On August 10, 2008, a grouping of ships of the Black Sea Fleet consisting of two large landing ships (flagship Caesar Kunikov and Saratov) and two escort ships (MRK Mirage and MPK Suzdalets) were off the coast of Abkhazia.
In the area patrolling by Russian ships, five unidentified boats were found moving at high speed. They violated the border of the declared security zone and did not respond to warnings. At 18:39, one of the Russian ships fired a warning shot with an anti-aircraft missile that fell between the boats. The Georgians continued to move towards rapprochement.
At 18:41, the Mirage MRC fired two Malakhit anti-ship missiles towards the targets from a distance of 25 km. As a result of both missiles hitting the target, the Georgian hydrographic boat sank (disappeared from the radar screens after a short exposure).
At 18:50, one of the Georgian boats again went to a rapprochement with the Black Sea Fleet ships. MRK "Mirage" from a distance of 15 km fired at it an anti-aircraft missile complex "Osa-M". As a result of the missile hit, the Georgian boat lost speed, and after the crew was removed by another boat, it finally burned out and sank.
SAM "Osa-M", preparations for battle. A double-girder launcher with missiles extends from under the deck
Something like this describes a sea battle off the coast of Abkhazia, which happened during the 2008 Five-Day War. Despite the discrepancies in some details, each source cites data on the shelling of Georgian boats with Osa-M air defense missile systems.
But how adequate is the use of anti-aircraft missiles against naval targets? Or is it all about the peculiarities of the ships of the Russian Navy, which at that time did not have another, more suitable weapon?
The answer to this question can be the events that took place exactly 20 years before the naval battle off the coast of Abkhazia.
April 18, 1988. Persian Gulf. A US Navy Aircraft Carrier Strike Group battles three Iranian corvettes and two oil rigs in Operation Praying Mantis. There are losses on both sides.
… At nine in the morning, Charlie's unit consisting of the missile cruiser Wainwright and two frigates, Badley and Simpson, attacked the Iranian oil platform Sirri and, after a two-hour shelling, completely destroyed the offshore oil production complex.
Closer to lunchtime, the Iranian "fleet" pulled up to the scene of hostilities. The 44-meter corvette (missile boat?) Joshan, with the most serious intentions, approached the US Navy compound. The Iranian sailors responded to the proposal to stop the engines and leave the ship by launching the Harpoon anti-ship missile system. The Yankees only miraculously managed to dodge the fired rocket.
There was no time left for long thoughts. "Simpson" immediately responded with two RIM-66E missiles, caught in the superstructure of the Iranian corvette. Following this, another anti-aircraft RIM-67 from the cruiser "Wainwright" flew to Joshan.
Greek Navy boat, identical in design to the Iranian Joshan.
Full in / and 265 tons. Armament: 4 anti-ship missiles, artillery pieces of 76 mm and 40 mm caliber.
The launch of the Stenderd-1 MR anti-aircraft guided missile (RIM-66E). Warhead weight - 62 kg.
By this time, almost all of Joshan's crew were dead. Three powerful explosions disfigured the superstructure and completely disabled the Iranian ship. But the Americans only flared up hunting excitement. Not wanting to lose its portion of glory, the frigate Badley joined the group beating, firing a Harpoon missile at the ruins of Joshan from close range. However, he missed. Not wanting to spend more missiles, American ships approached the sinking corvette and finished it off with cannons.
Here is such a sad story with a dark crimson tint.
The Iranian frigate Sahand is on fire. This ship was destroyed by an air strike
It is noteworthy that today the valiant frigate USS Simpson remains the only (!) Ship in the US Navy, which was given the opportunity to sink an enemy ship (even such a poor one as Joshan). Over the next 26 years, the American Navy never again had a chance to participate in a naval battle.
Hidden opportunities
The sailors knew about this remarkable feature of anti-aircraft missile systems for a long time. Half a century ago, during a naval exercise, an obvious discovery was made: at line-of-sight range, the first missiles should be fired. They have a smaller warhead mass, but their reaction time is 5-10 times less compared to anti-ship missiles!
Unlike ground-based air defense systems, where the detection of low-flying targets is limited by relief folds, trees and buildings, the sea provides unprecedented opportunities in terms of NLC detection - the line-of-sight range is limited by the range of the radio horizon. In the case of large ships with high masts and superstructures, the detection range can reach 20-30 km. Most modern naval battles (or rather, skirmishes) took place at precisely this distance. And every time, anti-aircraft missiles were actively used to destroy surface targets.
Is it difficult to aim an anti-aircraft missile at a ship?
Regardless of the method of guiding the missile defense system (along the beam, radio command I and II types, etc.), in the end, the homing head (GOS) of an anti-aircraft missile or guidance station on board the ship is completely indifferent to what the radio signal is reflected from. From the wing of a low-flying plane or the superstructures of an enemy ship, it doesn't matter! The main thing is that the target is within line of sight, above the radio horizon.
In comparison with an aircraft, the colossal size (and, consequently, the RCS) of the enemy ship, on the contrary, contributes to an increase in accuracy and a decrease in the probability of a miss.
It turns out that any naval air defense system has a mode of firing at ships?
No, not everyone. For effective destruction of surface targets, one small condition must be met - turn off the proximity fuse. Otherwise, a strong signal reflection from a large (compared to an aircraft) ship will cause a premature operation of the missile warhead. It detonates in the air at a considerable distance, without causing serious damage to the enemy.
The trick was simple.
The SAM possesses all the useful skills of an anti-ship missile, while being several times superior to a conventional anti-ship missile in terms of reaction time. It has a high speed (Mach 2-4) and extremely high maneuverability (the available overload of the RIM-162 ESSM is up to 50g). Flight time is reduced. The smaller size of the missile defense system makes it difficult to intercept it by the air defense / missile defense of an enemy ship. The cost of most missiles, as a rule, does not exceed the cost of anti-ship cruise missiles.
As a result, we have before us a dual-use system capable of hitting air and surface targets with equal efficiency.
Which has already been proven in practice!
The only limitation for the air defense system is the firing range. When firing at sea targets, it does not exceed 20-30 km - but, as practice shows, this is enough for combat at short distances, typical of modern local wars. In the era of confrontation between the USSR Navy and the US Navy, the short firing range was also not an obstacle to the use of air defense systems in naval combat. The fleets of the great powers practiced continuous tracking of each other, regularly approaching at line-of-sight distance.
Anti-aircraft missile of the M-11 "Shtorm" complex. Museum of the Black Sea Fleet (Sevastopol)
As for the "weakness" of the combat units of the missile defense system, it all depends on the specific complex. Getting on board the V-611 SAM of the Shtorm anti-aircraft complex (warhead mass 120 kg) was hardly more pleasant than withstanding the hit of the French Exocet anti-aircraft missile system (warhead 165 kg) or the Norwegian NSM (warhead 120 kg).
This feature of the air defense system was well known overseas. The results of the firing of the shipborne anti-aircraft complex RIM-8 Talos at the target destroyer shocked everyone who watched these tests. A giant supersonic missile nearly chopped the unfortunate ship in half!
However, they did not expect anything else - a sea monster called "Talos" with a 136-kilogram warhead and a launch range of 180 kilometers was a lethal weapon, equally dangerous for air and surface objects.
Nuclear modifications "Talos" - RIM-8B and RIM-8D, equipped with a 2 kt SBSh, were supposed to be used to "clear" the coast before the landing during the Third World War.
The theme of the unique air defense system began to be developed further: in 1965, a new modification of the RIM-8H Anti-Radiation Missile (ARM) entered service, aiming at the radiation of enemy radar stations. It was not possible to shoot such weapons at the ships, but it is known that the Oklahoma City cruiser launched such ammunition through the jungles of Vietnam and even, according to the stories of the Yankees themselves, managed to suppress the enemy radar with them.
However, this improvisation based on an anti-aircraft missile can no longer be regarded as an ordinary missile defense system.
Anti-aircraft missile complex "Talos". The starting mass of this "baby" together with the accelerator is over 3.5 tons!
Launching Talos from the Little Rock cruiser
Concluding the story about the unusual features of shipborne anti-aircraft missile systems, it is worth recalling the tragicomic incident that occurred in the Mediterranean Sea during the international naval exercise "Exercise Display Determination 92".
At that time, the command of the Sixth Fleet invited Turkish sailors to participate in the exercises. Flattered by such attention from "Uncle Sam", the Turks happily agreed and put several of their "pellets" next to the US Navy aircraft carrier group. But no one told the Turks that they would be used as targets.
All night from October 1 to October 2, 1992, a group of NATO ships plowed the Mediterranean Sea, and by morning it turned out that the navigating bridge on the Turkish destroyer TCG Muavenet had been broken and 5 officers had been killed. Another 22 Turkish sailors after those "exercises" ended up in a hospital bed.
… The officer in charge of the self-defense systems of the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga, cheerfully reported to the commander: “All assigned tasks have been completed successfully. Consumption - two SeaSperrow anti-aircraft missiles!
The result of hitting 2 RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missiles at Muavenet
The Turks were horrified and bewildered - how could this happen? The two SeaSperrows could not accidentally hit the Turkish destroyer. It was necessary to specifically direct them using the radar illumination. The operator could not help but see and know who he was shooting at. What happened looks like an unfriendly act and betrayal in relation to an ally.
When they began to figure it out, it turned out that that night the Americans were training the crews of the ship's air defense systems, alternately "taking aim" at the Turkish ships going abeam (of course, the Turks were not warned about this). Further - the usual army humor: "Who threw the boot on the rocket console ?!" The launch command passed through the electrical circuits, the PU guide plugs flew out with a clang, two anti-aircraft missiles went to the selected target. The sailor, who controlled the radar illumination, did not have time to say "Oh, shit", as a pair of fire lightning pierced the superstructure of a nearby ship, illuminating the sea for a moment.
The whole story ended in a typical way. Seven American sailors received reprimands, the Turkish Navy was donated to replace the beaten Muavenet with another obsolete frigate.
What remains to add here? Now even the Turks know that the ship's air defense system is not a pound of raisins.
Turkish newspaper is indignant
