening is also engaged in tertiary matters - he works with General M. I. Kazakov (Chief of Staff of the Central Asian Military District).
The situation changes dramatically after the start of the war. D. D. Lyulyushenko: «
The fact of a surprise attack
Do you think the head of the Operations Directorate was so worried about the situation on the border, and not the very fact of the outbreak of hostilities ?! Of course, he was concerned about the very fact of the surprise attack! Why do I think so? Let's see the first operational summary of the General Staff at 10-00 on 22.6.41:
What is in the summary dangerous for the spacecraft? In the Baltic States, German troops are advancing in two reinforced army groups of 3-4 infantry divisions. These groups are reinforced with tanks - up to 500 units. 500 tanks are, according to RI, two separate tank regiments (550 tanks) or a separate tank regiment and battalion (408 tanks). Do not forget that according to the Republic of Ingushetia against the PribOVO troops there is only one full-fledged tank division and five MD, which have not yet been entered into battle. The rate of advance of infantry units is several times less than the rate of advance of tank-mechanized troops …
Only one strike grouping is noted against the troops of the ZAPOVO in the direction in which a strike by German troops is already expected. There is not a word in the report about the tank group in the area of the city of Brest. And what can one sector of an attack on for a sufficiently large district mean? Only - provocation of German troops or reconnaissance in force …
Something insignificant is happening against the most powerful military district - KOVO. THEIR. Baghramyan:
Somehow everything is not taken seriously at the General Staff either. If war is expected there at dawn on June 22, then why does the General Staff believe such reports coming from the districts ?! And not only in the morning, but also in the daytime reports! If a provocation was expected, then everything immediately becomes clear - give no reason for the German adventurers to start a war …
Counterstrike decision
Based on the operational reports provided by the top leadership of the spacecraft, the government decides on a counterattack by the forces of the South-Western Front. The Chief of the General Staff refuses to make this decision. This is all Stalin, and he was on his way to the headquarters of the South-Western Front to sort out the situation … But why deal with the situation if nothing terrible has come in the reports from the districts yet? Stalin could not decide on a counterstrike without taking into account the opinion of the People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff! But the military could just convince Stalin of the correctness of such a step.
In part, this is confirmed by the Journal of Stalin's visit. Timoshenko and Zhukov are present for the second time at the meeting in Stalin's office from 14:00 to 16:00. Vatutin is with them. The People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff were supposed to report to Stalin the situation on the border, after the day's reports arrived. In the same place, they probably came up with a proposal to inflict counterattacks by the spacecraft forces and the subsequent exit to the territory of former Poland. In any case, the Chief of the General Staff is once again distorting real events: his signature is under the Directive, which was received by the SWF headquarters.
The lack of reliable RI (pre-war and the first day of the war, including the absence of large mechanized and tank formations near the border) led to an incorrect assessment of the information in the General Staff and the adoption of a disastrous decision on a counterattack by the SWF troops on Lublin. Perhaps the leadership of the spacecraft decided to use their pre-war preparation.
When discussing the impracticable directive that had been received, the opinions of the members of the Military Council of the SWF were divided. At this time, the chief of the General Staff arrives, who, having understood the situation on the spot, did not report to Stalin about the true state of affairs on the northern flank of the front. Only on the spot did the Chief of the General Staff realize the seriousness of the situation, while in Moscow he did not yet realize it …
How could he hasten the command of the border districts with the withdrawal of troops, if, before arriving at the headquarters of the SWF, he does not understand the seriousness of the events that have begun on the border? This is another confirmation of the correctness of the events in the diary of Marshal S. M. Budyonny:
In the afternoon and evening of June 22, he was either sure of the correctness of his actions, or he did not dare to admit his mistake before Stalin, convincing him of the need for a counterattack on Lublin. And if he did not dare to admit his mistake, then perhaps there were many other of his erroneous explanations to Comrade Stalin before the war … Maybe that is why there is nothing truthful in his memoirs about the events of June 19-22?..
