As you know, the United States actively opposes the conclusion of an agreement banning the deployment of weapons systems in space (at the moment there is only an agreement on nuclear weapons in orbit). Negotiations on this issue, however, continue periodically. At the same time, no one is talking about the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons. But even if the talk about such a treaty goes seriously, then it will be necessary first to draw up at least a classification of such weapons systems. And this is the problem. Nobody really tried to do it at a serious level, although at the expert level such attempts are taking place.
Classification problems
One of the attempts to create such a classification was made by Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in an article published by the resource C4ISRNET. There he tries to create a taxonomy of space and anti-space weapons. His study is presented at a time when a number of countries, including Japan, France, South Korea and the United States, are expanding or building up military organizations specifically focused on space, with officials in these countries hinting (if not explicitly) the need for enhancing their respective capabilities in the area of space weapons. In addition, both India and China are engaged in this topic, and, undoubtedly, Russia, which is actively developing primarily anti-satellite weapons systems or systems capable of acting against orbital targets, both with the physical destruction of targets, and with their temporary or permanent disabling or part of the equipment on them.
Despite certain treaty restrictions on the placement of weapons in space, Harrison argues that there is no real consensus on what it means to place weapons in space, even if it becomes impossible to deny that a number of states already have space weapons:
“To arrive at a consensus definition of what counts as a space weapon and what is not, you need a treaty mechanism that is widely accepted. The likelihood that this will happen is negligible. So I think that in a practical sense, countries will continue to define space weapons to mean whatever they want, to be consistent with their own goals. And we will have to go through that in terms of communicating with allies and partners and communicating with the public.
Harrison's Categories
In Harrison's report, space-based and anti-space weapons are divided into six categories, including kinetic and non-kinetic versions of the Earth-to-space, Space-to-space and Space-to-Earth systems, with a total of six. These categories are:
1. Kinetic weapon "Earth-space". Rocket systems launched from Earth.
Such weapons run the risk of leaving behind fields of space debris. These missile systems can be equipped with conventional (we will specify: kinetic or high-explosive fragmentation charges) or nuclear warheads. Such tests of an anti-satellite missile were carried out by China in 2007 or India in 2019. It is strange that Harrison forgot to mention the interception of the USA-193 satellite by the American SM-3 anti-missile missile in 2008.- it is possible that he does not consider the attack of a falling vehicle at such an altitude where the satellites usually do not fly and from where they are only flying down is a successful anti-satellite test. Harrison mentions that the United States and Russia "have demonstrated this ability, with the United States and Russia conducting nuclear tests in space in the 1960s." Well, let's say the USSR carried out nuclear tests. He also performed numerous tests of the A-35, A-35M and A-135 anti-missile systems, which are also capable of operating against low-orbit targets. For some reason, Harrison forgot all this. But he recalled that "Russia experienced this ability quite recently, in April." This is he about the next launch of the long-range transatmospheric intercept missile "Nudol" of the A-235 missile defense system, which had an anti-satellite orientation and was successful. However, there have been a lot of Nudoli launches in recent years, and almost all of them were successful, except for one, according to Western sources. But "Nudol" is primarily an anti-missile missile defense system, and secondarily an anti-satellite missile, and not all tests had an anti-satellite orientation. Harrison also "forgot" about the newest ultra-long-range air defense system, the S-500, which also has anti-satellite capabilities.
2. Non-kinetic weapon "Earth-space". Here Harrison includes various jamming systems for satellite communications or electronic or radar reconnaissance systems, systems aimed at deceiving aerial reconnaissance means, systems that allow you to blind and damage equipment temporarily or permanently, for example, laser or microwave. And also "cyberattacks", that is, hacking of communication channels and control of devices. Many countries have this potential, including the United States, Russia, China and Iran, Harrison said.
The potential is there, but only in Russia are such systems now really in service, if we talk about blinding and burning laser weapons. We are talking about the Peresvet laser complex, widely known after the well-known first March message of our president. And also we are talking about the next generation of the Sokol-Echelon system being created, that is, about the laser system on board the Il-76 aircraft. True, the question is: can such a weapon be considered a "Earth-to-space" weapon or is it worth introducing a separate classification? But systems for jamming satellites and hacking satellites are in service with both Russia and its American "partners."
3. Kinetic weapon "Space - space". That is, satellites that physically intercept other satellites in order to destroy them, with the loss of the interceptor itself, which also explodes, or due to the use of weapons by this interceptor without losing it - say, rockets, cannons, laser systems, etc.
This is where the issue of debris re-emerges, as does the potential use of nuclear weapons, which could have implications for a number of systems. The Soviet Union has repeatedly tested such interceptor satellites, both disposable explosive and based on other principles of destruction. These interceptors (Polet, IS, IS-M, IS-MU satellites) were of several generations, and these systems were on alert. Moreover, at the end of the Cold War, a similar system was created in the USSR, which makes it possible to reach targets at the geostationary as well. The disadvantage of such weapons systems, however, is the impossibility of mass use - to launch interceptor satellites into orbit, many launches of space rockets are needed, the capabilities of cosmodromes even of leading powers do not allow organizing more than several launches per day. Even if ballistic missiles are adapted for withdrawal, with the current military orbital groupings for a hundred military vehicles, not counting double ones, it will simply not be possible to quickly destroy the necessary satellites. Satellites equipped with reusable weapons, by and large, are still more theory than practice. Although the Russian "satellites-inspectors" of the "Nivelir" type 14F150 (the index and code are speculative) are suspected in the West of the presence of destruction systems on them, and not just inspection, however, of an unknown type, and there is still no solid proof of this. It is not very clear whether to attribute the "inspector" in general to this point of the classification, or to the following
4. "Space - space" (non-kinetic). The satellite is launched into orbit and uses non-kinetic weapons such as powerful microwaves, electromagnetic pulses, jamming systems, or other means to destroy or disable elements of another space-based system or its entirety.
There are no open sources of such a system, although Harrison notes that it will be difficult for outside observers to tell if this has happened. Thus, France, through the mouth of its Minister of Defense, accused Russia of committing this kind of action in 2018, which Paris described as an attempt to intercept military communications. True, the satellite that the French minister was nodding at is a relay satellite, not a spy.
This type of space weapon also includes, according to some information, the Russian type of "inspector satellites", but there is no evidence here either.
In general, there is a type of weapon in the classification, but it is not clear whether at least someone has it. However, several countries, including France, hinted or announced plans to create such.
5. Kinetic weapon "Space - Earth". Classics of science fiction, Hollywood cinema (like the movie "Under Siege 2" with Russian citizen Steven Seagal), political and journalistic "scarecrows" for the layman.
The ability to bombard a terrestrial target from space, according to ordinary people and Internet experts from the couch, will give true superiority to any country that receives and develops it. The damage can be done using the kinetic energy of the weapon itself, such as nuclear and conventional warheads launched from orbit, or something like laser beams. The US military has considered it in the past, but there are no open examples of how such a system was created or created by someone. Although ordinary people and sofa experts and various politicians like to suspect of this the late Space Shuttles (without the slightest reason, however), that is, the American reusable non-lethal reconnaissance apparatus X-37B.
In fact, such a weapon is absolutely futile. First, it is much easier to remove weapons in orbit from orbit than delivered ICBMs or SLBMs. It is easier to shoot down an orbital target, it has a stable trajectory and constant speed. If, of course, there are means to reach orbit.
Secondly, load shedding from orbit makes almost no sense at all. An orbital-based combat unit (even a single-turn or less than orbital, like the Soviet R-36orb) has a much larger mass, the required thermal protection, needs brake motors for deorbiting, and, most importantly, has a very low accuracy even with ballistic descent. It is impossible for the orbital unit to achieve the deviation values that ICBM warheads have long been capable of, or it is simply extremely difficult and will not pay for itself. Such a weapon is not a weapon of instant use either - it will take much longer to de-orbit than any ICBM to deliver "gifts" to an adversary. And it is not a surprise weapon either. Deorbiting will be detected before the launch of an ICBM is detected. As for the various "death rays" from orbit, the earth's atmosphere reliably protects against any such target strikes on the surface, at least the power of the rays that can be obtained by orbital means. Do not forget that the satellite does not hang over the desired point on the earth's surface and can, as a rule, visit it twice a day. Except for the geostationary orbit, but it takes a very long time to lower the load from there, tens of hours, and it is expensive, and you cannot save enough fuel. In general, this item is probably the most effective, but also the most useless in classification. At least for the next few decades.
6. Non-kinetic system "Space - space". A system that can engage a target by interfering with signals or by targeting spacecraft or ballistic missiles. The United States spoke about the desire to use space-based laser systems based on nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers for missile defense, but this was in the 80s and has long been forgotten because of its unfeasibility.
Two more points in conclusion
It seems to the author that Mr. Harrison has forgotten two more points. We are talking about kinetic and non-kinetic weapons "Air - Space". These are airborne anti-satellite missiles. A type of closed American topic with the development of an ASAT missile in service with a specially converted F-15, a Soviet theme with a Contact missile on a lightweight and converted MiG-31D and the newest Russian Burevestnik missile (not to be confused with the land-based nuclear cruise missile of the same name with a nuclear jet engine) in service with the MiG-31BM fighter, also modified. There was also a similar development for the Tu-160 heavy bomber, which in the 90s was already proposed as a launch platform for small satellites, but the project did not go then. As, however, and an attempt to convert the topic "Contact" by the same principle. But in recent times, Russia has returned to this topic.
This method of destroying satellites, like ground anti-satellite missiles, makes it possible to organize a massive attack on satellites. As well as airborne nonkinetic impact systems, in the form of blinding and equipment-spoiling laser installations on aircraft, they, together with ground-based "colleagues", are also capable of solving tasks of massive counteraction against the enemy's orbital grouping. Of course, this is only possible in wartime or just before the start of large-scale hostilities. But "small dirty tricks" to separate satellites by means of jamming or disabling an interfering satellite by an implicit method are already possible in peacetime. Even quite exotic methods are being discussed in the Western press, such as small survey satellites covering the optical means of observing the foe's satellite with polyurethane foam or paint. You can also a word that you can, they say, read in a Parisian toilet, write. But this is already quite exotic.
Harrison does not include in its scope the entire anti-space potential, specifically excluding weapons that are based on Earth and have an effect there on the communications and control of the orbital group:
A form of anti-space weapon that is used to destroy or degrade our space systems can be a cruise missile launched from a ground communications station or control room. This could prevent us from using space. But I would not call it a space weapon, because it never goes into space and does not affect objects in orbit.
Broadly speaking, the development and deployment of space weapons can be expected to continue in the near future, Harrison says, but with an emphasis on capabilities that are only used for defensive measures - even if, as he noted, “the same system may be used in a different capacity”.
In any case, it seems that all these anti-space weapons will be actively developed in the coming decades, and not only in our country, where they are already actively developing. But it is Russia, acting from the position of its extremely solid potential in this matter, that is in favor of limiting this race. It is strange that the Americans do not agree, apparently, they again cherish plans to bypass us in this aspect. And in vain they hope: Russia will not allow achieving superiority over itself in such an important area.
