Russia has a long history of naval parades. They have been around for as long as the navy. But at different times there were different phenomena behind the parades. Sometimes they marked the won wars or the high level of combat readiness achieved. Sometimes, on the contrary, they masked gaping gaps in combat training or in the theory of combat use, at worst, problems with morale behind their brilliance. And if such a "camouflaged" fleet was then forced to fight, then it ended badly.
The era of naval parades began at the same time when the fleet itself began - in the times of Peter the Great.
Start. Peter the Great
It all started with the Grand Embassy and the king's stay in England. King William III ordered that Peter Mikhailov (the First) be shown everything that would interest him in the English fleet, up to being present at the review and fleet maneuvers on the Spithead roadstead. Peter was jubilant, he was on deck all day, he climbed the masts, trying to understand everything …
Only ten years ago, he first saw a sailing boat, and now before his eyes was a real and effective "instrument" of sea power (and helpfully "open").
In subsequent years, Peter I showed that he was not just a "tsar-carpenter", but an outstanding statesman, strategist who, in an extremely unfavorable military-political and economic situation, managed to win the Northern War and make a backward agrarian country an empire. This happened in battles where the "hands" of the state were the army and the navy, and the latter, completely new for the state, had (thanks to the genius of Peter) a clear and clear concept of conceptual development and application for its intended purpose at the "strategic level", as a result of which it grew very quickly tactically.
Peter's example is underestimated today, and he is extremely important. In the course of the Northern War, Russia faced a power that had not only a stronger army and navy, economy, but also significant naval experience. It would seem that there is no point in investing in a war at sea against such an enemy. But Peter didn't just invest. He was able to formulate principles, starting from which the weakest at that time Russian fleet successfully waged its war against Sweden. He created his own doctrine, on the basis of which the fleet fought and won the war (providing both landings in Sweden and the "interception" of Baltic trade in Russian ports).
Having a clear and precise understanding of what and why they were doing, the Russian sailors began to defeat the enemy, against whom, in theory, they should have had no chance.
Today we are in a somewhat similar situation: there are a lot of rivals and coalitions around, unquestionably hostile to our country and having superiority in forces at sea. And the example given by the first Russian emperor is more relevant today than ever.
Peter, who loved holidays and understood the great political and educational role of a worthy celebration of "victories", after the first major victory of the Russian fleet in 1714 at Gangut, staged the first naval parade in St. Petersburg.
A huge naval parade took place on August 11, 1723 on the Kronstadt raid after the victory over Sweden in the Northern War. The fleet, which played a strategic role in the war, met with dignity its first "ship" - a small boat, from which the Russian fleet began, at the tiller of which was Peter the Great himself. The boat passed along the entire formation of the ships saluting it (only battleships - 21, more than 1, 5 thousand guns in total).
Unfortunately, Peter I did not leave to the descendants a written concept of naval power for Russia. The introduced charter of the fleet turned out to be rather a "step back" from what and how the fleet was successfully doing in the Northern War … And although the fleet had many victories and achievements ahead, there were also periods when it existed rather by inertia, without a clear goal and clear for all sense (with a corresponding "failure" of its combat readiness).
Admiral Lazarev and the Crimean War. About real combat training and show
Two pictures of the fleet reviews with the participation of Nicholas I are known: A. P. Bogolyubov. "Review of the Baltic Fleet" in 1848, and Aivazovsky "Black Sea Fleet" in 1849
At the same time, it is important to understand that there was an understanding that “things are heading for war”, and the reviews were not just a “drill”. Nicholas I was interested in the real combat capability of the fleet. And soon it had to be tested in practice. But the times in the yard were far from Peter's times.
The realities of that era were excellently described by the historian Sergey Makhov:
In the 1840s. For the first time, our Naval Department was concerned with the question that there is a fully combat-ready ship. We thought for a long time, argued and in the end decided: a combat-ready ship is a ship that can at least withstand the fire of its guns and not fall apart in a strong wind. We were delighted! Class! Formulated gracefully and beautifully! We decided to apply this principle to the available ships and a little … ate fish soup: out of 35, only 14 can withstand the fire of their guns and not fall apart.
The problem was that the elegant formula had already been voiced before Tsar Nikolai Pavlovich. Frightened … But the need for inventions is cunning …
Nikolai listened to these verbal escapades and … asked him to explain in normal Russian what he meant … The admirals were afraid to explain, and the tsar did not fully understand anything. And he asked his son Konstantin to figure out what was going on with the resinous asses.
Konstantin figured it out. By 1853. When the Crimean War had already begun and it was too late to take measures. They say he swore for a long time.
When the war had been raging for a year, in 1854 the military council of the Baltic Fleet decided to completely abandon active operations, giving the sea to the enemy. This decision of the council made Nicholas I exclaim in anger:
"Was the fleet existed and maintained for that, so that at the moment when it is really needed, I was told that the fleet was not ready for the job!"
The Baltic Fleet was not ready … Then came the emergency measures that did not allow the Allies to break through to the capital, but it was just an "impromptu". The fleet that looked beautiful and powerful at the imperial review in 1848 turned out to be absolutely unsuitable for business and battle.
The inspection of the Black Sea Fleet by the emperor took place in 1849, but the situation there was absolutely opposite to the Baltic one.
In 1849, the Black Sea Fleet is not only in a combat-ready state under the command of the reformer Admiral Lazarev, it was "at the peak of form", being ready to give battle to any enemy, even the Turks, even the French, even the British, even the devil himself … And win!
On October 8, 1833, Lazarev became the commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Combat training at the Black Sea Fleet: horror, the fleet did not go out to sea for three years.
A word to Sergei Makhov:
Having become a fleet commander, Lazarev set two main tasks: training crews and creating a normal material base …
In 1834, "Cannon Exercise", "Rules for Preparing a Ship for Battle", "Instructions for Lieutenants of Watch", etc. were introduced as mandatory. Lazarev, probably for the first time in the Russian fleet in 1841, conducts training battles between squadrons.
Lazarev fully supports those officers who show a passion for command. In English style, he supports the "Master and Commander" institute, advancing first of all those who have experience in independent command and navigation.
The barbarian-Anglophile Lazarev swung at the sacred - he demanded and believed that it is necessary to promote and appoint people only according to their ability. And that their origin and connections do not play any role!
And as a result, by 1841, Mikhail Petrovich succeeded: Lazarev made a combat, normal, floated fleet on the Black Sea. Which in every possible way improved its combat training, conducted practical sailing and shooting at sea, but which still lacked the infrastructure.
What is the great merit of Lazarev? He really did not so much make up the staffs (of the fleet), but also fully complied with them. But the problem was not only to build, the fact is that our shipyards could only build 1 battleship at a time. And Lazarev begins a complete modernization of the shipbuilding industry …
All this is described in detail in the excellent articles by Sergey Makhov, let's highlight the main thing:
Lazarev pays attention to real combat training, he does not care about parades and shagistik.
Menshikov, who visited Sevastopol in 1836, was not particularly pleased with the passage of the troops of the Sevastopol garrison in the parade formation. He writes to Lazarev: “You have no expert in this respect. Shouldn't I send you an Exercirmeister? To which the fleet commander says that he is not interested in how they walk, the main thing is how they will fight … At this time in the Baltic Sea, forgetting about the real study, sailors drill on the parade ground and learn to step. For the prince and the emperor are pleased to see this.
And "tomorrow there was a war" … Alas, Lazarev was no longer alive, and the system he created had a key element of himself not only as a talented reformer admiral, but also as a person whom the sovereign trusted unconditionally.
The victory in Sinop over a weak enemy (the Turks) became a trigger for England and France entering the war, for the landing of a large allied assault force in the Crimea. The Black Sea Fleet was inactive, having given the sea to the enemy … At the same time, it is known today that our enemy was in a very bad condition, and by giving him a battle (which Kornilov demanded), our fleet had a great chance of getting its Trafalgar. Alas, instead, everything ended with the sinking of ships (the first of which were sunk in general with guns and supplies) …
And the preparation of the fleet has not yet disappeared, for which an example is the battle between steam frigates on June 3, 1854 … The British (Close) for some reason designated this battle on June 11, but it also says that “the enemy had organized an excellent look-out service along the coast, and noted and reported every movement of the frigates”, but the battle was really on an equal footing. For - suddenly! - the sailors and captains did not know that the British could not be defeated, that, according to some … "It is contraindicated for Russia to fight at sea", they just did what they knew how to do. What difference does it make who to shoot at? An Englishman dies in exactly the same way as a Turk.
But mind you - this is no longer the policy of the fleet, but an initiative …
And finally, the September 9 meeting [on the flooding of the fleet]. The fleet leader is gone. The plans have been disrupted. It is forbidden to fight. There are squabbles inside the fleet that have not yet broken out, but just about. At the same time - do not forget - there is no longer a cover in the form of Lazarev, and if anything, they will be judged by the charter, which preaches only unconditional obedience and caution.
We see an anti-example in relation to Peter. Only one admiral has an understanding of why a fleet is needed and how it needs to be managed, the rest of those vested with power have only a vague understanding that, generally speaking, the fleet is needed, but nothing more.
As a result - the replacement of combat training with show and shagistika. It looks great, but, alas, it does not help to fight.
On the Black Sea, the situation is somewhat different - a combat-ready fleet was created, but alas, the only person who had an understanding of what and how to use it died.
Left without a clear understanding of why they exist, the sailors abruptly "surrender". The rest is known. Large-scale reviews did not help.
Almost like today. Early 20th century
At the end of July (according to the old style) of 1902, the highest inspection of the ships of the Imperial Navy was held in the roadstead of Revel (now Tallinn). Emperor Nicholas II, German Kaiser Wilhelm II, German ships as "guests" were present. Soon, most of the new warships that participated in the review went to the Pacific Ocean, to the new fleet base in Port Arthur.
Inspections of the ships became regular for some time. In 1903, the Baltic Fleet took part in a grand celebration on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of St. Petersburg. And in 1904, when the Russo-Japanese War was already underway, the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which was destined to pass around the world and meet the Japanese fleet in the strait near Tsushima Island and almost completely perish (the remaining ships surrendered, only a few ships and a messenger ship broke through to Vladivostok).
I must say that the holidays and celebrations with the participation of the fleet in Russia in those years were very large-scale and spectacular, and the prestige of the naval service was high. In combat readiness, however, there were such failures that cost Russia a brutal defeat in the Russo-Japanese War with dire political and, which is still underestimated, psychological consequences.
At the same time, before the start of the Russo-Japanese War, many domestic sailors clearly underestimated the complexity and responsibility of the case to which they dedicated themselves (“there were many good sailors, but there were very few good sailors”).
From the book of V. Yu. Gribovsky "Vice-Admiral Rozhestvensky":
There is no doubt that the July "show" of 1902, organized by Rozhestvensky with the participation, on duty, of his subordinates and (according to the established custom) the admiral-general and the head of the ministry, was purely ostentatious …
At the end of the maneuvers and firing, Wilhelm at Tirpitz said to Nicholas II:
- I would be happy if I had such talented admirals as your Rozhestvensky in my fleet.
Nikolai believed him, and treasured his opinion, smiled happily. He first kissed … Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, and then - Rozhdestvensky. The admiral, in a fit of highly submissive feelings, bent down, grabbed the tsar's hand and pressed his lips tightly to it, but immediately straightened up and, wishing to strengthen the impression made on the crowned sovereign, firmly declared:
- That would be when we have to make war, Your Imperial Majesty.
Then there was Port Arthur and the Tsushima defeat of our fleet. Before the departure of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Rozhestvensky himself already looked at his combat prospects in a completely different way. But it was too late. It was necessary to prepare for war earlier, now it was only necessary to fight. But behind our sailors there was insufficient and frankly weak preparation of the fleet for the war that had actually begun and was already underway (from strategy in general to the choice of the type of shells) and too much ceremonial gloss.
In 1908, a book was published in Geneva "Panama of the Russian fleet" Boris Tageev, a man of amazing biography, released under the pseudonym Rustam Bek. The word "Panama" in the old days was used (and in some places it is still used) in the meaning of "scam". After the huge scandal that broke out in France in 1892-1893 due to the monstrous corruption and theft in the construction of the Panama Canal, any fraud on an especially large scale began to be called "Panama".
The book was revelatory in nature and was devoted to the disclosure of vices that were characteristic of the Russian imperial fleet in the pre-war years and at the beginning of the war with Japan. Tageev knew the topic well - he himself took part in the war, served in Port Arthur and was taken prisoner by the Japanese.
Here is just one quote from this work:
All the telegrams about the combat readiness of the fleet flew, and the whole of Russia, through the rattling of weapons "Novoye Vremya" and similar publications, read about the mighty stronghold in the Far East in the person of the Pacific Ocean squadron.
Thanks to the lackey newspaper "Novy Kray", Lieutenant Colonel of the Maritime Department P. A. Artemyev, the combat training of our fleet was inflated to the last degree. The flattering, laudatory articles were reprinted by Russian newspapers, and the bribed French organ in Shanghai, "Echo de Chine", echoed its Amur comrade, fogging the already giddy heads of the sailors.
The rest is known. But how similar it is to what we are seeing today!
Our days. GVMP-2020
At the end of July, Russia traditionally celebrates the Day of the Navy. In 2020, this day falls on July 26, and at the same time the Main Naval Parade was held in St. Petersburg.
Parades are good, but only when the troops and forces represented at them are combat-ready without reservations. In the case of the Russian Navy, this is not entirely true, and instead of a feeling of indestructible military power, the Main Parade evokes completely different associations, mainly with the times of Nicholas II and Rozhdestvensky.
The “facade of the parade” should not cover up the real problems of the fleet, the fact that everything was “beautiful in the parade” should not be an excuse for the existence of critical problems of our fleet (the level of which even means defeat, but defeat in war).
And the main problem of our GVMP is precisely this! We now have “everything is fine”, the problems are not just “no”, they “simply cannot but be”! And all this is happening not only at the level of the man in the street, but also at the "top military-political leadership." In fact, our Main Naval Parades serve precisely to replace real work with a bright picture.
There are questions about which ships participated in the parade.
Why "drag" the Project 949A nuclear submarine cruiser (APCR) to the GVMP? Yes, it is still a powerful strike ship (under skilful control and command), a factor of which is still perceived by the US Navy as a sword of Damocles. However, the modernization of the agro-industrial complex of project 949A and only 3 generations of nuclear-powered ships was disrupted (and it was actually deliberately disrupted), and only a few units of nuclear-powered ships of the 3rd generation will actually be able to get the long-established medium repair (with modernization) in the future. Today, in terms of its technical level, the Orel AICR presented at the GVMP corresponds to the technical level of the mid-80s, while having serious operating restrictions!
The acute issue of the small residual resource of the agro-industrial complex, which, instead of combat training at sea and long-distance campaigns, is knocked out on a parade, is no longer discussed. In the end, if you need a nuclear-powered ship at the GVMP, then there is a representative "nuclear self-propelled test stand" of project 941UM "Dmitry Donskoy", the resource of which was restored after a medium repair, but which has long had no combat value.
Disrupted by the Navy, the modernization of ships that are still quite suitable for business is especially clearly visible in the example of the participants of the GVMP: raid and base minesweepers (details in the articles of M. Klimov "What's wrong with our minesweepers" and "What's wrong with the" newest "PMK project 12700").
In their present form, these are long outdated and absolutely worn-out units that have no combat value (just carry the flag at the parade). Why was this shame of the Navy put on the GVMP?
Especially taking into account the fact that abroad they are quite successfully modernizing the ships of our export projects, incl. mine action.
Why was it disgraced by the demonstration at the GVMP not just of the imported mine-action system DIAMAND (of which BEC INSPECTOR is a part), but of an actually incapable of combat system, incapable of solving problems in any difficult (real) conditions? Moreover, the imposition of which on the fleet was accompanied by very foul-smelling details and the squeezing (for the sake of "import") of successful domestic developments.
It is also of interest that they did not show at the GVMP-2020, namely, the Project 20385 "Thundering" corvette. But it didn’t grow together.
I would like to know: why did he not participate in the parade? At one time, the fact that the customer had not yet accepted the ship did not interfere with the demonstration of the frigate "Admiral Gorshkov" at the parade. Is everything okay with "Thundering"? It should be borne in mind that this ship is equipped with a fundamentally new, rather complex and very expensive radar system. Who and why pushed this radar on the ship of the near sea zone, which should be massive and cheap, is unclear. Does this ship with its expensive radar shoot down air targets?
The fact that the new corvette was not shown at the parade is alarming. It's somehow not our way to hide the newest ship. There is a statement in the media of the ex-director of the Severnaya Verf about "accelerated state tests" in order to hand over the ship to the Navy by the end of August, however, given the fact that today the "Zaslon" radar of the "Thundering" could not ensure the downing of a single air target, the absence of "Thundering" on the GVMP is, rather, "to remove the Supreme from the eyes" (so that uncomfortable questions do not arise).
The situation with naval aviation is even worse …
There has not been any naval missile-carrying aviation since 2010, the Aerospace Forces did not find even one Tu-22M3 from the Long-Range Aviation for the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the GVMP. This is very symbolic: if a war happens, the Aerospace Forces will not give aircraft to the fleet. Their tasks in bulk. Yes, and preparation for flights over the sea and strikes against aircraft carrier groups and ship formations needs special (including in terms of interaction with the Navy).
Demonstration of absolutely ancient Il-38s at the parade is like giving up on anti-submarine aviation in general: something flies there, and okay … If the Il-38N with the Novella can still do something, then the Il-38 with the original search sighting system "Baku" practically lost its combat significance back in the 90s.
Helicopters also failed to evoke positive emotions: the Ka-27 and Ka-29 are no longer produced in Russia, the promising Lamprey is still very far away, in fact we do not have serial sea helicopters. On the modernized Ka-27, shown at the parade, there is a high-frequency GAS, ineffective for searching for submarines, and … a search and targeting system (PPS) is completely absent. Installed instead of the "native" for the Ka-27PL PPS "Octopus" "crutches" in the form of command-tactical and radio-hydroacoustic systems can in no way be a replacement for the "cut out" PPS "Octopus".
With all this, there is certainly a good thing, and at the GVMP-2020 it was the first serial frigate "Admiral of the Fleet Kasatonov" of project 22350 first of all in terms of anti-submarine defense, including because of the Ka-27M helicopter), this is a very worthy project that you can truly be proud of.
A series of new MRKs of project 22800 went on, which convincingly showed that our industry, with a normal organization, is able to build fully combat-ready ships quickly and inexpensively. With RTOs, however, there is a question: about ¼ of the cost of a strike aircraft carrier has been invested in the series of "Karakurt" and "Buyanov-M". The question arises: do they also need to be protected from submarines and aircraft? It would be much more logical to create such ships as multipurpose.
But, alas, the fleet today has a new religion - "calibrating". The matter is important and useful, but business should not even come close to it alone. The main threat to Russia from the sea is underwater. Ships should be able to somehow fight submarines.
We do not have this understanding
Nevertheless, the ships of Project 22800 "turned out", it is especially worth noting the truly outstanding work of the designers. They would still have the correct tactical and technical assignment …
And in aviation there are new Su-30SM and MiG-29KUB naval fighters. Both are very useful, the only pity is that there are few of them.
The brand new "Varshavyanka" for the Pacific Fleet, the submarine "Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky", the first missile carrier "Caliber" built for the Pacific Fleet passed in service in Kronstadt. True, I immediately want to ask the question: is there a sane telecontrol for torpedoes there? Anti-torpedoes? Possibility to apply PLUR? Low frequency towed extended antenna? The answer to all questions is no. And why?
But because it was more important for some to report that the boat was built than to strain and hand over to the Navy a ship that was combat-ready without discounts. But instead of anti-torpedoes (and effective anti-torpedo protection), the boat received journal entries about its participation in the parade.
And this is also a symbol.
And the GVMP, and those ships that pass in parade on this day, and naval aviation today as a symbol of the Navy as a whole: money is invested, ships are being built, but without effective weapons. Yes, our strike missiles are traditionally strong and effective, but you still have to get to the point of the salvo!
New "ones" are added, but critical vulnerabilities remain, each of which is capable of sinking the Navy even in a war with a weak but competent enemy.
Like a soldier who has everything - absolutely everything except the cartridges. And nowhere to take cartridges. At the same time, one cannot say that he is not good for anything. He is healthy, physically trained, more or less trained, well equipped.
He is simply de facto unarmed. But it doesn't matter for parades, does it?
Conclusion
The military parade is not just a holiday. It is a symbol of military power, and it is not in vain that the concept of "review" exists in something similar in content. This is a show of military strength. Show your citizens to create in them a sense of belonging, pride and confidence in the power of the society of which they are a part.
Show to other nations: some to be afraid to attack, others to believe in the capabilities of a potential ally.
Parades are an important element of international diplomacy. You can recall the grandiose parades in England at the Spithead Raid. In 1937, the Soviet battleship Marat was present at the parade in honor of the coronation of George VI.
The irony of the situation is that it was the review and maneuvers on the Spithead raid, shown by William III to Peter, that became one of the key factors that made Russia a maritime power. In this regard, the emotional reaction in the British media to our Main Naval Parade is not surprising.
Here, it is necessary to note the very worthy representation of Russia at the parade in honor of the 70th anniversary of the PLA in 2019 in Qindao. The newest frigate of project 22350 "Admiral Gorshkov" took part in it, which was much better than if an old Soviet-built ship had come from the Pacific Fleet. "Gorshkov" showed our neighbors that no matter what crisis we are in in terms of shipbuilding, our designers and engineers are still capable of creating modern military equipment, and the industry, albeit slowly, is beginning to recover from the crisis. This was an important signal.
But behind "ceremonial diplomacy" there should be real opportunities, and in the case of the Navy, they should imply the absence of serious vulnerabilities.
We can afford to build few ships, but we cannot afford to leave "holes" in defenses, for example, in mine action capabilities
On the way, our submarines are outdated in comparison with the enemy's boats, but their potential must be realized to the maximum, with all means of hydroacoustic countermeasures, anti-torpedoes and a high level of crew training, primarily tactical. Then the message, which is the parade, reflects reality and brings unconditional benefit to the country.
But if the parade is a giant bluff, and if it is followed by what followed the ceremonial parades of the beginning of the last century (Port Arthur and Tsushima), then the effect of the parades turns into a disaster, and allies and opponents completely lose faith and fear. But the most important thing is that the faith in the power of the population is completely and unconditionally lost.
Had we now even enter into sluggish clashes with some competent adversary who will be able to “work out” on our weak points (mine and anti-submarine defense, for example), not allowing ourselves to impose those scenarios in which we are strong (a fight with any surface ships), and our political system will receive a blow from which it will never rise. The most powerful propaganda convinced the people that we are, if not the strongest in the world, then almost the most.
Several submarines destroyed "dry" and a mined base, from which we cannot quickly and without losses get out, will give the population the impression not only that they were lied to, but of the weakness, inferiority and unsuitability of the entire state machine.
At the same time, due to the fact that crowds do not know how to think rationally, everything that comes from the authorities will be considered a lie. Even the truth.
And this is already a revolutionary situation
So naval parades, behind which there is no real power, can go so sideways to us that it defies any description. This does not mean that they should not be carried out, in any case. They are needed and exactly in the form in which they are carried out. They simply should not replace real military capabilities.
Parades are needed. But the military strength shown at the GVMP must be real. Without a single props element. Real minesweepers with real, not museum, mine action capabilities, real, and not mythical, anti-torpedoes on all warships and submarines without exception, real sonar stations on ship helicopters, and not rarities from which the Turks would fall to the ground laughing.
Now, unfortunately, this is not the case, and it is very dangerous for our country.
