In January 2021, a Ukrainian propaganda video titled "Pitfalls of T-64 Modernization" was released on YouTube, in which Sergei Zgurets, a fennel propagandist who was raised on Western grants, demonstrates that he understands little about technology. And even more so in tanks.
Secret notes of Ukraine
This passionate fan of squealing on Ukromov “condescended” to the Russian language and in this video he broadcasts in the great and mighty. With undisguised aplomb, he talks about the "great tank-building" power Ukraine with a long-term school of tank building and how it plans to modernize its tanks.
Immediately striking is the impudence with which he categorically broadcasts about the Ukrainian school of tank building, which allegedly created the world's best T-34, T-64 and some super-secret Nota tank (about Nota a little below).
The T-34 and T-64 tanks were indeed some of the best in the world at one time. But what does this newborn state have to do with them?
These tanks are the result of the colossal work of the Soviet school of tank building, which was stationed in Kharkov at a time when there was no Ukraine, and even more so no "great ukrov" even in sight.
I have always had pride in this high-class domestic school, to which I once had the honor to belong.
You are filled with the deepest contempt for the new-born fennel propagandists who are trying to impudently and unreasonably ascribe to themselves the merits of other people's schools. And to declare the existence of some supposedly "Ukrainian" school of tank building, which is a bluff. If they can create something meaningful in Ukraine after 1991, then it will be possible to talk about their supposedly "school".
The video shows T-64 tanks under a collaborationist banner, which for me is just a "yellow and blue rag" and nothing more. Which is completely equivalent to a fascist banner over a Soviet tank during the Great Patriotic War.
Ukraine has not been producing its tanks for a long time.
All the tanks that it has in service are made in the Soviet Union. And she just exploits them.
In the 90s, Ukraine supplied a batch of T-80UD (T-84) tanks developed in the Soviet Union under a Pakistani contract. Then, with difficulty, she realized the delivery of several dozen Oplot tanks to Thailand (modernization of the T-80UD). And made up to two dozen modernized T-80UD for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
This was the end of the Ukrainian tank building industry inherited from the USSR.
Now we can only talk about the modernization of still Soviet tanks, of which there are about one and a half thousand left in Ukraine. These are the T-64A (1968) and T-64B (1973) tanks.
There are no T-80UD tanks (1984) in Ukraine.
About 700 tanks produced in 1984-1991 remained in Russia. And now in storage. The last batch of 43 T-80UD was delivered against the Pakistani contract.
There is also no Oplot tank there. One sample of the tank, which Ukraine has undertaken to deliver to the United States, has been unable to leave the workshops of their plant since 2012 due to the complete collapse of production.
From the existing fleet of tanks, these are mainly T-64B.
Until 1973, not many T-64As were produced. And they dispersed to all military districts.
Nevertheless, Zgurets (through his thoughtlessness) asserts mainly about the alleged modernization of the T-64A.
In a conversation with him, a former employee of the KMDB Bogach objectively and intelligibly explains in what direction it is possible to modernize existing tanks, avoiding Zgurts's provocative questions.
Rich reveals options for upgrading tanks in terms of protection, mobility and firepower. At the same time, it leads to restrictions associated with the capabilities of the chassis and the permissible weight of the tank up to 46 tons.
On protection - this is the implementation of the latest achievements in the field of dynamic protection. There are no other acceptable options.
The most interesting modernization options may be in the direction of increasing mobility and firepower. And I would like to dwell on this in more detail. (Which is not covered in this video).
In addition, we will try to compare the capabilities of the tanks being modernized by Ukraine with the capabilities of Russian tanks, which have one common base - the T-64 tank.
Modernization of the power plant
An increase in the mobility of a tank is primarily an increase in engine power.
The T-64A and T-64B tanks were equipped with a 5TDF engine with a capacity of 700 hp. There are two options - installation of a 5TDFM engine with a capacity of 850 hp. or the 6TD-1 engine with a capacity of 1,000 hp.
There are no technical problems here. The 5TDFM engine was developed and tested as part of the tank back in the 80s. And the 6TD-1 engine was tested as part of a batch of tanks object 476 "Birch" back in 1976. And then it smoothly switched as a power plant to the T-80UD (1984).
The modernization of the power plant will be determined by the technological and organizational capabilities of the plant to produce the required number of engines. However, these very opportunities are just seriously undermined by the general collapse of industry in Ukraine.
To what extent can Ukrainian power plants be comparable in their characteristics with Russian ones?
The T-72 tanks of all modifications were equipped with a V-46 engine with a capacity of 780 hp. with. On the T-72B (1984), the V-84 engine with a capacity of 840 hp. with. S T-72B3 (2011) - V92S2 engine with a capacity of 1,000 hp. with. And on the T-72B3 (2014) and T-72B3M (2018) - the V92S2F engine with a capacity of 1,130 hp. with.
That is, the installation on the T-64 of the 6TD-1 engine with a capacity of 1,000 liters. with. will allow the power plant to reach the level of T-72B3 (2011). And in the future, go to the 6TD-2 engine with a capacity of 1,200 liters. with.
Is this modernization possible?
Doubtful. Since for its implementation it is necessary to restore production and provide appropriate funding, sources of which are not available.
And they are unlikely to appear in the near future.
Modernization of the LMS
An increase in firepower during modernization can go along the path of using a more powerful cannon, using more powerful ammunition and installing advanced FCS.
All Ukrainian and Russian tanks are equipped with 2A46 cannon modifications.
Let me remind you that in Ukraine, with very great difficulty, according to Soviet documentation and with the help of Russian specialists, it was possible to reproduce this gun. There are no other guns in Ukraine. And no one there is going to change it.
Ukraine's capabilities for the production of new ammunition (except for guided missiles) are practically zero.
Therefore, an increase in firepower can be made by upgrading the control system. Moreover, the Soviet backlog of a fairly high level remained on these systems.
The T-64A tank has long been outdated in terms of fire efficiency. And seriously inferior to the T-64B. As such, there is no LMS on it. Only a set of sights and observation devices. The gunner has a TPD-2-49 day sight with a single-plane stabilization of the field of view, without a laser rangefinder and without a TBV, a gun stabilizer, a TPN-3 gunner's non-stabilized night sight, a TKN-3 commander's day-night non-stabilized device and a closed remotely controlled anti-aircraft gun "Utes" with anti-aircraft sight PZU-5.
On the T-64B tank was installed the first in the Soviet Union full-size OMS 1A33 with a 1G42 Ob day sight with two-plane stabilization of the field of view, a laser rangefinder, an optoelectronic guidance channel (together with a radio channel) of a 9K112 Cobra complex guided missile, TBV, modification the TPN-3 gunner's night sight and the commander's T-64A sighting system.
On the T-80UD tank, the next generation OMS 1A42 was implemented, featuring a modernized gunner's sight 1G46 Irtysh with a laser guidance channel for a 9K119 Reflex guided missile and a commander's sighting system based on the TKN-4S Agat-S day-night sight with single-plane stabilization of the field of view and a closed anti-aircraft installation with a PZU-7 sight.
For the upgraded Oplot tank, a commander's sighting system was developed and implemented based on a panorama with a two-plane system for stabilizing the field of view and a thermal imaging channel, and a thermal imaging sight was installed instead of the gunner's night sight. But this tank never made it to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
All this suggests that tanks T-64B, T-80UD (T-84) and "Oplot" are quite advanced MSA, which have not lost their relevance today. There is the technical potential for a serious modernization of the MSA of the existing generation of tanks.
But at the same time, there are also a number of organizational and production difficulties.
An increase in the firepower of the T-64A suggests itself, at least to the level of the T-64B. But this is impossible to realize.
The fact is that the production of the Ob and Cobra complexes was carried out at factories in Russia. And it has long been discontinued. (Instead of them, Irtysh and Reflkeks are issued). In addition, the Cobra guided missiles were not produced in Ukraine either. Consequently, the existing fleet of T-64B tanks, if these tanks are in satisfactory technical condition, can only be used in an artillery version without guided weapons.
Ukraine is lucky in other ways.
In 1989, the Cherkassk Instrument-Making Plant was transferred from Vologda to the documentation on organizing the serial production of Irtysh and Agat-S sights for T-80UD tanks. And within the framework of the Pakistani contract, their production was organized there.
The rest of the LMS elements (such as the gun stabilizer, TBV and a number of others) were reproduced according to the available documentation. And on the basis of the Reflex rocket, the Kombat rocket was developed and its production was organized.
Now Ukraine is theoretically able to produce all the components of the FCS of the T-80UD tank and use them to modernize the FCS of the T-64A and T-64B tanks, bringing them to the level of the T-80UD.
But this requires the restoration of production capacity and the necessary funding.
Comparison of the FCS of Ukrainian and Russian tanks
Let's see how the modernization of the T-64 tanks, which is possible in Ukraine, may look successful in comparison with the modernization of the Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks.
On the T-72A tank (1973), the sighting system was completely borrowed from the T-64A tank.
On the T-72B (1985), a not entirely successful attempt was made to create an OMS that is not inferior to the OMS T-64B. A laser rangefinder was built into the gunner's sight and received a TPD-K1 sight. Instead of TBV, a ballistic corrector was installed with all its shortcomings, the 9K120 Svir laser beam-guided weapon system, which provides rocket firing only from the spot, was implemented in a 1K13 day-night non-stabilized sight, and the commander still had ancient modifications of the TKN-3 device.
It was only on the T-72B3 (2011) that the FCS began to form on the basis of a full-fledged gunner's sight "Sosna-U" with a thermal imaging channel and a laser guidance channel for the Reflex missile. But it was installed in a terribly inconvenient place instead of 1K13, retaining as a sight - a TPD-K1 backup. The commander's poor sighting complex has not changed.
On the T-72B3M (2018), a full-fledged sighting complex for the commander was finally introduced based on a panorama with a thermal imaging channel and the possibility of further transition to the Kalina fire control system.
The T-90 (1993) was not cunning for a long time. And they just moved the MSA from the T-80UD tank.
And on the T-90M (2019), a new-generation fire control system "Kalina" was introduced, which includes the "Sosna-U" sight and the commander's panoramic sight "Falcon Eye".
Comparing the OMS of the Ukrainian and Russian fleets of existing tanks, we can conclude that the main tank of the T-64B APU is at the level of the Russian T-72B, the T-80UD at the T-90 level, and the "Oplot" at the T-72B3M level.
It should be noted right away that the Russian army is beginning to gradually switch to the modernized T-72B3M and T-90M, the advantages of which in terms of fire efficiency are beyond doubt.
Regarding the FCS (not yet accepted for service) of the Armata tank, it can be noted that it will not differ fundamentally from the FCS T-90M in terms of its main characteristics. There has not yet been a serious gap there. At the same time, the tank does not have a single device with an optical channel, even duplicating the main sights. And this can be assessed as a disadvantage.
The modernization of Ukrainian tanks, despite the existing technical groundwork, is impossible. Due to the collapse of production and lack of necessary funding.
To carry out the modernization of tanks, it is necessary to organize production not only at the tank plant, but also the production of all components at several dozen factories, which, alas, is not feasible in the conditions of a collapsing state.
So this modernization can be viewed purely in theoretical terms. And nothing more.
Regarding the statement of the ukropagandist Zgurts about the super-secret promising Ukrainian tank "Nota", which never existed, one can only laugh merrily.
In the 80s, the last promising Soviet tank "Boxer" was really developed at the KMDB, the work on which was curtailed in 1991 due to the collapse of the Union and the impossibility of organizing a full cycle of development of such a complex product in Ukraine, requiring the involvement of specialists in various branches of science and technology. which have never been in Ukraine.
According to open information, later R&D "Nota" was carried out, within the framework of which pictures of a promising tank were drawn without involving subcontractors to work out the units and systems of the tank, without which it is impossible to create a tank.
With these pictures it all ended.
And Zgurets has been talking about some kind of pseudo-promising tank for several years now.
