This part is the final one in the article on the Southern Front. In part 1 and in part 2, we reviewed intelligence materials and events on the eve of the war, documents on the expected number of German troops expected by the leadership of the Red Army (KA) that will take part in the war with the USSR, and documents on the creation of a front-line directorate of the Southern Front (SF). The previous part was devoted to the events related to the mobilization of the operations department (OO) of the headquarters of the Southern Front (LF). A legitimate question arises: maybe other departments and services of the headquarters were mobilized in advance and only the OO was somewhat late in its deployment?
Mobilization of departments and services of management of the Law Firm
It was possible to find information on the commanders of the department of the Law Firm, who were not part of the OO. They were called up from the reserve on June 22, 1941: senior assistant to the head of the artillery department A. Z. Krasnov (Krasno-Presnensky RVK), senior assistant of the PA of the artillery headquarters P. E. Egorov (Sverdlovsk RVK in Moscow), assistant to the head of the supply department of the sanitary department I. Ya. Osipov (Kominternovsky RVK), assistant to the head of the road department of the logistics department T. I. Titov (Sokolniki RVK), dispatcher of the fuel supply department P. I. Simakov (Tagansky RVK), commander from the communications department I. I. Volegov (drafted by the Moskvoretsky RVC). Red Army soldier (driver) of the financial department of the front headquarters Y. P. Finogenov Drafted on 22.6.41 (Kirov Regional Military Commissariat) and on the same day left in an M-1 car for the SF. Perhaps with him left for the front and a motorcycle platoon to guard the field administration of the Law Firm.
In accordance with statistical materials, a separate guard battalion of the Department of the Law Firm has been listed in the active army since 25.6.41 and began its formation in Vinnitsa.
In the book “K. A. Vershinin. Fourth Air”it is said that after the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, an operational control group of the Air Force of the JF left Moscow for Vinnitsa. The group included: commander P. S. Shelukhin (until 22.6.41, Deputy Commander of the Air Force of the Moscow Military District), Deputy Commander for Political Affairs V. I. Alekseeva (until 22.6.41 - head of the department of special personnel of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Spacecraft), head of the public organization K. N. Odintsov (until 22.6.41 - head of the intelligence department of the Air Force headquarters of the Moscow Military District), head of the intelligence department G. A. Drozdov (until 22.6.41 - Chief of Staff of the IAP); chief of communications K. A. Korobkov (until 22.6.41, the chief of communications of the Air Force of the Moscow Military District), the flagship navigator V. I. Suvorov (until 22.6.41, the flag-navigator of the Air Force of the Moscow Military District). Two days later, the rest of the Air Force command departed for the front. The newly formed department was staffed only by 60-65%. By July 1, the work of the department was basically established.
From the information provided, it can be seen that the headquarters and field administration of the Law Firm began their deployment only after the start of the war … How so? Indeed, in accordance with Note of the NKO of the USSR and the General Staff of the Spacecraft in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (February 1941), outlining the scheme for the mobilization deployment of the spacecraft, it is said that according to the mobilization plan, 9 field front directorates are deployed? The Far Eastern Front already existed. The deployment of front-line directorates was to be carried out in the ZabVO, ZakVO, LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, ARVO and MVO. If the telegram about the deployment of the front-line command went to the ARVO on June 19, then why was the deployment of the same command in the Moscow Military District not started? The answer lies on the surface.
The scheme took into account the deployment of troops in case of war, which did not necessarily have to start on June 22. The document was supposed to provide for the possibility of starting a war in 1941 or 1942.
The British ambassador to the USSR wrote in a telegram dated 23.4.41:
The military, who are beginning to be a force outside the party, are convinced that war is inevitable, but they yearn for a postponement at least until winter …
Of course, at that time, the leadership of the country and the spacecraft hoped for a postponement of the war, since, according to intelligence, the number of German divisions on the border has hardly changed since November 1940.
According to the same Note in the spacecraft it was planned to deploy 30 mechanized corps directorates, 30 motorized and 60 tank divisions. The formation of such a number of formations and associations was not planned by the beginning of the war. These were plans for the future.
Remember what the head of the GABTU replied to General D. D. Lyulyushenko?
About a month before the start of the war, while at the GABTU KA, I asked the chief
- When will the tanks arrive? After all, we feel the Germans are preparing …
“Don't worry,” said Lieutenant General Ya. N. Fedorenko. - According to the plan, your corps should be fully completed in 1942.
- And if there is a war?
- The spacecraft will have enough strength even without your corps …
In June, the situation changes somewhat. On June 22, the 21st mechanized corps had 30 flamethrower tanks, 98 T-26 and BT-7 tanks. Despite the small number of obsolete tanks, the hull is planned for use in the Daugavpils direction. On June 15, the commanders of the corps formations conduct reconnaissance. This does not contradict the fulfillment of the combat mission by the mechanized corps in the future after the receipt of additional materiel.
Similar events are taking place in the Moscow Military District. In early June, General Tyulenev announced to the senior chief of staff of the district:. However, no dates have been named and no specific tasks have been set for the command personnel. Also, the theater of military operations, where front-line control will have to unfold, has not been named.
KA communication parts
Without what else can front-line control exist? Without communication! Without proper communication, front management is not a headquarters, but only a large group of commanders.
Each military district (in wartime - the front) was served by its own separate communications regiment (ops), and the other ops were in the Reserve of the High Command (RGK). In peacetime, at the headquarters of the army there was a separate communications battalion, which, upon completion of mobilization, was supposed to be increased to a full communications regiment. At the five headquarters of the armies there were already formed ops. All communications units were staffed in peacetime states.
The article states that the pre-war signal troops of the RGK consisted of 19 ops (14 district and 5 army), 25 separate communications battalions, 16 separate special radio battalions (for radio interception) and 17 communications centers (one for NCOs and one for each military district). These units existed only on paper and had to be mobilized on the 9th … 10th day of the war.
According to the plans of the General Staff, during the war, after the deployment of units, a structure of signal troops was formed from 37 ops, 98 separate wire communications battalions and 298 separate communications companies. In reality, however, only 17 regiments were created (shortage of 48.6%), 25 battalions (shortage of 74.4%) and 4 companies (shortage of 98%).
Before the mobilization of communications units of the RGK, communications in the command link "front - army" in the initial period of the war were supposed to be organized at the expense of the network of the People's Commissariat of Communications. This approach, adopted by the General Staff, was one of the reasons for the defeat of the ZapOVO and PribOVO troops in border battles due to the loss of command and control.
After the announcement of mobilization, the period of readiness of the communications inspectorates was set at 3 days; readiness of telegraph-construction and telegraph-operational companies - from 6 to 11 days. If for the 2nd and subsequent operational-strategic echelons such terms of the formations of communications agencies could be acceptable, then they did not in any way correspond to the tasks of the command of the covering armies that entered the battle in the very first days of the war.
It should be noted that on June 22, 1941, the shortage in units and in educational institutions of communication was: for the command staff - 24% and for the junior command staff (sergeants) - about 10%.
When planning the conduct of hostilities in the initial period of the war, the General Staff did not attach importance to possible problems with communication in the border districts during this period. In the last days of peace, no decisions were made to deploy communications units and release communications weapons from the warehouses.
Readers who have read the series of articles by the author of Victoria should remember that a similar situation was with parts of the VNOS. Their full deployment began to take place only after the outbreak of the war. According to the standards, the deployment time was up to 7-8 hours. Somewhere the warning system points were deployed, somewhere the personnel were scattered or destroyed during the advance. As a result, in the first half of the day on June 22, air defense and air force units were served only by company VNOS points (on average, four points to the army front). This led to a delay in the arrival of information from the "air" series to fighter airfields and air defense units. Part of the enemy aircraft was not even detected until they entered the target zone. And after the deployment of the VNOS system, problems began with wire communication lines. For example, by the evening of June 22, an almost complete loss of communication occurs in PribOVO.
In Directive No. 1 it is especially emphasized that the lifting of the assigned personnel should not be carried out. Immediately after the start of the war (at 4-00), a cipher telegram (SHT) is sent from the PribOVO command post with a request to authorize the call of signalmen.
Chief of the General Staff. The weak points of the district's communications that can cause a crisis are:
1. The weakness of the front-line and army communications units in terms of size and power in relation to their tasks.
2. Unequipped communication centers of the army and the front.
3. Insufficient development of wires from Panevezys and Dvinsky communication centers.
4. Lack of communication facilities to provide logistic communications.
5. Poor security of the communications of the district, army communications units and the air force.
I ask: 1. Permit the partial mobilization of front-line and army communications units by mobilizing communications regiments, line battalions, operational companies and communications squadrons … P. Klenov Also, the SHT listed the funds required for the functioning of the communications troops.
A lack of understanding of the problems of organizing communications existed not only in the General Staff, but also in the control units of the fronts and armies.
Head of Communications Department of PribOVO General P. M. Kurochkin, describing the pre-war methods of combat training of the headquarters and command personnel of the signal troops of the army and district levels of command, he wrote:
Communication in the area of exercises and maneuvers was always prepared in advance, 2-3 weeks in advance. To provide communications for maneuvers conducted in any one military district, many communications units from other districts were assembled. State communication was widely used. All prepared communications were used only for operational command and control of troops.
As for the communications needed to control the air defense, air force, and rear services, it was either not taken into account at all, or its organization was studied in special classes, in which the issues of providing communications for the operational leadership were not understood, i.e. again favorable conditions were created … Under such conditions commanders and staffs got used to the fact that the organization of communications does not present any difficulties, they will always have communications at their disposal, and not just any, but wired.
Was it not this semblance of well-being in the provision of communications, created in peacetime, that led the combined-arms commanders and staffs to neglect the difficulties in organizing communications that had been encountered at every step from the very beginning of the war? Was this not one of the reasons that led to great difficulties in the leadership of the troops, and often to a complete loss of control …
The headquarters of the PribOVO knew about this problem and, long before the war, informed the General Staff about possible problems. P. M. Kurochkin:
Analyzing the survivability of communications in the Baltics, we noted that all the main lines pass near railways and highways, and, therefore, can be destroyed during aerial bombardments. The main nodes located in large settlements or in areas of railway intersections were also very vulnerable from the air, while there were no reserve ones. Thus, for the proper preparation of communications in the theater of operations, a large amount of work had to be done; they needed building materials, labor, money, and most importantly - time … All this is the chief of staff of the district, General PS. Klenov reported to the General Staff. But, unfortunately, we did not get even the twentieth part of what was required …
Responsibility for organizing and maintaining communications between the General Staff and the fronts and fronts with the armies was assigned, respectively, to the head of the communications department of the spacecraft and to the chiefs of communications of the fronts. In addition to the apparatus of the head of the communications directorate of the spacecraft, there was also another body - the communications department of the operational directorate of the General Staff, which was also in charge of the development of communication issues, but was not subordinate to the head of the communications directorate of the spacecraft. In addition, the communications departments of the Air Force and the Navy were relatively independent. This situation could not but affect the quality of communications management from the central office. By the beginning of the war, the General Staff of its forces and means of communication to ensure communication with the fronts and armies did not have and did not plan to deploy, relying on the People's Commissariat of Communication. The head of the communications department of the spacecraft, the communications department of the operational management of the General Staff, the Main Directorate of Air Defense were subordinate to G. K. Zhukov …
Front-line communication units of the Law Firm
In accordance with Vedomosti of the combat strength of the formations and units of the Law Firm on 1.7.41, the front signal troops included the 40th OPS, which included: the 377th separate linear communications battalion (olbs), the 378th olbs, the 379th olbs, 3 -th separate cable-pole company (okshr), 240th okshr, 252nd okshr, 255th separate telegraph-operational company (oter), military post station No. 1. The indicated communications units are just arriving at the front on July 1.
According to other sources, there was also a telegraph battalion in the LF signal troops, which existed before the arrival of the 40th ops at the front.
We managed to find several servicemen who served in some of the indicated communications units. All of them were drafted into the spacecraft only after the start of the war. In the 377th olbs, servicemen living in Moscow were called up on 23 June 1941: Averin I. L. (Tagansky RVC), Voskoboinik G. D. (Sokolniki RVC), Zhuravsky D. V. (Rostokinsky RVC) and Krylov V. A. (Proletarian RVK). In the 378th Olbs, A. S. Korotkov was drafted. 22.6.41 (Moskvoretsky RVC). In the 240th okshr was called on 24.6.41, E. A. Lisin. (Komsomolsk RVK of the Ivanovo region). It can be assumed that this was also the case in the rest of the units that are part of the 40th OPS.
According to statistical materials 377, 378 and 379 olbs, 252 okshr in the active army are listed from 1.7.41 g, and 240 okshr and 255 otter - from 25.6.41 g. There is no information on 3 okshr in the collection. The appearance at the front on June 25 of 240 and 255 Oter raises doubts, since the Vedomosti indicates that they will arrive on 1 July. In addition, the serviceman Lisin E. A. was drafted to the 240th okshr on June 24. Consequently, the 240th okshr began to unfold from June 22 and continued its formation on June 24. Therefore, she simply could not be at the front on June 25.
As part of the MVO troops, there was only one district ops - the 1st ops. In peacetime, the signal regiments of the internal districts were contained in the state number 14/913 and had a strength of 840 people. Peacetime district and army regiments and battalions were entrusted with the task of forming the entire set of front-line and army communications units, as well as spare parts. Each of these parts had to form from 8 to 14 separate communication parts. After the start of the war, on the basis of the 1st ops, the 40th ops and the 67th ops began to unfold. Remembrance of the company commander of the 67th ops I. E. Milkina:
On the morning of Sunday, June 22, I woke up, but I had not yet got up, and lying in bed, I heard women in the yard talking loudly and repeating the word "war, war." "What kind of war, what are they talking about?" - I thought …
[June 23] I went to the Sverdlovsk District Military Commissariat for assignment to the active army. There I introduced myself to the commission as the commander of the radio line. Immediately I was appointed commander of the radio battalion of the 67th ops. I was given two days to receive the materiel and form a radio battalion. The recruitment took place on the territory of the military communications unit in the area of Matrosskaya Tishina street. On the third day [26.6.41] we left for the North-Western Front …
There were a lot of personnel called up from the reserve in the communications units that were being created. The ratio of personnel and personnel called up from the reserve was found only for the initial period of the Soviet-Finnish war: in the Moscow Military District, for 500 personnel, when deploying communications units sent to the theater of military operations, there were about 6,500 people called up from the reserve. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, our command already had a negative experience in the mobilization deployment of front-line and army sets of communications units (meaning the Soviet-Finnish war, as well as operations to bring Soviet troops into the Baltic states, into the western regions of Belarus and Ukraine), but by June In 1941, in fact, nothing was changed (Almanac. Volume 4. Military communications).
The personnel called up from the reserve were practically not called up for training before. In 1940, the head of communications of the Western Military District, General A. G. Grigoriev (shot together with the commander of the ZapOVO) in a letter to the head of the communications department of the spacecraft wrote:
"… Every year I submitted reports to the General Staff asking for permission to call at least part of the companies for training, but I did not receive permission …"
The outbreak of the war was unexpected for the military registration and enlistment offices of the city of Moscow and the Moscow region. The period of vacations and the departure of people on vacation on Sunday led to an increase in the time for recruiting teams, even if there was a reserve in them. An example is the appointment of I. E. Milkin, who was not part of the assigned composition of the 67th ops, the commander of the radio battalion.
M. N. Sbitnev (military commissar of the Dzerzhinsky district of Moscow):
We learned about the treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on our homeland early in the morning on June 22 at the city military commissariat, where all the district military commissars gathered. Military Commissar of Moscow G. K. Chernykh, announcing the beginning of the war, ordered the immediate deployment of assembly and acceptance points. By the evening of the same day, we were ready to mobilize. On that slightly cloudy but warm morning of June 22, many Muscovites went out of town. Moscow still lived a peaceful life. At 12 o'clock, a government message was transmitted about the attack of the Nazis …
V. Kotelnikov: The beginning of the Great Patriotic War for the leadership of the country and the entire Soviet people, despite its inevitability, it was still a big surprise … This can be evidenced by the fact that the mobilization on the territory of Kirsanov and the Kirsanovsky district began not on June 22, 1941 …, but only on June 23, almost a day later … The first days of mobilization also revealed a number of problems that affected the full and systematic implementation of the assigned task … Despite the fact that all teams were reserve, additional delivery of resources was carried out for seven, and for some military formations and up to 10 days … The main reasons for this state of affairs, first of all, can be called a slow restructuring of the consciousness of citizens on a military basis, not realizing the threat that hung over the Soviet Union …
Since the deployment of the front-line communications regiment of the Law Firm was not started on June 20, the rise of field management in the Moscow Military District on 20.6.41 could not be associated with the advancement of management to Vinnitsa in anticipation of the war.
Promotion of the Field Office of the Law Firm
According to the memoirs of General Zakharov, before the start of the war, the headquarters of the ODVO did not suspect that the district's troops were included in the SF. Moscow did not receive any information on this issue in the event of a war. After the start of the war, telegrams began to arrive from the General Staff to the Kharkov and Odessa military districts with the notification of the creation of the law firm.
PCS # 1456 / op from 22.6.41: To the Commander of the HVO troops. The People's Commissar of Defense ordered, without waiting for the rise of the army management, to send the first echelon of the district management with the necessary communication units to a new point on 22.6.41. You, a member of the Military Council and the chief of staff of the district, should be in the first echelon. N. Vatutin
The journal of military operations of the 18th army: … In the morning of 22.6.41, the Commander of the Kharkov Military District, in pursuance of the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Union No. _, ordered the allocation of a complete army administration. On June 29, 1941, the Army's field administration of 4 echelons was fully concentrated in the Kamenets-Podolsk region. June 26, 1941 Task Force Shtarm (1st echelon) arrived in Kamenets-Podolsk at 2-30 …
PCS # 05 23-25 23.6.41: To the Commander of the 18th Army.
1. By order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 04, the Law Firm was established. General of the Army Tyulenev was appointed commander of the forces of the Law Firm, a member of the Military Council was the army commissar of the 1st rank Zaporozhets, and the chief of staff of the front was Major General Shishenin. Front headquarters in the morning 24.6 - Vinnitsa.
2. 18th Army from 00-05 25.6.41 is included in the SF … Vatutin
PCS # 08 23-30 23.6.41: To the Commander of the 9th Army.
1. By order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 04, the Law Firm was established. General of the Army Tyulenev was appointed the commander of the forces of the Law Firm, a member of the Military Council was the army commissar of the 1st rank Zaporozhets, the chief of staff of the front was Major General Shishenin
2.9th Army from 00-05 25.6 1941 is included in the SF.
3. The 9th Special Corps from 00-05 25.6 is withdrawn from the 9th Army and reports directly to the commander of the forces of the Law Firm.
4. Inform me about the establishment of contact with the front headquarters. Vatutin
The departure of the unscheduled special train on June 22 was so hasty and unexpected that at the headquarters of the Law Firm no one knew the situation in the area of their future deployment. A. F. Khrenov:
We arrived in Kiev on the evening of June 23rd. A car from the district headquarters was waiting for us at the station. I was among those who went to the headquarters …
I went to the departments and directorates of the headquarters to get information, topographic maps and other documents related to the URs, as well as the road and airfield network in the LF strip. The situation at the headquarters puzzled me somewhat. The offices were depopulated - their owners, which was quite natural, ended up in Ternopil. But those who remained were not endowed with sufficient powers and did not have access to the documents of interest to me …
The employees of the Engineering Department who found themselves on the spot helped me out. They described to me the state of the URs, roads and airfields from memory. We sketched out an approximate layout of the reinforced concrete command post in Vinnitsa, on the banks of the Southern Bug, - it was there that our front-line command was to be located. They also warned that the command post might not have the necessary means of communication and full calculation of the service team …
We arrived in Vinnitsa at dawn on June 24 … The scheme received in Kiev made it possible to easily find the command post … In the evening of the next day, the second echelon of the front's field command arrived safely …
As General I. V. Tyulenev, neither the General Staff nor the headquarters of the Kiev Military District informed him of the existence of a command post in Vinnitsa. Ivan Vladimirovich learned about him from the chief of the front engineering troops, although the point was built back in 1939-1940. I. V. Tyulenev:… On the evening of June 24, I arrived in Vinnitsa by a special train. My amazement and chagrin knew no bounds: the command post of the front turned out to be completely unprepared - not a single telephone and telegraph apparatus, not a single radio station. I had to mobilize local funds and use them to establish contact with the troops …
M. V. Zakharov:
General of the Army I. V. Tyulenev. First of all, he asked me to send him a map with the situation and several telegraph machines … I had to urgently send an officer of the operational department of the 9th Army headquarters to Vinnitsa with a map of the situation and several telegraph devices …
V. D. Tarasova:
22.6.41g. I came to work at 9 o'clock, on duty. Lights were on in the control room at all stations, which meant there was no connection. There were military men at the telegraph office, and Brigadier Nadya Yaskova said that the war had begun. We went over to the barracks position. 30.6.41g. at 20 o'clock a truck arrived from the communication center of the Law Firm, and our youth shift was sent … to the communication center of the headquarters of the Law Firm. We were assigned to the telegraph battalion of the 40th Ops, which served the headquarters of the Law Firm. I started the war in the military rank of a private, in the position of a signalman-bodist …
The beginning of the work of the Department of the Law Firm
On June 25, the command of the Law Firm sent its first Directive to the troops.
First. By the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 04 of 24.6.41, the JF was created to unite the actions of our troops against the enemy troops deployed in Romania.
Second. I was appointed Commander of the Law Faculty, I was appointed as a Member of the Military Council, Army Commissar of the 1st rank Zaporozhets, Chief of Staff of the Front - Major General Shishenin …
Commander of the Law Firm, General of the Army Tyulenev
Member of the Military Council, army commissar of the 1st rank Zaporozhets
Chief of Staff of the Front, Major General Shishenin.
The uncomplicated situation in the Southern Division, in comparison with the situation on the Western and North-Western Fronts, allowed the arrived field command to establish command and control of the troops and enter the course of affairs only at the beginning of July. The lack of communications weapons at the command post in Vinnitsa in the early days of the front-line directorate workers had to use the means of the People's Commissariat of Communications, which did not guarantee the secrecy of the negotiations and limited the number of communication lines. The Western and Northwestern Fronts did not have such a delay …
On 22.6.41 in the state, the number of people in the headquarters of the front-line field control was 333.
There is a note to the table that the management of the fronts (armies) included political directorates (departments), directorates (departments) of the Air Force command, special departments, which were contained in their own states. The servicemen of the indicated directorates or departments were not included in the total number of servicemen shown in the figure.
As of June 27, there is a large shortage of staff at the headquarters of the Law Firm: there are about 100 people. At the headquarters of the Law Firm there is a security company, in which there are about 160 fighters.
Instructions on the organization of the Air Defense Forces of the headquarters of military unit 1080 of June 27, 1941.
Human protection:
a) Open and equip by 28.6.41 ten open-type field slots with full profiles of normal capacity … to shelter 160 people in them. fighters.
b) Open and equip by 29.6.41 six open-type field slots of a full profile, normal capacity for 100 people … shelter in them for the personnel of the headquarters of military unit 1080 …
After the redeployment of the front-line administration of the Law Firm, the shortage of personnel in early July was eliminated. According to the state, the number of people in the department was 925, and as of July 12, the department already had 1,190 command personnel and 1,668 rank-and-file personnel (a total of 3,246 people).
Major General G. D. Shishenin. It is difficult to say how he led the work of the headquarters practically without communication, having a large shortage of personnel, most of which was called up from the reserve. As you remember, the personnel called up from the reserve to the OO were completely unprepared. Front commander Tyulenev and member of the Military Council Zaporozhets "signaled" to Moscow that the front headquarters was headed by Shishenin. Probably they tried to absolve themselves of responsibility for the bad work of commanding the front troops … On June 30, General Shishenin was replaced by a new chief of staff, Colonel F. K. Korzhevich.
In Directive 12.8.41, Stalin pointed out to Budenny:
Komfronta Tyulenev turned out to be untenable. He does not know how to attack, but he also does not know how to withdraw troops. He lost two armies in a way that even regiments do not lose … It seems to me that Tyulenev is demoralized and unable to lead the front …
Too chaotic and not planned was the deployment of the management of the Law Firm, which can only be associated with the unexpected start of the war in June 1941 for the leadership of the spacecraft and their lack of understanding of how the German command would conduct military operations in the initial period of the war. With the introduction of troops into Bessarabia in 1940, everything happened in a more organized manner (article).
We reviewed the events and documents related to the deployment of the field administration of the Law Firm. The author considers it unnecessary to repeat the conclusions that follow from the presented material. According to the author, the refusal of the Chief of General Staff from the proposal of the Military Council of the OdVO to deploy front-line control on the basis of the district headquarters at the beginning of the war and the redeployment of one army from the internal districts was a mistake.
