As strange as it may sound, but Russia with its geographic location, economics and vulnerabilities should be viewed as the weakest in potential naval wars. In fact, if it does, it will not always be so, but it will be so often. Russia cannot quickly create a fleet comparable to the Japanese. The Baltic Fleet will not outnumber the squadron of forces that NATO can use in the Baltic. Turkey with its economy and population, with access to Western technologies and shipbuilding will always be able to create a more powerful fleet than our Black Sea one. Or at least more numerous. In addition, any country at war with Russia will be able to count on this or that assistance from the Western countries - always. And this is not to mention a hypothetical clash with the United States, if it can not be brought to a nuclear escalation.
We are weaker, it is better to proceed from this. And even the timely transfer of reserves from other fleets to the problematic theater of operations, even powerful strike aircraft on the shore should not plunge us into illusions. We should start from the very beginning from the bad - we must win in conditions of the numerical and economic superiority of the enemy, and win with a crushing score, quickly and scary for our rivals.
Is it possible? There is a number of, so to speak, “principles of the second order”, or those rules that help to achieve the main goal in war, voiced earlier - domination at sea, or by blockade or other displacement of the enemy from the sea, or its destruction.
It makes sense to list them, because the operations of the weakest side in the war at sea have a chance of success only when it sticks to them. They do not guarantee her victory, of course, because the opponent will not play giveaway. But they give the weaker side a chance, and in some cases, considerable. By not guaranteeing victory, they make it achievable.
Speed versus force
In the summer of 1914, a detachment of two German warships, the battle cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau, passed the Dardanelles to, based on Turkish territory, conduct military operations against the Entente. In the specific circumstances prevailing at that time - against Russia.
In theory, Russia had a significant advantage in the Black Sea over two German ships. But there was a nuance. Both "Goeben" and "Breslau" were significantly faster than any Russian battleship. And stronger than any Russian ship that could catch up with them.
As a result, all battles between German ships and Russians ended in the same way - when they fell under the powerful fire of Russian ships, the Germans simply broke away, dropped out of the battle, and that's it. This went on throughout the entire war, which "Goeben" survived safely. The superiority in speed of the more modern German ship made it possible to survive several battles with the Russian fleet, and no firepower of the Russian battleships helped - the speed helped the Germans simply avoid the battle when they did not consider it necessary to enter it, or when they wanted to get out of it. No numerical and firepower superiority helped the Russians, just as the tactical skill of the commanders, contrary to popular estimates today, actually took place.
You can find many similar examples in history. The side with the superiority in speed is either not vulnerable at all, or requires completely disproportionate forces for its defeat. This is especially evident when the action takes place in the open ocean.
But this is at the tactical level. And what about "a level above"? Does speed matter operatively?
It has.
Consider a situation when an aircraft carrier strike group in the open ocean needs to destroy a naval strike group, or drive it into a neutral port, where it will be interned. For this, it is necessary to attack it with aircraft from the air, ensuring the defeat of at least one target in each sortie. At first glance, everything is obvious, but in fact, the commander of the aircraft carrier group must resolve a number of issues.
Let's not talk about reconnaissance, maintaining contact and issuing target designation - this is not as easy as it seems, but it is not impossible either, we will simply omit this question. We consider it resolved.
Let's think about something else.
For a strike on the KUG to be just a blow, and not a suicidal throw of a bunch of planes under fire from several powerful air defense systems, it must be a massive strike. The maximum number of aircraft must be lifted into the air, and they must strike the enemy together, overloading his air defense systems and making it impossible to repel the attack. At first glance, this is what aircraft carriers exist for, but for such an attack, the KUG must be within the combat radius of the carrier-based aircraft.
Let us ask the question: what if the speed of the ACG at the transition is always and in all cases higher than the speed of the ACH? For example, 5 knots? These five knots mean an increase in the gap between the KUG and AUG by 220 kilometers every day - almost half the combat radius of the F / A-18 loaded in the shock version and without outboard tanks. And a day later - almost a full radius. At the same time, the AUG must go at a speed that excludes the use of its submarines for its protection, and if the pursued KUG passed over the curtain of its submarines, then the AUG chasing it risks running into this curtain, and suddenly.
So how to hit the target under these conditions? It is not worth arguing that this is impossible at all, the reality is more complicated than a race in a straight line. However, the above example is a good example of how sometimes speed can be used. Let us assume that the "integral" AUG is twice as strong. But she cannot reach the target, at least at this moment in time!
As a result, it is necessary to carry out a whole naval operation, to remove ships and naval groups from other tasks … ultimately making it easier for the enemy to operate in other parts of the theater of operations.
Equally important is the speed with which a ship group or squadron moves to the required theater of operations. Any ship has a maximum speed, and there is an economical speed at which long-distance transitions are made. The higher the latter, the higher the speed of deployment of naval groupings.
As a result, a stronger, but slower opponent faces an unpleasant prospect - he is always late. The fast opponent attacks the forces he sees fit and leaves with impunity. Of course, every battle for him contains the same risk as for the "slow" one - after all, missiles and planes are faster than ships in any case. But between fights, it is the speed that determines who will drive whom into a desperate situation.
The weak should be faster. It must be faster during any operation, it must be faster during deployment. And this means the need in shipbuilding to build on the data of the enemy - to wait until it becomes clear with what maximum speed his ships can go, and what is the speed of economic progress, and then hand over the ships that are superior to the enemy in this.
Let us illustrate this statement with another example - it is necessary to take control of a certain narrowness, for example, a strait. One side sends there a nuclear submarine or two, the other - a pair of anti-submarine corvettes and non-nuclear submarines, with the task of destroying all military surface and all submarine targets without exception after a certain moment. Does it matter who comes to narrowness faster? The answer is obvious.
If we abstract from speed as a tactical property of a ship, then we can say that the enemy needs to be ahead of everything - in the speed of analyzing the situation, in the speed of decision-making, in the speed of mobilization, in the speed of transmission of orders and other information. A fast opponent will be able to impose his own pace, set it, and a strong, but slow one will have to follow him, he will be led, and at a certain moment he will be brought to some sad ending for himself. Like a submarine ambush.
So, weak rule number one is to be faster than the enemy in every sense - from the speed with which a ship can move in one mode or another, to the speed of decision-making.
This implies, among other things, delegating to the commanders of ships and formations a few more powers than they have now.
And also the fact that all battleships of the first rank under construction must have high speed indicators. As well as some supply ships.
Raiding operations as the basis of offensive operations
Having achieved an advantage in speed, it is worth implementing it first of all with raid actions. The article "Raiders against cruisers" the opportunities unused by the navy of Nazi Germany in the war at sea were considered, in the form of raids against the warships of the British, and not against their convoys. In the case of the weaker side, such actions are necessary - it is necessary to "balance the balance", force the enemy to suffer losses greater than you yourself bear and distract his combat fleet from important tasks, for example, from protecting communications.
We proceed from the premise that the purpose of the fleet is dominance at sea, and, consequently, the raid should be aimed at destroying the enemy's warships, his naval aviation, or the infrastructure necessary for their combat use.
At the same time, the raid should not be confused with the raid, which is its special case - the raid is limited in time, and its finale is the withdrawal and separation from the enemy's pursuit, but in its course it is quite possible to fight with a weak part of the enemy's forces until it is completely destroyed.
When faced with equal or superior enemy forces, raiders leave at the expense of speed. Having found weak enemy forces, they destroy them in battle. This is non-negotiable and is the basis of their methods. It is this feature that distinguishes the raid from other offensive operations and will allow us, the weak side, to save forces in a war with the strong side. At the same time, this approach does not negate the importance of the battle - having discovered the enemy and deciding to destroy him (not just about the attack!), The raider compound may well, and, basically, should fight with him until he is destroyed.
You cannot write detailed instructions for such hostilities, each case is unique, and strongly depends on specific circumstances. Let us indicate only some of the possibilities that can be used, but which are not all about.
Raiders strike with their own forces. The task of the raid squad of ships is to find and destroy the enemy. Taking advantage of the speed advantage, relying on aerial reconnaissance from the "coast", satellite observation data, neutral traffic in which you can hide, fishermen at fishing grounds, among which you can also hide, reconnaissance with the help of passive (non-radiating) means, raiders should be at a distance missile salvo from the enemy forces to be destroyed, and then destroy them with a series of successive attacks. At a predetermined point in time, the raiders leave for the area, the dominance of the sea in which is already ensured, even if it is a coastal area near its own coast. From there, a new raid takes place.
Raiders bring in basic strike aircraft. The task of the raiders in such a scenario is only to find the enemy forces to be destroyed, and then issue target designations to strike them. After delivering a series of attacks, raiders should, if possible, assess their result.
Raiders use themselves as bait. In this case, the goal of the raiders is to "drag" the enemy forces behind them, which need to be ambushed. To do this, the raiders conduct a search for them, a demonstrative attack or several attacks alternating with retreats to a safe range, having the task of provoking a pursuit of enemy forces and "drag them on the tail" to the place of destruction, for example, where it will be possible to apply a combined shock from under the water and from the air.
Under normal conditions, it is very difficult to organize a joint strike by aircraft and submarines. In Soviet times, such actions were considered the basis of the struggle at sea, but in fairness it must be admitted that the complexity of organizing such actions was prohibitively high even during exercises. In a real war, this would be almost impossible. Except for the situation when our forces "lead" the enemy behind them "to the slaughter" and know exactly the time and place in which he should be in the course of this chase.
Raiders create a threat that forces the enemy to crush forces. In this case, the goal of the raiders is to attack something that will force the enemy to withdraw part of the forces from the direction of concentration of the main efforts, and to throw part of the forces against the raiders. This can be an intensive operation against supply ships and ships of the floating rear, demonstrative actions on enemy communications, demonstrative actions far from the places of main battles, weakly protected bases, with strikes along the coast, or other actions that leave the enemy no choice but to start a transfer of our forces on the secondary direction, facilitating the actions of our forces on the main one. Or, as an option, come to terms with the destruction of coastal infrastructure, the loss of rear ships, and so on.
Any combination of such actions can be used, and they can be carried out on any scale, including the deployment of all theater forces in one large raid operation. There are only two fundamental conditions - to break away from superior or equal forces, without getting involved in battle with them, and to have combat ships, naval aviation and infrastructure important for waging war at sea as the main target of attack. The rest is optional and depending on the course of hostilities (in some cases, troop transports and airborne troops on the transition will turn out to be a more important target, but outside such circumstances, the number one goal is the enemy navy).
What is the target of the raiders' attack? Separate enemy warships, weak and small surface combat groups, escort warships as part of large and strong formations, occupying extreme positions in a combat formation, ships of the floating rear, coastal infrastructure - docks, fuel depots, ships in bases, located at sea airfields aviation, especially anti-submarine, which is the number one target in all cases and is subject to complete and unconditional destruction. For this purpose, cruise missile strikes are delivered at such ground targets.
Theoretically, the commander of a group of raiders can get involved in an operation against superior enemy forces, but only on conditions under which he does not have to take an open battle with it, in which the enemy can use all his capabilities.
So, in the course of a storm, if it lasts long enough, the raiders can, without hiding, try to approach the aircraft carrier strike group at the distance of a missile salvo.
Essential for their success is well-organized reconnaissance and well-tested interaction with both base aviation and submarines.
There may, of course, be other options, up to provoking a powerful raider formation to attack carrier-based aircraft against itself, in order to destroy as many enemy naval pilots as possible in a subsequent battle and then break away from its ships URO, thus reducingthe value of the enemy aircraft carrier to zero. It must be admitted that this is a very dangerous type of action, with unpredictable consequences, but it can also give a lot.
Let's designate the rule of the weak number two - to conduct intensive raids aimed at destroying enemy ships, ships of the floating rear, its naval aviation and coastal infrastructure important for the combat capability of the fleet. At the same time, in the course of raids, one should not get involved in battles with equal or superior enemy forces, and one must immediately "jerk" away from his forces, after they have suffered losses planned by the commander of the raiders
The massive use of the raid as a type of hostilities will reduce the enemy's numerical superiority, prevent the concentration of his forces in the main direction, disrupt large-scale offensive operations, alleviate the position of Russian forces in the theater of operations, receive additional intelligence information and undermine the enemy's morale.
Their fleet on its own against our military in general
It may sound like a commonplace, but it is not a commonplace. According to domestic military science (or the principles of military art - the dispute between science and art in military affairs is eternal, we will bypass this issue), success in hostilities is achieved by the forces of interspecific groupings of the armed forces, which include the branches of the armed forces and forces fighting in close cooperation with each other …
Moreover, in such military conflicts as, for example, the Syrian one, this principle finds a certain embodiment.
Let us ask ourselves, however, a few questions.
When was the last time a joint landing operation of the fleet, marines, airborne forces, and ground forces was practiced, in which each branch of troops and forces would be used as intended? When was the last time ground forces tankers with their weapons and equipment landed behind the Marines? When did the tank-reinforced marines break through to join the airborne regiment of the Airborne Forces? When was a motorized rifle battalion of ground forces actually assigned a ship post for adjusting artillery fire and then acted in its interests, with real live fire on request? On the fly, I recall the recent exercises of the Caspian Flotilla, but the scale there was, to put it mildly, not the same, and the Caspians worked with their own marines, which greatly facilitates interaction. Someone may argue that such things are probably somewhere and someone is being worked out at the command post, but the command post are never sufficient to work out all the nuances of combat use, and, having played the landing forces on the maps by the forces of a couple of divisions, then it is necessary to actually land on the ground at least a couple of battalions.
Or is it worth recalling the combat use of US Army helicopters from US Navy ships during the Gulf War in 1991 (see article “Air fighters over ocean waves. On the role of helicopters in the war at sea ). For us, this is impossible even technically, our helicopters of the Aerospace Forces, unlike naval ones, are not equipped with mechanisms for folding the rotor blades. This complicates their transportation by air, or by land transport, and hangar storage, but that's how we have it.
Let us venture to suggest the following.
The level of interspecies interaction, which we consider to be optimal, is really insufficient. At least, if you look through the "prism" of the war at sea - for sure. The theory, which is absolutely correct, does not find its full embodiment in practice. The reason for this is the absolute dominance of natives of the Ground Forces in the command structures of the Armed Forces and the subordinate position of the fleet and the Aerospace Forces in relation to them. The bottom line is that tank commanders and infantrymen do what they can. They plan ground operations with air support, and where necessary, they plan support from the sea too - transportation under guard, tactical landing, cruise missile strike from ships, as long as they are there, shelling the enemy. The full potential of the Armed Forces other than the ground forces is not being used.
I would like to look at an air offensive operation in which ground forces perform auxiliary tasks, but none of our large exercises did this.
From the point of view of war at sea, we are interested in the following - it is necessary that the enemy, superior to the Russian Navy at sea, would be forced to resist with his naval forces not only our fleet, but also our aerospace forces and ground forces.
At the same time, it is critically important to prevent the opposite, so that our fleet would come under attack not only by the enemy's naval forces, but also by its army units.
Let's look at historical examples of how it looks. Let's start with the most recent example. Watching the video.
This is the explosion of Georgian boats in Poti, committed by the forces of the Airborne Forces of the Russian Army in August 2008, operating in isolation from the main forces. That is, the task that, in theory, the fleet should perform - the establishment of dominance at sea, by blockading or destroying the enemy's fleet, in this case, was performed by the army. At the same time, one must understand that the army did not carry out a large-scale occupation of this territory.
Question: what if the base were well guarded, for example, by the forces of an infantry regiment? How then could the Airborne Forces destroy the boats? In our case, the Airborne Forces are armed with self-propelled guns 2S9 "Nona", with a 120-mm cannon, capable of using both mines and special shells. The ships could be fired upon from a long distance.
Then question number two arises: what if the base is far from the front line? But the Airborne Forces is a mobile branch of the military, a small detachment can simply be thrown out by parachute with equipment, the only truly critical moment here is that the Russian Aerospace Forces must maintain air supremacy over the zone of flight, landing and landing operations. This, of course, is not easy, but it is also not worth considering the achievement of such an impossibility.
Of course, the enemy will move reserves to destroy the landing, transfer additional air forces, and make every effort to block and destroy it. That is, the landing squad after completing the task must be evacuated. How? By sea, of course, taking it off the coast to at least the same large landing craft, and bringing it to a safe area under the protection of airborne fighter aircraft.
What does this method of action give? For the destruction of ships, it does not require large naval forces (which will have to fight against other naval groupings of the enemy), nor numerous strike aircraft, which will have to break through the air defense of a naval base, and when waging a war with a serious enemy, also ship air defense., which, as a rule, is distinguished by serious power. It does not require the expense of a large number of scarce cruise missiles.
Naturally, such operations do not always make sense, but in the conditions of a "trishka caftan", which our Armed Forces will turn into during a war with a serious enemy, when there will be a shortage of ships and aircraft, such operations will sometimes be possible, and sometimes it will be meaning.
Moreover, as can be seen from the description above, they can be carried out in the format of the same raid, not aimed at holding territories or capturing fortified objects. Troops that have completed the raid are evacuated and then can be used for other purposes.
There are other examples as well.
So, during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet consistently lost bases and repair capacities under the attacks of the German and Romanian armies from land. In fact, the fleet did not have an adequate enemy at sea, and the German aviation, no matter how destructive it was, could not completely stop the movement of ships, vessels and floating craft of the fleet. In fact, for large surface ships this could only be done by our own Supreme Command Headquarters, in response to the loss of three ships in battle - an unpleasant episode, but not critical for the combat effectiveness of the fleet (this was the case for the British and the Japanese, but they continued to fight). What would have happened if the Germans had been lucky in their attack on the Caucasus? If they went to the Turkish border? The entire fleet would be lost at the bases. At the same time, they did not have a single significant surface ship in the theater of operations. And, I must say, they were very close to this achievement.
The events in the Black Sea are an example of how the weakest side at sea, with a strong ground army and air force, can eliminate the enemy's fleet from the sea without having its own fleet at all. The Germans did not succeed, but they almost succeeded. This, of course, does not mean that you need to "with fire and sword" go thousands of kilometers along the coast of the enemy country for the sake of domination at sea - after all, domination at sea is not an end in itself. But this is a great demonstration that it is not only the fleet that can help in the fight against the enemy fleet. And the RF Armed Forces should be ready to carry out such operations, prepare for them, and not be afraid to carry them out in conditions when it turns out to be justified and the risks are acceptable. In some cases, both the Airborne Forces with motorized infantry and the marines can destroy enemy forces at sea. Even if the enemy is stronger.
And, of course, one should not forget that near the Russian shores or the territory occupied by Russian troops in battles (this does not have to be Russia, we can and can attack in some cases) the aerospace forces should also work over the sea. At the very least, it would be logical if some tasks completely fall on them. Part of the cruise missile strikes on enemy bases, attacks of convoys, amphibious troops, transports, air mining, strikes on weak ship groups and individual ships within the combat radius of base aircraft without refueling should be fully entrusted to the Aerospace Forces, freeing up the naval base strike aircraft for truly difficult missions - strikes against large groupings of surface ships at sea, at a great distance from the coast.
There is another hypothetical scenario for the battle of ground units with the enemy's fleet. As you know, Russia has airborne troops that are unique in their capabilities. Our country is the only one where the Airborne Forces, having landed, can fight as mechanized troops. This makes it possible to solve problems with a smaller force than a completely foot assault without heavy weapons.
It is quite possible, in some cases, to seize enemy territory by airborne assault, for example, islands, which, for psychological reasons, the enemy then cannot but recapture. If the Aerospace Forces do not allow the enemy to quickly recapture such island territories back with their airborne assault, then he will have only two choices - to recapture them by conducting a large amphibious assault operation or "leave it as it is" with an eye to reclaiming its territory sometime in the future.
An example of such a territory during World War II is the Aleutian Islands. The Japanese managed to pull off large forces of the US Navy to this dead-end and irrelevant for the course of the war Archipelago. What is most interesting, realizing the impossibility of holding these territories, they evacuated some of their garrisons.
In modern warfare, the capture of Kiska and Attu is, in principle, possible in the form of an air strike, and subsequent airborne assault. When the Shemya airfield is destroyed and the Adak airfield is seized, the same Americans will face enormous difficulties in striking these territories, and they can only be liberated by attacking from the sea, as well as at the WWII entrance. However, today there is such a technique as coastal missile systems, which allow attacking ships that have come too close to the islands, in the presence of target designation.
In fact, very small groups of ground forces, dispersed among the rocks, can force the US Navy to fight the Aerospace Forces and coastal anti-ship missiles without distracting the Navy for these operations, with the exception of the sea raids described above, which will be facilitated by the fact that the Americans will not be able to leave the islands and search they won't be in the ocean. Raids, in turn, will help, if necessary, to evacuate the troops defending the islands.
This, again, does not mean that the Airborne Forces should capture the Aleuts in the event of a limited clash with the United States. After all, the fate of Attu's garrison is well known today. This is simply a demonstration of the principle of how you can force the enemy fleet to fight against ground forces and incur losses, "freeing" the Navy for active offensive operations.
It is worth noting that during the Cold War, Americans feared such options. In all adjustments to the Reagan Administration's "Naval Strategy", there was a categorical demand in the very first hours of the conflict or before it to transfer two infantry brigades to the Aleuts in order to make such a trick on the part of the Russians impossible. Because the expenditure of resources and the loss of time to clean up the Aleutian Islands looked disproportionately large compared to the benefits from this, and it was impossible not to recapture them back in the 80s for internal political reasons. At the same time, the Americans remembered how the Japanese during the Second World War simply evacuated the Kyski garrison and took it out from under attack without a fight.
One way or another, but for a side with a weak fleet, creating conditions under which the enemy's fleet will be destroyed by ground forces and the air force, without much involvement of naval forces, is one of the ways to "align the balance." And, as you can easily see, these operations also require speed. They will be obtained only if the enemy does not have time to react ahead of time.
Thus, let us formulate the third rule of the weak - it is necessary to destroy the enemy's naval forces by forces of ground units and aviation (not naval) in all cases when it is possible from the point of view of the predicted effect and risks. This will free up the naval forces for other operations and reduce the enemy's superiority in forces
Russia, with all its access to the sea, is still a huge land mass. You can try to come up with such a strategy of war at sea for her, where ground troops would not be needed. But, apparently, these will be unsuccessful attempts.
It should be specially noted that such operations are the "strong point" of the Americans. We can believe in such opportunities or not, but they will do it en masse, and we should be ready for this on the one hand, and not “be ashamed” to do it ourselves on the other.
We are no worse than the Americans. There are simply fewer of us.
Strikes against the "key links" of the enemy's military power
One of the possibilities of the weak to weaken the strong is to concentrate efforts on strictly defined components of his military power.
For example, the United States currently has a colossal weak link in the war at sea - the absence of any escort force. They are not just not there, and they are nowhere to be found within a reasonable time frame. In the event of serious involvement of the United States in the war on the ground, another "Achilles heel" will be added - a huge shortage of transport ships, and the crews for them, in particular, now the Americans do not even have people to ensure rotation of all the crews of their high-speed transports, oh there is no question of covering losses. Those interested should read the article. "There will be no ground invasion" v "Independent Military Review".
Some time ago, these facts, having become public knowledge, were even able to cause slight panic among the concerned public in the United States. The panic has subsided, but the problem still remains, and no one is solving it. The future American frigates planned by the Pentagon will turn out to be too expensive for a mass escort, and there is no talk of building new transports.
This is the weak link. An aircraft carrier can be any formidable, but planes cannot fly without fuel. Missile destroyers cannot maneuver without it. And there is nothing to protect the tankers.
Many navies in the world have such weak links. Some IUDs in the world may have more than one. Targeted actions against these weak links can disorganize the enemy's naval forces and deprive them of the opportunity to fight. At least for a while. But a lot can be done during this time.
This strategy also has a flaw. While there is a hunt for tankers and supply ships (or something else - it doesn't matter), the enemy acts relatively freely. His hands are banally untied. As a result, the first blow from the side of his naval forces has to simply be taken, without "softening". No matter how strong he is. Thus, taking such actions, it is necessary to weigh the risks as accurately as possible.
The Americans themselves fear that the tactics of "auxiliary cruisers" - armed civilian ships equipped with container missile launchers, could be used against them. Repeatedly in the specialized press and media resources, the question was raised that countermeasures are needed against such tactics, but so far there are no countermeasures. Echoes of this state of affairs were mentioned in the article “Return of Surface Raiders. Is it possible? ".
However, on the "auxiliary cruisers" the light did not converge like a wedge. A heavy tanker or transport moving without cover can be destroyed by conventional bombs from a strategic bomber. He will not be able to withstand such an attack, and in fact, the only thing that is needed for such operations is training of pilots of the Aerospace Forces in the use of bombs, and, of course, that a detachment of forces would be allocated for actions in the interests of the fleet. In the case of the Russian Navy, it is of interest for such operations to equip the Tu-142 with bombs and appropriate sights. Such a measure will allow the fleet to manage on its own in some cases. According to media reports, work on equipping the Tu-142 with the Hephaestus high-altitude aiming system is already underway. It remains to wait for the installation of the underwing suspension units of the weapon.
It is interesting how this threat was seen earlier in the United States.
When the USSR acquired Tu-95RTs reconnaissance target designators, American strategists saw this as a threat to convoys with military equipment, which were supposed to supply NATO troops fighting in Europe against the Soviet Army and the ATS armies. They assumed that the Tu-95RTs would track down convoys and direct Soviet nuclear submarines in the Atlantic to them. It was believed that the threat would soon become even greater as the Russians would equip their strategic bombers with anti-ship missiles.
To combat this evil, the concept of Sea Control Ship was even born - an escort aircraft carrier capable of carrying 8-9 anti-submarine helicopters, and four Harriers. The concept was tested on the LPH-9 Guam landing helicopter carrier. The experiments turned out to be successful, but in the late seventies, the Americans realized that the target of the Soviet submarines would be their surface warships, including aircraft carriers, and, if possible, SSBNs, and not transport in the Atlantic. And the "ships of naval control" never appeared. Although, in an amusing way, the X-22 anti-ship missiles on the Tu-95 were eventually "registered" on a special "naval" modification of this aircraft - Tu-95K-22 … Now these vehicles have been removed from service and destroyed.
Today, many current and former officers of the US Navy and the US Coast Guard see that the threat exists, but apparently do not represent it to themselves in full.
The command structures of the Navy, relying on intelligence data, will not have difficulty finding such vulnerabilities in any enemy, and planning actions against them. If there is an opportunity to deprive a strong enemy of the ability to fight, at least for a while, then it must be used.
Let us formulate the fourth rule of the weak. It is necessary to identify the critical vulnerabilities of the enemy's naval forces, assess whether it is possible to divert sufficient forces to strike against these vulnerabilities, without a critical reduction in defenses in the directions of the main attack from the enemy, and, if possible, to strike at them. An example of such vulnerabilities in the US Navy is the lack of escort forces for tankers and integrated supply vessels
Other opponents have other vulnerabilities. They need to be used.
Offensive mining
The history of war at sea is full of examples of how offensive mining allowed the weak side to inflict losses on the strong, and in some cases even deprive the strong side of dominance at sea, which, according to its strength, could well establish. Perhaps the brightest from the point of view of the insignificance of the advancing forces against the background of the attacked forces is the operation of the German and Finnish navies to blockade the Baltic Fleet of the USSR during the Second World War.
On June 22, 1941, the Germans generally had a more powerful military fleet than the USSR in the Baltic. Come to the Baltic Sea "Tirpitz", "Scharnhorst", "Gneisenau", "Prince Eugen", "Admiral Hipper", "Admiral Scheer", supported by a dozen destroyers, and a squadron of submarines, and the Baltic Fleet would not have shone. After such an operation, and taking into account the domination of the Luftwaffe in the air, it was possible to immediately land near Leningrad.
But the Germans, like the Russians, did not think in terms of "domination of the sea." They chased the chimeras of war on communications. By 1941, the German Navy was fundamentally unprepared for such actions in any way. They did something different, however.
On June 12, a detachment of German ships, passing according to documents as "Group" Nord ", began redeployment to the skerries of Finland. At the same time, another group called Cobra started the same thing. By June 18, the group "Nord" disguised itself in the skerries near Turku (in the then documents of Abo), and the "Cobra" in the skerries near Porkkala-Udd. The group "Nord" consisted of three minelayers - "Tannenberg" "Hansenstadt Danzig" and "Brummer", a flotilla of torpedo boats, and a semi-flotilla of minesweepers. The Cobra consisted of minelayers Cobra, Königen Luise, Kaiser, as well as a flotilla of torpedo boats and a semi-fleet of minesweepers. Of the listed minelayers, only one ship was a specially built combat mine-layer - "Brummer", renamed the captured Norwegian "Olaf Tryggvasson". The rest of the minelayers were civilian steamers, adapted for mine laying. Together with them, two Finnish submarines were preparing for laying mines.
It is believed that the Great Patriotic War began on June 22, 1941, at 3.30 am, with Luftwaffe air strikes against the Soviet Union. In fact, the first German attack against the USSR was mine laying, which began on June 21, 1941 at 23.30 Leningrad time. Actually, the war began just then, and it would be nice for mass historians to start mentioning this. Groups "Nord" and "Cobra" set up 9 minefields during the night. An hour before the "start of the war" Soviet planes had already fired at these ships, followed them, transmitting information to the shore, but nothing could be done - Finland was nearby and the minesags went into the protected skerries too quickly. On June 22, three days before Finland officially entered the war, Finnish submarines joined the German mines and set up two more minefields. Before dawn, a group of German planes dropped 25 bottom mines southeast of Kronstadt, forming another. The mine war has begun.
By the end of June 24, the Germans and the Finns jointly spent more than 1200 mines of various types. By that time, the Soviet Union had already lost the destroyer "Wrathful" on these mines, the cruiser "Maxim Gorky" received heavy damage, and the destroyers "Gordy" and "Guarding" were damaged. However, this was, as you know, only the beginning.
The forces that the Kriegsmarine and their Finnish allies used against the Baltic fleet did not go in terms of numbers and power in any comparison with it. The Baltic Fleet of some battleships had two units. The Germans had torpedo boats and one mine-loader in real combat ships. But they, firstly, possessed the initiative, and secondly, and this must be said especially, they planned the actions of the mines in such a way as to confuse the Soviet command. So, during the first days of the war, the front of the formations in the northern part of the Gulf of Finland shifted to the east, the Germans started much farther west than they could, so that by the time Soviet sailors discovered mines, there was already a deep enough barrier in front of them, which in the end turned out. To conceal the forces actually involved in mining, the Germans withdrawn their ships from the operation and stopped laying mines for a long time, and only when, in their opinion, the Soviet command should have come to certain (incorrect) conclusions about the number of enemy mines, these ships were again put into battle. The Germans simply outplayed the command of the Baltic Fleet. The clever and quick (for making decisions) defeated the strong and slow - in a rout.
The result of these extremely impudent operations was an almost complete blockade of the Baltic Fleet and huge, monstrous losses incurred by Soviet ships on mines, with huge human casualties. In fact, the Germans, with an insignificant force, brought a very powerful fleet by any measure out of the war for two years. The Baltic Fleet still played a positive role in the war - but at times less than it could and what it should have
This is an example from which to draw a conclusion. Our neighbors in the Baltic made it - until recently, minelayers were part of almost all the fleets of the Baltic countries. Today, in the Finnish Navy, the minelay is still the main class of warships. The planned "large" corvettes "Pohyanmaa" will also have rails and decks for mines. Those interested can read the article "Minelayers of modern fleets".
This is not to say that the Russian Navy completely ignores the possibilities of waging a mine war - this is how diesel submarines regularly work out covert mine laying. The laying of mines from large landing ships is being practiced. However, the scale of the preparation of our fleet for such operations simply pales against the background of how some countries are preparing for them.
For example, in the United States, laying mines is a routine task of the bombers of the Strategic Air Command. The "Quickstrike" mines planning in a controlled mode, similar to the JDAM bombs on the principle of delivery to the target, have been adopted for service. "Quickstrike" allows you to "lay" a minefield exactly according to the scheme with one throw - mines flying on guidance from a satellite signal will fall exactly where they need to, forming a ready-made obstacle from one salvo discharge. Bonus - the bomber will be able to drop mines while being tens of kilometers from the target, with much less risk than if it had to fly over the place where the mines were planted.
There is no need to talk about serial large minelayers of the Nampo class of the South Korean Navy.
For Russia, mine warfare is familiar. It was the mines that turned out to be the most effective weapon of the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese War. Two Japanese battleships were killed by mines from the Amur minelayer, making the Amur Russia's most successful warship in the post-sail era.
During the First World War, the Baltic Fleet created effective minefields to prevent the Germans from advancing into the Gulf of Finland. These were, however, defensive barriers.
Russia has created the world's first specialized minesag submarine - "Crab".
Less known to the general public, mines proved to be a much more useful weapon than torpedoes from submarines during the Great Patriotic War. In any case, the losses of the Germans from our mines were greater than from torpedoes. The aviation also used mines with great success. In fact, when Russia and the USSR competently resorted to mines, they turned out to be the most destructive weapon against any enemy. But even against us, the mines of the enemy turned out to be very destructive and led to consequences of at least an operational scale, if not worse.
It is necessary to draw the correct conclusion from the past - a properly conducted mine war is potentially capable of inflicting more damage on the enemy than tactical nuclear weapons. And this is not an exaggeration. The Americans, with their air mines in 1945, inflicted damage on Japan comparable to that brought by the operations to destroy cities, and guaranteed more than the nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Today, the effect of mines can be even greater.
Of course, unlike Russia, which simply does not have any meritorious mine action forces, developed countries have them and are training in their combat use. But this should not stop us, in the end, a minesweeper with the most modern anti-mine equipment will be detected by any submarine from a great distance when the first mine in the obstacle is detonated, after which, for example, an anti-ship missile can fly over the mine barrier or suddenly a powerful airstrike can be carried out on trawling forces, the last wave of aircraft in which will drop new mines to replace the destroyed ones. A properly exposed and well-guarded obstacle will require incredible forces to break through, and the price of the issue here is simply ridiculous, in comparison with any shipbuilding program.
It works in our favor that we have had large reserves of mines since Soviet times. They are already outdated. But a mine is a technically complex product, it can be upgraded to further meet the requirements of modern warfare. Russia is also quite capable of producing new mines.
It is necessary to create a special unit in the Main Command of the Navy, which will deal with the development of issues related to offensive mining and various types of its support (for example, protection from demining and repeated mining). The interaction of this department with the General Staff, and through it, with other types of the Armed Forces, for example, to ensure the laying of mines by aircraft of the Aerospace Forces, with higher naval educational institutions, with the military industry should be ensured. Mine war plans must be developed for all our theaters of operations, for various cases of warfare. Mines are not only a defensive tool. In some cases, this is just a lifesaver that allows you to nullify ANY superiority that the enemy has. There are examples in history. And this tool must be used without fail.
The fifth rule of the weak is to conduct a high-intensity offensive mine war against enemy bases and the narrows necessary for him to maneuver across the sea. Have a well-thought-out mine warfare strategy for different variants of warfare in each theater of operations, have the forces and means necessary for it, and trained personnel. Both in the Navy and in other branches of the Armed Forces, if necessary.
Equalize balance
You can always find an opponent who will have an overwhelming superiority in forces. That is, such that no tricks can be overcome. "There are just so many of them that we won't have enough for them." And it's not just about the fleet. Around the mid-1980s, the PLA mobilization plan called for up to one hundred million people to be recruited. At the end of World War II, the Americans had thousands of warships in the ocean zone and thousands of long-range bombers of various classes. Now a hypothetical alliance from NATO (with the USA), Japan, Australia and New Zealand is under a billion people
This is a lot. It's so much that you can't fight back. One should not, of course, think that a war is possible in the foreseeable future, in which Russia will have to resist such forces. More likely no than yes. But the formation of a military bloc of such a scale is a reality in less than five minutes. Even if not against Russia, and not with all NATO countries, but with some against China. The meaning of the example is that there are prohibitively powerful opponents
What to do when and if it becomes clear that a war with such force cannot be avoided? How to make sure that in the face of an impending catastrophe, such a colossal enemy superiority does not crush us like a skating rink?
Or maybe, how not to let the not so strong, but generally superior enemy inflict heavy losses on us in the attack?
How can we, the weak side, secure the most advantageous positions for ourselves before the start of the war, which is inevitable? If all types of intelligence say that it is inevitable?
There is an answer, and it is called very simply, although it will scare many: if war is inevitable, you must hit first. Moreover, what is especially important, for the weaker side, a preemptive strike by all means is the only way to even out the balance of forces, at least temporarily.
Take, for example, the most powerful adversary in a naval war of all possible - the United States. Their strength is monstrous.
But, to be honest, this monstrous power is concentrated in not so many monstrous targets. What is the US surface fleet? These are 67 destroyers, 11 cruisers and 11 aircraft carriers in service. There are 89 targets in total. Up to two thirds of them are usually found in bases. Well, let it be half. Another 11 cruisers, a couple of worn out to impossibility of old aircraft carriers and a dozen frigates are in storage, with coordinates known in advance, with an accuracy of a meter. This is much more than any other country has. Once out to sea, these forces are capable of crushing almost any resistance.
But the medal also has a downside. All those ships of the US Navy, which are in the bases of the continental US, can be hit by the number of cruise missiles that will soon be carried by two modernized Project 949 submarines, rebuilt for the use of missiles of the Caliber family. One in the Atlantic, one in the Pacific. The ship at the pier is a stationary target. He will be there tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, too, while ammunition, food, fuel and water are being loaded, he will be there. At a point with previously known coordinates, close to the coast, where it is quite possible to send a low-altitude, and therefore inconspicuous, cruise missile.
And then they will have only those forces that are deployed in different regions of the world. Small battle groups, around an aircraft carrier or an amphibious assault ship, three to four units each. Against which it will already be possible to fight with much smaller forces than those that, in theory, are needed for direct combat with all the US Navy. Plus submarines and basic aircraft.
This, of course, does not mean that you can defeat America with two submarines. In no case. The example, like all the previous ones, was for understanding the scale. But if we discard primitive arithmetic and think sensibly, then we can come to the following conclusions.
Modern weapon systems, be they ships or aircraft, take time and scarce resources to build. During the Second World War, all the belligerents put into service new warships. But now it won't work out that way. The ship now and the ship then are fundamentally different things, first of all, in terms of the complexity of construction and the complexity of use. Having lost the same "Arleigh Burke", the Americans will not be able to put into operation two new replacements within a year, as well as one. And this also applies to aircraft too. And not only Americans - everyone.
In such conditions, the side that struck the first successful strike gains a colossal advantage. In practice, one submarine does not knock out all ships on any of the US coasts, there is not enough range for missiles, one missile for a large ship is not enough, there are accidents of breakdown of cruise missiles in flight, but you never know what else is there. But if, for example, a certain country actually inflicts a massive non-nuclear strike on the US Navy bases, then the reduction of the US Navy's combat strength by at least a third is quite realistic. And the complexity of modern warships will not allow the Americans to replace the lost earlier than within five to six years at best.
We live in a world of super-long military cycles discovered a long time ago by V. Tsymbursky. The mobilization dominance cycle is where people can make up for any losses that their weapons may cause, such as they can create. So it was during the Second World War, and in the First too. You could have lost a million soldiers in battle, or two. But then new reservists were called up, received a set of cheap uniforms, a duffel bag, boots with windings and a rifle, and that's it - the losses were reimbursed. In the phase when mobilization dominates, it covers losses faster than they are inflicted.
But the cycle of mobilization is always followed by a cycle of destruction. And then another dependence works - people's weapons can quickly destroy any forces that they can mobilize. Destruction proceeds faster than mobilization covers losses. We live in such a period. The balance between the power of weapons and the timing of compensation for losses is such that it is impossible to compensate for losses during the ongoing war.
How many aircraft carriers can the United States build at the same time? One. One aircraft carrier, because for its assembly, in addition to a huge slipway, an even large, high 1000-ton crane is needed. And there is only one such crane on a large slipway in the USA. German built, 1975 release.
How long does it take to hit it with a cruise missile? How long does it take to buy, deliver, assemble and launch a new one? Now is not the forties, it is impossible to build a fleet lost at the first enemy strike. It will be necessary to end the war with what is left.
And all that is required of the attacker is to destroy the attacked ships for real, so that they cannot be repaired.
And then the balance of power will change dramatically in his favor.
This is not really about the United States. Who in their right mind would attack the United States? This is just an example of how a dramatically correct attack can change the balance of power. Although, if you get reliable evidence that the United States is planning to strike itself, then there may be no choice. True, in this case, the first strike will not be reduced to the attack of ships in bases with cruise missiles …
The sixth rule of the weak. If war is inevitable, you must strike first. It doesn't matter who and how will assess it, history is written, if not by the winners, then at least by the survivors. To find yourself in one of these groups, you must not let the enemy hit first and with all your might. You have to hit first yourself, and with all your might. Then the balance of power will change, and it will change very much.
Taking into account modern realities in military production, it is irreversible.
There was a four-fold superior enemy who was preparing to attack and seize the initiative, but now he has a 1.5-fold superiority and the initiative was lost - and this is a big difference. This, of course, does not guarantee anything. But the chances are increasing.
The weak side, which has realized the inevitability of war, really has no choice.
Outcome
There are ways of waging war at sea that allow the weaker side to either defeat the strongest enemy, or at least prevent themselves from being overwhelmed easily and quickly.
1. Anticipate the speed of the enemy. Plan faster, make decisions, deploy forces at sea, transfer them to the required theater of operations. Have superior speed in ships. Be faster overall.
2. Conduct intensive raid operations with the aim of inflicting losses on the enemy in warships, naval aviation, and coastal infrastructure necessary for conducting combat operations. Use all kinds of forces in raids, according to their "strengths".
3. To conduct intensive combat operations against the enemy's fleet with the forces of not only your own fleet, but also other branches of the Armed Forces.
4. To identify "systemic weaknesses" in the organization of the enemy's Navy, the vulnerabilities that give rise to these weaknesses, and at every opportunity to hit on these vulnerabilities (for example, the Navy does not have escort forces, has vulnerable tankers and integrated supply ships - there is no one to protect them) …
5. To conduct an intensive offensive mine war, to provide mine laying with everything necessary, to ensure the defense of obstacles from trawling / demining.
6. If there is reliable and reliable evidence that the enemy is going to hit him first, hit him first himself, do not wait until he begins to deploy his forces, inflict losses on him and seize the initiative.
The purpose of all this, in the final analysis, has already been announced earlier - to establish dominance at sea. Or at least prevent the enemy from installing it.
These rules alone do not guarantee victory in a war. Simply because almost nothing guarantees victory in a war. In addition, all the variety of situations in a war at sea is not limited to them. But they dramatically increase the weakest side's chances of this victory. Since Russia is doomed to the fact that its neighbors will be stronger at sea than it is, it is worth taking these rules as a basis and using them in a war at sea.
