The author (and other specialists) repeatedly raised questions of the critical state of the mine action forces of the Navy, not only incapable of fighting the modern mine threat, but also having a military-technical lag behind the modern level of military affairs, unprecedented in our armed forces (reaching 50-75 years!) … The reasons for this are not technical, but purely organizational, and to a large extent personnel.
Moreover, the problems of mine defense (MDP) make it possible to reveal much deeper problems of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense, which need to be discussed.
It is necessary while there is still time to have time to eliminate their consequences.
Terrorist threat in the fairways
At the end of 2018, the hacker group Anonymous released excerpts from Christopher Donnelly's 2014 Crimea Proposals. The list of measures includes the installation of bottom mines in the Sevastopol Bay …
Military measures CND 2014-01-03 (Military measures, CND, 2014-01-03) …
2. Bottom mines in the Sevastopol Bay. Can be easily delivered from a civilian ferry if they do not have special minelayers. It does not take many minutes to achieve the required efficiency. They could easily buy them.
All this was written not just by a “private person”, but by a person who was supported by the state and special structures of Great Britain and NATO and carried out assignments of a “certain nature”.
In No. 1 of January 15, 2019, the "VPK" published an article by the author indicating these documents and the likely consequences of their implementation:
Due to the complete absence of the means of combating modern bottom mines in the Russian Navy … the use of Sevastopol as a fleet base could be paralyzed for a long time. On the only minesweeper in the Russian Navy - the mine seeker "Vice-Admiral Zakharyin", the anti-mine complex … was out of service. … despite the sharp aggravation of the situation, the "Mayevka" on the "Zakharyin" was commissioned only two years later …
Note: earlier, taking into account the likelihood and danger of the use of mines by terrorist groups, the author in open publications bypassed this topic (while repeatedly putting it in a "closed format"). However, the complete disregard of this threat by the navy forces them to openly sound the alarm.
The question is so urgent that it was reflected even in the press organ of the Navy - the magazine "Marine collection" (No. 10, 2017), in an article by employees of the Central Research Institute of VK Bystrov B. V., Pirozhenko V. A., Kuleshov K. V.:
… terrorism remains a threat at sea, which has emerged as an instrument of a new war with all the attributes of asymmetry.
Currently, there are 3 known cases of so-called mine terrorism:
- mining of the ports of Nicaragua in 1984;
- laying mines in the Red Sea in 1984;
- laying mines off the coast of Sri Lanka in 2008
Ministry of Defense and the Navy: "There are no problems, everything is under control"
The reaction of the Ministry of Defense "followed" in the person of the Deputy Head of the Department of Information and Mass Communications (DIMK) of the Ministry of Defense A. Volosatov, "VPK", 2019-29-01:
… trying to analyze the issues of anti-mine support for the Navy, the development of mine-sweeping forces, Klimov uses outdated data without the slightest hesitation, … an upgrade program for new ships of project 12700 … is being carried out … equipped with the most modern anti-mine systems … the armament of mine-sweeping ships of existing projects is constantly being improved and updated … which is typical for Klimov,in the same material there is a composite hodgepodge of completely different topics, made up of rumors and speculation … the author understands his incompetence, but strengthens the emotional component of the articles due to the usual "hoax" and manipulation of information.
Real environment
The first thing that should be noted about this "response" is the military rank of Mr. Volosatov - colonel, and his earlier position of "chief expert" of the press service of the Ministry of Defense.
It is logical to see a strong professional in such a position and in such a rank, however, there are simply no objections as such in the publication of the “expert” Volosatov, not a single fact cited by me was refuted by him. In his letter there are only false statements and vague references to some anonymous and notoriously dubious "foreign analysts" and "bloggers."
All the facts given in my article on January 15 are true and have documentary evidence (including documents from the Ministry of Defense itself posted on the public procurement website):
Purchase No. 0173100004515000738.
Date of the auction: 2015-25-05. Completion date: November 25, 2016.
Purpose and goals of the work results: maintaining in good working order the self-propelled remote-controlled mine seeker "Mayevka" … training of personnel.
Products 4047 SYNM.788133.001 and 4047K SYNM.788133.001-01 are intended for additional search, classification and destruction of anchor, bottom (including silted) and bottom mines detected by the ship's sonar mine detection station (GASM). Product 4047 SYNM.788133.001 is used for armament of TSCHM pr. 02668. Product 4047K SYNM.788133.001-01 is used for autonomous installation on ships or vessels.
Purchase No. 0173100004518001288 - a set of works for the repair of GAS "Livadia" on the order of pr. 02668 of the Black Sea Fleet. Completion date: September 30, 2019.
Conclusions from this:
The only, relatively modern, anti-mine ship of the Black Sea Fleet was not operational (the main complex was out of service; list of faults, see purchase documents No. at the beginning of 2014, the central bodies of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation were not undertaken.
At the beginning, the situation is similar (in acoustics), and its solution is only "planned" by the end of 2019.
At the beginning of 2019, there is not a single modern anti-mine ship in the ranks of the Black Sea Fleet today. Even absolutely obsolete minesweepers built in 1973 that have not undergone any modernization and have lost their combat capability are forced to go to combat services in the combat zone (accompanied by a tug).
Note: at present, MTSH "Vice-Admiral Zakharyin" is in combat service in the Mediterranean Sea, and, hopefully, with the urgently put into operation the repaired (and not "blind") GAS "Livadia".
Mr. Volosatov's statement on the modernization and improvement of the anti-mine weapons of the minesweepers of the combat strength has no basis, the situation not only does not get better - they even lost what they had (for example, seekers).
The new PMK project 12700 has an outdated concept and a number of serious shortcomings. The main thing is that ships are actually up to the first mine with a modern fuse (on which either the minesweeper itself or its only and extremely expensive self-propelled underwater vehicle will be blown up).
Note: Project 12700 issues are covered in a separate article
The main type of hydroacoustic stations (GAS) for minesweepers of the Navy is MG-89 "Serna" (developed in 1969, which has not undergone any modernization since then)
Moreover, in recent years, tenders for the repair of GAS MG-89 (from ship repair enterprises that repair the PMK of the Navy) have ended in recent years with a "typical phrase": "Not a single application has been submitted." On a significant part of the Navy's PMK, GAS MG-89 is simply not in service from dilapidation, and there is no one to repair them.
Those.a significant part of the Navy's minesweepers is simply "blind"! This "level" of mine action forces corresponds to the first years of World War II …
On the roadstead PMK of project 10750 and two sea minesweepers of project 12660, GAS "Kabarga" developed in the 80s, which do not have full digital processing, and with performance characteristics close to GAS MG-89 are installed.
In the 2000s, an attempt was made to modernize the MG-89 GAS, with the introduction of a full-fledged digital processing, the MG-89ME GAS. With the ability to carry out effective modernization of almost all minesweepers of the Navy:
Installation of MG-89ME instead of the previous GAS can be carried out without docking the ship, without significant changes in the hull structures of the ship and with the preservation of most of the cable routes.
However … "the customer (the Navy) did not show interest", the modernization work (GAS MG-89ME) was not completed, and today this GAS has been excluded from all "promotional offers" of Okeanpribor JSC.
For comparison: the Polish Navy carried out in the mid-2000s its own modernization of our MG-89 (installed on Polish minesweepers built in the 60s - 70s of the last century).
Moreover, Polish specialists have created a modern set of new anti-mine weapons (from underwater vehicles to non-contact trawls), and today the combat capabilities of the Polish Navy's secondary battery are many times higher than those of the Russian Navy (even taking into account the presence of two "newest" Project 12700 secondary battery in the Baltic)!
The missed opportunities of our underwater robots
Could we have done the same? Undoubtedly! As for the GAS, it was said above, but for underwater vehicles we had a number of companies that successfully worked in this direction (State Scientific Production Enterprise "Region", OKB OT, FSUE "Yuzhmorgeologiya", OKB STS and others).
An extremely negative role was played by the "stake" of the Navy on "imports" (or, more precisely, the "interest" of a number of high-ranking officials of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense in "imports"). Report at the "round table" on underwater equipment of the Army-2018 forum by the General Director of Tethys-Pro JSC:
… Out of 155 supplied by the Tethys-Pro Group of Companies to the Navy, 27 underwater vehicles are domestic.
Surprisingly, they are proud of these numbers! Or maybe there were no domestic ones? But at the same round table a presentation was made by representatives of Tomsk University (TUSUR). Among others, they mentioned the long-term work of domestic submarines at great depths in search of the Argentine submarine "San Juan" (purchased by "another structure" of the RF Ministry of Defense, not the Navy). Representatives of 40 research institutes of the Navy there also gave a high assessment of the RTM-500 apparatus (developed in the 90s) based on the results of work on the Kursk agro-industrial complex. However, not a single RTM-500 (or any other domestic underwater vehicle) was purchased by the Navy after that (except for the Mayevka and Livadia design and development projects) - all the money was spent on imports from Tethys-Pro …
The task of creating mass underwater vehicles for the PMO of the domestic industry was simply not posed (despite the fact that the potential for solving it, of course, was)!
Against the background of all the other minesweepers of the Navy, the MTShch "Vice-Admiral Zakharyin" of project 02668 stands out - the first full-fledged minesweeper-finder of mines (TSPHM) of the Russian Navy, equipped not only with GAS, but also with a dynamic positioning system, an automated mine action system (ACS PMD) and special self-propelled underwater vehicles (SPA) PMO.
The main "anti-mine tool" of the MTSH "Vice-Admiral Zakharyin", the SPA "Mayevka", successfully passed state tests in November 2008 (together with the ship). By Decision No. 253 / 8.6309 of November 25, 2008, "recommended for adoption and the organization of serial production."
Moreover, "Mayevka" turned out to be our only model of naval underwater weapons and an anti-mine complex, developed within the specified timeframe and funding and successfully passed (right away!) State tests.
The complex had two modifications, incl. container, which successfully passed tests at the Valentin Pikul MTF of the Black Sea Fleet in 2007, the use of which was possible from all base and sea minesweepers of the Navy (i.e.the possibility of effective modernization of almost all secondary battery of the Navy's combat strength opened up).
A series was planned. The first "Mayevki" were to be received by sea minesweepers MT-264 and MT-265 of the Joint Command of Troops and Forces in the northeast of the Russian Federation (for mine countermeasures for the Boreyevs of the Pacific Fleet).
However, the container "Mayevka" was taken for "storage" to Moscow, and the planned series was excluded during the "proofreading" of the State Defense Order (without any justification).
I would very much like to ask the then head of the department for the development and orders of ships, naval equipment and weapons of the Navy in Benzoruk about the motives for such a "decision".
Later, Mr. Benzoruk turned out to be the deputy general director of the State Scientific and Production Enterprise "Region" for R&D, after which all the latest events in "Mayevka" (including the sad end of its history) no longer seem surprising.
In the early 2010s, finances again went to "imports", "Mayevka" was "ordered to forget", and, moreover, gossip was launched at a very high level that Mayevka allegedly "failed the test."
Only one example of this is an interview after the Euronaval-2012 salon with the deputy head of the Almaz Central Design Bureau A. Zakharov.
It was very important for us to get off the ground in the creation of mine defense ships. And we have found certain elements here that are ready to be used on our ships. We have conducted very effective negotiations, including with French firms. … what will be useful to the Russian fleet, what we can really use, and where we are seriously lagging behind. This applies primarily to uninhabited underwater vehicles, which we will install on our mine defense ships.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, confirmed the correctness of all our actions.
I would like to note that V. V. Chirkov personally, 5 months earlier, when visiting the State Scientific and Production Enterprise "Region", observed the real work of the container modification "Mayevka" (in the hydroacoustic basin) and had objective information on it.
In order to show an objective picture, below are the documents (from the public procurement website).
Thus, the facts are documented:
• the complex has two modifications, incl. container;
• the ability to work on silted mines (while the overwhelming majority of PMO underwater vehicles are not capable of this) - and this was confirmed by tests (!);
• successful completion of the complex of state tests and the presence of its letter O1 (ie documentary confirmation of readiness for the series).
In reality, it was not Mayevka that failed, but the NPA Livadia, which was (until the end of 2009) part of GAS Livadia, developed by ZAO Aquamarine (St. Petersburg). Unfortunately, contrary to the advertising statements of JSC "Aquamarine", its products do not always confirm in practice the declared characteristics and capabilities.
As a result of all these intrigues, the Navy did not start operating the Mayevka; in fact, only ancient trawls were in service with the Vice-Admiral Zakharyin.
Obviously, such a state of the only relatively modern secondary battery of the Navy was absolutely abnormal. However, for Benzoruk, Chirkov and other similar bosses "everything was in order" ("there will be no war!").
As a result, in 2013, the tender "Maintenance and service and repair of automatic control devices for trawls and finders, contact trawls, non-contact trawls and mine finders …" that “the auction for this lot was declared invalid (not a single application was submitted)”.
Let me emphasize: for the repair and commissioning of the main complex of the only TSCHIM Navy.
I will tell you the reason for this myself: the only performer of the work was not informed about it, found out only at the last moment and simply did not have time to prepare the documents.
Those.the officials “have a line,” formally, “they did everything,” but in fact the case was ruined already at the stage of placing the tender. There were enough of such deliberately impracticable "dummies" for tenders for naval underwater weapons. Of course, no one bore any responsibility for this.
When 2014 "burst out"
2014 From a report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral V. V. Chirkov, input. 11977:
The critical problem of the Navy is mine defense (MIP) … In March of this year [2014] I handed over to the Chief of the Naval Underwater Weapons Service of the Navy … a document (attached) on the situation, possible consequences and necessary measures … taking into account the evolving military-political situation. The necessary measures are not being taken.
The essence of the document was the need for urgent commissioning not only of the Mayevka on the Zakharyin, but also the return to V. Pikul”of its container modification.
However, officials of the Navy and officials of the Ministry of Defense (below their names will be named) "continued to plan":
Purchase No. 0173100004515000738 Maintenance of the self-propelled remote-controlled mine finder "Mayevka" … in good condition. training of personnel.
Date of the auction: 2015-25-05. Completion date: November 25, 2016
Those. there is a war in which the Russian Federation participates, incl. Navy and Black Sea Fleet. The only relatively modern PMK of the Navy is not in service, but the officials of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense “everything is in order”, “the shoulder straps are not tight”, “maybe the enemy will not use mines”!
At the same time, the only adequate approach in this situation, with the beginning of the operation in Syria, was the commissioning of the Mayevoks on the Zakharyin and Pikul as soon as possible, and the constant presence of one of these secondary armaments in Tartus!
Nevertheless, in 2017, after the repair and commissioning of the Mayevka at the end of 2016, the MTSH "Vice-Admiral Zakharyin" went into the combat zone, having its main weapon in service for its first military service. Tellingly, this fact was not noted in any way in Konashenkov's DIMK, which further continued to publish "lubki" about "minesweepers in fleets, trawling with trawls" and advertising films on complexes that obviously did not have effective PMO capabilities (for example, "Galtel").
However, the period of functioning of the MTSH "Vice-Admiral Zakharyin" as a THIRD was short-lived - the subtle GAS "Livadia" was out of order.
And again, instead of urgent repairs and commissioning of the ship - "next planning".
Purchase No. 0173100004518001288 - a set of works for the repair of GAS "Livadia" on the order of pr. 02668 of the Black Sea Fleet. Completion date: until September 30, 2019.
Those. there is a war, the Black Sea Fleet is fighting without a single modern secondary battery!
With "Mayevki" it is even more "fun". Instead of its modernization (with the elimination of existing shortcomings and an increase in performance characteristics) and serial production, the "question" on it is closed. Finally. The chief designer was dismissed. In fact, today the fleet has already lost it, and it is necessary to think about replacing it with the Zakharyin.
And here it is necessary to emphasize separately what we have lost with this.
The modernization of the MG-89 GAS and the Maevok series provided at least limited combat capability to the entire PMK grouping of the Navy (MTShch projects 266M, 12660 (with GAS Kabarga), BTShch project 1265). This did not require any significant costs, it was necessary (for the officials of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense) only to properly relate to their official duties.
Moreover, "Mayevki" were not allowed not only to the fleet, but also for export.
Despite its presence in Rosoboronexport's catalogs, the registration of an advertising passport and an export passport was blocked. There were requests from foreign customers about it, but for the indicated reasons, they remained unanswered.
As a result, the Vietnamese Navy went on to purchase the Italian TNPA PLUTO PLUS to equip its PMK projects 266E and 1265E (Soviet-built).
So what's wrong with our minesweepers?
The above is compelling evidence of the critical state of the Navy's mine action forces. At the same time, there are no technical problems for the Navy to have effective mine action forces, and large expenditures are not required for this.
And now the names of the officials personally responsible for the situation with the Navy's secondary battery and the state of mine defense.
V. A. Tryapichnikov, Chief of Naval Shipbuilding
Head of the Service for the Development and Operation of Marine Underwater Weapons of the Naval Shipbuilding Directorate I. M. Taran:
Head of the Department of Marine Underwater Weapons of the Department of the Ministry of Defense for Ensuring the State Defense Order (DOGOZ) Kaplouhiy S. A.
After all these high officials, mentioning the head of the anti-mine department of the Central Research Institute of Military Shipbuilding (also called the Central Research Institute of Shipwreck), Mr. R-ko, is somehow "small", but necessary.
In January 2015, after the Supreme Commander-in-Chief received information (in the fall of 2014) about the critical state of naval underwater weapons, the Navy urgently prepares a document with "proposals for overcoming the crisis" (in fact, having copied them from previously developed documents with which we are in this " underwater pit "and turned out to be). Mr. R. writes "his part", in his text it reads:
… the coefficient of lag of the Russian Navy from Western countries in terms of underwater vehicles is 0.8, the coefficient of superiority in trawls is 1, 2.
Even Taran, who was standing next to him, “lost the gift of speech” from such “numbers” (hereinafter - with “preservation of intonation”):
- Aaaaaa … aaa, why 0, 8 and 1, 2?!?!?!?
- Well … these are "scientifically grounded" coefficients!
I emphasize that in this "parallel reality" there is a whole head of the profile department of the central research institute of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy on the subject!
But, excuse me, someone appointed him …
Head of the military representative office of the State Scientific and Production Enterprise "Region", Zv, as a representative of the Ministry of Defense at the enterprise, who bears personal responsibility for what happened to "Mayevka" and the problems of ISPUM (as well as a number of other problematic issues of the IGO).
And what about the commander-in-chief of the Navy Korolev?
And he knows everything for a long time:
Note: Appendix No. 1 is the text of a report on the problems of the Navy's PMO, prepared by the author for the Scientific and Technical Council of the Navy and the Military-Industrial Commission under the Government of the Russian Federation in the spring of 2017.
Yes, as a matter of fact, Korolev has not a single modern secondary battery in the ranks in the theater of operations (theater of operations), in the warring (!) Fleet! Or does he “don't know” about it?
He has not ensured the combat stability of the NSNF, elementary - the withdrawal of forces from the bases in the anti-mine sense, and he also "does not know" about this?
The book "The Main Naval Parade of Russia", published under the editorship of Admiral Korolev, provides simply amazing historical "information" about both the participating ships and the "history of the Navy". For example, the fact that Vice Admiral Makarov is a "hero of the Tsushima battle"!
This, alas, is not a joke. The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy does not know that Vice Admiral S. O. Makarov died more than a year before Tsushima, on March 31, 1904, and was blown up by a Japanese mine!
I suppose if Admiral Korolyov is asked a question about the ship of our fleet that has achieved the greatest combat success in history, he will also "find it very difficult" …
Well, let's call it: this is a minelayer "Cupid", in the combat account of which two battleships (battleships) of the enemy (blown up by Russian mines)! "Good question" - at least one naval ship today bears this name?
And this is all against the background of the shameful renaming of ships: "Vilyuchinsk" in "Tver" and "Hurricane" in "Mytishchi", and the preservation of such odious names in the names of ships, such as "Kulakov".
What are the conclusions from all this?
We have no problems with equipment, the problem of the Navy's PMO can and should and must be resolved as soon as possible.
The main obstacle to this is a number of specific officials of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense, by their actions (inaction), undermining the real combat capability of the Navy and deliberately misleading the command of the RF Armed Forces and society.
The “wildness” of the current situation in the PMO is that it is clearly visible to everyone, even to outside civilian observers.
However, the "experts" of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense do not want to "see" this …
There is only one solution here, complex:
1. The real (critical) situation and the necessary measures must be reported to the command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (including the Supreme Commander-in-Chief).
2. The need for appropriate “decisions” on specific “persons”.
3. Society. The current situation should be sounded by the society (civil society, and not in the “liberal version” of this concept, but in the patriotic version - “citizens who are responsible for their country and its future”).
And the last thing.
Obviously, the PMO problem is far from the only one in the Navy and Defense Ministry (although it is the most “disastrous” in terms of lagging behind the current level).
And the fact that the current bishops are trying to close the problems with a veil of pseudo-secrecy requires the society to develop effective independent control mechanisms (for example, the creation of parliamentary commissions and empowering them to conduct inspections in cases that are particularly resonant and significant for the country's security).
Lies and lies in propaganda, agitation and the press discredit party political work, the naval press and inflict exceptional harm on the cause of the Bolshevik education of the masses.
(From the directive of the Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR Navy and the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Navy, 2nd Rank Army Commissar I. V. Rogov.)
Application. Some (far from complete) chronology of the “tough questioning of the PMO”
2007, "New defense order", V. A. Katenin, A. V. Katenin, (State Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation).
… [enemy mines] are quite enough to completely block our forces in all fleets … The lack of serious work over the past twenty years to improve mine and mine weapons in the Navy has led to the fact that the sweeping forces are unable to effectively deal with the modern mine threat … and the country's military leadership of the mine threat and degradation of domestic mine-sweeping forces should be the first step towards solving this acute problem.
2010, "VPK", M. A. Klimov:
… the capabilities of the mine-sweeping forces of the Navy are so low that they call into question the possibility of ensuring the deployment of the forces of the Russian Navy from their bases. in the conditions of a modern mine threat … despite the successful passage of the MTSH "Vice-Admiral Zakharyin" state tests, today he is alone in the Navy.
2014 From a report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral V. V. Chirkov. input 11977:
The current level of the naval mine countermeasures corresponds to 50-60. last century. The minesweepers in the Navy were actually abandoned - unlike foreign ones, no modernization with the introduction of new mine action systems was carried out on them.
On the only minesweeper-seeker of the Navy, "Vice-Admiral Zakharyin", new mine action systems are either mothballed ("Mayevka") or …
The new container complex "Mayevka", successfully tested in 2007 on the minesweeper "Valentin Pikul" before the war on 08.08.08, was taken for safekeeping … to Moscow.
Prospective minesweepers of project 12700. A series of these extremely expensive minesweepers, if there will be, it will be small, while the Navy needed not “a few minesweepers for parades” but ANTI-MINE FORCES - dozens of modern secondary armaments, and not “in the bright future tomorrow”, but yesterday !
… the planned serial production of the Mayevka complexes was thwarted by intrigues …
2014 "MIC" "Unarmed minesweepers".
To overcome the half-century lagging behind the current level, the PMO requires the following set of measures:
• serial construction of the BTShch project 12700 - there is no alternative;
• proactive delivery of modern mine action systems to the Navy and emergency modernization of minesweepers in service, ensuring the installation of these systems in the Project 12700 hulls after the old TSCs have been decommissioned;
• immediate launch of R&D work on modernization of STIUM "Maevka" (in container version) in order to improve performance characteristics and prepare for serial production;
• purchase and development of HBO and AUV with the implementation of tasks for mapping mine-like objects, primarily in the area of the bases;
• development on a competitive basis (with tests on fleets) of small-sized disposable anti-mine UUVs;
• development of unmanned mine action boats on a competitive basis in the shortest possible time.
2016-29-02, "VPK.name", "We are on the verge of another Tsushima" …
And here we come to the essence of what was happening.
Obvious negligence and unprincipled attitude of officials to ensure the real combat capability of the Navy. For example, today, Project 955 RPLSN "Alexander Nevsky" will enter combat service at OKVS (Kamchatka) by only two sea minesweepers, whose anti-mine armament corresponds to the western end of the 60s, and is unable to deal with modern bottom mines. At the same time, earlier "Mayevki" were planned primarily for Kamchatka, in support of "Boreyev" (they were excluded from the state defense order). In fact, today the Pacific Fleet's submarine missile launcher is deliberately not provided. Everyone knows about it (including Chirkov V. V.). No measures.
2016 December, "VPK.name", "The issue of the non-combat capability of the Russian Navy against the modern mine threat must be resolved as soon as possible."
2018 "NVO" "The Russian Navy ran into mines and submarines."
The minesweepers available today in the combat composition of the Navy have long been outdated and have actually lost their combat significance. Moreover, the new project of the sea minesweeper (MTShch) of project 12700 has a number of key disadvantages:
- the outdated PMO concept - a ship “to the first modern mine”;
- knowingly unsecured actual explosion resistance;
- limited efficiency at shallow depths;
- inability to solve multipurpose tasks (at least at the level of the 266M project);
- the possibilities of serial construction are limited by the capacities of PJSC "Zvezda" (one set of diesel engines per year).
