The experience of the past is valuable only when it is studied and correctly understood. Forgotten lessons of the past will certainly be repeated. This is more true than ever for military construction and preparation for war, and it is not in vain that the military is carefully studying the battles of the past.
This, of course, also applies to the naval forces.
There is, however, one historical lesson that is completely ignored in almost all countries to which this lesson was once taught, and those who taught it are also ignored. We are talking about sea mines and the destructive effect that they can have on any of the fleets of the world, if correctly and massively used.
This is surprising and partly frightening: not a single fleet is able to adequately assess the threat of a weapon that has been studied many times, and in some cases has been used. Let's leave the phenomenon of mass blindness to psychologists, after all, when assessing the naval preparations of certain countries, it is important for us that decision-makers have a "cognitive distortion", and where it came from is better understood by psychologists. It is much more interesting to assess the real potential of mine weapons for themselves, especially since they are sometimes underestimated even by professionals whose duties will include its combat use.
A bit of history.
The most massive conflict today, in which sea mines were used, is the Second World War. At the same time, although the results of the use of mine weapons are well documented, they are not really studied. Mine warfare issues are "divided" between different types of the Armed Forces, which, for the most part, see in laying mines something secondary to the use of other types of weapons. This is a common point in the Armed Forces of different countries, including Russia.
How was it really?
We remember how the Gulf of Finland was blocked by German mines, and how the Baltic Fleet was locked for a long time in its harbors, we remember how submarines died when they tried to break through the mines and nets put up by the enemy. We remember how many ships were lost during the evacuation of Tallinn and Hanko. It would seem that everything is obvious, but in Russia the mine war is "not held in high esteem", as well as the anti-mine support. More on this later, but for now let's see what the Western historical experience looks like.
In 1996, the Australian Air Power Research Center, a military research organization with the Australian Air Force, issued the so-called Document 45 - Air Warfare and Naval Operations. The document, authored by Richard Hallion, Doctor of Historical Sciences, is a forty-one page essay summarizing the combat experience of the Allied base aviation in the fight against the naval forces of their opponents, both during WWII and after, a kind of squeeze from the actions of the "coast" against "Fleet". The essay is a very detailed and high-quality study, with a detailed bibliography, and for the Australian Air Force it is also, in a sense, a guide to action. It is freely available.
Here is what, for example, it indicates regarding the effectiveness of mine laying from the air:
A total of 1, 475 enemy surface vessels (representing 1, 654, 670 tons of shipping) sank at sea or were destroyed in port by RAF attack, constituting 51% of the total enemy losses of 2, 885 ships (totaling 4, 693, 836 tons) destroyed by Allied sea and air action, captured, or scuttled from 1939 through 1945. A total of 437 of these ships (186 of which were warships) sank from direct air attack at sea, while 279 others (of which 152 were warships) were bombed and destroyed in port. Mines laid by Coastal Command and Bomber Command claimed an additional 759 ships, of which 215 were warships. These 759 represented fully 51% of all ships lost to RAF air attack. Indeed, mining was over five times more productive than other forms of air attack; for approximately every 26 mine-dropping sorties flown, the RAF could claim an enemy ship sunk, while it took approximately 148 sorties to generate a sinking by direct air attack.
Approximate translation:
A total of 1,475 ships and vessels (with a total displacement of 1,654,670 tons) were sunk at sea or destroyed in ports during attacks by the Royal Air Force, which amounted to 51% of all enemy losses of 2,885 ships and vessels (with a total displacement of 4,693,836 tons) destroyed by Allied actions at sea and in the air, captured or sunk from 1939 to 1945. Of these, 437 ships and vessels (186 of which are warships) were sunk as a result of air attacks at sea, while 279 others (including 152 warships) were bombed and destroyed in ports. Another 759 ships and vessels (215 warships) are attributed to the mines exposed by the Coastal and Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force. These 759 targets represent 51% of all ships sunk by the RAF. Indeed, mining was five times more productive than any other form of air attack; The Royal Air Force could declare a ship sinking for every 26 combat missions for mining, while 148 sorties were required to sink a ship with a direct air attack.
Thus, the experience of the British in Europe suggests that mines are the most effective weapon against ships, more effective than bombs, torpedoes, shelling and airborne cannons of aircraft, or anything else.
The author gives an example unknown in our country: the Kriegsmarine had to use 40% of the personnel in mine clearance! This could not but have an effect on the outcome of the war at sea. Interestingly, the author, citing statistics on the German tonnage destroyed by our armed forces, assigns 25% to mines. This data is worth checking, of course, but the order of the numbers looks realistic.
The chapter "Aerial Mining Bottles Up the Home Islands" (roughly - "Aerial mining locks up the Japanese islands") would deserve to be cited in full, but the format of the article does not provide for this, therefore, here is an extract.
Since the end of 1944, the Allies have carried out a campaign to mine the waters important for the supply of the Japanese islands, including the coastal ones. 21,389 mines were deployed from the air, of which 57% were deployed by B-29 Superfortress bombers.
According to the author, the result of this short mining campaign was the sinking of 484 ships, destruction to the point of impossibility of recovery, another 138 and 338 were seriously damaged. The total tonnage amounted to 2,027,516 tons, including 1,028,563 tons lost completely and irrevocably. This, in general, is about 10, 5 percent of all that Japan lost at sea during the entire war, according to JANAC, a special commission of the OKNSH for evaluating the results of the war. But the mine-laying campaign lasted only a few months!
And if the Americans immediately, from 1941, resorted to such operations? If they used seaplanes for night raids with mines on coastal waters, which, relying on tender ships, could well “get” Japan? What if the mine-laying campaign took a couple of years? How long would Japan have held out, given that ten-month Allied mining raids have completely paralyzed Japanese shipping? So much so that 86% of all ship repair facilities were idle, blocked by mines from the delivery of damaged ships to them?
At the same time, everyone must understand that the then mines were very much simpler and cheaper than torpedoes. In fact, it was about a "cheap victory" - if the Americans were quicker with mining, the war could have ended earlier. The Japanese would simply be killed.
Fast forward to a somewhat later historical period - to the early 80s, to the "peak" of the Cold War.
Planning a war at sea with the USSR, the Americans, remembering (then) their experience with Japan, intended to carry out high-intensity "offensive mining" by tactical aviation forces, B-52 Stratofortress bombers, and P-3 Orion patrol aircraft, as well as submarines. The latter, using secrecy, had to mine Soviet ports in the White Sea and Kamchatka, partly in the Barents Sea. Aviation would take over areas remote from the Soviet coast.
This page from the 1980s US Naval Strategy compendium published by the Naval War College in Newport shows where the US planned to mine and how many mines the US allies had.
It is not hard to see that it was huge. And we must understand that these were not at all the mines with which they blocked Japan. A mine like CAPTOR has a kill zone of 1000 meters - it is in such a "field" that a mine can detect a submarine and release an anti-submarine torpedo from a tethered container.
In fact, if this plan were realized, mines would temporarily become a factor on a planetary scale.
In 1984, the US CIA unleashed a terrorist war against Nicaragua, and, in addition to the actions of "Contras" on the ground, the Americans carried out mining of harbors and coastal waters, which led to the undermining of many civilian ships and would cause enormous damage to the Nicaraguan economy if not for the assistance of the USSR. At the same time, the Americans used artisanal mines installed from boats "Contras" and this operation cost them quite ridiculous money. The investments turned out to be scanty, the efficiency was enormous.
What else does historical experience tell us?
For example, the duration of trawling can be very long. So, the Soviet Navy in 1974 spent 6 thousand hours of continuous trawling on demining the Gulf of Suez.
The US and NATO have been clearing the Suez Canal from mines for 14 months. During the demining of the Haiphong harbor by the Chinese in 1972, a detachment of 16 minesweepers and support vessels, staffed by the best Chinese specialists, spent three months just breaking through the Haiphong corridor at sea, from August 25 to November 25, 1972. Subsequently, trawling work continued until mid-January 1973. And this despite the fact that the scale of American mining was limited.
The question arises: how would emergency demining be carried out if it was necessary to urgently withdraw submarines from the harbor, for example? Alas, the answer is no way. By those methods, at least.
Yet? We also know that during an offensive operation, mining is carried out in advance. This is a very important point - if you ask anyone when the war between Germany and the USSR began, most will say that on June 22, 1941, at about 3.30 am, from Luftwaffe air strikes.
But in fact, it began in the late evening of June 21 in the Baltic, with the setting of mines.
Let us briefly summarize the historical experience.
1. Sea mines have tremendous destructive power, in relative terms, they turned out to be more effective lethal weapons than torpedoes and bombs. Most likely, mines are the most effective anti-ship weapon.
2. The main means of laying mines is aviation. The number of ships blown up on mines exposed from the air exceeds the same number, but on mines from submarines hundreds of times - by two orders of magnitude. This is evidenced, for example, by American data (the same JANAC).
3. Submarines are able to carry out covert and pinpoint mining in the enemy-guarded zone, including in its territorial waters.
4. Trawling mines takes a huge amount of time, from months to years. However, there is no way to speed it up. For now, at least.
5. When conducting an aggressive offensive war, the enemy will resort to "offensive mining" and lay mines in advance, before the start of hostilities.
6. Mines are one of the most "cost effective" types of weapons - their cost is disproportionately small in comparison with the effect.
Now fast forward to our days.
Currently, the developed countries have thousands of mines. These are bottom mines, and torpedo mines, which instead of an exploding warhead have a container with a homing torpedo, and mines with a torpedo missile, and self-propelled mines fired from a submarine torpedo tube and going to the installation site on their own.
Mines are installed from surface ships and boats, submarines and aircraft.
An example of a modern aircraft mine is the American system "Quickstrike" - airborne mines with satellite guidance. When dropped from a carrier - a combat aircraft, these mines fly several tens of kilometers using folding wings and a steering system similar to those of JDAM bombs, and then fall into the water at a given point. This method allows, firstly, to protect the carrier aircraft from air defense fire, and secondly, to lay mines exactly "according to the scheme" - being controlled, they will fall on the water, exactly repeating with their points of contact with the water the desired "map" of the minefield being laid.
With this trawling "the old fashioned way", when a minesweeper passes over the mine, and then it "hooks" (either physically - by chopping the minrep, or with its physical fields - acoustic or electromagnetic) one of the trawls submerged in water, modern mines no longer lend themselves to. The mine, most likely, will simply explode under the minesweeper, destroying it, despite the measures taken to reduce its own physical fields (non-metallic hull, demagnetized engine, reduced noise, etc.). The same will happen when divers try to defuse mines manually from under the water - the mine will react to this. Alternatively, a mine defender can react to this - also a mine, but designed to prevent the demining of a "normal" mine.
Today, mines are fought in the following way - the minesweeper "scans" the underwater environment and the bottom with the help of GAS. When a suspicious object is detected under water, an unmanned underwater vehicle is brought in, controlled by a fiber-optic cable from a minesweeper. Having identified the mine, the minesweeper's crew directs another apparatus towards it - a simpler one. This is a mine destroyer, a device that detonates a mine and dies. I must say that they cost a lot.
Ships that have such capabilities as a plus to the "traditional" mine trawls, today are called minesweepers, mine seekers - TSCHIM.
An alternative option is to place search systems on a ship that is not a minesweeper at all.
The modern trend is the use of another "link" in mine action - the unmanned boat (BEC). Such a remotely controlled boat, equipped with a GAS and controlled from a minesweeper, "takes risks" and helps to remove people from the danger zone.
The process of finding and destroying modern mines is shown as clearly as possible in this video:
So, the paradox of our time is that all this is very, very expensive. There is not a single country in the world that could afford sweeping forces adequate to the mine threat from a potential enemy.
Unfortunately, everything is clear with the Russian Navy. If we assume that the anti-mine complex "Mayevka" and GAS "Livadia" on minesweeper-seeker of project 02668 "Vice-Admiral Zakharyin" are not under repair, but stand on the ship and function, and the crew is trained to use them, then we can safely state that Russia has one minesweeper.
Not quite modern, and without a BEC, but at least capable of coping with the tasks of finding mines.
And if, as now, with some of the equipment being repaired, then it turns out that we have zero modern and efficient minesweepers. Ships of the project 12700, which began to enter the fleet recently, unfortunately, will not justify themselves - there are too many flaws in their anti-mine complex, and in general the design turned out to be unsuccessful. And PJSC "Zvezda" cannot produce diesel engines for them in the required quantity. At the same time, they will continue to be built anyway; in our country “face preservation” has long been more important than combat effectiveness.
However, catastrophic failures out of the blue have long been a normal phenomenon for the Russian Navy, so we will not be surprised.
However, in other navies, things are no better - there is simply no country in the world with adequate sweeping forces. There is not a single country where there would be at least twenty modern minesweepers. Moreover, there is not a single country where they would seriously ask themselves the question: “what are we going to do if not tens, but thousands of mines are on the way”? There is not a single country where at least someone would have calculated the economy of a mine war and came to the logical conclusion that it would not be possible to produce disposable destroyers in the required number. Modern minesweepers do not carry even a dozen destroyers - these devices are too expensive.
All are ready to lay mines and have their reserves, but no one is ready to fight them later. At present, all work on mine action is going around a bunch of BEC-NPA to search for mines-destroyers. Almost no one thinks about how to destroy minefields FAST or quickly pass them. Almost.
