In naval affairs, there are a number of ideas, concepts and theories that have so long and firmly ingrained in the minds of people that they are taken for granted, almost axioms that require neither explanation nor proof. But in fact, these are mistakes that can be very expensive if, starting from them, important decisions begin to be made. It is necessary to disassemble them and exclude them from the set of rules that our country should be guided by in naval development.
1. Nuclear weapons as insurance against attack and "equalizer of chances"
For a long time it was present in the Russian military theory, and even now the theory of the so-called nuclear de-escalation is mentioned. Its meaning, in short, is that, upon realizing the impossibility of getting out of a conventional war without defeat, Russia can resort to a limited-scale single use of nuclear weapons in order to "siege" the attacker and persuade him to end hostilities. Domestic military specialists considered various options for such use - from a strike on empty areas in the sea for demonstration purposes, to a limited nuclear strike against the non-nuclear allies of a nuclear aggressor.
With regard to war at sea, one of the possible varieties of such actions is the delivery of limited nuclear strikes against enemy naval groupings.
However, you need to understand the following. The use of nuclear weapons entails a lot of negative consequences even without taking into account the enemy's retaliatory moves. Among them:
a) undermining the reputation of the attacker and his political positions in the world, and the undermining is very serious, comparable in consequences to a lost war;
b) the need to escalate is even greater if the enemy against whom nuclear weapons have been used does not surrender. Escalation will be impossible without the destruction of the enemy's civilian population, and in this case - unrequited. Subsequently, a serious moral crisis in society is possible in the future, up to the appearance of a "guilt complex" similar to that which some Europeans experience in relation to representatives of peoples once colonized by Europeans;
v) an adversary who has received a nuclear strike may consider himself entitled to resort to methods of war that he would not otherwise have resorted to. For example, the use of combat strains on the territory of the attacker, or the large-scale equipping of terrorist groups with such types of weapons as MANPADS; sponsoring, supporting and using terrorism on a large scale, various forms of strikes against nuclear power facilities, and so on. You need to understand an important thing: other cultures have their own ideas about what is acceptable and unacceptable, and they do not coincide with ours. The concepts of unacceptable and acceptable damages also differ. Other people think differently from us. It seems logical and self-evident to them not the same as to us and not the same as to us.
All of the above is true for a nuclear strike against a non-nuclear country. If the attacked enemy also has nuclear weapons, then the situation changes dramatically. Having suffered losses from nuclear weapons, the enemy may well resort to a retaliatory nuclear strike. Moreover, what is not obvious for many Russian theorists is not necessarily a "symmetrical" strike.
The US Naval Strategy in the 1980s literally stated that in response to the USSR's use of nuclear weapons against US forces at sea, a US retaliatory nuclear strike would not necessarily be limited to the sea. Thus, the Americans, after the very first use of nuclear weapons against their ships, in all seriousness considered themselves entitled to retaliate nuclear strikes on Soviet territory.
Now the situation has not changed. American guidance documents indicate that the ideas of Russian theorists about the "stopping" effect of the use of nuclear weapons are erroneous. The generally accepted opinion is that in response to the limited use of nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies, the United States should use its nuclear weapons against the Russian Federation, and, unlike us, the Americans do not see the difference between attacking ships where there are only military personnel. and strike at ground targets, where there are civilians. It is the same for them.
Thus, the likelihood of a retaliatory nuclear strike when attempting to "de-escalate" the navy of a nuclear country with the highest (in the case of the United States - with a 100%) probability will lead to a retaliatory nuclear strike, and on the territory of the Russian Federation, with high attendant civilian casualties …
Does this mean that nuclear weapons are inapplicable precisely as a weapon and not as a deterrent? No, it doesn’t mean, but you need to be aware of the cost of using it and be ready to pay it. The use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear adversary may, instead of surrender, cause an asymmetric escalation of the conflict, while simultaneously bringing the Russian Federation to the need to use nuclear weapons across the enemy's territory, destroying its population as well. Such a victory may be worse than a defeat.
In the case of a strike on an enemy with nuclear weapons, there will be no de-escalation for sure, but there will be a nuclear war, perhaps initially limited, which will have to be waged, with all the ensuing consequences and risks.
It should also be understood that nuclear weapons alone do not stop both nuclear and non-nuclear countries from attacking. In 1950, non-nuclear China attacked UN troops (count the United States and its allies) in Korea; American nuclear weapons did not contain it. In 1969, the nuclear China, already at that time, attacked the nuclear USSR on the border, and more than once. In 1982, non-nuclear Argentina attacked nuclear Britain and seized its overseas possession, the Falkland Islands. In 2008, non-nuclear Georgia attacked Russian troops in South Ossetia. Russia's possession of nuclear weapons has not become a deterrent.
Scaring the enemy with nuclear bombs may not work. You need to take this into account in your planning.
2. "Small" fleet without "big"
The theory of the "small fleet" has existed for much more than a hundred years and its meaning boils down to the following: it is theoretically possible to create such ships that, being small and inexpensive, can nevertheless easily destroy large and powerful ships of the enemy, or wage a war on his communications due to superiority in weapons or stealth. Destroyers, then torpedo boats and submarines, then they were also missile boats or various types of small missile corvettes (like Soviet or Russian MRKs, for example) were originally such ships.
This theory has never been fully confirmed in practice, but it has failed many times. There are some successful episodes of the use of small ships armed with torpedoes in the 19th century, when they caused significant damage to large warships, as well as examples from the 20th century - the destruction of the Israeli Navy destroyer Eilat by Arab missile boats in 1967 and the successful use of Indian missile boats against Pakistan in 1971.
All these small piece examples have one thing in common - they took place when the weapons on the small ship and the large ship struck by it belonged technologically to different eras. In the future, the "balance" was leveled and after that small ships lost all chances to inflict any damage on large ships, acting independently. This was the case, for example, during the operations of the Iranian Navy and Air Force against the Iraqi Navy, as was the case in the US Navy's operations against the Libyan Navy in 1986 and against the Iranian Navy in 1988 (see the article "The Malicious Myth of the Mosquito Fleet"). "Small fleets" were destroyed within hours at best, but sometimes within minutes.
Also easily and without loss, the entire Iraqi fleet was destroyed by the Allies in 1991, and the US air superiority here was of indirect importance, since a significant and most combat-ready part of Iraqi warships was destroyed by a handful of British helicopters launched from full-fledged warships (see. article "Air fighters over ocean waves. On the role of helicopters in the war at sea"). The large fleet defeated the small one, as it had repeatedly before.
A small fleet operating independently has ALWAYS been helpless against a normal fleet, and its fate has always been very sad.
Does this mean that "light" forces at sea are not needed at all and never? No, it doesn’t mean, but it’s a "niche" tool. It is worth remembering:
Light forces can successfully carry out their combat missions only when they are supported by the "heavy" forces and ensure their combat stability
Examples: destroyers of Togo, which the latter used to attack the Russian fleet. They didn't work on their own. American submarines in the Pacific War, the success of which was ensured by the surface forces of the US Navy, which chained everything that the Imperial Japanese Navy had and did not allow any resources to be allocated for the creation of anti-submarine forces.
There are also quite a few counterexamples - Soviet and American torpedo boats of World War II, which did not sink almost anything, both lost German submarine wars. Independently operating "light" forces, even submarine or surface ones, although they could inflict some losses on the enemy, in the case of German submarines - great losses, but on the whole could never influence the course of the war.
On the whole, before the "young school" distorted the development of the Soviet fleet in the 1930s, this understanding was present in our fleet. So, in the thirties, the battleship in the Soviet fleet was seen as a means of giving combat stability to light forces. Similar provisions were in Soviet regulatory documents after the war, and on the light cruisers of the 68bis project, premises and communications were even provided for the command post of torpedo boats.
Moreover, the thesis that the main purpose of the existence of the line fleet is to support the actions of cruisers and light forces was expressed by Julian Corbett in his famous book.
This use of light forces can be quite effective. So, an MRK attacking an enemy convoy is powerless both against aviation and against submarines, but if it attacks from a warrant as part of one or more BODs and a cruiser, then its combat stability and ability to fight become completely different.
Or another example: small anti-submarine ships may well displace an enemy nuclear submarine from a given area, and simply destroy a non-nuclear submarine (and in theory, they could get an atomic one if they were lucky), but against a massive strike of deck aviation KPUG of four or five such ships will be look very pale (we will leave the question of the successful evasion of the KPUG from the blow "outside the brackets").
But everything changes if the ship search and strike group (KPUG) consisting of them relies on a pair of frigates with powerful air defense systems - then the success of the air raid becomes questionable, and in any case, the aircraft will not be able to completely destroy the ship group, although losses remain quite probable. The effectiveness of the anti-submarine actions of the KPUG is also growing at times, firstly because the frigates have anti-submarine helicopters, and secondly, because they have powerful sonar systems (in theory, at least, they should be).
From this, however, a consequence follows that fans of small ships will not like it - large ships can replace them if their number allows them to perform a combat mission. Or, figuratively speaking, a fleet of "light" and "heavy" forces can fight very well, a fleet of only "heavy" forces can also fight, but it is not always optimal and has a smaller number, and a fleet of only "light" forces is nothing at all really can't. A "small" fleet apart from a "big" one is useless and no matter how much money is lacking, it is impossible to slip from economy to building only small ships. Or they will be able to perform well only one combat mission, for example, to cover the submarines leaving the bases (in the case of the IPC), and that's it. But wars are not won that way. All of the above does not negate the need to work on such small ships as an anti-submarine corvette or a minesweeper-finder.
3. "Air Defense Umbrella"
There is an opinion, and many military professionals adhere to it, that it is possible, relying on coastal airfields, to create a coastal air defense system in which ships could operate, being relatively safe from enemy air attacks. Naturally, such a zone appears to be exactly the coastal, “under the coast”.
It is worth noting right away: domestic military science sees this defense system solely as a combination of radar surveillance equipment (preferably AWACS aircraft) and fighter aircraft. This is quite understandable and natural, because ground-based air defense systems will not have enough range, even if they are placed on the water's edge (which in itself will never be).
What is the depth of such "aircraft" air defense from the point of view of domestic theorists?
Back in 1948, during work to determine the appearance of future Soviet aircraft carriers (these ships were not destined to appear), a commission led by Rear Admiral V. F. Chernyshova determined that without protection from the carrier-based fighter aircraft, surface warships would be able to operate no further than 300 kilometers from the coast. This was not true for all possible situations, but for a situation when the enemy is "at the gate" and has carrier-based aircraft - more or less correct.
Then the commission operated on the fresh experience of World War II, mainly American, and the tactical and technical characteristics of aircraft and aircraft weapons of that time.
At the end of the 1980s, the figures were already different. So, in 1992, in the "Marine collection" published an article authored by Rear Admiral F. Matveychuk, Retired Vice Admiral V. Babiy and Captain 1st Rank V. Potvorov "Aircraft Carrying Ships - an Element of a Balanced Fleet", where air defense capabilities built around coastal-based fighters were characterized as follows:
“Sometimes an opinion is expressed about the possibility of solving the tasks of fighter cover of the fleet with aviation based on ground airfields. … As calculations show, taking into account the possible deployment of radar patrol and guidance aircraft (RLDN), the zone of fighter cover will actually be 150-250 km (from the position of duty at the airfield). At the same time, the enemy's radar detection zone should be 550-700 km for a squadron or an aviation regiment. It is practically impossible to further increase the area of radar detection”.
Let's remember these numbers. If we have a detection range of attacking aircraft of 550-700 kilometers, then the distance from the base airfield, where aviation can protect ships from an air strike, will be 150-250 km.
It is worth roughly counting. The air regiment, which is in readiness number 2 (the pilots are in the barracks, the aircraft are ready for immediate take-off, the control tower is ready to start takeoff operations immediately), during takeoff, one aircraft at a time must fully rise into the air, form a battle formation and enter the required course not more than an hour after receiving the order. In case of aircraft takeoff in pairs - in the region of 40 minutes. Then you need to go to the point where you want to intercept the enemy. Since the aviation must disrupt the attack on surface ships, it is necessary to prevent the enemy from reaching the line of launching his missiles.
Suppose that there is a case when the airfield, the defending ship group and the attacking enemy are approximately on the same line. From experience, the Americans (let's take them as a "model" enemy) use the Harpoon anti-ship missile system not at the maximum range, but from about 30-40 kilometers, so if they are intercepted 60 kilometers from the attacked target, then the attack can be considered disrupted. and the mission of the fighters completed. Let us assume that the range of launching air-to-air missiles, which ensures reliable defeat of targets covered by interference and evading targets, is, for example, 50 kilometers, which in the end requires being 160-260 kilometers from the airfield to launch them.
If we assume the advancement at a speed of 1000 km / h, then the required fighters will be about 9-16 minutes. Together with 40 minutes on the rise on alarm, collecting in the air and entering the course - 49-56 minutes.
How long will the enemy, who was found 700 kilometers from the ship's group, fly over during this time? The enemy is hung with offensive weapons (RCC) and outboard fuel tanks, so his speed is lower, for example, 740 km / h. Then it will fly the designated 700 kilometers in almost the same time - 57 minutes. And if he can give 800 km / h? Then for 53. But even the MiG-21 could fly near the ground at a speed of 930 km / h with a full load in the shock version, and the Su-17 in general went to supersonic near the ground with six ASP units on the hardpoints.
What if the radar field is 600 kilometers deep?
And the most important question: what if this is not an ocean theater? If we are not talking about an attack by US carrier-based aircraft "on a prick" from somewhere from an aircraft carrier hiding in the far sea zone, but about a strike by Polish fighter-bombers in the Baltic? Taking off from Szczecin, leaving to the north west of Bornholm, turning behind the island as a cover, dashing to the east, attacking targets near the Kaliningrad enclave, into the sea, and going home to the west are quite real. And then the distance at which even an AWACS aircraft can accurately identify a "contact" as a threat turns out to be less than 500 kilometers.
Anyone can play with numbers. Increase the speed with which fighters move to defend ships, increase or decrease the speed with which the attacker goes into the attack, realistically change the detection range of the attacker … the conclusion will be unambiguous - very often, or in general, fighters from the shore will always be late to repulse a strike even at a short distance … Even when the ships are practically under the coast - 100-150 kilometers away.
You can, of course, not wait for the entire air regiment to take off, but throw squadrons into battle from different airfields - if you manage to synchronize their arrival at the battle site, but we must remember that the enemy who owns the initiative will not introduce anything into the battle in squadrons, he will lift into the air as much as possible a large air group to provide both a powerful strike and a strong escort. And the introduction of fighters into battle in squadrons will simply lead to their being shot in the sky by a numerically superior enemy.
You can send fighters to a supersonic counterattack, and try to be on the required line of launching missiles faster than the enemy, but this method has a lot of limitations - you need to have enough fuel for an air battle and return, including a possible separation from the enemy also on supersonic, in the strip there should be no buildings or people over the ground, a group supersonic flight is more difficult than a single one and pilots should be ready for this, including beginners, and so on - in general, this is not always possible. More often it is not possible. But the attacker over the sea, basically, does not have these problems (minus the pilots' ability to fly like that).
No "air defense umbrella" (forgive me people in uniform for such a "term") does not exist in principle. Even off the coast. Fighters can sometimes protect ships and sometimes they cannot, and this cannot be changed in any way. During the Falklands War, British Harriers were late to repulse an attack on surface ships, loitering in the air a dozen kilometers away and receiving notification of the attack and information about the location, course and speed of the enemy. In advance.
During the Cold War, the Americans, planning the air defense of aircraft carrier groups and formations, proceeded from the assumption that interceptors on duty in the air would be able to disorganize the enemy's attack, shoot down some (not most) part of his aircraft, “break” his order of battle and, as a result, increase the range of the missile salvo, after which the enemy would continue his attack and further with him and his missiles the URO ships would have dealt with, and the interceptors urgently raised at the moment of the attack would already catch up with the Tupolevs freed from missiles that survived the fire of the ship's air defense systems.
"Air defense umbrella" does not exist, the attackers are usually faster. This is how this world actually works.
What conclusion should be drawn from this?
The conclusion is simple: ships must be able to fight aircraft themselves. That's all. The key to the successful survival of surface ships in the fight against aviation is competent tactics - the commander of a ship group must know the tactics of strike aviation, understand the limitations that it has, be able to mislead enemy reconnaissance about the number, course and composition of the forces entrusted to him, and navigate ships in this way, so that an accurate and timely determination of their location by the enemy would be impossible, to fight aerial reconnaissance, to be able to organize a battle of ships against strike aircraft and to control it in the process, to be able to detach from tracking, to promptly withdraw ships from the zone of a potential airstrike, use false targets, create false warrant and lure enemy aircraft to it, organize "missile ambushes".
It is difficult, but it is not impossible.
The command of the forces of the fleet in the theater of operations, in turn, must conduct intensive misinformation of the enemy, provide subordinate units, formations and ships with all the necessary reconnaissance information, ensure the use of fighter aircraft in the interests of naval groups, and not so much from "readiness number 2" at the airfield, but from air alert positions. This means that there will be few interceptors, but at least they will be on time. AWACS aircraft are urgently needed.
The ships themselves must either have powerful radar systems and air defense systems. If, for economic reasons, it is impossible to build ships with powerful air defense (for example, this is a massive small corvette), then they must carry out their combat missions together with “normal warships. There will be no one else to protect them.
In any case, there will be no other way out. Either this or not.
4. Fleet on the defensive
The mentality of the Russian people, like most of the peoples inhabiting Russia, is defensist. We are ready to open a trench and hold it until our death, without retreating under any circumstances. Unfortunately, this mental trait does not work at sea as it does on land. At sea, the "shark principle" works - to drive at top speed and grab everyone's teeth with your teeth, tearing off piece by piece. Run away, if necessary, and then return again and attack, attack, attack. You still can't dig a trench in the sea, the water is fluid.
Alas, not everyone is psychologically capable of showing such an approach, and historically, this was a problem for the fleet as well. We lack the aggression inherent in the same Americans, and together with the "defencist" consciousness, this gives rise to a specific approach to war at sea, and, alas, it does not work.
During the Crimean War, the command of the Black Sea Fleet did not think of a better use of the ships than to flood them and use them as a barrier to enemy ships, and send the crews to the infantry. I must say that wars are not won in this way, in principle, they are only lost. There is a ship - attack the enemy on it, there are no other options.
During the Russo-Japanese War, the 1st Pacific Squadron made literally a few weak attempts to inflict serious losses on the Japanese, of which the mining on May 1 (14 in the modern style) of 1904, performed by the Amur mine transport, was really successful, which the next day led to the death of two Japanese battleships. Two more such successes would have led to Japan's defeat in the war. But they were not, and there were none because none of the Port Arthur squadron tried to aggressively enough "get" the enemy. By the way, Amur hid in the fog during mining, and had a range sufficient to break through to Vladivostok, and for a significant part of the way it could go with good speed. But the ship returned to the fortress, did not have more active use and died along with the entire Port Arthur squadron.
Analyzing the actions of the 1st Pacific Squadron of the Russian Imperial Navy, Mahan saw in them the whole concept of a "fortress fleet", that is, a fleet holding an important fortress together with the army, and fiercely criticized it. Interestingly, he called the idea of a "fortress fleet" the words "definitely Russian", which well reflects his view of the actions of our sailors and our mentality. Definitely the Russian idea of the fleet, passively defending itself in the fortress, was never recorded in any documents, moreover, even if it was formalized, there was hardly anyone in the fleet who could sincerely support it, but in fact, the fleet was slipping into just this method of action., and more than once.
This cannot be allowed any longer.
In the guidance documents of the Navy there are requirements to hold the initiative, attack the enemy and the like, but we must always remember that in addition to instructions and regulations, we still have a national mentality and, if we talk about the current situation, we also have an army command, to which the fleet is subordinate and which “sees the world in his own way. " As a result, the stake on the "defense of their shores" in the event of a real military conflict may again prevail, with the result already achieved more than once - defeat.
It is necessary to clearly understand that the fleet cannot defend itself, it can only attack. And in the conditions of the enemy's numerical superiority, too. Special operations such as defensive mining are exceptions and very “weak”. It is offensive actions, and not "reactive" ones, which are a reaction to the enemy's activity, but independent ones, that are the key to the successful employment of the fleet. They can be direct, when a battle is imposed on enemy ships, or they can be indirect, when raids are carried out against its weakly defended bases and ships of the floating rear, but these should be offensive actions.
If the base of the fleet is blocked, as in its time Port Arthur, then the answer is ONLY the breakthrough and withdrawal from it of warships, which then, at the first opportunity, should be thrown into the offensive against the enemy fleet. The fleet cannot "defend positions", cannot and should not be in the attacked bases together with units of ground and coastal forces.
The ban on passive "defensive" actions by surface and submarine forces should be explicitly written down in all governing documents, manuals and the like, despite the separate requirements for "maintaining a favorable operational regime" and establishing dominance at sea in a particular area.
5. "Neutrals"
Among military theorists and practitioners, there is a certain underestimation of the importance of actions to prevent damage to third parties not participating in the conflict. It is believed that a war will start and no one will pay attention to such "trifles", and civil shipping and fishing will quickly come to naught.
Let's figure it out.
A distinctive feature of the anti-ship missile is the primitive algorithm for the operation of its seeker. The missile can "take" its seeker or the first target that hits the detection sector, or select a target with the highest RCS from several, depending on the algorithm. More complex principles of target selection, the exchange of data in a group of missiles and other innovations in the Navy were, but in the end they did not take root, although something even stood in service. So everything remained simple.
But what will happen if a cruise liner fleeing from the area of the outbreak of hostilities, whose crew, trying to hide, even turned off the navigation radar out of fear, turns out to be in panic on the path of a missile launched at the maximum range? Could this be?
Of course, a cruise ship is a form of dramatization of the issue, although it may be so. It is more likely to be replaced by an escaping bulk carrier or escaping tanker. And that's the problem.
Non-military shipping and fishing did not disappear in either the First or Second World Wars. For many societies, this is a matter of survival and people from these societies will go to sea in absolutely any situation.
At present, when assessing the effectiveness of the offensive weapons of the fleet and tactics, the possibility of causing collateral damage - damage that was not planned and not desirable is not taken into account. There is nothing new in inflicting collateral damage during hostilities, but war at sea, as usual, has its own specifics - collateral damage at sea can very easily be inflicted on neutral countries.
This is especially easy with the massive use of anti-ship missiles in areas of intense shipping or fishing.
RCC can be retracted by passive interference. In this case, it will go away from the ship to the LOC - a false target cloud, and since this cloud is easily permeable, it will slip through it. Further, her lost target seeker will start again looking for something radio contrast. It may well be a neutral vessel.
An anti-ship missile can simply by inertia "slip through" a ship with a low silhouette. So the Americans "missed" by shooting at the damaged Iranian corvette during Operation Praying Mantis. And then she will start looking for the target again. And again it can be a neutral vessel.
The Americans in the Gulf have realized this very well. "Praying Mantis" was the last operation where American ships operating in the Persian Gulf in conditions of intensive shipping used the Harpoon anti-ship missile system. Based on the results of the analysis of the course of the operation, especially the understanding of how many false "contacts" there were, fire on which would lead to the defeat of friendly or neutral targets, the Americans established the requirement to identify the target visually (!) Before using weapons against it. Otherwise, it was possible to send a missile by mistake, for example, to a Soviet destroyer. With all that it implies. So, the anti-aircraft Standard SM-1 became the main missile for naval combat in those days. In the future, the anti-ship missiles generally "left" the American destroyers, and new ships were built without them.
There are examples in history of how attacks on neutral ships end. The sinking of the US-flagged steamer Lusitania by the German submarine U-20 on May 7, 1915, was the first in a series of German moves that prepared US public opinion for World War I. Subsequently, the combination of German actions in Mexico and a series of attacks against American (neutral) merchant ships triggered a US declaration of war on Germany. The fact that the German attacks were intentional makes little difference - the reaction to the deaths of ships and their passengers would have been anyway.
Imagine a situation: a clash with Japan, Russian anti-ship missiles fired at Japanese ships in the Sea of Japan are diverted to a Chinese bulk carrier, the ship and its crew are killed. Is it good for Russia or bad? Or not at all? Everything is obvious, for Russia it is at least not useful. And if instead of a Chinese bulk carrier, a South Korean one? And if not a bulk carrier, but a neutral cruise liner? Who is better to fight - with Japan or Japan and South Korea?
Questions are not idle. A blow to neutrals can easily lead to the fact that they cease to be so and join the opposite side of the conflict. The number of enemies, thus, will increase, and the damage from the entry into the war of a technologically advanced and militarily strong enemy can be simply limitless.
Thus, the approach to the planning of combat operations, the tactical and technical characteristics of ships and missiles, the training of personnel should allow timely detection of signs of the presence of "neutrals", and conduct military operations in such a way as not to endanger their lives. Otherwise, a local war can easily turn into a regional war against several opponents.
The task is greatly facilitated by the fact that it is technically easy for an anti-ship missile to provide the possibility of self-destruction if the missile has "passed" the target and continues to fly.
Neutral ships, their presence and vulnerability, the enemy's ability to sink them "on our behalf" must be taken into account by the commanders of our Navy at all levels. The complacency that exists among some officers about this must be completely eradicated.
6. Superweapon
A well-known "disease" of military development is the bet on a kind of "superweapon" - a weapon that will qualitatively raise the combat effectiveness of troops so much that they will win the war at the expense of this. Such sentiments are fueled in society by military propaganda and flare up both with the slightest success of the military-industrial complex, and with various difficult situations for the country. So, the Germans know the belief in a kind of semi-mythical "weapon of retaliation", which was widespread in Germany at the end of World War II. In Russia with its 90s, when the very existence of the country was in question, the belief in superweapons became part of the national myth. Alas, it turned out to be subject to various officials who, according to their position and role in the state system, can make fundamental decisions and implement them.
So, recently the President V. V. Putin said that since Russia has hypersonic missiles, the level of military threat to the country does not cause concern. Let's hope that Vladimir Vladimirovich nevertheless "worked for the public", and does not really think so.
In fact, there is a universal rule: superweapons do not exist and cannot be invented.
What do hypersonic missiles give? Increased probability of hitting the target. It was 0, 72, now, for example, 0, 89. Or 0, 91. Is it good? It is very good. This is just wonderful, and the enemy's losses will now significantly increase (the question of the fact that in fact we do not have any serial hypersonic missiles yet, we will leave theoretical research "outside the brackets" for now). But does this mean that now you can rest on your laurels and not worry about anything else? No. Because, having raised the enemy's losses, the fundamentally new weapon did not change anything. It just kills more. And that's all.
What if the enemy doesn't have hypersonic missiles? Yes, nothing special - it will fight subsonic, with the probability of hitting the target 0, 5 or 0, 6. He will have to launch them in much larger quantities than we own, he will have to bring more carriers to the launch line than we do, he will suffer heavy losses what we are … and what exactly? Nothing.
In fact, while investing in new weapons is usually beneficial and gaining technological superiority over the enemy is always beneficial, wars alone are not won. The influence of more effective missiles, shells or other ammunition turns out to be decisive only when they increase the probability of hitting the target several times. This is only possible when the previous generation of weapons was incapable of fighting at all. For example, at the beginning of World War II, American submarines did not have operational torpedoes. As a result, when the "torpedo crisis" in the US Navy was nevertheless overcome, the efficiency of the boats increased significantly.
On the other hand, at first glance, the adoption by the US Navy of the Mk.48 torpedo was a "knockout" for the Soviet (and Russian) Navy. It did, but only because countermeasures were not taken in time. Technically and technologically, they were quite possible and feasible for our country, however, the personal ill will of individual responsible leaders did not allow these measures to be implemented. That is, with our correct actions, the Americans would not have obtained any superweapon.
Throughout military history, there has been only one precedent for the emergence of a real "candidate" for superweapons - the emergence of nuclear weapons. But the rate of its production turned out to be so low at first that it was impossible to win serious wars with its help for several years after the first application. And then it was no longer a superweapon - there was no monopoly on it, the armies of the rival military blocs understood how to fight in the conditions of its use, as a result, superweapons again did not work out.
Alas, but the idea of a superweapon turned out to be tenacious - it is enough to assess the level of exaltation of characters with an unstable psyche at the mention of the SPA "Poseidon", which has not yet been created in metal.
Poseidon, by the way, is a classic attempt to create a superweapon. An innovative power plant, a super-powerful thermonuclear charge, a specific concept of combat use, specialized super-expensive carrier submarines, an aura of absolute secrecy (not for everyone, which is funny), closed teams of scientists, decades of hard work and a lot of money spent - there are already two submarines for this project built of them one atomic, and one more is under construction, the third in a row. And all for the sake of neutralizing the threat of the distant future - the American missile defense system. And this is only the beginning, the project has not even really started yet.
The result is also classic for a superweapon - the super torpedo itself is not yet available, and the money sufficient to modernize a significant part of the fleet has already gone to it, while the tasks that can be solved by the planned 32 Poseidons would be much easier and cheaper to solve three ground-based missile regiment with conventional serial missiles and serial warheads. Or two SSBNs of project 955A. Serial weapon. The "bonus" in comparison with the "Poseidons" would be the speed of the strike, its accuracy and the ability to hit targets in the interior of the continent, and not just on the coast. And nothing would have to be invented, financed, spent decades and so on.
So often epics with superweapons end.
Let's summarize. The concept, according to which it is possible to obtain a decisive advantage over the enemy, by creating a new type of weapon that automatically “zeroes out” the previously existing balance of forces, is untenable. The number of conventional weapons, personnel, their training, moral stability, the correctness of the doctrines on the basis of which military force is preparing to act, the ability of the headquarters to manage all this and the ability of politicians to set real and achievable tasks for the military is much more important than some super-innovative model of a missile or torpedo. This does not mean, of course, that there is no need to invent new weapons, to try to gain technical superiority over the enemy. Necessary. But this alone will not win any war, and will not receive a truly decisive superiority.
Therefore, relying on innovative types of weapons cannot serve as the basis for military development. New weapons need to be invented and created, but this is only one of many components of the military development process, and not always the most important one. In the presence of gaps in military power, such as now, for example, the anti-submarine defense in Russia, a separate rocket model will not fundamentally solve anything, even if it is exactly as effective as the officials claim.
7. Rate on stationary objects
In their activities, fleets rely on a number of objects, without which ships cannot fight or fight badly. These are, first of all, bases. The ships need repairs, we need to replenish fuel and ammunition, the latter on our ships very often cannot be replenished at sea, we need to remove the wounded from the ship, take boiler water, fuel …
Airfields have a similar meaning, but for aviation.
Also, stationary radars, communications and radio intelligence centers, and much more are extremely important. There is, however, a problem. And it consists in the fact that all this cannot maneuver and evade a missile or air strike. The ZGRLS can have any impressive parameters, but a massive salvo of cruise missiles can take it out of the game until the end of the war. An important base could be destroyed, leaving ships unable to continue the war. Airplanes and airfields in all wars were the number one target for destruction, as were the objects providing communications. All this will be destroyed in the very first days of the war, if not in hours. Or at least disabled. This applies to all parties to the conflict.
This means that what these objects give will not be.
This means that the planning of military operations cannot take into account their existence. If the enemy cannot knock out the long-range radar, this should be a big "bonus" for us. If he can - a standard situation, foreseen in advance.
Understanding these simple facts opens up the opportunity to prepare for war what will actually be needed in it - backup infrastructure, including mobile.
Mobile control towers for aviation, radars, workshops and equipment for servicing aircraft, equipment for rapid equipping of unpaved runways, sections of roads ready for use as runways, units ready to immediately move to all existing airports and airfields and deploy military to them bases, floating berths, prefabricated fuel tanks, folding hangars for material and technical equipment and weapons, previously explored places for this and at least some roads leading to them, mobile radar for marine reconnaissance, AWACS aircraft, mobile power plants - that's what the activities of the fleet will be built.
Stationary objects, regardless of their importance, will be disabled by the enemy in the first days of the conflict, maybe in the first hours. You need to be ready to fight without them. However, for aviation, you can find more airfields in the rear and organize continuous rotation and dispersed basing. But this also needs to be done before the war.
Naturally, no air defense system will be able to provide all-aspect protection of each valuable object, no resources will be enough to complete such a task.
But it is possible to accumulate a sufficient amount of missile weapons over a period of time, so that the same devastating fire would go through the enemy's infrastructure.
And if his mobilization readiness is lower than ours, then we will get a good advantage at the very beginning.
Not counting on the uninterrupted functioning of stationary objects used in war is a prerequisite for adequate military planning. It is only a matter of time before their incapacitation. The sword in this case is stronger than the shield - immeasurably.
All of the above does not negate the need, as far as the forces allow, to protect important objects, especially bases and airfields. You just need to have a fallback - always.
8. "Asymmetric" technical solutions and concepts
Very often, in response to the growing military threat to our country, such as, for example, the US missile defense, our leaders have stated and still declare that the response will be inexpensive and "asymmetric." "Asymmetry" has already become a kind of "brand", today this word is inserted wherever it gets, including in a frankly thoughtless (and sometimes insane) way.
The meaning of the idea itself is simple - you need to refuse to follow the generally accepted canonical path of development of technology, and make a breakthrough in a "non-standard" direction, one that would devalue the enemy's superiority. Unlike the idea of a superweapon, here we are talking about the exploitation of an alternative concept of weapons, when instead of a super-powerful or super-effective means created using superior technologies, a means is created that is quite understandable to the enemy, and, mainly on the existing technological base, but such that he can resist. not ready.
In fact, the idea of creating an asymmetric low-cost product is highly controversial. It’s not that it’s not working, there are examples of asymmetric concepts that work. It's just that it is far from always working and almost always not cheap.
Let's look at some examples.
At the turn of the 20s and 30s, the Japanese managed to make an engineering breakthrough - to create a workable large-caliber torpedo with a steam-gas engine, in which oxygen was used as an oxidizer. It was precisely an engineering breakthrough - the Japanese did not invent anything new, but they polished the existing "layer of technologies", which was everywhere recognized as a dead end, to a workable state. The result was the Type 93 torpedo or, as the Americans called it "Long Lance" - a long spear. The program for its creation "ate" a lot of resources, especially at the stage of arming ships. As a result, in theory, the Japanese were able to carry out massive torpedo salvos at the same range that only large-caliber guns could previously operate. The Type 93 was mounted on dozens of ships, and on some it became the "main caliber". The range and speed of the torpedo, taking into account the power of its warhead, were unprecedented, and their combat use was successful.
Thus, there is an asymmetric method of fighting (an ultra-long-range torpedo salvo instead of artillery, at the same distance), and an attempt to create a superweapon is expensive and large-scale.
And even successfully destroyed ships, and many more.
But there is only a problem: if we discard from the statistics those targets that could be reached with conventional torpedoes and finishing off the type of an abandoned Hornet, then the expediency of creating such a weapon begins to seem at least controversial. And if someone would undertake to analyze each episode of a successful "spear" strike and estimate whether it was possible to get by with artillery, then in general the idea of an ultra-long-range torpedo begins to seem strange. Especially for that kind of money.
The Soviet Union was also fond of asymmetric solutions. One example was the increase in the underwater speed of nuclear submarines. After experiments with the super-expensive "Goldfish" - SSGN K-222, the fastest submarine in history, the Navy has already received production boats, in which speed was one of the main tactical properties, if not the main one. True, not rocket boats, but torpedo boats (PLAT). We are talking about the project 705 "Lira".
It was not for nothing that the Lyra was called an underwater interceptor - the submarine's speed allowed it to evade even anti-submarine torpedoes, and its maneuverability was also extraordinary. It took less than a minute to reach full power for the power plant with an LMC reactor - tens of times faster than that of any "normal" submarine. Due to this, "Lyra" could simply hang on the tail of the US Navy submarine, and when the latter tried to attack, it was banal to get away from torpedoes. Of course, it was not as easy as it is written, but it is quite possible. At the same time, its high noise did not play a noticeable role - what is the use of observing a Russian submarine if it cannot be hit?
It was an "asymmetric" response to American underwater superiority. And at first, he really seriously reduced this superiority. However, the Americans and the British eliminated this "asymmetric" advantage in an unpretentious direct way - by creating torpedoes capable of "reaching" the Lear. As a result, its advantage disappeared, and all the disadvantages of the boat, which are widely known today, remained.
The expensive "asymmetric" solution was neutralized by another solution - symmetrical and much cheaper.
However, there was one example when the "asymmetry" worked just "with a bang."
We are talking about the naval missile-carrying aviation of the USSR Navy, and, more broadly, about long-range bombers armed with anti-ship missiles in principle.
The creation of the MPA was the Soviet Union's response to the impossibility of creating several large ocean-going fleets in different parts of the country. Such aviation, firstly, in some cases nullified the superiority of the West in the number of warships, secondly, it made it possible for a very fast inter-theater maneuver, and thirdly, it was relatively universal - bombers could, if necessary, attack not only ships, and not only with conventional weapons. The tool evolved slowly, but by the end of the 1980s it was a force factor comparable to the American carrier-based aircraft and aircraft carrier fleet - even if it did not have a guaranteed superiority over them.
The "blow" that the MPA has inflicted on the United States is significant. This is, firstly, the failed Phoenix rocket and the concept of the F-14 interceptor, which was not particularly successful in its initial form, which, for all its advantages, in conjunction with the Phoenix and as an escort for deck "strikers" turned out to be useless. In fact, the Americans created an aircraft whose full potential could be revealed only over the sea and only against the MPA. Or it was necessary to equip it with conventional missiles and use it over land just as a good interceptor, as, for example, the Iranians did. But in this capacity, he was not worth his money.
MPA gave birth to the AEGIS system. Without the constant risk of being hit by at least a regiment of cruise missile bombers, the US Navy would hardly have made such progress in air defense. But at the same time, this system cost the United States a lot of money, money that ultimately turned out to be wasted - the war with the USSR did not happen, and the costs passed.
Also indirectly, it was the MPA that "killed" the destroyers of the "Spruance" class. These ships could have served for a long time, but in order to achieve the maximum efficiency of the naval air defense, the Americans had to replace them with Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and effective air defense was needed precisely against the Tupolevs. As a result, the Arleigh Burke program has grown to such proportions that it is now unclear whether the US Navy will ever have a new capital ship.
So far, the American military-industrial complex does not show the intellectual ability to come up with a replacement for the Burkes, and perhaps this class of ships in America "forever", and regardless of whether America needs such a ship, or if it needs some other one. This stagnation could cost the United States a lot in the long run. Andrei Nikolaevich Tupolev could be proud of what he had done.
One can only guess how the Americans would have used the money spent on countering the MPA in another case. Perhaps we would not like it.
To finish with the description, let's say that, for example, one Tu-16 regiment could destroy all the British Navy forces that were sent to the Falklands War in a few days. And there were many such regiments.
Thus, the "asymmetric" solution to replace the warship (which was not there) with a heavy attack aircraft proved to be very effective.
But was it cheap? Dozens of regiments of the best in the world (in their class) aircraft, flown by the world's best pilots, with a huge flying time, and armed with the world's best cruise missiles - it couldn't be cheap. And there was not. The MPA was comparable in cost to the aircraft carrier fleet, if you count not just aircraft, but the full cost of this type of force, including pilot training, weapons, fuel, infrastructure. And, this tool had a lot of limitations.
So, the aircraft carrier could be sent to fight in the South Atlantic. Tu-16 - only if a theater base was provided and the ability to fly to it. The issue of target designation for the MPA was solved in ways that in a real war could not but lead to heavy losses. For it, many airfields were needed, and, unlike tactical aviation, bombers could not disperse along public roads, and operation from the ground on a more or less regular basis looked extremely doubtful even for the Tu-16, and for the Tu-22M3 it was technically impossible.
MRA strikes needed to ensure complete surprise, which in a real war would not always be possible - or, would be accompanied by large losses. The combination of the need to conduct aerial reconnaissance and ensure the guidance of strike aircraft at their targets and the requirement to ensure surprise did not go well together.
So this very effective "asymmetric" tool was also very expensive and had a number of limitations in its combat use. Very serious restrictions.
And yes, this is the only such successful example without quotes, there were no other such examples.
What conclusions can be drawn from all this? “Asymmetric” solutions either work poorly or for a short time, and in the event of a natural failure as well as an unexpected success, they are very expensive. Especially successful ones like MRA.
For a country with a weak economy and rich enemies, the "asymmetry" is likely to be overwhelming. This does not mean that one must always abandon it, but one must approach this kind of innovation with extreme caution.
Do not expect that they will provide a decisive superiority over the main enemy. The MPA, in the end, did not provide such over the US Navy, although it did give the Navy the ability to defeat a significant portion of US forces in combat.
And you should not understand all of the above as a justification for abandoning the base strike aircraft of the Navy. We really need such aviation, as has already been said (see articles “We are building a fleet. Consequences of inconvenient geography " and "On the need to recreate naval missile-carrying aviation"), but its appearance is a topic for a separate conversation.
Conclusion
Erroneous ideas and wrong concepts of naval development in peacetime lead to irrational spending of money, in wartime to offensive and unjustified losses. At the same time, some of these ideas have their adherents both in the navy and in society. Some are already perceived as not requiring any proof. Meanwhile, "the common knowledge is not always true," and in the case of the navy, this is more often the case than not.
Russia is in a unique situation when it will have to strengthen itself on the seas in conditions of extremely small resources and modest funding. In such conditions, we cannot afford any mistakes, not a single ruble spent in the wrong place.
And, of course, we cannot afford to be "exposed" to the attack of a more powerful and much more experienced adversary in naval affairs.
Attempts to implement decisions that are based on wrong ideas and wrong concepts will lead precisely to wasting money “in the wrong place” and getting hit.
When rebuilding Russia's naval power, absolutely everything must be subjected to ruthless critical analysis.
We have no room for error, not even one.
