In the article "On the quality of the shooting of the Russian squadron in the Tsushima battle" I tried to squeeze the maximum out of the available statistical data, and came to the following conclusions:
1. The best accuracy was demonstrated by the battleships of the "Borodino" type and, possibly, "Oslyabya", but the ships of the 3rd Pacific Squadron systematically, throughout the entire battle, did not hit the enemy.
2. The fire of the Russian squadron in the first 20 minutes of the battle was very good, but then deteriorated under the influence of the damage inflicted on us by the Japanese. Russian shells, although in some cases led to serious damage to Japanese ships, could not suppress the enemy's artillery potential.
3. As a result, the quality of Russian fire quickly faded away, while the quality of Japanese fire remained at the same level, which soon turned into a beating.
But the question of who nevertheless shot more accurately in the outset of the battle remains open to this day.
On the accuracy of Russian and Japanese ships in the first 20 minutes of the battle
With the quality of Russian shooting, everything is more or less clear.
It is reliably known that in the period from 13:49 (or still 13:50), when the first shot of the Suvorov was fired, and until 14:09, 26 Russian shells hit the Japanese ships. Taking into account the fact that the armored ships H. Togo and H. Kamimura had at least 50 hits, the time of which was not fixed, and assuming that the hits that were not fixed in time were distributed proportionally to the fixed ones, it can be assumed that in the indicated period of time the Japanese ships received another 16-19 hits. Accordingly, their total number may well reach 42–45 or even slightly exceed these values, but most certainly cannot be lower than 26.
But with Japanese shooting, everything is much more complicated.
The number of hits in "Suvorov" can only be guessed at. Well, or use Japanese reports, which will be much worse, because in battle they usually see much more hits on the enemy than actually happens. An example is the report of the commander of the battleship "Sevastopol" von Essen on the battle in the Yellow Sea, in which he reported on 26 hits he noticed on the "Mikasa". Of course, we are talking only about hits from Sevastopol. According to von Essen, 6 hits were 305-mm, another 6 achieved 152-mm guns located in the battery, and another 14 shells were driven into the Japanese flagship by 152-mm turret guns. This is despite the fact that the total number of hits on the Mikasa from all the ships of the Russian squadron for the entire battle hardly exceeded 22. In addition, Nikolai Ottovich was sure that the artillerymen of the battleship entrusted to him had hit the Sikishima with 8 six-inch shells. All would be fine, but Packinham notes that during the entire battle this battleship was hit by 1 or 2 small-caliber shells (in the stern).
The Japanese also had all sorts of things. So, after the battle in "Chemulpo" the commander of "Chiyoda" indicated in the report that he was firing at the "Koreyets" from a 120-mm gun, while the Russian gunboat "apparently had a fire", which is why she turned to the north. In fact, there were no hits on the "Korean", no fire on it. On "Takachiho" "with their own eyes" saw the hit of their 152-mm projectile "near the gun in front of the nose bridge" of the "Varyag" - and subsequently on the raised cruiser, such a hit was not found.
I have said this before and will repeat it again. These errors are normal and common. Very often, for example, for a hit, you can take a shot from an enemy gun, etc. In other words, we have no reason to accuse either the Japanese or the Russians of lying - we are talking about a conscientious delusion. But the hits should still be taken into account according to the data of the side that received them and nothing else.
We have evidence of the hits on the Oslyabya from midshipman Shcherbachev 4th, the commander of the 12-inch aft tower of the Eagle, who in the first minutes of the battle had the opportunity to observe the flagship of the 2nd armored detachment of our squadron. The testimony of Shcherbachev 4th paint an apocalyptic picture of the destruction of this Russian battleship, which, in his words, received no less than 20 hits by 14:00.
However, it should be understood that Shcherbachev 4th, in essence, was an outside observer, hardly able to reliably estimate the number of hits in "Oslyabya". There was no need to go far for an example of his conscientious delusions (there was no point in lying to the midshipman). Describing the damage "Oslyabi" received shortly before 14:00, Shcherbachev 4th indicates:
"Both 6" guns of the left bow casemate also fell silent."
Everything would be fine, but Lieutenant Kolokoltsev, who was in charge of the bow plutong of the right, non-firing side of the Oslyabi, was just at that time engaged in helping the artillerymen of the left, firing side. He reports:
"During half an hour of continuous firing with the port side guns, no shells hit the upper battery, and one shell hit the armor of the bow 6" casemate without consequences. The 75-mm guns had frequent misfires, and 6 "guns had several rounds of jamming." …
As you can see, there is no talk of any "silence of the guns" of the bow casemate, and Kolokoltsev is much more credible in this matter than Shcherbachev 4th. Well, if the latter was mistaken, not having considered the firing of the bow casemate, it is easy to assume the presence of errors in its other testimonies.
From personal experience, I know that in situations of severe stress, memories sometimes take on a fragmented character, the past is recalled as if in “chunks”, which is why sometimes even the sequence of events can be confused. And it is possible, for example, that Shcherbachev 4th describes the destruction of the Oslyabi, which he received not at 14:00, but at 14:20, when the battleship was already leaving the battle. At this time, under the influence of the roll and trim on the nose, the 152-mm cannon of the bow casemate was apparently brought to silence.
But still, from the descriptions it is quite possible to assume that in the period from 13:49 to 14:09 "Oslyabya" and "Suvorov" received 20 hits or even more. Given that the Japanese opened fire later than the Russians, and, in addition, there were also hits on other Russian ships, it should be assumed that the Japanese artillerymen fired more accurately than the Russians.
Let us now try to understand the reasons for the high accuracy of the shooting of our opponents.
Rangefinders
Dear A. Rytik points out that the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons had rangefinders of the same brand as the ships of the Japanese fleet, and if he was not mistaken in this, the material part can be safely equated. But there are questions about its use.
A. Rytik points out that the Russian rangefinders were poorly calibrated, and the training of the personnel serving them was by no means up to par. From this, the devices gave a large scatter in the measurement of distances. Indeed, there were cases when two rangefinders of one Russian ship gave completely different information about the distance to the enemy, and the respected A. Rytik cites the following facts:
“So, on the" Emperor Nicholas I "for the same target, the bow rangefinder showed 42 cab., And the stern - 32 cab. On "Apraksin" the readings differed by 14 rooms, on "Senyavin" - by 5 rooms."
But let's ask ourselves a question, what about the quality of ranging on the ships of the United Fleet?
I will use the translation of the combat reports of the armored cruisers Tokiwa and Yakumo (as I understand it, made by the distinguished V. Sidorenko). The nuance here is that the Yakumo went to the wake of the Tokiwa, so the distances to the same Russian ships from both Japanese cruisers had to be comparable.
And yes, in some cases, the accuracy of the distance determination is amazing. So, for example, at 14:45 (hereinafter - Russian time) on "Tokiva" it was believed that:
"The distance to the enemy is 3 200 m."
And on Yakumo they thought the same thing:
"An enemy ship at a distance of 3100 m, they opened artillery fire."
Alas, in other cases, the errors were more than significant. For example, at 15:02 on the Tokiva it was believed that the lead Russian ship was 4.5 km away:
"They opened fire on the enemy ship No. 1 with the left side, a distance of 4500 meters."
But on "Yakumo" it was believed that this ship is 5, 4 km away:
"We opened artillery fire, [distance to] the enemy's lead ship 5400 [m]."
At that moment, the distance between the "Tokiwa" and "Yakumo" was hardly 900 m - there were no such intervals in the Japanese formation.
But there were also more significant mistakes. At 16:15 Japanese time (and, accordingly, 15:57 Russian time), the Tokiwa believed that they "opened fire on enemy ship No. 1, distance 3900 meters." But on "Yakumo" there was a completely different opinion:
"15:56. Target - enemy ship # 1; 15:57 - 12-pounder guns opened fire on [a ship] of the Borodino class, [range] 5500 [m]."
In this case, the difference in determining the distances is no longer 0.9, but 1.6 km.
In other words, you can see that the Japanese, having much more time and opportunities both for distance exercises and for calibrating rangefinders than the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, periodically made very bad mistakes in determining the distances to the enemy.
Dear A. Rytik writes:
“The degree of possession of rangefinders on the ships of the detachment of Vice Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky was known from the results of the exercises conducted on April 27, 1905 according to the methodology developed in the detachment of N. I. Nebogatov. The cruiser "Ural" was approaching the squadron, and the rangefinders had to determine its speed by making two control measurements with an interval of 15 minutes at the same time."
I myself have no information about this episode from the life of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, so I rely entirely on the data of A. Rytik. And now, at first glance, the picture is terrible, but …
Let's take a look at the state of affairs during the First World War. Since the Russo-Japanese War, one might say, a whole era has passed, much more advanced Zeiss rangefinders have appeared, with a base not of 4, 5, but 9 feet (by the way, for the battle cruiser Derflinger, 3.05 m is usually indicated). And yet, the results of measurements from one rangefinder left much to be desired. According to the senior artilleryman of the Derflinger von Hase:
“The cruiser had 7 Zeiss rangefinders. One of them was in the forward artillery post. Each rangefinder was serviced by two rangefinders. The measurements were satisfactory up to a distance of 110 cables. The senior artilleryman had a counter that automatically gave the average of the readings of all rangefinders. The result obtained was transmitted to the guns as the initial setting of the sight."
Note that even much more advanced rangefinders of the First World War era gave an acceptable result only up to 110 cables. Let us now recall how much the British artillerymen were mistaken in estimating the distance during the battle of battlecruisers in the Battle of Jutland, which at the beginning of the battle just fluctuated within the range of 80-100 cables. Despite the fact that at their disposal were rangefinders with a base not 4, 5 feet, as on Russian ships, but 9 feet.
Let's remember that the Derflinger itself could not aim for a long time - its first three volleys fell with a long flight, which indicates an incorrect determination of the distance to the target. We also note that the battleships of Evan-Thomas demonstrated very accurate shooting among the British - but they were equipped with rangefinders not with a 9-foot, but with a 15-foot base.
So is it any wonder that an attempt to measure the speed of the cruiser "Ural" (the first measurement - from a distance of under 100 cables, the second - about 70 cables) with a rangefinder with a base of 4.5 feet gave large errors? And by the way … Were they big?
Let's count.
Once the Ural was sailing at a speed of 10 knots, then in a quarter of an hour it covered 25 cables. And if the ships of the squadron absolutely accurately determined the parameters of the movement of the "Ural", then just such a difference would be shown by their measurements. But range finders at such distances allowed a fair amount of error, range finders could be wrong, and as a result, the actual 25 cables of distance changes turned into 15–44 cables for various ships of the squadron.
But what does this mean?
If we disregard the results of the "Eagle", where the rangefinders have clearly and confused a lot, then for the rest of the ships the total error in two measurements averaged only 6 cables. This is at distances from 70 to 100 cables.
And here I would especially like to note the ways of presenting information to the reader. If a respected author writes that the quality of the rangefinders and the level of training of the sailors serving them turned out to be such that when determining the speed of the Ural on the battleship Alexander III, they made a mistake by more than 30% (13, 2 knots versus 10 knots) - then an unprepared reader may faint. This is just some kind of blatant incompetence!
But if you report that a similar result was obtained as a result of the fact that at distances of 67 and 100 cables the distance was determined with an average error of 4.8% - the same reader will only shrug his shoulders. What's so-and-so? Especially against the background of the range measurements "Tokiwa" and "Yakumo". In the above case, a deviation of 1,600 m at a distance of either 3,900 or 5,500 m, the error in determining the range on one of these ships ranged from 29–41% of the measured distance. And it would be fine if the distance was 100 cables, but no - 21-30 cables!
And finally, the last thing. There is a lot of evidence that the Barr and Stroud rangefinders of those years were not intended at all to measure distances over 50 cables. For example, from the appendix to the report of Rear Admiral Matusevich ("The conclusions reached by the commanders and officers of the battleship" Tsesarevich "and the destroyers" Silent "," Fearless "and" Merciless ", when considering the battle on July 28, 1904 with the Japanese squadron") are followed by extremely interesting details about the use of the Barr and Stroud rangefinders.
Please note - dividing the indexes by 5000 m (27 cables), the manufacturer guarantees an accurate determination of the distance no further than 3000 m (16 with a small cable).
The senior artilleryman of the "Eagle" spoke about the accuracy of the rangefinders as follows:
"… at long distances (over 60 cables) our low-base rangefinders gave an error of 10 to 20% of the true distance, and the greater the distance, the greater the error."
As a matter of fact, from the above data it follows that the errors in determining the range to the "Ural" for the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron were almost within the rangefinder error, with the exception of perhaps the battleship "Eagle". Consequently, we have no reason to believe that deviations in determining the distance along the Ural indicate a poor quality of command training and that the rangefinder business was delivered on the ships of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons somehow especially badly and much worse. than the Japanese.
Optical sights
As you know, the Russian ships were equipped with optical sights of the Perepelkin system, and the Japanese - with the "Ross Optical Co". Formally, both those and others approximately corresponded in terms of capabilities - they had an 8-fold increase, etc. But Russian sights suffered from numerous "childhood diseases". A. Rytik mentions this:
“Unfortunately, Perepelkin's sights were developed, manufactured and put into service in a great hurry, so they had numerous flaws. The most serious problem was the misalignment of the sighting line and the axis of the gun, which sometimes occurred after two or three shots. In addition, in battle, the lenses quickly got dirty from soot, dust and splashes."
Japanese sights did not have such problems, although there is a nuance. The fact is that some of the problems with Perepelkin's sights are caused by soot arising from nearby fires. So, perhaps, in some cases, the clogging of domestic sights was not due to their poor quality, but as a result of the impact of Japanese fire. But our sailors could not answer the Japanese in the same way - due to the peculiarities of Russian shells, the ships of H. Togo and H. Kamimura burned little. Accordingly, it can be assumed that if Japanese ships were fired at with Japanese shells, which had good "incendiary" properties, then the Ross optical Co sights would also have some problems with contamination.
This version needs serious testing, since, apparently, Perepelkin's monoculars were littered not so much by the soot of fires as by the "waste" generated by the firing of the guns on which they were installed. But even if the fires are to blame, it still turns out that the failure of the Russian optical sights is due to their design flaws and Japanese materiel, and we did not have the opportunity to respond to the enemy in kind. At the same time, A. Rytik notes that after the failure of Perepelkin's sights, our gunners switched to a mechanical sight, but the Japanese, in those cases when their sights were hit by fragments of Russian shells, simply changed the broken optics to a spare one.
Accordingly, in terms of optical sights, the Japanese superiority is evident - their quality was higher. And it can be assumed that the effect of Russian fire on them was weaker than the effect of Japanese fire on Russian optics; moreover, the United Fleet had stocks of telescopic sights for their quick replacement. What allows respected A. Rytik in such conditions to "count" the equality of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons with the ships of the United Fleet in terms of optical sights? It's a mystery to me
Shells
But what it is worth unconditionally agreeing with the respected A. Rytik is that the Japanese had a huge advantage in sighting, using high-explosive shells equipped with shimosa and fuses set for instant action. The comparative effect of domestic and Japanese high-explosive shells is perfectly described by Lieutenant Slavinsky, who commanded the 6-inch sighting tower of the battleship Eagle in Tsushima:
“Our greatest inequality was in the different quality of our and enemy's shells. Our high-explosive projectile does not break on the water, but raises only a small, comparatively, splash. Our shortages are visible through binoculars with difficulty, as in a fog, while flights at a distance of 35–40 cables behind the hulls of enemy ships are impossible to see. When hit, the projectile breaks through the light side, and breaks inside the ship even if it encounters great resistance. But again, this is not visible. Thus, if after a shot one does not see a pod splash in front of an enemy ship, then it is impossible to decide whether the projectile hit or gave a flight."
Slavinsky speaks about Japanese shells as follows:
“The enemy was shooting at shells equipped with very sensitive tubes. When hitting the water, such shells break and raise a column of water 35-40 feet. Thanks to the gases from the explosion, these pillars are bright black. If such a sighting projectile explodes 10-15 fathoms from the side, then the fragments, scattering in all directions, riddled the entire light side with holes the size of a fist. During the flight, the pillar from the smoke, rising above the side of the ship and projecting on the gray hazy horizon, should be clearly visible. When a projectile hits, at least in a light, unprotected side, it breaks without passing it. The explosion produces a huge bright yellow flame, perfectly set off by a thick ring of black smoke. Such a hit cannot be overlooked even from 60 cables”.
What could be done here? A. Rytik points out that zeroing in and fire to kill should have been carried out with cast-iron shells equipped with black powder and a Baranovsky tube, providing instant detonation. At the same time, A. Rytik points out that the explosions of such shells were clearly visible, and that the Russian gunners were targeting Tsushima in this way:
"A very noticeable gap with a cloud of black smoke was given by a cast iron shell … It was he who was used for zeroing in the previous naval battles of the Russo-Japanese War."
Consequently, according to A. Rytik, it turns out that the artillerymen of the 1st Pacific squadron and the Vladivostok cruiser detachment wisely used the opportunities provided to them by cast-iron shells, but in Tsushima our fleet did not.
I would like to note the controversy of both statements of my respected opponent.
Let's start with the latter - about the applicability of cast iron shells for zeroing in the naval battles of the Russo-Japanese War.
As you know, the artillery of Russian ships was equipped with the following types of shells with a caliber from 152 mm: steel armor-piercing, steel high-explosive, cast iron and segment, and for 75 mm guns there were steel and cast iron. At the same time, cast-iron shells were considered second-rate: the problem was that with the transition to smokeless powder in charges (not shells!) Of sea guns, cast-iron shells very often split when fired. Therefore, in 1889, it was decided to everywhere replace such shells with steel, but later, in 1892, it was decided to leave up to 25% of the ammunition with cast iron in order to save money. At the same time, they were used only with half (practical) charges, but even in this case, splitting of cast-iron shells was a fairly frequent phenomenon in training firing.
In 1901, the final decision was made to abandon cast iron shells. In fact, on the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron, they were preserved, but not as combat ones, but as training ones. The war, however, made its own adjustments, and they were still used as military ones, but how? Basically - for shelling the coast, however, they were also used for cross-country fire. However, cases of premature rupture continued. So, the senior artillery officer of "Peresvet", V. N. Cherkasov, pointed out:
"To save shells, it was ordered to fire cast-iron shells … After the first shot from the" Brave "they said that the shell exploded over them and the fragments fell into the water."
Of course, cast iron shells could still be used for zeroing. However, I have no data to support this. For example, according to the data provided by the commanders of the ships that returned after the battle on July 28, 1904, to Port Arthur, the battleships did not use up a single cast-iron shell with a caliber of 152 mm or more.
Also, I have no information about the use of cast-iron shells with a caliber of 152 mm or more in the battle on January 27, when H. Togo came to "visit" Port Arthur after a night attack by destroyers, which, in fact, began the Russo-Japanese War. The official Russian history of the war at sea indicates the consumption of shells for each battleship of the Russian squadron, but does not always detail the type of shells used. Where such detail is available, the consumption of armor-piercing or high-explosive shells, but not cast iron, is indicated, but it cannot be ruled out that battleships that did not show the type of shells used were fired with cast iron shells. However, lack of confirmation is not evidence.
As for the battle of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers with the ships of Kh. Kamimura, then, according to R. M. Melnikov, "Russia" used up 20, and "Thunderbolt" - 310 cast-iron shells, but whether they were used when zeroing in is unclear. Let's not forget that the battle of the armored cruisers lasted for about 5 hours: it is not surprising that during such a time, cast-iron shells could be supplied to the surviving guns. According to the data of R. M. Melnikov, in 1905 the ammunition load of the 152-mm guns of the "Russia" was 170 shells per gun, of which 61 were armor-piercing, 36 were cast-iron, and only 73 were high-explosive. Since the battle took place for the most part at distances excluding the use of armor-piercing shells, it is possible that at some point the high-explosive shells in the nearest cellars were used up. Also, cast-iron shells could be used if they were prepared in advance for firing, as ammunition of the "first shot", in case of the appearance of, say, enemy destroyers.
Thus, the version of A. Rytik about the use of cast-iron shells by the Russians for zeroing does not have an unambiguous confirmation.
My esteemed opponent is convinced that the use of cast-iron shells in sighting could significantly improve the quality of the firing of Russian ships in Tsushima. But the officers of the 1st Pacific Squadron had completely different, sometimes diametrically opposite points of view on this issue.
For example, the senior artilleryman of "Peresvet" VN Cherkasov directly recommended using cast-iron shells for zeroing (while in battle "Peresvet" did not fire cast-iron shells). The officers of the Tsesarevich, who submitted a lot of proposals on the materiel, organization and other important issues of the war at sea based on their own combat experience, including, by the way, artillery work, generally bypassed the questions of sighting, as if there were no problems with it. The commander of the Retvizan recommended using a certain “salt” that would be “easy to find” in order to mix it with pyroxylin to obtain colored breaks. But the officers of the cruiser "Askold", working out proposals on the results of the battle in the Yellow Sea at a meeting chaired by Rear Admiral Reitenstein, decided at all that cast-iron shells (along with canister and segmental shells) were completely unnecessary for all guns, and they should be replaced with armor-piercing and high-explosive.
Thus, there are very big doubts that the cast-iron shells were actually used before Tsushima in the sighting, and it is absolutely certain that the reports of those who participated in the battle on July 28 in the Yellow Sea gave polar opinions about the cast-iron shells.
But there is no doubt about it - it is that the battleship "Eagle" in Tsushima used cast-iron shells for zeroing. Let us recall, again, the testimony of Lieutenant Slavinsky:
“At 1 hour 40 minutes. half., according to the order from the conning tower received from the battle index, I opened the sighting with cast-iron shells at the head flagship battleship Mikaza from a distance of 57 cables."
But the sad humor of the situation is that, according to the same Slavinsky:
“After three shots had been fired, we had to abandon the zeroing, in view of the complete impossibility of observing the fall of our shells in the mass of bursts, which at times completely blocked the Mikaza from our eyes.”
In other words, there is already one of two things. If the other ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron fired conventional high-explosive shells, it turns out that zeroing in with a cast-iron shell while concentrating fire on one target did not give any advantage. Or the rest of the Russian battleships also fired cast-iron shells, which, in fact, made it difficult for the Eagle gunner to detect the fall of his own shells.
The splash raised by a shell that exploded from hitting the water turns out to be higher than that of an unexploded one, and besides, it has a color similar to the color of the resulting smoke. In the case of Japanese shells, eyewitnesses have repeatedly mentioned that they saw the smoke itself. But it should be understood that the Japanese shells were distinguished by a high content of shimose, which, in terms of its explosive properties, was much higher than gunpowder, with which old cast-iron shells were equipped. Therefore, it would be strange to expect that a Russian cast-iron 152-mm projectile containing 1.38 kg of black powder would raise the same splash and produce the same amount of smoke as a 152-mm Japanese shell containing up to 6 kg of shimosa. Of course, when hitting an enemy ship, the rupture of a cast-iron projectile could be noticed, unlike a steel armor-piercing or high-explosive, but how much the splash from a cast-iron projectile differed from the splash of other shells of Russian ships is not clear.
In general, it turns out the following. Of course, Japanese ships had an advantage in sighting due to their high-explosive shells, which explode when hit, both into ships and into the water. But the questions: could the use of obsolete cast-iron shells help the cause and whether they were used by the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron in Tsushima - remain open.
Now is the time to move on to fire control systems and methods of targeting the sides in the Russo-Japanese War.
