They will talk about that war, probably forever, and thank God more and more often they do not speak, but spread documents, so I found a whole array of documents in LiveJournal, which is interesting - without any comments, and if you look at them in chronological order, you get an interesting result … The minutes of the meeting of December 11, 1904, speaks of the plans of the Second Squadron:
“HIS IMPERIAL HIGHNESS General-Admiral: Although the Arthur squadron still existed at the time of Rozhdestvensky's departure, he believed that by the time of his arrival this squadron would no longer exist.
General-Admiral personally suggested to Rozhdestvensky that the battleships "Admiral Ushakov", "Admiral Senyavin", "General-Admiral Apraksin" join the squadron, but Rozhdestvensky refused them, believing that they would prevent him from following."
Rozhestvensky KNEW that Port Arthur would not resist, and saw it as his goal to transfer Baltic reinforcements to the theater of operations as soon as possible. A deeply logical step, even the presence of the fleet in Vladivostok is a bargaining chip in the negotiations, especially in conditions when the First Squadron is defeated and destroyed. There are ships, and the Japanese will not dare to attack our shores, there are no ships and we get Witte - Polusakhalinsky. One more point:
"By sending the 1st echelon on January 15, we will receive it in the Indian Ocean near Java around April or the end of March, at that time Rozhestvensky had already had a battle, and whatever the result of the battle was …"
The breakthrough was planned for late February - early March 1905, and only the decision of the meeting under the emperor led to what can be called the Madagascar seat. I do not know what to call the two Grand Dukes and Dubasov, who joined them, who sincerely believed that Nebogatov's detachment would significantly strengthen the squadron. I know that Birilev and Alekseev were against them, who were just thinking about naval affairs.
“Vice-Admiral Birilev: considers it impossible to detain Rozhestvensky, he cannot stand idle in Madagascar for such a long time, his nerves simply will not stand it and he will go forward; He probably has some kind of plan, which we have no right to violate."
But in the end it turned out how it happened, and for the sake of five useless ships, the squadron was detained for two months, and much later Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich in his memoirs presented Zinovy as a comic and dull-hysterical figure, but himself as a hero and a thinker. Rate the depth of thought:
“Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich: It is necessary to strengthen Rozhdestvensky and prevent him from entering the Pacific Ocean until reinforcements join; The first echelon should be sent out as soon as possible in order to return it from the road in the extreme, it all depends on the time when it can join, i.e. when he's in the Indian Ocean."
Give the Japanese time to repair and prepare and send them to break through in ideal conditions for the enemy. And so it happened, Alexander Mikhailovich had a great influence on Nicholas and considered himself an experienced sailor … to the trouble of the Russian fleet.
Now about the preparation of the battle:
A diagram of the analysis of the February maneuvering at 12 nodes, which was clearly not done for abstract interest and for training the helmsmen, but as preparation for battle and practicing BATTLE maneuvering. And then there is Nebogatov's order, the diagram from which I posted above:
ORDER
COMMANDER OF THE 3rd ARMORED SQUAD
April 29, 1905 №156.
According to the order of the Commander of the 2nd Squadron of the Pacific Fleet from the 27th of this April, for No. 231 I announce the order of maneuvering of the 3rd armored detachment entrusted to me during the transition from the marching formation to the combat one.
This is strong then Nebogatov will declare that he did not know anything and that nothing was brought to him; The tasks of the 3rd armored detachment were set clearly, another question - Nebogatov did not fulfill his own order, nor the order of Rozhdestvensky, but understood the right to initiative in a peculiar way. This document is of particular interest:
“The real purpose of sending transports to Shanghai, which is to be kept in complete secrecy, is as follows:
If the squadron does not reach Vladivostok, but is thrown back by the Japanese fleet, then one way or another you will receive an order from me to send transports by the appointed time and rendezvous, to replenish the coal reserves of combat ships …"
That is, the option of defeat was fully considered and planned, prescription No. 360 to Radlov and the additions to it to the commander of the cruiser "Askold" are quite understandable and specific - to buy supplies and load.
"For each transport must now be loaded with machine materials for 2 months according to the calculation, as for the cruiser" Askold "and sea provisions for the first month according to the calculation for 500 people."
It is even provided for the preservation of "Xenia" as a floating workshop for possible repair of damaged ships. Other options - escort to Vladivostok in case of victory, the retreat of the squadron from Vladivostok to the South, if the war drags on until winter, and supply of auxiliary cruisers. And it is unlikely that, having notified Radlov, Rozhestvensky did not notify the junior flagships. Therefore, there was where to retreat, and in this context, the actions of Enquist are clear, remember the quote:
“At three o'clock we laid down on a 48 ° south-west course and set off on an eight-knot course, heading for Shanghai.
The admiral never again asked his usual question: "Is it good, will it be?" On the contrary, he reassured himself and his subordinates:
- It is possible that tomorrow the squadron will catch up with us. We are not walking, but crawling. And she probably developed a move of at least twelve knots …
- Let Svir go to Shanghai and from there send us a transport with coal. We will go with the detachment to Manila. The American authorities will treat us better than the Chinese: we will repair the damage without disarming."
Enquist, after all, deliberately retreated to Shanghai, knowing that the squadron would come there in case of defeat and that supplies and a floating workshop would be waiting there. And it seems to me that he was very surprised when he realized that the squadron did not retreat after the defeat.
But in general, the documents indicate that Rozhestvensky had a breakthrough plan, in early March, either to Port Arthur, if it resists until that time, or to Vladivostok, where they were also preparing.
“In general, one can expect that when the 2nd squadron approaches, Vladivostok will be unblocked.
Of course, there is still a danger from Japanese minefields, but if there are several transports in the port of a large depression and a trawling caravan at the right time, the cruisers can be withdrawn with great confidence in their safety. The time of approach of the 2nd squadron to the Korea Strait can be indicated quite accurately by sending a destroyer to Shanghai or Qingtau."
Knowing clearly in NOVEMBER 1904 that the squadron would break through the Korea Strait and at the end of winter. Moreover:
"The coal reserves in the port are very insignificant for the 2nd squadron, and therefore the 2nd squadron must be accompanied by an additional detachment of coal transports containing the amount of coal needed for the year of the war."
Lugging transports with you is not Rozhdestvensky's idea, the idea of the Naval Department of the headquarters of the Fleet Commander in the Pacific Ocean. In a word, they were preparing, but the schizophrenic conviction at the top that "Nikolai 1" and three BBOs are power, delayed the campaign for two months. The plan of the operation was also developed, it provided for a possible breakthrough, and a possible defeat, and even actions in six months, if the war dragged on. Similarly, they worked out the elements of the battle, and shooting, and maneuvering, moreover, the junior flagships drew up their orders at the outset of the battle, that is, they knew their maneuver. Who is smarter even specified, like Enquist:
“From all of the above, a number of questions follow, to which I most humbly, Your Excellency, will not leave me an answer.
Do I generally understand the mission of the Cruising Detachment in accordance with Your Excellency's proposals?
What should be considered the most important: whether the protection of transports or the help that cruisers can provide battleships?
Can I use the Reconnaissance Party and Svetlana, as indicated above?"
And in the order, he was directly ordered to hold a meeting of the commanders of warships:
“I ask Your Excellency to draw up a preliminary general plan of action for several arbitrary missions, to gather the Commanders of the ships entrusted to you and to familiarize them with your chosen techniques and planned maneuvers, so that at the decisive moment each of them would be prepared to carry out your orders and signals, and in case of need could have taken independent action."
The result of viewing just a few documents is as follows:
1. There was a breakthrough plan, and not the stupidest one. Torn down by Petersburg, judging by the minutes of the meeting, the Grand Dukes became the initiators.
2. Preparations for the breakthrough were carried out, everyone who was supposed to know knew and in what way, and the timing, the Junior flagships were also notified.
3. There was a plan for starting the battle. Junior flagships are advised to develop orders and hold commanders' meetings. It is unclear about Baer, because the second detachment still follows the first in the main forces, but there is correspondence on Enquist and, I think, similar to Nebogatov, which he modestly kept silent at the trial, I think, for quite understandable reasons.
4. Only Enquist fulfilled the plans of the Commander, both in terms of actions in battle and in terms of retreat. Ber died, and Nebogatov turned out to be unfit for professional use. There are, of course, questions for Rozhdestvensky, but the image of a stupid Tsarist satrap and an idiot who has been drawing for decades, when reading documents, goes somewhere, and a thinking person and a good staff officer comes to the fore.
Where, by the way, is the main reason for the defeat - a quick loss of control. Two commanders of the detachments (and Zinovy actually combined the commander of the First Armored and the Main Forces) were knocked out within half an hour, the third did not understand the situation and preferred to carry out the last order, so that it did not work out, and Enquist fought his own, essentially independent battle. Had he been on "Nikolay", at least two squadron battleships and two BBOs would have come out to Shanghai. If you are lucky - even "Nakhimov" with "Navarin". Of course, internment would have awaited them, but rescuing six (out of 12) ships of the line and all cruisers is a little better than what came out. But the history of the subjunctive mood does not know, it remains only to study what and how it was, and how it could be.
