Without a doubt, when analyzing a particular battle or battle, the assessment of the effectiveness of the artillery fire of the parties involved in it should end the description, but not start it. But in the case of the Varyag battle, this classic scheme does not work: without understanding the quality of fire demonstrated by the artillery officers and gunners of the cruiser, we will not understand many of the decisions made by V. F. Rudnev in battle.
Surprisingly, but the accuracy of shooting "Varyag" in the battle on January 27, 1904, still raises many questions. V. F. Rudnev said in his report and memoirs:
“Italian officers watching the battle and an English steam boat returning from a Japanese squadron claim that a large fire was seen on the cruiser Asama and the stern bridge was shot down; on the two-pipe cruiser, an explosion was seen between the pipes, and one destroyer was sunk, which was later confirmed. According to rumors, the Japanese took 30 killed and many wounded to the A-san Bay … According to information received in Shanghai … The cruiser "Takachiho" was also damaged, which received a hole; The cruiser took 200 wounded and went to Sasebo, but the plaster burst on the road and the bulkheads could not stand, so the cruiser Takachiho sank into the sea."
On the other hand, the official Japanese historiography denies any losses, and moreover, claims that in the battle on January 27, 1904, not a single Japanese ship was even hit.
Who is right? Today we already know for sure that the data of Vsevolod Fedorovich's report are completely overestimated: "Takachiho" did not sink, and survived until World War I, and "Asama" did not receive serious injuries. The story of the sinking of the Japanese destroyer also looks more than dubious, so the question, rather, should not be asked whether the report of V. F. Rudnev, but in another way: did the "Varyag" and "Koreyets" manage to inflict any harm at all on the enemy in the battle on January 27, 1904?
Let's try to answer it. To do this, first let's try to figure out how many shells did the cruiser fire in this battle? Again, the canonical version is that the Varyag used 1,105 rounds, including: 152-mm - 425; 75-mm - 470 and 47-mm - 210. Let's leave the source of these figures without comment, but note that they are completely incorrect.
As you know, the cruiser "Varyag" ammunition included 2,388,152-mm shells, 3,000 rounds of 75 mm, 1,490 64 mm, 5,000 47 mm and 2,584 37 mm. In order not to multiply entities beyond what is necessary, consider only the situation with 152-mm and 75-mm shells.
As you know, after the war the Japanese raised the cruiser Varyag and included it in their fleet under the name Soya. Accordingly, they also got all the shells remaining on it after the battle, let's count how many there were. It must be said that the delivery of Varyag ammunition to the Japanese arsenals was carried out in two stages. The first stage is the raising of ammunition while the Varyag was still at the bottom of the Chemulpo raid, in the period from March to October 1904, 128 152-mm shells were raised from the cruiser. Then the cruiser was raised and docked, and already there the remaining ammunition was unloaded from it: of course, their number was taken into account and documented. During the transfer of guns and shells and other artillery equipment to the naval arsenals, an "Assessment sheet of weapons and ammunition on board the Soya" was compiled. In total, three such documents were drawn up, dated December 13, 1905, February 14, 1906, and August 3, 1906. According to these three documents, 1 953 152-mm shells were transferred to the naval arsenals, including:
Steel - 393.
Forged - 549.
Cast iron - 587.
Shrapnel - 336.
Segmental - 88.
As well as 2,953 75-mm projectiles, including 897 armor-piercing and 2,052 high-explosive.
As we have already said, 128 152-mm shells were raised from the Varyag earlier, they were not included in the indicated statements: this is obvious at least from the fact that ten 152-mm guns were removed from the cruiser simultaneously with the indicated shells, that is the Varyag got to the dock with only two 152-mm cannons. It is this number of them that appears in the first "Assessment sheet", although it is obvious that if it included shells and guns previously removed from the cruiser, then it would indicate 2, and all 12 guns.
Accordingly, according to Japanese documents, 2,081 152-mm projectiles and 2,953 75-mm projectiles were lifted from the cruiser and removed in the dock. The difference between these numbers and the Varyag's full ammunition load is 307 152-mm shells and 47 75-mm shells - the Varyag could not even fire more than the indicated values in battle, even in principle. But could it be less?
First. In Japanese documents, and this applies not even to the official, but to the "Top secret war at sea 37-38. Meiji”, there is a strange gap. As we said above, the documents mention that while the Varyag was still lying on the ground, 128 six-inch shells were removed from it. But at the same time, in the same "Top Secret War" (5th section "Buildings and equipment": section 2. "Objects of the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding", T12, Ch6 "Objects of the Kure naval region" pp. 29-31,) it is indicated that when arming the auxiliary cruiser Hachiman-maru, 200 six-inch shells and charges removed from the Varyag were loaded onto it. Everything would be fine, but the loading took place on January 11, 1905, that is, before the Varyag was docked, and in fact, according to the documents, at that moment the Japanese had only 128 such shells from the Varyag, but in no way 200!
One could, of course, assume that there was simply a typo in the document, and in fact the auxiliary cruiser received 128 shells from the Varyag and 72 shells of a different type used in the Japanese fleet. But the fact is that the main armament of the Hachiman-maru consisted of two 152-mm Kane guns, lifted from the Varyag, and it is extremely doubtful that the Japanese would suddenly begin to equip them with shells intended for guns of a different design. This consideration gives us the right to assert that, in fact, while the Varyag was not docked, not 128, but at least 200 shells were removed from it, but the document for some reason was lost, or simply before has not yet been published, so the difference between the full ammunition load and the total number of six-inch shells removed by the Japanese is reduced from 307 to 235.
Second. The 235 six-inch shells we used up in battle are obtained only if the Varyag had a full ammunition load at the beginning of the battle. But in fact, with the highest degree of probability, this is not the case. Let us recall that the Varyag on the way to Chemulpo (meaning its first call) on December 16, 1903 conducted firing practice at the Encounter Rock, having spent 36 shells, respectively, by the beginning of the battle the cruiser had not 2,388, but only 2,352 shells with a caliber of 152 mm. But could it happen that upon returning from Chemulpo to Port Arthur, the cruiser replenished the ammunition load to full? Frankly speaking, this is extremely doubtful. The fact is that the cruiser's ammunition consisted of 624 cast-iron shells, and the Japanese unloaded only 587 such shells from the cruiser - the difference is 37 shells. It is extremely doubtful that such shells were used in battle - the Russian gunners did not like them for the extremely low quality of workmanship. That is, their use in battle was, in principle, possible, but only after the stocks of full-fledged steel and forged shells were exhausted, and after all, there were still about a thousand of them, according to the “Estimated Sheets”. And this is not counting the 200 shells previously removed from the cruiser, which were probably also steel and forged (it is difficult to imagine that the Japanese would have given frankly second-rate ammunition to the auxiliary cruiser). In any case, it can be stated that there were more than enough full-fledged shells on the Varyag, and the transition to cast-iron shells is inexplicable - but the use of cast-iron shells for training on December 16, 1903 looks quite realistic. In addition, the difference of 37 shells is strikingly similar to the number of shells fired at Anacunter Rock (36 shells), and the difference of one shell is more than explainable by the fact that the Japanese counted only combat-fit ammunition in their Estimates. The fact is that shells fell into the document for transfer to the arsenal - well, if some shell was discarded, then why transfer it there? Accordingly, the rejected shells did not get into the "Evaluation sheet", and it is quite possible to assume that one of the cast-iron shells was considered a marriage by the Japanese.
Thus, we come to the conclusion that the Varyag used up a maximum of 198 six-inch shells in battle (the previously calculated 235 shells minus 36 shot at exercises and minus one, rejected by the Japanese, and therefore not included in their documents). But is this figure final? Perhaps not, because:
1. The presence of a gap in the documents (128 shells were raised, 200 shells were transferred to Hachiman-maru) reveals inaccuracies in the Japanese accounting, and this allows us to assume that, in fact, the shells were raised before the cruiser was docked, not 200, but more;
2. It cannot be ruled out that a certain number of shells removed from the cruiser were discarded, and they did not end up in Japanese documents at all;
3. Some of the shells could have been lost at the Varyag sinking site (the cruiser went on board, it is possible that several shells simply fell on the ground next to the ship and were not subsequently found);
4. It is possible that some of the shells were lost in battle - for example, R. M. Melnikov points out that during the fire on the quarterdecks, a certain number of 152-mm shells and charges, touched by the fire, were thrown overboard.
On the whole, we can state that the Varyag gunmen hardly fired at the enemy more than 198 152-mm shells and 47 75-mm shells, while some historians (for example, the respected A. V. Polutov) suggest that in in battle, the cruiser used up no more than 160 six-inch shells. Therefore, in the future, in our calculations, we will use the 160-198 forks of 152-mm shells.
Now, knowing the approximate number of shells fired at the enemy, we can try to determine how many hits the Varyag gunmen could count on.
As you know, on January 27, 1904, the Port Arthur squadron fought for about 40 minutes with the main forces of the United Fleet under the command of H. Togo. In this battle, Russian ships used up, among others, 680 rounds of 152-mm caliber, while achieving 8 hits (in this battle, the number of six-inch hits on Japanese ships was recorded quite accurately). Thus, the accuracy was 1, 18%. If the "Varyag" fired with the same accuracy as the ships of the Arthurian squadron, then, having spent 160-198 shells, one could count on 1, 8-2, 3 hits, that is, the ships of Sotokichi Uriu could have hit at best 2-3 shells. As for the 75-mm cannons, 1,302 shells were fired in the battle on January 27, but only 6 hits were achieved, that is, 0, 46% - it is obvious that out of the 47 shells spent on the enemy, there are chances to achieve at least one hit the Russians did not.
But why would the "Varyag" shoot like the ships of the Port Arthur squadron did?
A significant part of 1902, the Pacific Squadron was engaged in combat training. Let us recall that the Varyag, making its ocean passage to the Far East, arrived at the Nagasaki raid on February 13 - and the day before that the battleships Poltava and Petropavlovsk left Nagasaki, which by that time had already been on a training voyage for a month. combat training was in full swing. And what about the Varyag? Due to problems with machines and boilers, he joined the armed reserve on March 15, from which he left only on April 30. In May-July, the cruiser was engaged in combat training, but on July 31 she again got up for repairs, which lasted until October 2, and only after that resumed the exercises. In other words, from the moment of arrival in Port Arthur (February 25) and before the squadron was put into the armed reserve for the winter (for the Varyag - November 21), almost 9 months passed, during which the squadron was engaged in combat training. But "Varyag" due to its repairs and taking into account the interruption of classes for Taku's visit, made at the request (equivalent to the august order) of the Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich, almost half of this period fell out - about 4 months.
And then came 1903 and on February 15 "Varyag" entered the campaign (so it entered that already on February 17, resuming the bearing bulkhead). Less than 2 weeks later, an inspector review of the cruiser took place (this was how all the ships of the squadron were examined), during which "rifle techniques and exercises according to the combat schedule were considered satisfactory, although artillery control required further development and strengthening of practice" (RM Melnikov). That is, the artillery preparation of the cruiser was about three points: however, the language will not turn to reproach the commander of the cruiser V. I. Ber, who, apparently, did everything he could under such unfavorable circumstances (it was not for nothing that at the end of 1903, "Varyag" earned the signal "Admiral expresses special pleasure"!). However, of course, V. I. Baer was not omnipotent and could not compensate for the double reduction in training time.
What's next? Immediately after the review, on March 1, 1903, Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev took command of the cruiser. It intensifies the combat training of the ship to the maximum - gunners shoot up to 300 rounds of rounds a day (barrel firing). Is it a lot or a little? Let us recall that during several months of waiting for the 2nd Pacific Squadron, the flagship battleship Mikasa used up about 9,000 bullets and small-caliber shells for barrel firing, so that, as we see, the classes led by V. F. Rudnev should be considered very, very intense. Nevertheless, all this could not give the ship full-fledged combat training - immediately after the start of the campaign, the cruiser was being prepared for testing its power plant, the crew continued to tinker with boilers and machines, regularly going on runs. All this, of course, distracted from the exercises, and the test results were negative. And on June 14, "Varyag" again leaves for the armed reserve, for repairs, from which it leaves only on September 29.
In other words, while the Pacific Squadron from March to the end of September, that is, for 7 months, practiced, conducted maneuvers, etc. The cruiser "Varyag" for the first 3, 5 months (March - mid-June) was forced to alternate combat training with tests and permanent repairs of the power plant (engineer Gippius worked on the cruiser just at this time), and the next 3, 5 months (from mid-June to the end of September) completely stood in repair and was engaged in preparation only as far as it was available for the ship standing still in the harbor. And when, finally, on September 29, the cruiser entered the campaign again … then after 3 days, on October 2, the review began, which was arranged by the governor of the Squadron E. I. Alekseev, during which, according to the senior artillery officer Lieutenant V. Cherkasov 1st, "There was even one shooting" - and then, after "insanely important" formations and boat exercises on November 1, 1903, Ekadra entered the armed reserve."
And what about the Varyag? The repairs ended on September 29, the cruiser went to the dock for painting and entered the campaign only on October 5. While the Squadron was demonstrating to the governor the very "roughly combat shooting" that V. Cherkasov spoke about, "Varyag" was testing machines …
It cannot be said that the command did not at all understand the gaping gap in the combat training of the cruiser, so the Varyag, unlike the main forces of the Squadron, did not join the armed reserve. But the next repair was unsuccessful - as a result of this, during October and November, the cruiser lived mainly not in combat training, but in preparation for the next tests, and in the first half of December it stood at all in the harbor. Only on December 16, the cruiser made an exit to Chemulpo, arranging more or less full-fledged practice shooting at the Encounter Rock cliff on the way, but that was all. Moreover, although there is no direct evidence of such a limitation, judging by the consumption of ammunition, V. F. Rudnev was forced to save on this too - after all, 36 shots, this is only three shells for a 152-mm gun, rifle cartridges this time only 130 were used up (not counting 15 shots from machine guns).
Of course, the ships of the Squadron also underwent repairs during the campaign period - for example, in 1903, after the Varyag got up for repairs, the Squadron left for Vladivostok, where the battleships were docked, but in terms of time, all this took at least a week, and not half of the campaign. And even at the time when the "Varyag" was officially in dripping, permanent repair work did not stop on it. Moreover, if in 1902, despite the fact that half of the campaign the cruiser stood in repair, he still managed to spend some time on squadron exercises, then in 1903 this was not the case - in the period from March to mid-June, the ship was investigated on the subject of the success of the winter repair, and when it became clear that it was unsuccessful, a new cycle of research began, which prevented the Varyag from taking part in the squadron exercises. For the most part, the cruiser was engaged individually, and not at sea, but while at anchor and engaged in the next bulkhead of mechanisms.
Such exercises were not too different from those exercises that were conducted during the "great stand" of the Pacific Squadron on the inner roadstead of Port Arthur after the outbreak of the war. And, we can say, if they differed in something, it was only for the worse, because the Arthurian battleships and cruisers (not counting the Retvizan and Tsarevich, of course) still did not have to live in conditions of permanent repair. And the effectiveness of such training on the roadstead was "excellently" demonstrated by the battle on July 28, 1904, when, trying to break through to Vladivostok, a squadron led by V. K. Vitgefta demonstrated many times worse shooting accuracy than in a battle with the main forces of H. Togo six months earlier, on January 27, 1904.
Summing up the above, we note that numerous critics of the Varyag's firing accuracy in the battle at Chemulpo completely ignore the devastating effect the endless repairs of its boilers and vehicles had on the combat training of the cruiser crew. Perhaps it would be an exaggeration to say that during 1902-1903. The cruiser had half the time for combat training for other ships of the squadron, but even at this time, due to the need for constant checks and bulkheads of mechanisms, she was forced to train one and a half times less intensively than was possible for the others. However, this exaggeration will not be too great.
Taking into account the above, from the gunners of the "Varyag" one should expect not the accuracy demonstrated in the battle on January 27, but rather the accuracy of the squadron of V. K. Vitgeft in battle on July 28, 1904. Despite the fact that the distance of the battle reached 20 cables, or even less, the six-inch Russian artillery showed a much modest result: even if you account for all the hits, the caliber of which was not established by the Japanese, then and then the firing accuracy of 152-mm guns did not exceed 0, 64%. And this, for the estimated 160-198 six-inch shells fired at the enemy, gives 1, 02-1, 27 hits.
Thus, taking into account the actual level of training of Russian artillerymen, we have the right to expect from the gunners of the "Varyag" in battle on January 27, 1904.1 (ONE) hit with a 152 mm projectile
Was this single hit on Sotokichi Uriu's ships achieved? Alas, this we will never know. The Japanese claim that nothing of the kind happened, but here, of course, options are possible. The hit statistics still do not guarantee accurate reproduction in a specific situation, especially when we are dealing with such low probabilities as the hit of just one projectile. So the "Varyag", no doubt, could and in fact not hit anyone. But he could have hit, and why then did the Japanese not reflect this hit in the reports? Firstly, surprisingly, but the Japanese sailors could simply not have noticed this hit - for example, if the shell would ricochet from the side armor of the cruiser "Asama". And secondly, "Varyag" fired armor-piercing shells with a delayed fuse and it could easily happen that its shell, hitting the ship, did not cause much damage: well, for example, having made a six-inch hole in the fence of the bridge. Such damage is easily repaired by ship means, and the Japanese commander could consider it beneath his dignity to report it in the report.
The next question - who is to blame for such a deplorable quality of the cruiser's training? The answer to it is quite obvious: this is the work of those, thanks to whom "Varyag" did not get out of repairs. According to the personal opinion of the author of this series of articles, Charles Crump and his plant should be considered the main culprit in the disastrous state of the cruiser's power plant, which did not make proper efforts to adjust the steam engines during the construction of the cruiser, paying all attention only to reaching the contract speed. Nevertheless, a number of respected readers of "VO" considered that the blame is still on the Russian sailors, who could not properly operate (repair) the "Varyag" machines, which made the latter unusable. The author considers this point of view erroneous, but does not consider it possible to repeat his arguments (set out in several articles devoted to the Varyag power plant).
However, I would like to draw your attention to the following: regardless of who is right in this dispute, it is absolutely impossible to blame Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev for the poor condition of the Varyag's machines and boilers. Even if we accept the point of view that it is the Russian sailors who are to blame for everything, then even then it should be admitted that the Varyag's vehicles were damaged under the previous commander, V. I. Bere - we see that by the time V. F. Rudnev "Varyag" has already undergone several repairs, which have not been able to fix his problems. And if so, then we cannot blame V. F. Rudnev.
What could the new commander of "Varyag" have done, having taken over the cruiser in March 1904, when the ship, instead of improving its combat training together with the Squadron, went through a cycle of post-repair tests, which were also unsuccessful, and did not stop at the same time in the hundredth and one hundred and first to sort out machines and repair boilers? We see that Vsevolod Fedorovich tried to somehow rectify the situation, the same artillery exercises, barrel firing, under him significantly intensified. But this did not fundamentally solve the problem, and then the cruiser, in the midst of the Squadron's combat training, completely got up for repairs for 3, 5 months … In general, it is clear that its commander is responsible for everything on the ship, but it is obvious that V. F. Rudnev did not have the opportunity to properly prepare his ship for battle.
By the way … It is possible that this low training, to a certain extent, is due to the sending of the "Varyag" to "work" as a stationary. Without a doubt, on paper it was the newest and most powerful 1st rank armored cruiser. But in fact, it was a very slow-moving (in fact - even worse than the "Diana" and "Pallada") cruiser with an unreliable power plant and did not undergo sufficient training, detrained due to permanent repair by the crew. That is, being formally one of the best, in terms of its real qualities, the cruiser "Varyag" at the end of 1904 could be considered one of the worst cruisers of the squadron - taking this into account, it is no longer surprising that it was sent to Chemulpo. However, these are just guesses.
But we digress - let's return to the question that we did not answer at the beginning of the article. If the "Varyag" used up no more than 160-198 152-mm and 47 75-mm shells in battle, then how did it happen that V. F. Rudnev indicated in his report many times more of them? Strictly speaking, this fact is one of the cornerstones of the revisionist "accusers". In their opinion, V. F. Rudnev was not going to go "into the last and decisive", but only planned to imitate the battle, after which "with a clear conscience" he would have destroyed the "Varyag", then reported that he had done everything possible. But, being a "subtle politician", he understood that he would need proof that the cruiser had withstood a fierce battle: one of such proofs was the indication of the increased consumption of shells in the report.
At first glance, the stated point of view is quite logical. But one single fact does not fit into it: the fact is that V. F. Rudnev wrote not one, but two reports on the battle in Chemulpo. The first report addressed to the governor (Alekseev) was drawn up by him, one might say, "in hot pursuit" on February 6, 1904 - that is, just 10 days after the battle.
And in it V. F. Rudnev does not indicate the number of spent shells. At all. Absolutely.
Consumption of shells in the amount of 1 105 pcs. (425 six-inch, 470 75-mm, etc.) appears only in the second report of Vsevolod Fedorovich, which he wrote to the Manager of the Naval Ministry more than a year after the battle at Chemulpo - the second report of V. F. Rudnev is dated March 5, 1905, that is, shortly before the return of the team of "Varyag" and "Koreyets" to their homeland. And so it turns out to be an amazing oddity: if V. F. Rudnev is such a subtle politician, and thought out all his moves in advance, why did he not indicate the consumption of shells in his first report? After all, it is obvious that it is this report to the Governor that will become the basis on which the actions of the Varyag commander will be assessed. At the same time, Vsevolod Fedorovich obviously had nowhere to know that in the future he would have to write another report to the Head of the Marine Ministry - that is, in the usual case of office work, everything would have been limited to his report to the governor EI Alekseev, and the “invented” V. F. Rudnev would never have known the number of shells consumed! What kind of "delicate policy" is this?
In general, of course, we can assume that V. F. Rudnev, a dreamer and inventor, decided to decorate the report to the Manager with details that the Varyag commander had invented a lot after the battle and after the report was drawn up to the governor. But another version looks much more logical: that V. F. After the battle, Rudnev did not become interested in the number of shells remaining on the cruiser (he was not up to this - and what he cared about and why, we will consider later), after all, it was already clear that the cruiser could not run out of ammunition. Accordingly, the Varyag commander did not know and did not indicate this expense in his first report. But then someone pointed out to him the issues that should have been highlighted in a report addressed to the Head of the Marine Ministry (I must say that the second report is much more detailed than the first) and… V. F. Rudnev was forced more than a year after the battle, possibly together with his officers, to remember how things were with the consumption of shells. And here one very … let's say, similar to the truth version suggests itself.
Why did the Japanese raise shells from the cruiser even before they raised the cruiser itself? Obviously, they were somehow a hindrance to them, but we see that the bulk of the shells from the ship was already unloaded at the dock. At the same time, the ship was sunk shortly after the battle - we can assume that some of the shells were at combat posts and some were in artillery cellars. So we can assume that the 128 raised shells were outside the cellars, on the decks of the cruiser, possibly next to the guns. It is clear that they tried to remove them in the first place, because these shells could detonate during ship-lifting operations.
So, as we said earlier, the full ammunition load of the 152-mm guns of the Varyag was 2,388 shells, and in the cruiser's cellars, according to the Assessment Gazette, the Japanese found 1,953 shells. The difference is 435 shells - isn't it very similar to those 425 shells that V. F. Rudnev indicated in his report? Therefore, we can assume the following:
1. It is possible that at the end of the battle, one of the officers ordered to count the shells remaining on the cruiser, but due to an error, only those shells that remained in the cellars were taken into account, but not those that were supplied to the guns and remained unused;
2. It is possible that V. F. Rudnev, a year after the battle, simply mixed up the numbers - he was told about the number of shells remaining in the cellars, and he, when writing a report in March 1905, mistakenly decided that these were all the shells that remained on the cruiser.
In any case, this is precisely a mistake, and not a deliberate deception.
How were things in reality? Alas, this we will never know now. There is no way to find out exactly why V. F. Rudnev indicated an overestimated number of shells in a report addressed to the Governor of the Naval Ministry. But we must understand that there are quite logical explanations for this "disinformation", according to which it is the result of delusion, error, but not malicious intent. And therefore, the overestimation of the consumption of projectiles cannot be considered proof that V. F. Rudnev was engaged in "eyewash". The version that Vsevolod Fedorovich deliberately misinformed his superiors, at best, can be considered just one of the possible explanations, moreover, not the most logical of the available ones.
