This article is an attempt to tell about the "great mystery" of domestic developers of armored vehicles, relying on well-known facts that somehow became the property of the media and public opinion, about one of the most interesting and mysterious tanks.
In the now distant March 2000, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev visited Uralvagonzavod. From this moment on, let us recall the tank that has excited the minds for so long, gave rise to fantasies, various conjectures and confusion. We are talking about the "object 195", which is better known as the T-95. Igor Sergeev first voiced this name, announcing after visiting the military-industrial complex in Nizhny Tagil and Yekaterinburg that a fundamentally new main battle tank (MBT) T-95 had been created. The leading tank-building enterprise of Russia, Uralvagonzavod, presented the marshal with a full-scale model of the new vehicle, which he appreciated, noting the highest technical level and combat characteristics of the promising tank. The fact that the head of the military department named it T-95 then made it possible to draw a conclusion about the possibility of a new tank entering the troops, since such names are assigned to equipment already in service, and experimental and developed vehicles are usually designated by the word "object" with the assigned number.
So the unknown "object 195" became the T-95 tank for the public. Then, few people knew that the creation of a new machine was the result of the development of a promising project for a tank of the Soviet Union, which was launched within the framework of the research project "Improvement-88" (1988). The lead developer was the Ural Design Bureau of Transport Engineering (Nizhny Tagil), and the production of tanks was carried out by PO Uralvagonzavod (UVZ, Nizhny Tagil). The co-executors of the research work were a group of enterprises: FSUE "NIID", JSC VNITM, JSC "VNITI", JSC "Ural NITI", FSUE "Plant No. 9", FSUE PO "Barrikady", FSUE "TsNIIM", JSC VPMZ "Molot", " NPO "Electromashina" which included SKB "Rotor" and others. The assembly of the first prototype "Object 195" was carried out at UVZ in 1999 and 2000.
The tank was a classic design, but with an uninhabited turret, somewhat shifted towards the engine compartment. The new design of the automatic loader, traditional for Russian tanks, is located under the turret. The workplaces of the crew of three, the driver-mechanic, the gunner-operator and the commander were placed in a special armored capsule, fenced off by an armored bulkhead from the automatic loader and the turret. At that time, according to experts, within the framework of "Object 195" it was possible to solve the second most serious problem of modern tank building, due to the fact that the power reserves of existing tank guns of 125 mm (in Russia) and 120 mm (in the West) were practically exhausted. the tank received a new powerful cannon. It must be said that the possibility of equipping the next generation tanks with new guns of caliber up to 140 mm has already been studied abroad.
In the domestic development, all the main means of destruction of the enemy were located in a combat module with an all-revolving platform. The main armament of the T-95 consisted of a 152-mm 2A83 cannon (developed by the OKB of Plant No. 9 and VNIITM). The gun had an initial speed of an armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile of 1980 m / s and the ability to launch a guided missile through the barrel, the range of a direct shot was 5100 meters, and the armor penetration of the BPS reached 1024 millimeters of steel homogeneous armor. Ammunition was 36-40 rounds, types of ammunition: BPS, OFS, KUV. Characterizing the additional armament, it should be noted the 30-mm 2A42 cannon, which could be used as an alternative to the excessive consumption of the main ammunition, the gun was mounted in the combat module along with the 152-mm gun. At the same time, the automatic gun had its own guidance drives, both vertically and partially horizontally, that is, in a certain sector, the gun could be used independently. Machine-gun armament was also supposed to be one (two) 7, 62-mm machine gun (14, 5-mm machine gun), as well as anti-tank systems.
Protection of a tank with a combat weight of about 55 tons provided for several levels. Firstly, these are various camouflage-type coatings, such as anti-radar capes and various deforming coloration. Further, this is a complex of active protection, for the T-95 was developed KAZ "Standart" (combining the qualities of "Arena" and "Drozd"), at the same time the complex of active optoelectronic countermeasures "Shtora-2" operated. The next level included a complex of dynamic protection, - a universal modular DZ "Relikt" with 4S23 elements (developed by the Research Institute of Steel, Moscow). Further, 81-mm launchers 902B "Tucha" for setting up smoke and aerosol screens, anti-nuclear protection equipment. Tank armor included a variety of alloys, ceramics, and composites. Finally, the T-95 crew itself had protection in the form of the already mentioned capsule, which was made of armored titanium; titanium was also used in many structural elements, reducing the mass of the tank. In addition, there was a set of protective uniforms for tankers (of the "Cowboy" type).
From the equipment of the tank, one should also note the combat information system (developed by NPO Elektromashina) with an aiming system (developed by JSC KMZ), infrared devices, a thermal imager (developed by NPO Orion) and a radar. On one of the design variants of the tank, according to foreign data, it was planned to install a laser device for destroying the optics of sights and enemy observation devices (LASAR).
As part of the second stage of state tests of prototype No. 2 "object 195", NPO Elektromashina successfully completed tests of the following tank equipment: IUS-D, 1ETs41-1, APKN-A, RSA-1, 1ETs69, 3ETs18, BTShU1-2B, also completed tests of the following products: PUT, PUM, BUVO, RSA-1, BGD32-1, ED-66A, EDM-66, ED-43, AZ195-1.
The chassis of the T-95 for seven rollers, with a hydromechanical transmission. According to the TTZ, a hydromechanical transmission and a hydrostatic transmission (GOP) were used to create the tank. There were options for the engine. Option 1, "Object 195" - a prototype of an X-shaped diesel engine with a capacity of about 1500 hp. development of the design bureau of engines ChTZ (Chelyabinsk).
Option 1A, "object 195" - a prototype of an X-shaped diesel engine with a capacity of 1650 hp. development of KB "Barnaultransmash" (Barnaul). Option 2, "object 195" - gas turbine engine designed and manufactured by the design bureau and the plant. V. Ya. Klimov with a capacity of 1500 hp. The engine was supposed to provide road speed up to 75-80 km / h, ground speed over 50 km / h. The dimensions of the tank: the height of the equipment is about 3100 mm, the roof of the tower is within 2500 mm, the width is 3500 mm, the length of the hull is within 7800 mm.
This was the "object 195", or T-95, one of the latest developments of the Soviet tank school, a tank that was later predicted to have a great future in the nicknames "Russian" Tiger "and" Abrams kaput ".
In total, three copies of the T-95 were built, the first was an experimental factory copy and two copies, they were called No. 1 and No. 2 for state tests. They passed state tests, the conclusion of the state commission was positive, but with a list of comments to be eliminated. Basically, these are questions about the automatic loader, and, most importantly, about sighting systems, electronics, the tank was supposed to interact with drones and satellites.
After 2000, information about the tank periodically got into the press. Chronology of events:
2006 yearAccording to media reports, the tank was undergoing government tests; the start of serial production was planned for 2007.
2007 On December 22, the head of the armament service of the Russian Armed Forces, General of the Army Nikolai Makarov, announced that the T-95 tanks are being tested and will enter service with the Russian Armed Forces in 2009.
2008 It was planned to complete the tests of the prototype tank "Object 195". During the year, the second stage of state tests of model No. 2 of the prototype object 195 took place.
2010, summer. It was planned to show "Object 195" at the exhibition of weapons and military equipment in Nizhny Tagil.
2010 The appearance of the T-95 was expected to be made public and, possibly, put into service.
Came the "black date" in the history of the T-95. It's April 7, 2010. On this day, Mr. Popovkin, being then the deputy of Anatoly Serdyukov and the chief of armaments, announced the termination of funding for the development of the T-95 tank and the closure of the project. According to him, the project of the car is "obsolete". In addition, the tank was called too expensive and difficult for "conscripts" … It was a blow, a message that the already actually finished T-95 would not be accepted into service.
On July 14, 2010, in a number of media outlets (ITAR-TASS and others), there was information about a closed display of the T-95, which allegedly took place on the first day of the Defense and Defense exhibition in Nizhny Tagil. Information about this event turned out to be false: there was a closed display of the T-90M model, which was mistakenly perceived by some of the media as a display of the T-95.
In April 2011, information appeared in the media about the statement of the management of Uralvagonzavod with the intention to continue the development of the T-95 project independently, without the participation of the Russian Ministry of Defense. It should be emphasized that under Anatoly Serdyukov, the idea of widespread unification of armored vehicles and the creation of single "economical" combat platforms began to be implemented, the priority shifted to this plane, terms of reference were issued and funds were allocated for the development of new infantry fighting vehicles, new armored personnel carriers and a new tank. Economy reforms were implemented, and everything that was Soviet was often declared hopelessly outdated, respectively, and armored vehicles. At the same time, it was not taken into account that the defeat of the domestic military-industrial complex in the "dashing nineties" was not in vain, that communications were already broken both in industry and in design bureaus and science. Many technologies were lost, entire design schools perished. In addition, the Ministry of Defense, by ordering new equipment, simultaneously liquidated its own research institutes and test sites. Civilian "managers" of the military department of Serdyukov's times did not really delve into the fact that it is not enough to design and even build military equipment, it must be tested according to specially developed programs, first at closed training grounds, then in the army. Only after that, make a decision whether what has been done is suitable for service in the troops, or requires serious revision. The introduction of a new model into operation is a whole science, which was practically lost in a quarter of a century, since nothing new was received. Even tested and ready-to-manufacture samples of domestic technology were not in demand and were criticized. The then MO positioned itself only as customers (consumers-buyers), respectively, the executor - the industry, which had to provide them with a "trade product", completely ready for use. Under Anatoly Eduardovich, they directly said that if you cannot do what we need here and now, then we will buy abroad, and we bought, and were ready to buy a lot, including German Leopards. They regretted "kopecks" on their own, they threw billions on someone else's (until now, the story with "Mistrals" is a reminder of that era, no matter how anyone now justifies that "creativity").
What, then, were domestic manufacturers to do, in particular, with the T-95 tank?
It is useful to recall in meaning how independent military expert Aleksey Khlopotov described the situation. Since we now live under capitalism, the interests of the state and the army itself often fade into the background, personal interests and the interests of corporations can be put forward. So, the design bureau creates a new tank as an intellectual product, receives some deductions from the number of manufactured products, but basically the design bureau lives by developing its own development work. Therefore, the question arose here: to refine the T-95, adapting it to new requirements, a new element base, for different electronics, optics, thermal imagers, or put an end to the finished tank and insist that it is necessary to open development work to create a new machine … The second option was chosen, promising funding. Now the mercantile approach prevails, it is not very profitable to undertake modernization, accordingly, it is much more profitable to do something new, then even newer and more. Also on the T-95 Khlopotov noted that the following situation developed inside the design bureau: there was a chief designer, who was about to retire at that time, and there were "zealous applicants" who really wanted to get their new development. That the chief came to Kubinka - he stood up for the continuation of work on the "195th", convinced of the need to bring it to the series, and then his deputy - and stated the exact opposite. What could be the results? Plus the change of the management team in the corporation - until the new general figured out what was what, until he got into the picture, the developers of the T-95 received the ROC of the "Armata" cipher.
What kind of fantasies in images and technical characteristics have spawned inquisitive minds! Many got so lost in this that they could not distinguish where the fiction of technical design, where the option of modernizing the T-90, where the Black Eagle (object 640, deep modernization of the T-80U, practically a new tank), where the T-95 (object "195"), where and what is "Armata". And they are still confused.
Apparently, there is a sacred meaning in the fact that the T-95 tank became not only a great miracle and a great mystery of its time, but also an indicator of domestic tank building, a litmus of our problems in the military-industrial complex, military development and social order in general.
