Why do some nations have successfully evolving navies, while others have only a series of attempts to create them, with varying success? Attempts interspersed with periods of prolonged decline and defeat for ridiculous and stupid reasons? Why do some societies know how to maintain combat capability at sea for decades and centuries, even if it periodically sinks to a dangerously low level, while others, spending a lot of money and resources, building ships and training personnel, then miss all this, lose, leaving only footage of the chronicle and the once formidable aircraft carrier cruisers, turned on foreign soil into amusement parks? What is the difference and where does it go?
Under this difference, many not very smart people summed up a lot of theories, even giving birth to the concepts of "continental" and "sea powers", justifying the ability of some and the inability of others to profitably use naval forces by some cultural peculiarities … All this is not quite right. Almost wrong. In fact, the line lies in the understanding of both society and the military-political leadership of literally a few simple principles, multiplied by the geographic limitations characteristic of the state. If this were not the case, then completely devoid of a normal fleet, sea trade and working population at sea, the United States would not have turned between 1890 and 1945 into a dominant power on the seas.
The United States was what not very perspicacious people call the words "continental power" - a huge subcontinent, the main wealth of which, as well as the vector of application of the population's efforts, are located on their own land. Their navy was nothing compared to, for example, the Russian Imperial Navy. But soon they brilliantly won their naval war against Spain, and Russia lost hers miserably. Lost to Japan, which had bags of rice instead of money seventy years earlier. Which, nine years before the attack on Port Arthur, was forced to take into account Russian political interests by a show of strength not by the largest Russian squadron. What “cultural characteristics” made this possible?
There is an answer.
There are centuries-old principles of building naval power. They are known and well described in the theoretical literature. They can be disputed, but not disputed. It is impossible, because there is no country so powerful in the naval sense that would ignore them. And there is no country that, even instinctively or even unconsciously, following them, would not receive a "take-off" of its sea power. Examples are endless. The United States, Britain, and Imperial Japan are on this list of countries that followed these rules. For a very short time, some of these principles were not quite consciously adopted by the USSR Navy - and the result was a rise in its power to unparalleled values, a solid second place in strength after the United States. Military thought in different countries came to understand them when they had already taken shape, and their structuring took quite a long time. But in general, the "theoretical part" was completed even before the First World War.
In Russia, with its difficult history, a theory adapted to Russian peculiarities was finally formulated a little later - after the Civil War. Until the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, it was left without practical application, which had monstrous consequences for our Motherland. But some of its echoes, partially embodied in practice, created the USSR nuclear missile fleet, capable of operating anywhere in the world ocean, albeit with a number of restrictions.
Today this knowledge is forgotten. They are forgotten, however, only by us. Our opponents in the world have not forgotten anything and are building their fleets, starting from this simple understanding of really simple questions.
It is worth, apparently, to remember them and to voice them.
Mahan and his postulates
In 1889, the captain (later - Rear Admiral) of the US Navy, Alfred Thayer Mahan, published his, without exaggeration, a landmark work - a book that we have translated as "The Influence of Naval Power on the History of 1660-1783".
And - a conceptual failure in translation from the very beginning. Mahan did not write anything about force, or force. He wrote about power - in a sociological context, power. Physically, power. The work of establishing authority over the sea, accomplished over a period of time, to be precise. This is an important point - according to Mahan, sea power is a process of gaining power over the seas that lasts in time - he does not give such a decoding anywhere, but this is a direct translation into Russian of the title of his main work, made without distortion. Influence of Sea Power upon history.
And this is the first lesson - where we thoughtlessly think about gaining "sea power" our competitors are looking for opportunities to gain maritime power, even if it takes time. Acquisition through the application of systematic efforts over a long period of time. And yes, this acquisition requires effort and time, and there is nothing "wrong" in this - in order to gain that very power over the seas, you have to work, it will take time, it cannot be done quickly - you have to be able to resist and build monotonously for a long time his power, "brick by brick", year after year, century after century, forever, never deviating from his goal. Generation after generation. In the fight. These efforts, their focus and compliance with the stated goal are the subject of discussion. This cover lesson skips the Russian reader right away, as do countless other mis-translated concepts. Nevertheless, even with some mental distortions, the book made a splash in Russia too. We will not describe its influence on the minds of that time, we will limit ourselves to what postulates Mahan voiced.
The well-being of the people and the state that this people inhabits is in direct proportion to how much this people controls world trade. World trade is sea trade - the delivery of large goods in significant quantities over long distances is unprofitable except by water, and from other continents is simply impossible. It is carried out thanks to the presence of a merchant fleet delivering goods and access (from the sea, of course) to the source of these goods. This access can be "formalized" in the form of a colony, or as exclusive trade rights in the exchange of goods with independent states. At the same time, it does not matter how they were established - by means of agreements or by "explicit procedure" (we look at how Holland controlled the supply of goods from the Baltic to central and Western Europe). To take control of maritime trade, a state must have a powerful navy, large and powerful enough to prevent any other country from encroaching on the state's "slice" of world trade. If the “opponent” is still trying to intercept the flow of goods, both by seizing colonies and destroying exclusive trade privileges, then it is necessary to fight with him - and this is what, for example, England and Holland have been doing for several centuries in a row. In this case, a powerful military fleet must defeat the enemy's military fleet, or, by demonstrating force, expel it from the sea, thus ensuring the preservation of the "status quo". Well, or not saving - depending on who won. The next step, of course, is the expulsion of the merchant fleet from the sea, in those wild times by the banal capture or sinking of ships.
The condition for maintaining power over the sea (and sea trade) is the navy, and the correct course of action for it is to exert pressure on the enemy, reduced to two possible outcomes - the enemy is defeated in battle, or the enemy fled without a fight.
This is how power over the seas is born - sea power. In the future, it can be a military-political factor outside of connection with sea trade, but it is born according to the above-described scheme.
This is how England and Holland became "sea powers" (we use this insignificant domestic term).
Mahan in his book drew attention to a possible strategy "for the weak" - the so-called. "Cruising war". The historical experience with which he operated, said that, of course, it may well turn out to be useful - but only when the combat fleet of the belligerent subjected to "cruising" is linked by combat operations with the combat fleet of the attacker. Otherwise, "according to Mahan," the cruising war will fail.
At the time of this writing, there have been many examples of such failure. Today, at the height of the industrial era, we can remember much more high-profile failures - an unrestricted submarine war that was defeated twice by Germany - both times because German "cruisers" - submarines - did not have the proper support from their combat fleet.
On the other hand, the unlimited submarine war that the Americans fought in the Pacific in 1941-1945 was quite successful - all the resources that Japan theoretically had for a naval war were shackled by a hopeless confrontation with the US Navy. With the American combat fleet. There was absolutely nothing left to protect shipping.
Everything that Mahan described was extremely true, but true mainly for the period described. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the world was already different. Some of Mahan's postulates remained true in the twentieth century - the same "cruising" war went completely "Mahan's way" in both world wars. Others demanded adjustment.
Thus, world trade has been greatly transformed, courts under a neutral flag have become a mass phenomenon, international agreements have appeared that regulate their status in the course of hostilities. Radio communication appeared, which sharply accelerated control, and increased the speed of all processes related to military operations.
Mahan tried to keep up with the times. In 1911, a work came out from under his pen "Naval strategy in comparison and contrast with the principles and practice of military operations on the ground." The most powerful text of more than five hundred pages, devoted practically only to combat examples, a comparison of operations on land and at sea, and their application to the current military-political situation, both in the world and around the United States (mainly), significantly detailed and clarified the postulates Mahan. Twenty-two years have passed since he wrote his first and most important book, during which time the Japanese-Chinese, Spanish-American, and Russian-Japanese wars took place, where the fleets played a crucial role.
Mahan re-analyzed his principles through the prism of modernity, through combat experience that was absent when he began his theoretical research. Cutting off everything superfluous and obsolete showed that one of its main principles is if there is a fleet, then it should be actively used against the enemy fleet - is correct. Mahan analyzed the Russo-Japanese War, paying particular attention to the actions of the 1st Pacific Squadron. It is noteworthy that he considered the correct course of action for the forces in Port Arthur - to violently, desperately attack the Japanese in order to change the balance of forces as much as possible by the time Rozhdestvensky's 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the war.
Was it said correctly? Let's imagine that the 1st TOE died in the battle completely, completely, having managed to destroy one more Japanese battleship, in addition to the pair actually sunk. What would it give? The fact that Rozhdestvensky would have met in the Tsushima Strait is one less battleship. Someone might say that with the existing balance of forces, this would have done nothing. May be. And if there were two fewer of them? On three? Or would the number of battleships remain the same, but the number of destroyers and cruisers would sharply "sink"?
Mahan was absolutely right in this case. Fight is important, and it is he who decides everything, in the end. A lot has changed since the beginning of the twentieth century. But the principle that a combat fleet is designed to fight has never lost its relevance. It must be created and built precisely for this, this is its purpose. A little later, we will see that force can not only be used, but also demonstrated, instead of a battle, the threat of such can be used, but the very fact that the fleet should be able to fight is undeniable. Fight, including with another fleet. This means that it should be built on this basis. Or we should not build anything at all and “distribute it to pensioners”. Or, finally, buy good and strong boots for the infantry. And this is not hyperbole, it’s actually better.
Let's remember this as "Mahan's principle", in our modern "creative processing", of course.
Ships and formations of the navy must be able to fight ships and formations of other fleets. The construction of "quasi-combat" ships, formally having weapons, but in fact incapable of fighting the enemy naval forces, is unacceptable. The training of personnel, the state of the rear services and the material base should allow the fleet to immediately engage in hostilities against another fleet, if necessary
Sounds like a platitude? Yes, this is commonplace, but most of the ships that the Russian Navy will receive from this year to the mid-2020s, or precisely "quasi-combat", that is, they formally have weapons on board, but they cannot fight against an adequate enemy (project 22160, which is directly referred to by the officers of the Navy as "not a combat ship"); or can perform one or two tasks and only in the absence of serious opposition (RTOs projects 21631 and 22800). Or a combat ship, but it does not have systems that are critical for its intended use or for ensuring combat stability (submarines without anti-torpedoes and hydroacoustic countermeasures, minesweepers without anti-mine systems). For the Russian fleet today, not combat or quasi-combat target ships are the norm, but full-fledged combat "units" are rather an exception. Why? Because those who order them, agree, accept and design do not mean BATTLE as the main purpose of the ship being created. Alas, this is so, and there is a lot of evidence for this.
As you can see, some people have not even learned the lessons of more than a century ago. It will be terribly painful if history repeats them - after all, we are conducting such a cool propaganda that everything is more than good, and then suddenly …
But all that was needed was to follow a simple principle. Actually, this is what distinguishes countries that are successful in naval development from unsuccessful ones - understanding the principles and adhering to them. This is the reason for the success of some and the failure of others.
But let's continue, because Mahan's principle is not the only one.
Some Principles of Naval Strategy by Sir Julian Stafford Corbett
Mahan, having accomplished a great deed, did not create a coherent theory, however. The postulates that he voiced were, on the whole, correct - if only because he built them on the basis of an analysis of events that actually took place. But this cannot be considered a theory, it cannot be considered a method. In Mahan's books, there are not even definitions - what kind of theory is there. This is a set of principles. You can adhere to Mahan's principles - and it is necessary in some cases. It's just that at the beginning of the twentieth century, the "Mehanian" approach was incomplete. He didn't explain everything.
For example, the fate of the 1st Pacific Squadron of the Russian Navy, at first glance, was predetermined by the fleet under the command of Togo. But she didn't die in a sea battle, did she? And Port Arthur did not fall under attack from the sea. On the other hand, all this would have been impossible without the Japanese fleet. But Togo led blockade actions, and did not get into a fight at any cost - although he did not neglect the attacks of the base, but in general, this was not the main content of his actions. Although he succeeded in the end.
It was clear to many thinkers of those years that a certain theory was needed, one that would “close” all questions about how to wage a naval war and what methods to achieve victory in it.
In the same year 1911, when Mahan published his Naval Strategy, another book was published in another part of the world. The book that really "closed" almost all the questions. Explained almost everything. Even for modern times.
It was a book by the British historian Julian Stafford Corbett (then without the "sir" prefix) "Some principles of maritime strategy".
Corbett, who was a civilian, a historian with no military experience, was the one who unleashed theory from his pen. Although there are questions about how he defined the "theory of war" and "the nature of wars", in general, his book is precisely a theory, and it is a working theory - it will be shown just below how much.
Corbett defines the goal of naval war in a very simple way - and it is, in fact, still the "alpha and omega" of naval warfare:
"The goal of military operations at sea is both to achieve domination at sea, and at the same time to prevent the enemy from achieving it."
This was, at first glance, the same thing that Mahan preached, but Corbett, unlike Mahan, did not place such an emphasis on combat as a means to an end. According to Corbett, dominance at sea was achieved in the following ways:
1. By decisive defeat of the enemy's military fleet.
2. By blockading the enemy.
The second point is fundamentally important - a little later, it was Corbett's strategy that would be chosen by the British as the main one in the war with Germany. And this is something that Mahan did not see as an operational concept in its own right.
Corbett here, apparently, was not the first - in the book of Admiral S. G. Gorshkov's "The Sea Power of the State" mentions the Russian textbook of naval tactics in 1873 by Lieutenant-Commander Berzin, where the same is stated in almost the same words.
Corbett, however, went even further, and considered the other (just so at that point in time) options for war at sea.
For the situation of contested domination, Corbett formalized the long-known principle of fleet-in-beeing - "fleet as a factor of presence", when the naval group is close enough to the enemy to attack (or counterattack), but for the sake of reducing risks or saving forces into battle enters. As a result, now the enemy bears risks - any maneuver by his fleet can cause both a counterattack against the forces carrying out the maneuver, and an attack of the target, which these forces, after the start of the maneuver, can no longer defend. Thus, any actions of the adversary are constrained - the wisest or least risky option on his part is “to do nothing”. This does not mean that the side exerting pressure on the enemy with its fleet should evade the battle, but it is not obliged to strive for it in this case. You have to understand that you have to try to arrange such a "zugzwang" for the enemy (with the amendment that he can give up the initiative and not "walk" at all) - it is not always as easy as it seems. But it is possible, and the same Englishmen know how to do it perfectly.
Corbett considered the “for the weak side” option as a second option in the context of contested domination - however, applicable to the strong side as well. "Auxiliary counterattacks" - "minor counter attacks". The weak side, according to Corbett, can try to "change the balance" in their favor with the help of one-time attacks of small enemy forces, attacks of his single ships, the fleet in the base, or under other conditions, when the numerical superiority of the attacked side cannot be realized. And this is logical, history knows many examples of how the weak side managed to create local superiority in forces.
An example, Corbett, however, found an unsuccessful one - the first strike by the Japanese on the Russian ships of Port Arthur. Unsuccessful because it was not a counterattack. But it is very successful as an illustration of the concept of "equalizing the balance" with the enemy by inflicting the first strike - if war is inevitable, then it is necessary to strike first, and so as to obtain a more advantageous (or less disadvantageous) balance of forces as a result of the attack than it was in peacetime.
The third type of action for Corbett is the use of dominance at sea.
The main types of such should be an obstacle to enemy invasion, an attack on the enemy's shipping and defense of one's own, and "expeditionary" actions, in simple terms - an invasion from the sea into enemy territory.
Corbett writes incredibly perspicaciously that the domination of "our" fleet at sea does not mean at all that the enemy will not try to conduct a large-scale landing operation - he just needs to wait until the main forces of the fleet are far away, or, alternatively, operate far from the place, where the dominant fleet can arrive quickly. In 1940, in Narvik, the Germans showed the British in detail that the books of their prophets must be carefully studied. With a disproportionately weaker fleet than Britain, Germany was able to land troops in Norway and fight them until the British withdrew. Corbett warned of this possibility and pointed out that protection from enemy invasion should be among the tasks, even with assured dominance of the sea.
Corbett proposed to conduct a cruising war "according to Mahan" - having achieved first supremacy at sea with his combat fleet, and then defending his communications from the enemy's "cruisers" and wielding superior forces on his communications.
The last way to use the already achieved supremacy at sea, Corbett considered an amphibious operation on enemy land. An apologist for limited intervention in the military conflict (and island Britain had such an opportunity), he saw the ending in the form of an expeditionary force landing, which was supposed to force the enemy to accept British terms - as was the case during the Crimean War, which Corbett mentions at the end of his a masterpiece of military thought.
The most important conclusion in comparison with past theorists, Corbett, however, made at the beginning of the second part of his book, where he basically analyzes the concept of "dominance at sea", defining what it is, and, accordingly, making it possible to understand how it achieve.
The sea, Corbett wrote, cannot be conquered as dry land. And, consequently, domination at sea has nothing to do with the deployment of troops or navies in one or another of its areas, as it would be on land. It cannot be simply "taken away". In fact, the only thing that can be "taken away" from the enemy according to Corbett (and in reality it is) is the ability to move around the sea.
Corbett points out:
"Supremacy of the sea, therefore, is nothing more than control over sea communications used for both commercial and military purposes."
Is Corbett right? Yes, completely. Britain acted on this basis. The Grand Fleet blocked German communications throughout the First World War - both for commercial shipping, which at some point caused an economic collapse in Germany, and for the maneuver of warships. During World War II, the Royal Navy blocked the ability for German surface ships to go to sea (use communications for military purposes) and fought against German "cruisers" (submarines) on their communications. It was control over communications that was the subject of naval warfare. "Bismarck" was destroyed while trying to pass along the sea routes to the open ocean and Brest. The British did not wait for him at the base. They were waiting for him on the communications they controlled.
Or take the example of Admiral Togo. Tsushima sits in us all as a sharp thorn, but in truth, Togo was simply protecting the communications of the Japanese army. That is why his fleet blocked Port Arthur, and did not arrange a gigantic bloody raid on the fortress from the sea with all its might. When, in order to preserve communications, it was necessary to destroy the potentially threatening force - the 2nd squadron, Togo did it in the "Mahenian" way, in battle. But the battle and destruction of the Russian fleet was not an end in itself for the Japanese high command - their goal was to win on the ground, expelling Russia from the lands of interest to the Japanese, expelling the forces of the army, which required the supply of the army with everything necessary, and it could only be supplied by sea. To do this, it was necessary to eliminate the threat to communications - the Russian fleet, which was done.
Or let's ask ourselves a question from modern times - what are American nuclear submarines doing in Avacha Bay, near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky? Yes, the same thing - they provide for the Russians the potential impossibility of maneuvering submarines at sea (the use of sea communications for military purposes) in case of war. How are we geographically deploying RPLSN in that region? The boat goes out to sea from Avacha Bay, turns south, goes to the Kuril ridge, then either on the surface through the first Kuril passage, or submerged through the fourth, goes into the Sea of Okhotsk and then into the designated ZRBD - a protected area of alert, where- then located there. It is on these lines "under the sea" that the Americans are going to dominate.
From the point of view of our Navy and General Staff, the deployment of NSNF in full force in a threatened period will untie the hands of the top political leadership, making a disarming strike on Russia impossible. On the contrary, the Americans have been striving for many years to obtain the possibility of such a strike, and for this they are preparing, in the event of a crisis, to prevent the NSNF from turning around by preventing their movement along sea communications. This is their command of the sea - domination of the sea. This is what the Anglo-Saxons have built their entire naval policy around for many centuries - of which consciously, "according to the book" - for more than a hundred years. This is both a goal and a criterion. This is what the fleet exists for and what it is supposed to do. The theory turned out to be correct, and the principle was almost eternal.
At the same time, it is important to understand that we are talking not only and not so much about sea trade routes. The path along which the nuclear submarine goes to the designated combat patrol area is also a sea communication. This is not about trading lines. We are talking about obstructing maneuver at sea in principle. On the prohibition of deployment as such. This is what "dominance at sea" is. It can be local, for example, in the coastal zone along Kamchatka and in the Sea of Okhotsk, or wider, for example, in the entire Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. Americans are claiming global dominance. But the nature of dominance at sea does not change with a change in scale, and the purpose of the fleet as its acquisition does not change either.
And this is the watershed. There are no "sea powers" or "continental powers" either. There is no cultural divide that makes one nation capable of naval power and another incapable or limited ability. Does not give Japanese origin "bonuses" to naval striking power by itself. They are given an understanding of the mission of the fleet in war. There are simply principles to be followed. Whoever follows them gets a fleet. It can be small or it can be large. It can grow and become stronger, or it can stagnate, but it is always fully and without special reservations, combat-ready, it has a purpose, its personnel does not have a single question about what it is for, military leadership and politics those responsible for naval construction can always understand whether it is necessary to build a particular ship, to start one or another expensive project. It is simply trite because there is a criterion for assessing its correctness. Two simple principles. The fleet is ultimately intended to fight with another fleet (Mahan), and its goal is to establish dominance at sea, that is, on sea lanes (Corbett) - in any way, including by destroying enemy forces in battle.
There is an understanding of these things at all levels of command and power in the camp - there is the so-called "sea power". No - and at least how many ships you can build and any number of planes you can take into service, “this” will not become a full-fledged fleet.
Our people and their ideas
All of the above at the theoretical level was realized in Russia in the first years after the Russo-Japanese War. The painful analysis of the defeat made by Russian sailors, army officers and a number of public figures, in principle, made it possible to answer the most important questions. So, for example, the Russian naval theorist and officer Nikolai Lavrentyevich Klado was a year ahead of Corbett with the understanding that the main tasks of the fleet were to ensure their communications at sea and suppress enemy actions. He did not formulate the same set of rules and definitions as Corbett, but he devoted great influence to the issue of interaction between the fleet and the army.
Clado developed his minds in relation to the military-political situation that had developed to the west of Russia and, mainly, in relation to a potential war with Germany. Thus, he did not create a universal theory, but in relation to the big war in Europe with the participation of Russia, his calculations are largely correct even now (see Klado N. L., 1910.)
But it is not enough to understand the problem; it also needs to be eliminated. This was not done in full, and during the First World War, the Russian fleet was unable to realize all its potential, although on the other hand, its role in today's society is usually underestimated, especially for the Black Sea Fleet. And then there was a revolution and a civil war, which the fleet, in its former form, simply did not survive.
But, oddly enough, it was the early Soviet years, the years of heady freedom and revolutionary romance, when it still seemed that there would be only victories and achievements ahead, when it was still possible to say out loud whatever you think, gave us our own, domestic theory of building military naval forces. It would seem that in conditions when the remnants of decrepit warships go to scrap metal to buy steam locomotives, there is no time for naval strategic theories, but in the end everything turned out differently.
In 1922, the printing house of the Naval Commissariat in Petrograd published a small book "The importance of sea power for the state", for the authorship of Boris Borisovich Gervais, head of the Naval Academy (now the VUNC of the Navy "Naval Academy named after NG Kuznetsov"). Boris Gervais, at that time, was, without exaggeration, one of the most talented naval thinkers in our country. Unlike other outstanding theorists, Gervais was also an outstanding practitioner - he participated in the Russo-Japanese War as an officer-miner of the cruiser Thunderbolt, participated in the military campaigns of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers, in the battle in the Korean Strait, and was awarded for bravery. During the First World War, he commanded two destroyers, after which he was responsible for the coastal defense of the entire Gulf of Finland. He rose to the rank of captain of the first rank in the Imperial Navy. Participated in the Civil War on the side of the Soviet regime. In general, the experience of B. B. Gervais had an excellent, not comparable to the theoretical officer Mahan. And his work, in terms of its content, still remains important for the Russian fleet. Alas, it has been partially forgotten, and this is the best adaptation of the principles of naval development to domestic realities at this historical moment.
The theoretical views of B. Gervais can be described very briefly and succinctly:
1. Modern states and their ability to wage wars are critically dependent on sea communications.
2. To ensure victory in a war, the fleet must sever the enemy's communications and prevent him from using the sea for either military or commercial purposes. This is especially important to prevent any enemy landing against Russian territory.
3. Likewise, the fleet must maintain its communications. This will provide the ability to use the sea for maneuvering troops, transporting and carrying out amphibious operations against the enemy.
4. Since Russia has a large land border and adversaries on land, the critical mission of the fleet is to help the army in the war. The best way to help an army is to provide a flank from the sea, both on the defensive and on the offensive. In the event of an enemy attack, his advancing group is "cut down" by a strike (landing) from the sea to the flank, similarly the army advancing on the enemy can count on the support of amphibious assault forces. Moreover, in all cases, enemy landings are not allowed.
5. To ensure this freedom of action, the domestic fleet must destroy, crush or block the enemy's fleet and impede its actions. In some cases, together with the army.
6. To do this, you need a fleet corresponding in strength to this purpose.
Like Corbett, Gervais used simple and concise language to describe the purpose of the Navy:
“In the case of offensive missions, the naval force must by all means strive for dominance at sea, that is, to the destruction of the enemy fleet or to the closure of its exit from the harbors. In the case of defensive missions, the naval force should mainly strive to maintain its combat capability and freedom to go to sea, i.e. prevent the enemy from dominating the sea."
Both that, and another, provides their fleet with the required freedom of action, and does not give such to the enemy.
Gervais saw naval operations not as independent operations, but rather as combined army and navy operations. He considered the option of destroying enemy fleets in the base by attack from land, for which it was necessary to conduct an extensive amphibious operation, which, again, required support from the combat fleet. He paid a lot of attention to submarine warfare, and extremely perspicaciously defined its intermediate finale, which was convincingly demonstrated by the allies in the Atlantic in 1943-1945. He illustrated each of his postulates with extensive combat examples from the past and theoretical possibilities of the near future.
From a technical point of view, Gervais was guided by global trends. In those years, ships of the line dominated the sea. It was a kind of superweapon, like strategic aviation is now. Gervais believed that it was the battle fleet of heavily armored and high-speed ships with powerful artillery that should be the main instrument of war at sea. He was supposed to be assisted by light forces - destroyers capable of conducting high-speed attacks, raids and the like from under the cover of the line forces. It was required to have a cruiser for reconnaissance and a submarine to wage war on communications and covert destruction of enemy warships. Due to the fact that the progress of aviation does not stand still, it was expected that soon the bombers based on the coast would pose a huge danger to surface ships. In order to prevent base aviation from overshooting surface ships with air strikes with impunity, it is required to provide air defense of ship formations with the help of deck aviation and a number of air defense aircraft carriers. In connection with the exceptional efficiency of mines and their own danger, the fleet must have a sufficient number of minelayers to carry out mine laying, and minesweepers to protect its forces from mines placed by the enemy. Not bad for the early 20s, right?
In the early twenties, an ideological trend took shape among Soviet sailors, aimed precisely at building a normal, full-fledged balanced fleet capable of performing a wide range of tasks - from sweeping mines to repelling air strikes against ships. Their ideas are extremely relevant today. Just replace battleships with URO ships, cruisers with multipurpose nuclear submarines, add an air defense aircraft carrier (we already have one, there is nothing special to imagine), normal minesweepers and diesel submarines ready for mine laying instead of minelayers (or BDK with trained mine productions by crews) - and nothing really needs to be invented, everything has already been invented, clear and understandable. Naval aviation only to add. And, most importantly, everything is perfectly in line with the principles.
Do we need to keep our communications? Northern Sea Route, connection with Sakhalin, Kuriles, Kamchatka, Chukotka, Kaliningrad? The Syrian Express? Routes along which the NSNF is being deployed in the Pacific Ocean and in the north? Necessary. Will there be a fight for them? Yes, that's for sure. And what if we keep them? And let the SSBN turn around, and the merchant fleet continue to ply from Sabetta and further everywhere? And will we not let the enemy wield them? This means that our enemy has lost - neither the escalation of the war can be carried out (they interfere with the NSNF), nor are these Russians to be starved to death, and the troops cannot be landed. Dead end.
But, according to the evil fate of fate, the construction of a normal balanced fleet, in those years, stumbled over an extremely harmful mental virus.
We are talking about the so-called "young school", the protagonist of which was Alexander Petrovich Alexandrov (Abel Pinkhusovich Bar). Aleksandrov-Bar himself did not have experience of participation in a real naval war at that time, he began to serve and grow in service along the political line, occupying commissar posts, began to receive a naval education only in 1922, received it only in 1927, but already in 1932 he became teacher at the Naval Academy. Since 1930, Aleksandrov has been creating a "name" for himself by criticizing the traditional approach to naval development, the one that created Britain's naval power and ensured Japan's victory over Russia. The criticism basically boiled down to the following - it is useless to try to destroy the enemy fleet, all the same, the power of the productive forces is such that the enemy will quickly restore all losses, and no establishment of dominance will be possible, which means that we must abandon the desire to ensure dominance at sea and start creating a new one. "Corresponding to practical tasks" theory of maritime operations. These views were presented to him in a brochure "Criticism of the theory of ownership of the sea".
Aleksandrov's constructions contained the worst error of all possible - a logical one. He overlooked the fact that not only one side, but the other will also do its best to compensate for the losses, relying on the "growth of productive forces", trying to maintain the previously existing superiority and even increase it. The Second World War perfectly showed what it looks like. The productive forces worked for the United States and Japan, not just Japan, and the United States had completely established dominance at sea at a certain point. In addition, the power of weapons also increased and the reimbursement of lost ships was in fact already in question - Germany, which was under continuous bombing, is an example of this. The ideas of the young school did not contain any clear goal - if for the "traditionalists" it was domination of the sea, then for the "young" there was something that they themselves could not formulate precisely. And they could not in the end.
In an amusing way, the early thirties were marked by the fact that the "traditionalists" were repressed, and the adherents of the "new school" got good posts - often instead of the very repressed traditionalists. True, the "young school" could not create a new theory of struggle at sea. But she was able to break the old one. Having lost the imputed purpose of its existence, the fleet also lost the correct guidelines in the organization of combat training, and then consistently failed the Republican maritime operations in Spain, the approach to planning and implementation of which turned out to be completely ugly among the "Soviet friends", then it turned out that the fleet could not fulfill the requirement Stalin on the deployment of forces in the Mediterranean. Then there were big maneuvers in the Baltic, in which it turned out that the sailors simply did not know how to do anything except how to navigate the ship from point A to point B. Stalin responded with a new round of repressions, the "young school" was now itself "under the knife", but nothing could be corrected by such methods - the fleet is too complex a system for something to be established like this. As a result, everything had to be restored painfully slowly.
It fell to the People's Commissar N. G. Kuznetsov, but he did not have enough time for anything at all - they got rid of the fleet with repression and ridiculous political appointments about a year before the war with Germany. It was impossible to return something back to normal in such a time. Nevertheless, even in its extremely disorganized state, the fleet was able to make a huge contribution to the victory over Germany, a contribution that today, unfortunately, has disappeared from the mass consciousness, and is not correctly understood by many military personnel. But we remember.
After the war, the ideology of naval development began to return to the right direction again. So, in the manual for the conduct of naval operations NMO-51, the requirement to ensure supremacy at sea finally returned, which meant the prohibition of enemy actions, and the need to maintain their communications. After Stalin's death, little has changed in the "ideology" - the requirement to ensure the dominant position of the Soviet Navy in the areas of military operations never left the governing documents, and albeit with mistakes and stupidity (such as rejection of the aircraft carrier fleet), but the power of the Navy grew continuously. To understand the scale of the growth, the forces that Britain sent to the Falklands War could have, without any special problems, and possibly without losses, destroyed one regiment of naval missile aviation in several sorties. And that was one of the results of "thinking in the right direction."
Soviet forces were focused on battle - even submarines were supposed to hit warships and other submarines, and not try to wage a cruising war in the style of Dönitz's "unshaven boys", although, of course, no one would have let the enemy transport just like that. And since the ships under construction, their weapons and types also corresponded to this approach, the power of the fleet became higher and higher. This does not look surprising from a theoretical point of view - Commander-in-Chief Gorshkov perfectly understood the significance and importance of establishing dominance at sea, at least local.
Let's not idealize the Soviet Navy. There were a lot of "excesses" in its development, especially when the evil genius of the Soviet state and one of its involuntary gravediggers, Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov, paid close attention to the fleet. And, nevertheless, while the "guiding star" of the need to ensure dominance at sea (under various sauces, up to the modern "maintenance of a favorable operational regime" - however, this term has already surfaced in history, and meant the same as now), shone both over the fleet itself and over shipbuilding, the navy became stronger.
The collapse of the nineties affected not only the Navy, and the consequences for its combat power that it brought with itself did not apply to the concepts of naval development - the whole country collapsed. It must be understood that Russia has gone through such a turning point, when literally everything was subjected to doubt and denial - few people in the world have such "baggage" behind their backs. This affected the fleet in full, since everything was questioned and denied, then the role of the fleet in the general defense system of the country was also subjected to serious doubts at all levels - from the Ministry of Defense to the minds of individual citizens. The result was strange.
Bifurcation of principles
An officer serving in the Navy, when asked "what is the purpose of the existence of the fleet?" will be able to blurt out something like the need to maintain that very favorable operating conditions, which becomes favorable after the establishment of domination at sea, the need for which in the governing documents and instructions of the fleet is fully spelled out. Is it right, should it be this way? Yes, it is right and it should.
But this is not the case in state doctrinal documents! This is similar to the psyche of a schizophrenic who sincerely believes in contradictory things, but alas, we have come to this point. While units and fleets are preparing for one thing, the highest state power in its doctrinal principles professes something completely different.
From the website of the Russian Ministry of Defense, section "Tasks of the Navy":
The Navy is designed to ensure the protection of the national interests of the Russian Federation and its allies in the World Ocean by military methods, to maintain military-political stability at the global and regional levels, and to repel aggression from sea and ocean directions.
The Navy creates and maintains conditions for ensuring the safety of the maritime activities of the Russian Federation, ensures the naval presence of the Russian Federation, demonstrates the flag and military force in the World Ocean, takes part in the fight against piracy, in military, peacekeeping and humanitarian actions carried out by the world community meeting the interests of the Russian Federation, makes calls by ships and vessels of the Navy at ports of foreign states.
Does anyone see here words like "military action", "destruction", "defense of communications", "domination of the sea"? There is a kind of "reflection of aggression from sea and ocean directions." And if we ourselves have to hit? And to repel the land aggression? How many landings did the fleet land during the Second World War? Strictly formally, proceeding from the wording of the Ministry of Defense, our Navy is NOT INTENDED FOR AN OFFENSIVE WAR AT ALL. It is, of course, designed to contain this very war. For this, it has a NSNF. At the same time, the only provision for their deployment in a threatened period or in wartime is military action. What if containment fails? Although, maybe in some other doctrinal document everything is more concretely stated?
As mentioned earlier in the article “Ideological impasse of the Russian fleet? No, Russian society! ", in Russia there are the following doctrinal documents concerning the domestic Navy. The first one is the "Sea policy of the Russian Federation". About the fleet in this document is mentioned in passing, since it is "not about the Navy", it lists the fundamental goals of Russia as a state in the seas and oceans, from scientific activities to fishing. The fleet is mentioned there only in the context of the fact that it must protect the interests of the country at sea, without highly specialized details.
The second document, which is almost entirely related to the Navy, is the "Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Activities for the Period up to 2030". The description of this document in the mentioned article was given more than exhaustive: profanity. Those interested can follow the link above and evaluate this gap with reality more closely.
We will not be too lazy, however, to quote one more fragment of this document, which was not mentioned earlier:
V. Strategic requirements for the Navy, tasks and priorities in the field of its construction and
development
… b) in wartime:
the ability to inflict unacceptable damage to the enemy in order to
his coercion to cease hostilities on the terms
guaranteed protection of the national interests of the Russian
Federation;
the ability to successfully confront the enemy, possessing high-tech naval potential (including
including those in service with precision weapons), with groups
its naval forces in the near, distant sea zones and ocean
areas;
the presence of high-level defensive capabilities in the area
anti-missile, anti-aircraft, anti-submarine and anti-mine
defense;
ability for long-term autonomous activity, including
including to self-replenishment of stocks of material and technical
means and weapons in remote areas of the oceans from ships
logistics support for new projects;
compliance of the structure and operational (combat) capabilities of forces
(troops) modern forms and methods of military operations, their
adaptation to new operational concepts of the use of the Armed Forces
Of the Russian Federation, taking into account the entire range of threats to military
security of the Russian Federation.
To do something he, the fleet, what will happen with these abilities? Will it be implemented in the form of a BATTLE with the enemy? How is the success of the confrontation with enemy groups expressed? What if they don't show up for battle, just like the Grand Fleet did in World War I? All exports will be blocked in the English Channel, Gibraltar and Tsushima, and that's it? What to do then? Where is the answer in doctrine?
This list is not intended, and it does not correspond to the principles of building sea power, which are guided by other countries. It is impossible to deduce from it the correctness or incorrectness of this or that shipbuilding program. It cannot be used as a criterion for checking the necessity or uselessness of the project of a particular ship or class of ships. One cannot push off from him in choosing a strategy of action in a war at sea. It's just a set of unrelated wishes, and nothing more. Yes, true and correct wishes, but only wishes.
And it is in this chaos in place of the fundamental principles of building the navy that there is a guarantee of all our problems - not warships, not combat rear admirals in shipbuilding, a fleet being built without clear operational tasks, without a basic idea that would give its existence meaning. The minesweepers, unable to deal with mines, and ships of almost 2000 tons, armed with one three-inch, are also from here. You cannot build a combat fleet where it is doctrinal and should not be combat.
But we remember that in the event of war, they will demand something completely different from naval sailors. After all, domination at sea has not disappeared from their governing documents. A state that builds a non-combat, albeit a military fleet, stuffs it with ships that do not even have a purpose, at a critical moment in time will begin to set tasks for this fleet "like a real one." Real tasks in a real war, against a real enemy, but not with the forces of a real fleet. The logical ending in the form of a new Tsushima in this case will only be a matter of time. The losses will be quite real.
Obviously, a new (or well-forgotten old?) Paradigm is needed.
We'll have to do everything ourselves
Karl Marx wrote:
"The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism with a weapon; material force must be overturned by material force: but theory becomes a material force as soon as it takes possession of the masses."
We, patriotic citizens, do not have the material strength to make the state authorities come to their senses. And she does not react to verbal criticism. But, in full accordance with the definition of Marx, we can create our own theory of how everything should be, and make it the property of the masses. And then it will no longer be possible to ignore it, if only because the majority will be indoctrinated with it. And, frankly, the moment has come for this. Because when, if not now, and who if not us?
Let us formulate, starting from the works of theorists and common sense, the very set of principles that must be followed in the creation and development of the navy, what any doctrinal document should begin with:
The Navy of the Russian Federation is a type of armed forces DESIGNED FOR WAYING WAR at sea, including its water surface, airspace over the sea, the water column and the seabed adjacent to the water's edge of the land area, as well as on other bodies of water - lakes and rivers, on their bottom and shores. In some cases, the Navy conducts hostilities, striking enemy communications equipment and their networks, using malicious software, and also strikes targets in low-earth orbit, if necessary. The navy achieves victory in the war by conquering supremacy at sea, namely by establishing such a level of control over sea communications in specified areas of the world ocean, distant, near sea and coastal zones, which allows the Russian Federation to use them unrestrictedly for any purpose, and also does not allow the enemy to interfere with such use, nor to use these communications himself, up to the complete impossibility of deploying his forces. Supremacy at sea is conquered or established without a fight by the navy, both independently and as part of interspecific groupings of the armed forces of the Russian Federation. Whenever possible, the Navy achieves naval dominance by blockade or demonstration of force, or threat of use of force. If these actions did not lead to the desired result, then the Navy DESTROY the opposing forces of the enemy, preventing the establishment of dominance at sea. To do this, all ships, submarines, combat aircraft, and other systems of weapons of the navy have the CAPABILITY OF CONDUCTING BATTLE, including a long-term one, and perform tasks of destroying opposing ships, submarines, aircraft and other enemy weapon systems, his manpower and various objects on land, including in its depths. The personnel of the Navy have the level of training and morale necessary to perform such tasks.
THE MAIN OBJECT OF THE IMPACT OF THE NAVAL FLEET ARE THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE ENTIRE AND THEIR SHORE INFRASTRUCTURE. In case of military necessity, the Navy can destroy targets located on land, using missile and artillery weapons of ships, naval aviation and units and formations of the marines.
THE OBJECTIVE TO CONQUER DOMINANCE AT THE SEA IS PRIMARY FOR THE NAVY. IF IT IS COMPLETELY IMPOSSIBLE TO CONQUER DOMINANCE AT THE SEA, IT IS REQUIRED NOT TO ALLOW THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DOMINANCE ON THE SEA BY THE ADVENTURE. All other tasks performed by the Navy are secondary, with the exception of ships in the NSNF and amphibious assault ships, for which operations against land are the main task. All warships and combat aircraft accepted into the Navy must either be capable of being used to perform the specified main task, or be necessary for its performance by other ships and aircraft. EXCEPTIONS ARE NOT ALLOWED.
Just? Just. These are the principles that make the navy a navy. It doesn't matter whether it is based on corvettes or aircraft carriers, whether a few thousand people serve in it or hundreds of thousands - it doesn't matter. Principles are important.
It is necessary to assess whether the design of the new warship is adequate (or how the project is implemented)? First, we see if it, or its implementation, conforms to the principles. Need to assess the focus of combat training? Let's see how it keeps pace with the principles. This is the criterion that separates a country with a fleet from a country with many ships.
It is these provisions that should one day appear in our doctrinal attitudes, become at the same time an indication for what needs to be done and a yardstick for what has already been done. And it is on the basis of them that our country should build its fleet in the future.
