Having considered the firing accuracy of the battlecruisers of both opponents, let's move on to the battleships. Unfortunately, the information available in the sources about the Grand Fleet and Hochseeflot dreadnoughts is much less detailed and does not allow an analysis in the context of each ship. Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn from the available data.
Having studied the descriptions of hits in each individual ship of the British, we get the following (the table shows the names of British ships and hits on them from battleships and battle cruisers of the Germans)
According to the data presented in it, the number of hits on British ships is slightly higher than the generally accepted (according to Puzyrevsky) value. This is due to the fact that, according to Muzhenikov's detailed descriptions, one more shell hit "Malaya", "Lion", "Tiger" and "Princess Royal" than Puzyrevsky indicates, and besides, the latter did not take into account the hit in " New Zealand”with“Von der Tann”. In accordance with the above, not 121, but 126 large-caliber shells hit the British ships, including 69 from battle cruisers (assuming that Queen Mary had 15 hits) and 57 from battleships.
Taking into account that the German dreadnoughts used 1,904 shells in the Battle of Jutland, 57 hits give 2.99% of the total number of shells fired, but one very important nuance should be taken into account. The fact is that out of 57 recorded hits, 15 fell on the armored cruiser Black Prince, and the following story happened to it.
With the onset of darkness, the armored cruiser, apparently, got lost and, moving separately from the rest of the fleet, stumbled upon a column of dreadnoughts of the High Seas Fleet. Probably, the cruiser thought that they saw their ships, otherwise it is impossible to explain why the Black Prince, discovered by the Thuringian and Ostfriesland at a distance of less than a mile (only 8 kbt), continued to approach the Germans. Several German ships hit him with sazu. It was not possible to establish the exact number of battleships that fired at the Black Prince, since the sources contradict each other, but they all agree on one thing: the armored cruiser was shot from some 5, 5 cables, i.e. just over a kilometer. At such a distance, the heavy guns of the Hochseeflotte dreadnoughts could hit with direct fire.
"Black Prince", in fact, was exposed to the attack, allowing the Germans to "increase the score" with the minimum expenditure of shells. The fire on the doomed armored cruiser, most likely, proved to be extremely effective, because it was conducted almost at close range. Of course, such shooting cannot serve as a confirmation of the high professionalism of the German artillerymen and, in order to compare with the achievements of their British colleagues, the shooting of the Black Prince should be ruled out.
The only problem is that we do not know the number of shells used by the British armored cruiser. It is likely that every second or third round hit the target, or maybe the Germans fired even better. But even if we assume that only every tenth shell hit (that is, when shooting at the Black Prince, the percentage of hits was only 10%), then in this case, there are 150 shells fired for 15 hits. Accordingly, in all other episodes of the battle, the German dreadnoughts used 1,754 shells and achieved 42 hits, which gives a very moderate 2.39%, but in fact, most likely, this percentage is even lower.
Thus, the firing accuracy of the German line of the fleet does not boggle the imagination at all. The dreadnoughts fired 1, 75 times worse than the battle cruisers of Rear Admiral Hipper (according to them, the most likely accuracy is 4, 19%). Perhaps this is due to the much worse conditions in which battleships had to fight. With the exception of firing at the 5th squadron of Evan-Thomas's battleships, in all other cases the British had an advantage in visibility and on German dreadnoughts they very poorly distinguished the enemy. Both the first and the second battle of the German and British dreadnoughts were characterized by the fact that not so much the British ships were seen from the German ships, but the flashes of their shots.
As for the British ships of the line, a little more detailed analysis is possible for them solely due to the large difference in the calibers of the guns. Despite the fact that the German 305-mm projectile was about a quarter heavier than the 280-mm, it is still not so easy to distinguish between their hits. Another thing is the British 305-mm, 343-mm and 381-mm shells, the hits of which are "diagnosed" much better. Accordingly, we are able to determine the shooting accuracy of superdreadnoughts in the context of their calibers, i.e. for ships carrying 381 mm, 343 mm and 305 mm separately.
As in the case of the German shooting results, the analysis according to Muzhenikov's data gives a slightly better picture than Puzyrevsky shows, but the discrepancies are even greater. According to Puzyrevsky, "Helgoland" and "Nassau" got one hit each, Muzhenikov does not confirm a single one. The author of this article in this case adheres to the position of Muzhenikov. In the case of "Helgoland" - simply because Muzhenikov's monographs are more detailed and detailed and therefore look more trustworthy. In the case of the Nassau, it can be assumed that Puzyrevsky mistakenly counted the damage to the German dreadnought, which he received as a result of the collision with the British destroyer Spitfire, as damage from the hit of a British heavy shell.
This is how Muzhisnikov describes the aftermath of Nassau's collision with Spitfire:
“At the same time,“Nassau”received significant damage to the bow end. Strange as it may seem, but the blow of the destroyer made a hole in the side of the battleship - the side sheathing was torn in an area of 3.5 m long, the underdeck beams bent, and the tank deck itself was pressed in places, swelled in places, which reduced its speed to 15 knots..
And here's how the Hubby's damage is described:
“During the day's battle,“Nassau”received one hit by a large-caliber projectile (from what caliber, it is not established). In its bow, in 152-mm armor above the waterline, there was a hole 3.5 m wide. Before it was repaired, the ship could only go in a 15-knot course."
Since the fact of the collision of "Nassau" and "Spitfire" is undeniable, and given the fact that Puzyrevsky does not mention the collision at all when describing the damage to "Nassau", it can be assumed that in this case it is Muzhenikov who are right.
The data on hitting the "Kaiser" are completely contradictory. As we said earlier, foreign sources contradict each other here, but still Campbell and Brayer argue that there were two hits, and Campbell attributes them to the 4th phase of the battle, when the commander of the Hochseeflotte Scheer exposed his battleships to the attack of the British line a second time. Campbell even points out that the caliber of the shells hitting the Kaiser battleship is 305 mm. But Hildebrand testifies that the Kaiser was not damaged in the Battle of Jutland. And Puzyrevsky finally confuses the matter, claiming that the Kaiser received one hit from a 343-mm shell from Marlboro-class battleships, while the second shell of the same caliber did not hit the ship, but exploded nearby and caused only shrapnel damage.
Since most sources lean towards two hits, and Campbell is probably still more reliable than Puzyrevsky, let's read the British two hits on the Kaiser with a 305-mm caliber.
Puzyrevsky points out a hit to the Schleswig-Holstein pre-dreadnought, Muzhenikov to the Pommern, but, by and large, if this hit really happened, then for our calculations it is not too important which battleship the shell hit.
There are also large and inexplicable discrepancies in the information about the British hits on the battle cruisers of the Germans. The situation with "Derflinger" is the simplest - Puzyrevsky reports 17 hits with large caliber, but Muzhenikov gives detailed descriptions of 21 hits, and therefore we accept Muzhenikov's data.
Puzyrevsky notes 4 hits in "Von der Tann", while Muzhenikov writes about five, noting, however, that one of them is unidentified (that is, the shell was heavy, but of unclear caliber). As we suggested earlier, this could have been a New Zealand projectile. We put 5 hits.
According to Seydlitz, the situation is very controversial, because again there are discrepancies in foreign sources - either 22, or 24 hits, but since, quoting Hildebrand and Brayer, Muzhenikov gives a description of only 22 hits, we will focus on the number 22.
The situation with the Moltke is also difficult, because the same projectile (343 mm from the Tiger) is interpreted in one case as a hit, in the other - as a close gap. The author of this article counted it as a hit. But it should be understood that this is pure author's arbitrariness, since the decision was made for reasons of the following nature: "Since 2 possible hits in Seydlitz have been removed, let's count this one hit in Moltke." Alas, for a reliable picture, it is necessary to work well with the primary sources in the British and German archives, and the author, unfortunately, is deprived of such an opportunity.
Questions remain about the hits on the German cruisers Pillau and Wiesbaden, and since the latter was killed, no archive will provide reliable information on it. In the descriptions of the Battle of Jutland, it is said about several hits by heavy shells on these cruisers, and most likely this is exactly what happened, but still 4 hits read (three in "Wiesbaden" and one in "Pillau") are again arbitrary. However, this assumption will not in any way affect the assessment of the accuracy of the shooting of the British dreadnoughts, because the 3rd squadron of battle cruisers fired at these German ships
Taking into account the above, it can be assumed that the total number of hits on German ships is also slightly higher than the generally accepted - 107 hits, and not 101, despite the fact that the British battle cruisers achieved 38 hits, battleships - 69. The British battleships used up 2,578 shells, respectively, the average the percentage of hits was 2.68%. Thus, it can be argued that, in general, the British battleships in Jutland fired better than the German ones.
At the same time, superdreadnoughts carrying 343 mm guns showed the best results. Interestingly, only Marlboro (162 rounds) and Iron Duke (90 rounds) Orion, Monarch and Conqueror fired for a long time and used up 51, 53 and 57 rounds, Benbow and "Tanderer" - 40 and 37 shells, and the rest barely had time to open fire: "Centurion", "King George V", and "Ajax" fired 19, 9 and 6 shells, respectively. In total, the battleships used up 524 shells and achieved 18 hits, the percentage of which reached 3.44%
Dreadnoughts with 381 mm guns are in second place. In total, the British used up 1,179 shells of this caliber, and the Germans read 37 hits with these shells, which gives a hit rate of 3.44%. were part of the 5th battleship squadron, operating in conjunction with the battlecruisers Beatty, while the other two ("Revenge" and "Royal Oak") fought alongside the battleships Jellicoe. Muzhenikov writes that the Rivenge achieved three hits on the Derflinger, and the Royal Oak - two on the Derflinger and one on the Seidlitz, while most likely there were no hits on other battle cruisers from these battleships, but they could be hitting the hochseeflotte dreadnoughts. Therefore, unfortunately, it is not possible to assess the firing accuracy of the 5th battleship squadron.
In the very tail, 305-mm battleships of the British fleet "weave". Having spent 833 shells, they achieved only 14 hits, which was 1.68%.
Well, it's time to take stock.
In total, in the Battle of Jutland, the Germans used up 3,549 shells and achieved 126 hits, the percentage of which was 3.55%. But excluding the Black Prince results we get roughly 3,399 shells, 111 hits and 3.27%. The British used 4,420 rounds, achieving 107 hits, which gives a hit rate of 2.42%.
Thus, we can state that the ratio of shooting accuracy (2, 42% -3, 27%) is somewhat better for the British than the generally accepted figures show (2, 2% -3, 4%), although, of course, the percentage of German hits above. As for the rating of formations and individual ships, it should be understood that it is rather arbitrary, if only due to possible errors in determining the ships that have achieved hits.
It should also be understood that such a rating only indirectly characterizes the skills of the artillerymen, because a high percentage of hits from one unit can be achieved in conditions of good visibility and at a short distance, while another unit, which showed the worst result, fought in much more difficult conditions. …
When considering the effectiveness of individual groups of ships, the author often operated with several values of the percentage of hits, due to discrepancies in the consumption of projectiles in the sources or because of the undetectable number of hits (to the dead ships), but for the rating the author takes single values - those that seem to him the most probable.
The best accuracy rates in the Battle of Jutland were demonstrated by the British 3rd battle cruiser squadron - 4.66%.
In second place are battle cruisers of the 1st reconnaissance group of Admiral Hipper - 4, 19%.
The third place is occupied by the British "343-mm" superdreadnoughts - 3.44%.
The fourth place belongs to the "381-mm" superdreadnoughts of the British - 3, 14%.
The fifth place is taken by the battleships of Germany - 2.39%.
Sixth place for the British 1st battle cruiser squadron (343 mm) - 1.78%.
The seventh place was taken by the British "305-mm" battleships - 1.68%.
And, finally, the British 2nd battle cruiser squadron (305-mm) is in the least honorable first place from the end - 0, 91%.
As for the "individual classification", it is won by … British ships.
The first place is taken by the "Royal Oak". According to the descriptions, he achieved two hits in Derflinger and one in Seidlitz, despite the fact that during the entire battle he used up only 38 shells, which gives an absolutely enchanting percentage of hits - 7, 89%!
The second place, most likely, belongs to the "305-mm" British dreadnought "Colosus" Having spent 93 rounds, the battleship achieved five hits in the "Derflinger", which is 5.38%
In third place is Hipper's flagship "Lutzov" - 380 spent shells and 19 hits, 5%.
However, there is another ship that can qualify for inclusion in the top three - this is the Derflinger. The battlecruiser is believed to have used up 385 rounds, achieving 16 hits. But only 3 hits on the Queen Mary "are recorded" on him, which is extremely doubtful, and if in fact he achieved 6-7 hits on this British ship, then the percentage of hits of the "Derflinger" will grow to 4, 94-5, 19%.
Nevertheless, I would like to once again note the extreme conventionality of this rating and recall that other ships that were not included in the rating at certain moments of the battle showed even better accuracy. For example, "Von der Tann" achieved five hits in the "Indefatigable" and destroyed it, using up only 52 shells, that is, in this period of the battle his percentage of hits was 9.62%! But later the ship had to go in a zigzag, in an attempt to avoid being hit by the fatal fifteen-inch shells of the British. In addition, combat damage led to the impossibility of firing from part of the main caliber turrets (there was a period when all eight 280-mm guns were inoperative) and all this could not but affect the further firing accuracy of the Von der Tann.
Generally speaking, the accuracy of shooting is influenced by many reasons, of which, in addition to the level of training of artillerymen, the following can be distinguished: the presence of centralized fire control, the number and quality of rangefinders, the quality of fire control systems, the quality of shells and guns, the distances at which they are fired, lighting and visibility. Damage inflicted on the firing ship is very important: high-quality zeroing is achieved with the participation of at least four barrels in a salvo, and the highest zeroing speed is achieved with eight, ten or twelve barrels. So, for example, "Derflinger" fired four-gun semi-salvoes, while while the four guns fired a volley, the rest were reloading. Accordingly, it is in no way impossible to demand the same accuracy from the Derflinger at the beginning of the battle, when it was fully operational, and towards the end, when two of its four towers were brought to silence.
Or here, for example, rangefinders. It is known that an optical rangefinder is a very difficult device to use, requiring from the operator, in addition to working skills, also perfect vision in both eyes. On "Derflinger" there were seven rangefinders, and they worked with them like this: they took measurements to the enemy all seven, and then chose the average value, discarding the extreme options. However, in the course of the battle, the rangefinders failed, and the measurement accuracy, of course, dropped.
Or, for example, such a seemingly "little" as … dirt. The Germans, apparently, very carefully studied the experience of the Russian-Japanese war, including the mass death of the command staff of the Russians due to the poor design of armored conning houses: large viewing slots, an unsuccessful roof design … In Germany, the issue was resolved radically - in battle special "armored barriers" were raised, turning the conning tower into a hermetically sealed room. At the same time, observation was carried out by means of devices similar in design to a periscope and a stereotube. It was, without a doubt, a sensible and ingenious decision, however, as the senior artilleryman of the Derflinger Georg Haase writes:
“Now it was more difficult to control the fire. The lens of my periscope was constantly contaminated with powder gases and smoke from pipes. At such moments, I was completely left to the officer's observations on the fore-mars. He directed his pipe at the enemy; the arrow at my periscope indicated to me the position of his pipe, and the non-commissioned officer at the central aiming combined his arrow with this arrow, and thus we directed all our guns at the enemy without seeing him. But this situation was only a temporary way out, and the lens glasses were immediately cleaned from the post with specially prepared sticks, and sometimes with a heavy heart I sent my orderly-galvaner to the roof of the conning tower to wipe the optical glasses."
Thus, shooting accuracy is influenced by many different factors and it almost never happens that both sides in a battle have equal conditions for shooting at their enemy. But it would be extremely difficult to analyze them in all their diversity, so we confine ourselves to a brief description of the conditions in which the German and British artillerymen fought.
It is well known that in the first phase of the battle (from the moment it began at 15.48 until the turn of Evan-Thomas's battleships from the hochseeflotte dreadnoughts at 16.54), the lighting was not on the side of the British. Their ships were against the background of the bright part of the horizon, the German ships were against the background of darkness, and this, of course, could not but affect the results of the fire battle. However, according to Campbell, during this period, 44 shells hit the British ships, and the German ones - only 17, and this ratio can hardly be explained solely by the difference in lighting. Usually, the superiority of German rangefinders over British ones is also indicated, and this is certainly true. But here is what should be taken into account. The rangefinder is a very important, but far from the only component of the fire control system. In those years, analog computers (AVMs) were used for this purpose, allowing, based on data on courses, speeds, range, and other data of the target's own ship and ship, to calculate the magnitude of the change in distance and gun aiming angles. But if something is known about the British AVM, then there is very little data about the German LMS, while there is quite authoritative evidence (British historian Wilson, who, in turn, refers to the story of the senior artilleryman "Luttsov" Paschen, published in the magazine "Marine Rundschau") that the German MSA was still losing in quality to the British.
It should also be taken into account that if the Beatty battle cruisers were equipped with "9-foot" rangefinders, which were really inferior to the German ones, then the superdreadnoughts "Barham", "Valiant", "Worspite" and "Malaya" had much more advanced "16-foot" rangefinders (the so-called "base" is measured in feet, the larger it is, the more accurate the rangefinder) and they hardly lost so much to German optics. Presumably, the material part of the "381-mm" superdreadnoughts was not inferior to that of the German battle cruisers, which means, other things being equal, one should expect equivalent firing results.
But the conditions were not equal - firstly, the coverage "played" against the British, and secondly, the commanders of the end German cruisers (Moltke and Von der Tann), perfectly understanding what threatened their ships with prolonged shelling with fifteen-inch shells periodically went zigzag, knocking down the tip of the British gunners. Of course, in this case, the accuracy of the fire of these battle cruisers should have decreased, but this is exactly what we observe - the Moltke fired almost worse than all other Hipper ships, and the accuracy of the Von der Tann after the sinking of the Indefatigable sharply decreased. But, again, it cannot be argued that the fault was solely their "zigzags".
It is interesting to evaluate the shooting results of the leaders of our rating, the ships of the 3rd battle cruiser squadron. The fact is that the bulk of their hits were made from a distance of 50 kb and below. So, "Wiesbaden" and "Pillau" were fired from 49 kbt, the battle with Hipper's battlecruisers also began at about 50 kbt, after which the distance was reduced further. This is significantly less than the distances at which the battlecruisers Hipper and Beatty fought, but does this indicate that the 3rd battlecruiser squadron fought in some "greenhouse" conditions compared to the latter?
It should be borne in mind that in order to correct artillery fire, it is extremely important to correctly determine the target parameters (course / speed / distance) and, subsequently, observe the fall of your own shells. Of course, it is easier to do this near than in the distance, but here it is not only and not so much distance that is important as visibility. In other words, if, say, the visibility is ten miles, then the ship will shoot at a target seven miles away from it, better than at a target located five miles with a visibility of five miles. Because in the first case, the gunners will shoot at a perfectly visible target, and in the second they will hardly distinguish it, although it is closer. As the commander of the battle cruiser "Lion" Chetfield, later - the admiral, said:
"In 90 cases out of 100, the distance of the battle is determined by the state of the weather."
So, the 3rd squadron of battle cruisers just fought in conditions when visibility ranged from 4 to 7 miles, depending on the specific location and direction. Both the shelling of German light cruisers, and the beginning of the battle with Hipper's ships took place at the moment the enemy was detected, that is, at the limit of range. Therefore, we have no reason to believe that the ships of Horace Hood would have fired worse than the German battlecruisers and at long distances - well, perhaps only because of the "9-foot" rangefinders inferior to German optics and … perhaps because of poor-quality materiel 305 -mm guns, but we'll talk about that a little later.
As for the relatively poor-quality shooting of German dreadnoughts, there is a very simple explanation, and it is connected with the fact that in both cases of collisions between Scheer's battleships and Jellicoe's dreadnoughts, the Germans practically did not see the enemy. If we analyze the hit statistics, we will see that Scheer's dreadnoughts hit the superdreadnoughts of the 5th squadron, the Princess Royal, when it was within reach, but the Jellicoe's battleships did not. In fact, only one hit to the Hercules was noted, and the rest of the hits of the German dreadnoughts fell on the armored cruisers Warrior and Defense.
Scheer twice converged with Jellicoe, and of course, the German battleships tried to somehow fight back, but firing at an enemy who was not visible (and the Germans really well distinguished only the flashes of shots of British guns) could not be of any kind. This is probably what reduced the percentage of hits of Sheer's battleships. And besides, in the last, fourth phase of the battle, in order to withdraw the main forces from the blow of the British, Scheer was forced to throw battle cruisers into the attack on Jellicoe. At the same time, the latter were shot with almost impunity - they could no longer fight back, but at the same time they saw them from British battleships quite well. All this gave the British artillerymen significantly better conditions than those in which their colleagues from the Hochseeflotte were.
As for the frankly weak firing of British "305-mm" dreadnoughts, here we can say the following: where ships with 343-mm guns confidently hit the enemy (we read 13 hits of 343-mm "battleship" shells in the "König", "Grosser Elector "and" Margrave "), battleships with 305-mm guns could not get anywhere at all. Yes, the "305-mm" battleships gave 14 hits, but to whom ?!
Eleven of them were sent to Seydlitz and Derflinger, that is, to ships forced by Scheer's order to approach the enemy at short distances. Another 2 hits were read into the "Kaiser", but, as we said above, they are very doubtful: these hits could not have been at all, or they were, but of a different caliber. More or less reliably, Scheer's dreadnoughts were hit by a single 305-mm shell from Jellicoe's battleships (in the "Margrave")! Interestingly, the New Zealand also "missed" from long distances - the battlecruiser made three hits on the Seydlitz from a distance of less than 50 kbt.
It turns out to be a very interesting picture. At some long ranges, the accuracy of British ships with 305-mm guns tends to zero, but as soon as the distance becomes relatively small (5-6 miles), they suddenly become excellent shooters! Excellent results from the 3rd battlecruiser squadron, excellent results from the Colossus, which drove 5 rounds into the Derflinger, unexpectedly decent shooting from New Zealand …
In the absence of other examples, one might assume that the British did not attach significant importance to firefighting at long distances, but we know that this is not the case. And, in the end, their battleships with 343-mm and 381-m guns showed quite decent results. It remains only to assume that the British 305-mm guns, due to some technical reasons, turned out to be ineffective at a distance of over 60 kbt.
This is indirectly confirmed by the famous Falklands battle: British battlecruisers achieved quite a decent percentage of hits in it, but only when the distance to the enemy was reduced to less than 60 kbt. In the first phase of the fight, when Sturdy tried to fight at long distances, the fire of his ships was shockingly inaccurate. So, "Inflexible", having spent 150 shells on "Gneisenau", achieved only two hits and one close gap.
Concluding this series of articles, the author makes the following assumptions: in his opinion, the quality of the training of the gunners of the British and German dreadnoughts was quite comparable, and, being in similar conditions, they could give a similar percentage of hits. But the "305-mm" British battleships, due to the imperfection of their guns, could not conduct effective fire engagement at distances over 60 kbt. The best shooters of the Germans turned out to be the battle cruisers Hipper, but the 3rd squadron of Hood's battle cruisers was in no way inferior to them in training, although it was losing in the material part (rangefinders and guns). As for the 343-mm "Admiral Fischer's cats", then, probably, their gunners were poorly trained, worse than the crews of the British and German dreadnoughts.
End.
List of used literature:
1. Muzhenikov VB The battleships Helgoland, Ostfriesland, Oldenburg and Thuringen. 1907-1921
2. Muzhenikov VB Battleships of the Kaiser and König types (1909-1918).
3. Husbands VB Battlecruisers of England. Part 1-2.
4. Muzhenikov VB Battle cruisers of Germany.
5. Husbands VB Battle cruisers of Germany. Part 1.
6. Husbands VB Armored cruisers Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Blucher (1905-1914).
7. Puzyrevsky K. P. Combat damage and death of ships in the Battle of Jutland.
8. Wilson H. Battleships in battle. 1914-1918
