Soviet generals and marshals, who managed to survive in the initial period of the war, have forever remembered how defenseless our troops were against the domination of German aviation in the skies. In this regard, the Soviet Union spared no resources to create object and military air defense systems. In this regard, it so happened that our country occupies a leading position in the world in terms of the number of types of land-based anti-aircraft missile systems put into service and the number of built examples of land-based anti-aircraft missile systems.
The reasons and features of the creation of a medium-range military air defense system
In the USSR, unlike other countries, they simultaneously produced different types of air defense systems that had similar characteristics in terms of the affected area and reach in height, intended for use in the country's air defense forces and in army air defense units. For example, in the air defense forces of the USSR, until the mid-1990s, low-altitude air defense systems of the S-125 family were operated, with a firing range of up to 25 km and a ceiling of 18 km. Mass deliveries of the S-125 air defense system to the troops began in the second half of the 1960s. In 1967, the air defense system of the Ground Forces entered the "Kub" air defense system, which had practically the same range of destruction and could fight air targets flying at an altitude of up to 8 km. With similar capabilities in terms of dealing with an air enemy, the S-125 and the Cube had different operational characteristics: deployment and folding time, transportation speed, off-road capabilities, the principle of anti-aircraft missile guidance and the ability to carry a long combat duty.
The same can be said about the medium-range military mobile complex "Krug", to which the S-75 air defense missile system corresponded in firing range in the object air defense. But, unlike the well-known "seventy-five", which was exported and took part in many regional conflicts, the Krug air defense missile system, as they say, remained in the shadows. Many readers, even those who are interested in military equipment, are very poorly informed about the characteristics and history of Krug's service.
Some Soviet high-ranking military leaders from the very beginning objected to the development of another medium-range air defense system, which could become a competitor to the S-75. So, the commander-in-chief of the USSR Air Defense Marshal V. A. Sudets in 1963, during a demonstration of new technology to the country's leadership, suggested N. S. Khrushchev to curtail the Krug air defense missile system, promising to provide cover for the ground forces with S-75 complexes. Since the unsuitability of the "seventy-five" for mobile warfare was understandable even to a layman, the impulsive Nikita Sergeevich responded with a counter proposal to the marshal - to shove the S-75 deeper into himself.
In fairness, it should be said that in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a number of anti-aircraft artillery regiments of the ground forces were re-equipped with the SA-75 air defense system (with a guidance station operating in the 10-cm frequency range). At the same time, the anti-aircraft artillery regiments were renamed anti-aircraft missile (ZRP). However, the use of semi-stationary complexes SA-75 in the air defense of the ground was a purely forced measure, and the groundmen themselves considered such a solution to be temporary. To ensure air defense at the level of the army and the front, a mobile medium-range anti-aircraft missile system was required with high mobility (hence the requirement to place the main elements on a tracked base), short deployment and collapse times, and the ability to conduct independent combat operations in the front-line zone.
The first work on the creation of a medium-range military complex on a mobile chassis began in 1956. By the middle of 1958, technical assignments were issued, and on the basis of the draft tactical and technical requirements, a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted on the implementation of the experimental design development "Circle". On November 26, 1964, the CM decree No. 966-377 was signed on the acceptance of the 2K11 air defense system into service. The decree also fixed its main characteristics: single-channel for the target (although it would be more correct for a division to write that three-channel both on the target and on the missile channel); radio command guidance system for missiles using the "three points" and "half straightening" methods. The affected area: 3-23, 5 km in height, 11-45 km in range, up to 18 km in the course parameter of targets. The maximum speed of fired typical targets (F-4C and F-105D) is up to 800 m / s. The average probability of hitting a non-maneuvering target throughout the entire affected area is not less than 0.7. The time of deployment (folding) of the air defense missile system is up to 5 minutes. To this we can add that the probability of defeat turned out to be less than required by the TTZ, and the deployment time of 5 minutes was not carried out for all the means of the complex.
Self-propelled launchers of the Krug air defense missile system were first publicly demonstrated during the military parade on November 7, 1966, and immediately attracted the attention of foreign military experts.
The composition of the Krug air defense system
The actions of the missile battalion (srn) were led by a command platoon, consisting of: target detection station - SOC 1S12, target designation cabin - K-1 "Crab" command and control center (since 1981 - command post from the "Polyana-D1" automated control system). The air defense missile system had 3 anti-aircraft missile batteries as part of the missile guidance station - SNR 1S32 and three self-propelled launchers - SPU 2P24 with two missiles on each. Repair, maintenance of the main assets of the division and replenishment of ammunition were assigned to the personnel of the technical battery, who had at their disposal: control and testing test stations - KIPS 2V9, transport vehicles - TM 2T5, transport and charging machines - TZM 2T6, tank trucks for transporting fuel, technological equipment for assembling and refueling missiles.
All combat assets of the complex, except for TZM, were located on tracked self-propelled light armored chassis of high cross-country ability and were protected from weapons of mass destruction. The fuel supply of the complex provided a march at a speed of up to 45-50 km / h to remove up to 300 km of travel and the ability to conduct combat work on the spot for 2 hours. Three air defense missile brigades were part of the anti-aircraft missile brigade (anti-aircraft missile brigade), the full composition of which, depending on the location of the deployment, could be different. The number of main combat assets (SOC, SNR and SPU) was always the same, but the composition of the auxiliary units could vary. In brigades equipped with different modifications of air defense systems, communications companies differed in the types of medium-power radio stations. An even more important difference was that in some cases one technical battery was used for the entire ZRBR.
The following versions of the air defense system are known: 2K11 "Circle" (produced since 1965), 2K11A "Circle-A" (1967), 2K11M "Circle-M" (1971) and 2K11M1 "Circle-M1" (1974).
Radio equipment of the Krug air defense missile system
The eyes of the complex were: 1C12 target detection station and PRV-9B "Tilt-2" radio altimeter (P-40 "Bronya" radar). SOTS 1S12 was a radar with a circular view of the centimeter wavelength range. It provided the detection of air targets, their identification and the issuance of target designation to the 1S32 missile guidance stations. All equipment of the 1C12 radar station was located on a self-propelled tracked chassis of an AT-T heavy artillery tractor ("object 426"). The mass of the SOC 1S12 prepared for operation was about 36 tons. The average technical speed of the station movement was 20 km / h. The maximum speed of movement on highways is up to 35 km / h. The power reserve on dry roads, taking into account the maintenance of the station for 8 hours with a full refueling of at least 200 km. Deployment / folding time of the station - 5 minutes. Calculation - 6 people.
The equipment of the station made it possible to analyze the characteristics of the movement of targets by roughly determining their course and speed by the indicator with a long-term memorization of at least 100 seconds of marks from the targets. The detection of a fighter aircraft was provided at a range of 70 km - at a target flight altitude of 500 m, 150 km - at an altitude of 6 km and 180 km - at an altitude of 12 km. The 1C12 station had topographic reference equipment, with the help of which the output to a given area without using landmarks was carried out, the station was oriented and parallax errors were taken into account when transmitting data to 1C32 products. In the late 1960s, a modernized version of the radar appeared. Tests of the modernized model showed that the detection ranges of the station increased at the above-mentioned heights to 85, 220 and 230 km, respectively. The station received protection from the Shrike-type missile defense system, and its reliability increased.
To accurately determine the range and altitude of air targets in the control company, it was initially envisaged to use a PRV-9B radio altimeter ("Slope-2B", 1RL19), which was towed by a KrAZ-214 vehicle. PRV-9B, operating in the centimeter range, ensured the detection of a fighter aircraft at ranges of 115-160 km and at altitudes of 1-12 km, respectively.
PRV-9B had a power source common to the 1C12 radar (gas turbine power unit for the rangefinder). In general, the PRV-9B radio altimeter fully met the requirements and was quite reliable. However, it was significantly inferior to the 1C12 rangefinder in terms of cross-country ability on soft soils and had a deployment time of 45 minutes.
Subsequently, in the brigades armed with late modifications of the Krug air defense system, the PRV-9B radio altimeters were replaced by the PRV-16B (Reliability-B, 1RL132B). The equipment and mechanisms of the PRV-16B altimeter are located in the K-375B body on the KrAZ-255B vehicle. The PRV-16B altimeter does not have a power plant; it is powered from the rangefinder power supply. The interference immunity and operational characteristics of the PRV-16B have been improved in comparison with the PRV-9B. The PRV-16B deployment time is 15 minutes. A fighter-type target flying at an altitude of 100 m can be detected at a range of 35 km, at an altitude of 500 m - 75 km, at an altitude of 1000 m - 110 km, at an altitude of more than 3000 - 170 km.
It should be said that radio altimeters were actually a pleasant option that greatly facilitates the process of issuing target designation CHP 1C32. It should be borne in mind that for the transportation of PRV-9B and PRV-16B, a wheeled chassis was used, which was significantly inferior in cross-country ability to other elements of the complex on a tracked base, and the time of deployment and folding of radio altimeters was many times longer than that of the main elements of the Krug air defense system. In this regard, the main burden of detecting, identifying targets and issuing target designation in the division fell on the SOC 1S12. Some sources mention that radio altimeters were originally planned to be included in the platoon of the air defense control, but, apparently, they were available only in the brigade control company.
Automated control systems
In the literature describing Soviet and Russian air defense systems, automated control systems (ACS) are either not mentioned at all, or are considered very superficially. Talking about the Krug anti-aircraft complex, it would be wrong not to consider the ACS used in its composition.
ACS 9S44, aka K-1 "Crab", was created in the late 1950s and was originally intended for automated fire control of anti-aircraft artillery regiments armed with 57-mm S-60 assault rifles. Subsequently, this system was used in the regimental and brigade level to direct the actions of a number of Soviet first-generation air defense systems. The K-1 consisted of a 9S416 combat control cabin (KBU on the Ural-375 chassis) with two AB-16 power supply units, a 9S417 target designation cabin (control center on a ZIL-157 or ZIL-131 chassis) of divisions, a radar information transmission line "Grid-2K", GAZ-69T topographic surveyor, 9S441 spare parts and accessories and power supply equipment.
The means of displaying information of the system made it possible to visually demonstrate the air situation on the brigade commander's console based on information from the P-40 or P-12/18 and P-15/19 radars, which were available in the brigade's radar company. When targets were found at a distance of 15 to 160 km, up to 10 targets were simultaneously processed, target designations were issued with a forced turn of the missile guidance station antennas in specified directions, and the acceptance of these target designations was checked. The coordinates of the 10 targets selected by the brigade commander were transmitted directly to the missile guidance station. In addition, it was possible to receive at the brigade command post and relay information about two targets coming from the army (front) air defense command post.
From the detection of the enemy aircraft to the issuance of target designation to the division, taking into account the distribution of targets and the possible need to transfer fire, it took on average 30-35 s. The reliability of target designation development reached more than 90% with an average target search time by the missile guidance station of 15–45 s. The calculation of the KBU was 8 people, not counting the chief of staff, the calculation of the KPTs - 3 people. Deployment time was 18 minutes for CBU and 9 for QPC, clotting time was 5 minutes 30 seconds and 5 minutes, respectively.
Already in the mid-1970s, the K-1 "Crab" ACS was considered primitive and outdated. The number of targets processed and tracked by the "Crab" was clearly insufficient, and there was virtually no automated communication with higher control bodies. The main disadvantage of the ACS was that the divisional commander through it could not report on independently chosen targets to the brigade commander and other divisional commanders, which could lead to the shelling of one target by several missiles. The battalion commander could notify of the decision to carry out an independent shelling of the target by radio or by a regular phone, if, of course, they had time to stretch the field cable. Meanwhile, the use of a radio station in voice mode immediately deprived the ACS of an important quality - secrecy. At the same time, it was very difficult, if not impossible, for the enemy's radio intelligence to reveal the ownership of telecode radio networks.
Due to the shortcomings of the 9S44 ACS, the development of the more advanced 9S468M1 "Polyana-D1" ACS was started in 1975, and in 1981 the latter was put into service. The command post of the brigade (PBU-B) 9S478 included a 9S486 combat control cabin, a 9S487 interface cabin and two diesel power plants. The battalion's command post (PBU-D) 9S479 consisted of a 9S489 command and control cabin and a diesel power plant. In addition, the automated control system included a 9C488 maintenance cab. All cabins and power plants PBU-B and PBU-D were located on the chassis of Ural-375 vehicles with a unified K1-375 van body. An exception was the UAZ-452T-2 topographic surveyor as part of the PBU-B. Topographic location of PBU-D was provided by the appropriate means of the division. Communication between the front (army) air defense command post and PBUB, between PBU-B and PBU-D was carried out via telecode and radiotelephone channels.
The publication format does not allow to describe in detail the characteristics and modes of operation of the Polyana-D1 system. But it can be noted that in comparison with the "Crab" equipment, the number of simultaneously processed targets at the brigade's command post increased from 10 to 62, simultaneously controlled target channels - from 8 to 16. At the division's command post, the corresponding indicators increased from 1 to 16 and from 1 to 4 respectively. In the ACS "Polyana-D1", for the first time, the solution of the tasks of coordinating the actions of subordinate units on their own chosen targets, issuing information about targets from subordinate units, identifying targets and preparing the commander's decision were automated. Estimated efficiency estimates have shown that the implementation of the Polyana-D1 automated control system increases the mathematical expectation of targets destroyed by the brigade by 21%, and the average missile consumption decreases by 19%.
Unfortunately, in the public domain there is no complete information on how many teams managed to master the new ACS. According to fragmentary information published on the air defense forums, it was possible to establish that the 133rd air defense brigade (Yuterbog, GSVG) received "Polyana-D1" in 1983, the 202nd air defense brigade (Magdeburg, GSVG) - until 1986 and 180th airborne brigade (Anastasyevka settlement, Khabarovsk Territory, Far Eastern Military District) - until 1987. There is a high probability that many brigades armed with the Krug air defense missile system, prior to disbandment or rearmament to the next generation complexes, exploited the ancient Crab.
1S32 missile guidance station
The most important element in the Krug air defense missile system was the 1S32 missile guidance station. SNR 1S32 was intended to search for a target according to the data of the Central Control Center of the SOC, its further auto-tracking in angular coordinates, the issuance of guidance data to the SPU 2P24 and radio command control of an anti-aircraft missile in flight after its launch. The SNR was located on a self-propelled tracked chassis, created on the basis of the SU-100P self-propelled artillery unit, and was unified with the complex launcher chassis. With a mass of 28.5 tons, a 400 hp diesel engine. ensured the movement of the SNR on the highway with a maximum speed of up to 65 km / h. The power reserve is up to 400 km. Crew - 5 people.
There is an opinion that CHP 1C32 was a "sore spot", in general, a very good complex. First of all, because the production of the air defense system itself was limited by the capabilities of the plant in Yoshkar-Ola, which delivered no more than 2 SNR per month. In addition, the decoding of SNR as a station of continuous repair is widely known. Of course, reliability improved during the production process, and there were no particular complaints about the latest modification of the 1C32M2. In addition, it was the SNR that determined the deployment time of the division - if 5 minutes were enough for the SOC and the SPU, then for the SNR it took up to 15 minutes. About another 10 minutes were spent warming up the lamp blocks and monitoring the operation and setting up the equipment.
The station was equipped with an electronic auto-rangefinder and operated according to the method of hidden monoconic scanning along angular coordinates. Target acquisition took place at a distance of up to 105 km in the absence of interference, a pulse power of 750 kW, and a beam width of 1 °. With interference and other negative factors, the range could be reduced to 70 km. To combat anti-radar missiles, the 1C32 had an intermittent mode of operation.
An antenna post was located on the rear of the hull, on which a coherent-pulse radar was installed. The antenna post had the ability to rotate around its axis. Above the antenna of the narrow beam of the missile channel, the antenna of the wide beam of the missile channel was attached. Above the antennas of the narrow and wide rocket channels, there was an antenna for transmitting instructions from the 3M8 missile defense system. On later modifications of the SNR, a television optical sighting camera (TOV) was installed in the upper part of the radar.
When 1S32 received information from 1S12 SOC, the missile guidance station began to process the information and searched for targets in the vertical plane in automatic mode. At the moment of target detection, its tracking began in range and angular coordinates. According to the current coordinates of the target, the calculating device worked out the necessary data to launch the missile defense system. Then, commands were sent over the communication line to the 2P24 launcher to turn the launcher into the launch zone. After the 2P24 launcher turned in the right direction, the missile defense system was launched and captured for escort. Through the antenna of the command transmitter, the missile was controlled and detonated. Commands of control and a one-time command to cocking the radio fuse were received on board the rocket through the antenna of the command transmitter. The immunity of the SNR 1C32 was ensured by the separation of the operating frequencies of the channels, the high energy potential of the transmitter and the coding of control signals, as well as by working at two carrier frequencies for transmitting commands simultaneously. The fuse was triggered at a miss of less than 50 meters.
It is believed that the search capabilities of the 1C32 guidance station were insufficient for self-detection of targets. Of course, everything is relative. Of course, they were much higher for SOC. The SNR scanned the space in the 1 ° sector in azimuth and +/- 9 ° in elevation. Mechanical rotation of the antenna system was possible in the sector of 340 degrees (the circular was prevented by the cables connecting the antenna unit to the housing) at a speed of about 6 rpm. Usually, the SNR conducted a search in a rather narrow sector (according to some information, of the order of 10-20 °), especially since even with the presence of a control center, an additional search was required from the SOC. Many sources write that the average target search time was 15-45 seconds.
The self-propelled gun had a reservation of 14-17 mm, which was supposed to protect the crew from shrapnel. But with a close explosion of a bomb or a warhead of an anti-radar missile (PRR), the antenna post inevitably received damage.
It was possible to reduce the likelihood of hitting the PRR thanks to the use of a television-optical sight. According to declassified reports on tests of TOV on the CHR-125, it had two field of view angles: 2 ° and 6 °. The first - when using a lens with a focal length of F = 500 mm, the second - with a focal length of F = 150 mm.
When using a radar channel for preliminary target designation, the target detection range at altitudes of 0.2-5 km was:
- aircraft MiG-17: 10-26 km;
- aircraft MiG-19: 9-32 km;
- aircraft MiG-21: 10-27 km;
- Tu-16 aircraft: 44-70 km (70 km at H = 10 km).
At a flight altitude of 0.2-5 km, the target detection range practically did not depend on the altitude. At an altitude of more than 5 km, the range increases by 20-40%.
These data were obtained for an F = 500 mm lens; when using a 150 mm lens, the detection ranges are reduced by 50% for Mig-17 targets, and by 30% for Tu-16 targets. In addition to the longer range, the narrow angle of view also provided about twice the accuracy. It corresponded broadly to similar accuracy when using manual tracking of the radar channel. However, the 150 mm lens did not require high target designation accuracy and worked better for low-altitude and group targets.
On the SNR, there was the possibility of both manual and automatic target tracking. There was also a PA mode - semi-automatic tracking, when the operator periodically drove the target with the flywheels into the "gate". At the same time, TV tracking was easier and more convenient than radar tracking. Of course, the effectiveness of the use of TOV directly depended on the transparency of the atmosphere and the time of day. In addition, when shooting with television accompaniment, it was necessary to take into account the location of the launcher relative to the SNR and the position of the Sun (in the +/- 16 ° sector in the direction of the sun, shooting was impossible).
Self-propelled launcher and transport-loading vehicle of the Krug air defense missile system
The SPU 2P24 was intended to accommodate two combat-ready anti-aircraft missiles, transport them and launch them at the command of the SNR at an angle of 10 to 60 ° to the horizon. The launcher chassis ("Product 123") based on the SU-100P self-propelled guns chassis is unified with the SNR 1S32. With a mass of 28.5 tons, a 400 hp diesel engine. provided movement along the highway with a maximum speed of 65 km / h. The range of the PU on the highway was 400 km. Calculation - 3 people.
The artillery part of the SPU 2P24 is made in the form of a support beam with an arrow pivotally fixed in its tail section, lifted by two hydraulic cylinders and side brackets with supports for placing two missiles. At the start of the rocket, the front support clears the way for the lower stabilizer of the rocket to pass. On the march, the missiles were held in place by additional supports attached to the boom.
According to the combat regulations, SPUs in a firing position were to be located at a distance of 150-400 meters from the SNR along an arc of a circle, in a line or at the corners of a triangle. But sometimes, depending on the terrain, the distance did not exceed 40-50 meters. The main concern of the crew was that there were no walls, large stones, trees, etc. behind the launcher.
Subject to good preparation, a team of 5 people (3 people - the calculation of the SPU and 2 people - TZM) charged one rocket with an approach from 20 meters in 3 minutes 40-50 seconds. If necessary, for example, in the event of a missile failure, it could be loaded back onto the TPM, and the loading itself in this case took even less time.
The use of the Ural-375 wheeled chassis for the transport-loading vehicle was generally not critical. If necessary, tracked self-propelled vehicles 2P24 could tow TPM when driving on soft soils.
Anti-aircraft guided missile 3M8
It is known that in the USSR until the early 1970s there were serious problems with the possibility of creating effective formulations of solid rocket fuel, and the choice of a ramjet engine (ramjet) for an anti-aircraft missile in the design of the Krug air defense system was predetermined from the very beginning. Solid-propellant medium-range missiles created in the late 1950s would have turned out to be too cumbersome, and the developers refused from liquid-propellant rocket engines based on safety and operational reliability requirements.
The PRVD had high efficiency and simple design. At the same time, it was much cheaper than a turbojet engine and atmospheric oxygen was used to burn fuel (kerosene). The specific thrust of the PRVD surpassed other types of engines and at a rocket flight speed 3-5 times higher than the sonic one, it was characterized by the lowest fuel consumption per unit of thrust even in comparison with a turbojet engine. The disadvantage of the ramjet engine was insufficient thrust at subsonic speeds due to the lack of the required high-speed pressure at the air intake inlet, which led to the need to use launching accelerators that accelerated the rocket to a speed of 1.5-2 times the speed of sound. However, almost all anti-aircraft missiles created at that time had boosters. The PRVD also had disadvantages inherent only to this type of engine. First, the complexity of the development - each ramjet is unique and requires lengthy refinement and testing. This was one of the reasons that postponed the adoption of the "Circle" by almost 3 years. Secondly, the rocket had a large frontal resistance, and quickly lost speed in the passive section. Therefore, it was impossible to increase the firing range of subsonic targets by inertial flight, as was done on the S-75. Finally, the ramjet engine was unstable at high angles of attack, which limited the maneuverability of the missile defense system.
The first modification of the 3M8 anti-aircraft missile appeared in 1964. It was followed by: 3M8M1 (1967), 3M8M2 (1971) and 3M8M3 (1974). There were no fundamental differences between them, basically, the height of the target hitting, the minimum range and maneuverability increased.
High-explosive fragmentation warhead 3N11 / 3N11M weighing 150 kg was placed directly behind the fairing of the central body of the air intake of the main engine. The weight of the explosive - a mixture of RDX and TNT - was 90 kg, a notch on the steel jacket formed 15,000 ready-made fragments of 4 grams each. Judging by the recollections of veterans - Krugovites, there was also a variant of a missile with a "special" warhead, similar to the V-760 (15D) missile of the S-75 air defense system. The rocket was equipped with a proximity radio fuse, a command receiver and an onboard impulse transponder.
Swivel wings (span 2206 mm) on the body of the missile defense system were placed in an X-shaped pattern and could deviate in the range of 28 °, fixed stabilizers (span 2702 mm) - in a cruciform pattern. Rocket length - 8436 mm, diameter - 850 mm, launch weight - 2455 kg, 270 kg of kerosene and 27 kg of isopropyl nitrate were refueled in the internal fuel tanks. On the marching section, the rocket accelerated to 1000 m / s.
Different sources publish conflicting data on the maximum possible overload of an anti-aircraft missile, but even at the design stage, the TZ specified the maximum overload of the missile 8g.
Another obscure point is that all sources say that the fuse is triggered when a miss of up to 50 meters, otherwise the command goes to self-destruct. But there is information that the warhead was directional, and when detonated, it formed a cone of fragments up to 300 meters long. There is also a mention that in addition to the K9 command for cocking the radio fuse, there was also the K6 command, which established the form of dispersion of warhead fragments, and this form depended on the target's speed.
As for the minimum height of targets to be hit, it should be remembered that it is determined both by the capabilities of the warhead fuse and the SAM control system. For example, with radar tracking of a target, the target height restrictions are greater than with television, which, incidentally, was characteristic of all radar equipment of that time.
Former operators have repeatedly written that they managed to shoot down targets at an altitude of 70-100 meters during control and training firing. Moreover, in the early to mid-1980s, attempts were made to use the Krug air defense system of later versions to practice the destruction of low-flying cruise missiles. However, to combat low-altitude targets, anti-aircraft missiles with PRVD had insufficient maneuverability, and the probability of intercepting the CD was small. On the basis of the 3M8 missile defense system, a universal missile was developed to combat not only aircraft, but also ballistic missiles at a range of up to 150 km. The universal missile defense system had a new guidance system and a directional warhead. But in connection with the beginning of the development of the S-300V complex, work in this direction was curtailed.
Comparison of the Krug air defense system with foreign and domestic complexes
Let's briefly consider anti-aircraft missiles with a ramjet engine created abroad. As you know, the United States and its closest NATO allies during the Cold War did not have medium-range mobile air defense systems. The task of covering troops from air strikes in Western countries was mainly assigned to fighters, and towed anti-aircraft missile systems were considered as an auxiliary air defense system. In the 1950s-1980s, in addition to the United States, work on the creation of their own air defense systems was carried out in Great Britain, France, Italy and Norway. Despite the advantages of the ramjet missiles, from the above countries, nowhere except the United States and Great Britain have brought anti-aircraft missiles with such an engine to mass production, but all of them were intended either for ship complexes or were placed in stationary positions.
About 5 years before the start of serial production of the Krug air defense system, launchers of the RIM-8 Talos anti-aircraft complex appeared on the decks of American heavy cruisers.
At the initial and middle stages of the trajectory, the rocket flew in the radar beam (this guidance method is also known as the "saddled beam"), and at the final stage it switched to homing by the signal reflected from the target. SAM RIM-8A weighed 3180 kg, had a length of 9, 8 m and a diameter of 71 cm. The maximum firing range was 120 km, the height reach was 27 km. Thus, a much heavier and larger American missile outnumbered the Soviet SAM3 M8 in range by more than two times. At the same time, the very significant dimensions and high cost of the Talos air defense system prevented its widespread use. This complex was available on Albany-class heavy cruisers converted from Baltimore-class cruisers, on three Galveston-class cruisers, and on the Long Beach nuclear-powered missile cruiser. Due to the excessive weight and dimensions, the RIM-8 Talos rocket launchers were removed from the decks of American cruisers in 1980.
In 1958, the Bloodhound Mk. I air defense system was adopted in Great Britain. Anti-aircraft missile "Bloodhound" had a very unusual layout, as a propulsion system used two ramjet engines "Tor", which ran on liquid fuel. The cruise engines were mounted in parallel on the upper and lower parts of the hull. To accelerate the rocket to a speed at which ramjet engines could operate, four solid-propellant boosters were used. The accelerators and part of the empennage were dropped after the acceleration of the rocket and the start of the propulsion engines. Direct-flow propulsion engines accelerated the rocket in the active section to a speed of 750 m / s. Launching the missile defense system went with great difficulties. This was mainly due to the unstable and unreliable operation of ramjet engines. Satisfactory results of the PRVD work were achieved only after about 500 firing tests of engines and missile launches, which were carried out at the Australian Woomera training ground.
The rocket was very large and heavy, and therefore it was impossible to place it on a mobile chassis. The length of the missile was 7700 mm, diameter 546 mm, and the weight of the missile exceeded 2050 kg. For targeting, a semi-active radar seeker was used. The firing range of the Bloodhound Mk. I air defense system was a little more than 35 km, which is comparable to the range of the much more compact low-altitude American solid-propellant air defense system MIM-23B HAWK. Characteristics of the Bloodhound Mk. II were significantly higher. Due to the increase in the amount of kerosene on board and the use of more powerful engines, the flight speed increased to 920 m / s, and the range - up to 85 km. The upgraded rocket has become 760 mm longer, its launch weight has increased by 250 kg.
SAM "Bloodhound", in addition to Great Britain, were in service in Australia, Singapore and Sweden. In Singapore, they were in service until 1990. In the British Isles, they covered large air bases until 1991. The Bloodhounds lasted the longest in Sweden - until 1999.
The armament of British destroyers in 1970-2000 included the Sea Dart air defense system. The official acceptance of the complex into service was formalized in 1973. The Sea Dart anti-aircraft missile had an original and rarely used scheme. It used two stages - accelerating and marching. The accelerating engine ran on solid fuel, its task is to give the rocket the speed necessary for the stable operation of the ramjet engine.
The main engine was integrated into the rocket body, in the bow there was an air intake with a central body. The rocket turned out to be quite "clean" in aerodynamic terms, it is made according to the normal aerodynamic design. The rocket diameter is 420 mm, the length is 4400 mm, the wingspan is 910 mm. The launch weight is 545 kg.
Comparing the Soviet 3M8 SAM and the British Sea Dart, it can be noted that the British missile was lighter and more compact, and also had a more advanced semi-active radar guidance system. The most advanced modification, the Sea Dart Mod 2, appeared in the early 1990s. On this complex, the firing range was increased to 140 km and the ability to combat low-altitude targets was improved. The long-range Sea Dart air defense system, which had quite good characteristics, was not widely used and was used only on the British destroyers Type 82 and Type 42 (destroyers of the Sheffield type), as well as on the aircraft carriers Invincible.
If desired, on the basis of the naval Sea Dart, it was possible to create a good mobile air defense system, with a very decent firing range by the standards of the 1970-1980s. The design of the land-based complex known as the Guardian dates back to the 1980s. In addition to fighting aerodynamic targets, it was also planned to be used to intercept the OTR. However, due to financial constraints, the creation of this air defense system did not progress beyond the "paper" stage.
Comparison of the 3M8 missile with the V-759 (5Ya23) missile used in the S-75M2 / M3 air defense system will be indicative. The masses of the missiles are approximately equal, as are the speeds. Due to the use of a passive section, the firing range at subsonic targets in the B-759 is greater (up to 55 km). Due to the lack of information about the maneuverability of missiles, it is difficult to speak. It can be assumed that the 3M8's low-altitude maneuverability left much to be desired, but it is no coincidence that the S-75 missiles were nicknamed "flying telegraph poles." At the same time, the Krug missiles were more compact, which facilitated their transportation, loading and positioning. But most importantly, the use of toxic fuel and oxidizer not only made life extremely difficult for the personnel of the technical division, who had to equip missiles in gas masks and OZK, but also reduced the combat survivability of the complex as a whole. When a rocket was damaged on the ground during air raids (and there were dozens of such cases in Vietnam), these liquids, when in contact, ignited spontaneously, which inevitably led to a fire and explosion. In the event of a rocket detonating in the air, until the fuel and oxidizer were fully depleted, tens of liters of poisonous fog settled on the ground.
In the next part we will talk about the service and combat use of the Krug air defense system. The authors would be extremely grateful to readers who have experience in operating this complex, who are able to point out possible shortcomings and inaccuracies that may exist in this publication.
