The American TV channel CNBC, which has recently been fond of "merging" various insiders about the RF Armed Forces of varying degrees of inventiveness, issued another one of these days. He said, referring to US intelligence, that "after 2024, the interception of warheads of the Russian Bulava SLBM will become impossible, because the Bulava will be equipped with hypersonic combat missiles (in a number of our translations, they were downgraded to" supersonic "by a willful decision). I immediately wanted to figure it out: either on American television again, people have some regular revelations of crazy people, or is there something healthy here, but they just perverted the essence?
To begin with, there is manipulation in the CNBC report, as is customary in the Western press (and sometimes in ours, to be sure). The fact is that a man in the street who is far from the problem of strategic nuclear forces, having read that the Bulava BB will become invulnerable in 8 years, may calmly (if American, if ours - indignantly) may think that now they can be intercepted. And this, of course, is not the case: so far neither GBI nor SM-3 of any "block" intercepts ICBMs and SLBMs, and this will be so for a very long time. Not to mention the launch in real combat conditions, when 4 (as they are on duty now) or 6 compact and extremely low-signature BB of a new design, separated by targets, accompanied by a complex of means of overcoming missile defense - this is now an unrealistic task at all. Another issue is that the introduction of planning and maneuvering BB will dramatically increase the security of the combat missile system and expand the possibilities of using it.
It should be noted that CNBC made a lot of mistakes in the material, in particular, they write that only 8 Boreyevs are planned for construction. Moreover, Russia is building "Borei", according to the authors, "reducing appropriations for other projects, for example, for the surface fleet." This is not so: the construction of SSBNs in itself, surface shipbuilding in itself, together with all its problems like long-term construction.
In fact, in the ranks of 3 SSBNs of project 955, 5, project 955A ("Borey-A") under construction or in completion, and 6 more cruisers are included in the weapons program until 2027, also project 955A. In addition, they carry Bulavs, in their opinion, as many as 20 cruisers - the stupid myth still lives that Borei-A will have 20 mines instead of 16, although the photos of the head Borei-A have long been published. Probably, they have not yet been delivered to television in the United States, the Russian Post is down. As well as information that Bulava does not have 10 BBs, as they believe, but for now 6. Moreover, they believe that new, planning and maneuvering BBs, which will appear, according to SNBC sources on Bulava, to 2024, will also fit there in a number of 10 pieces. Although it is absolutely clear that aeroballistic gliding hypersonic guided combat equipment cannot have the same dimensions and dimensions as a conventional warhead. Even a heavy candy bar. A typical example is the AGBO (aeroballistic hypersonic combat equipment) "Avangard" 15Yu71, which fits on the UR-100NUTTH (15A35) ICBM only in a single person, and in such a way that placing the converted ICBM in its old mine, they say, will not work - the cover will not close, a larger silo is needed. However, Avangard is for heavy ICBMs, and it will not fit on Bulava in any way. And CNBC also has the speed of hypersonic gliding guided warheads - about 5M, which, of course, is not close, but much more. Obviously, they confused it with the lower limit, beyond which, according to one of the opinions, hypersound begins and supersonic ends.
So what about Bulava and AGBO for it by 2024? Did the TV people lie, as with the rest? Probably not quite. They simply re-sing the magnificent Italian opera tenors with the voices of Odessa bandmen with a characteristic change of accent.
As you know, at the Army-2018 forum, it was announced that the Russian Defense Ministry had signed a contract with the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT) to carry out R&D with the code "Anchar-RV", and this is a "long-range hypersonic apparatus." Of course, such an announcement was not without reason, and was intended for the ears of "probable partners number one." As well as the fact that it was emphasized that the work left the research and development stage and moved into the R&D stage.
What is it? There are different versions, but the author thinks the following is the most probable - given that MIT is the developer of the Bulava R-30 SLBM and to some extent (in particular, in the area of BB and MIRV) of the Yars combat missile system unified with it with a silo and mobile versions (and so far suspended development of a "relative" - BZHRK "Barguzin"). Just as Avangard is the brainchild of NPO Mashinostroyenia from Reutov, as well as the ICBM it uses as an ICBM base (for the heavy ICBM Sarmat, the lead developer is the Miass SRC named after Makeev, and NPO Mashinostroyenia is also involved in the work), it is logical to assume that As before, for its complexes, MIT itself will develop a new AGBO, more compact, albeit with a smaller charge, but fit on the Bulava and, probably, on the Yars modification. The "Vanguard" was run in on old 15A35 ICBMs (in order to put it on the "dry" 15A35 ICBMs, which had already been wildly exchanged for vodka in advance, that is, with the state of the new ones. SLBMs) will probably be able to be practiced during launches used for testing new combat equipment, experimental Topol-E carriers.
Western sources have also expressed similar assumptions, moreover, some in the West claim that one of the recent test launches already related to this topic. The probable index of the new product was even named. Apparently, CNBC officials heard about this product from some acquaintances at the Pentagon and misinterpreted it as best they could in their article. Separately, it is worth noting that hardly anyone will re-equip the entire Bulav or Yarsov park with such a product - at the moment AGBO is not an obligatory piece of equipment that guarantees successful delivery of what they deserve to "lovers of light and heat". And this, of course, is a means of guaranteed accurate delivery, but much more a means of expanding the capabilities of strategic nuclear forces (for example, for effective strikes along a fast, flat trajectory, without approaching as close to the enemy as it would have to do without such a device). In general, "backward" Russia has put on stream the process of creating both new AGBS and new hypersonic aeroballistic or cruise missiles, until the Americans reach some concrete results, and not rare flights of demonstrators of technologies of varying success, and with frequent changes in projects … Of course, it is too early to write off the United States in this area, but such a reserve and such a head start cannot be made up quickly, if it is possible at all.
Moreover, there are other options for expanding the capabilities and increasing the invulnerability of the complexes. For example, Mr. Solomonov has long been talking about the transition to a "busless" scheme for breeding BB, that is, when the warheads are not guided one by one at their target by the breeding stage, but they themselves "scatter" at their targets, like cockroaches when the light is turned on - quickly and in an organized and unassisted manner. Such warheads will have their own propulsion systems, but they can hardly be considered maneuvering. But the rejection of the "bus scheme" greatly increases the invulnerability of the missile and its equipment from interception in this section of the trajectory, because it is believed that the sooner the OUT (active section of the trajectory) ends and the sooner the blocks and means of overcoming the missile defense are deployed for targets, the better.
Taking into account the unpleasant circumstances for the United States, such as the lag in technologies of guided hypersonic weapons, the impossibility of creating new nuclear weapons, the "hole" in the field of medium-range weapons, it is rather strange to hear that the US administration doubts whether they should be extended after 2021. The START-3 treaty, which will require significant efforts, because in the Russian Federation, too, there is more and more understanding that with people who cannot agree with each other, except for the desire to spoil the Russian Federation and the PRC, the agreement somehow does not want to be extended. Even needed by the world and yourself. That is why "bells" are heard here and there, indicating the likelihood of Russia's non-renewal of this treaty. Like the same 6 additional Boreyev-A's, with which it will be extremely difficult to meet the START-3 limits, taking into account both ICBMs and bombers. But the Russian Federation does not have these problems listed above.
Naturally, the Americans accuse Russia of "violating" the Treaty, for example, with the same hypersonic vehicles or intercontinental thermonuclear torpedoes, which are not mentioned in the Treaty in any way and are not a violation. In general, the Americans are behaving more and more inadequately, and their attempts to harm us are increasingly turning into harm to themselves, as has been said more than once in relation to strategic stability.
But on the other hand, it is worth mentioning that the US State Department recently announced that the country does not intend to leave the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty yet. Andrea Thompson, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, said this in a speech in the Senate. She also responded to a question from representatives of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who asked about the consequences of Washington's withdrawal from the treaty if the United States decides to take this step, accusing Russia of "material violation" of the INF Treaty.
"The consequences of a material breach are set out in the treaty. The treaty provides for various options for action, such discussions would take place in cooperation with our technical experts here, as well as with partners and allies. We have not gotten to that yet," Thompson said.
What does this mean? It is possible that the US leadership nevertheless realized that the withdrawal from the INF Treaty would look like an attempt to scare the porcupine by landing on it, because the Russian Federation has the potential for the rapid and relatively inexpensive deployment of new medium-range missiles, and there is no problem with nuclear ammunition for them. … For the United States, in both respects, things are going completely wrong. And so for the time being they decided not to untie Russia's hands in this, as happened with missile defense or hypersonic technologies.
In the meantime, they themselves will try to develop something in this area, however, there are few options. Firstly, the same problem with nuclear equipment for these missiles - it is not there and there is nowhere to get it. Is it possible to disfigure the long-suffering BB W76-1, by cutting off the power dozens of times and try to push it onto a new rocket? But here, too, everything is not so simple. Missiles can be developed in the United States. So, there is a competition for the creation of Precision Strike Missile - an operational-tactical missile with a range of more than 400 km. Someone has already dubbed this product, which will be launched, like OTR ATACMS, from MLRS launchers, in the media as the American Iskander. No, this is not the least bit of Iskander! The missile is small, its range is increased to a large extent due to a further decrease in the power of the warhead (it presses on the fact that it is weak, but, they say, accurate), that is, a decrease in combat effectiveness. And the Iskander's capabilities to overcome air defense and missile defense are not available. And the nuclear warhead will not be there. That is, it is necessary to take into account these weapons, as well as the announced preliminary studies on the "1000-mile missile", but as a nuclear one is unlikely, that is, this is not a topic of nuclear forces.
It is also worth mentioning the strange message that the United States is working on the issue of equipping the future promising subsonic airborne missile system LRSO … of the F-35 fighter. Moreover, it is unlikely that this missile can be used in the compartment of a fighter, which deprives it of its known advantages. It is clear if we were talking about non-nuclear missile launchers of the JASSM series, but the LRSO will have a nuclear charge, and this is already a direct violation of START-3. Probably, if such an option is being worked out, then in case the contract is not renewed and its replacement is not concluded. In this case, the Americans should expect similar surprises. For example, the new KR X-50 (aka X-SD), officially non-nuclear, which can also be used by planes of our operational-tactical aviation, like the Su-34, Su-30SM, Su-35S or Su-57, in this case too will probably change its status as "strictly non-nuclear".
It is possible to live and develop in the absence of contractual restrictions: both superpowers existed in the 1950s and 1960s. But the world, unfortunately, will not become safer from this.
