Why was the development of "weaving" given to OKB-52 of Vladimir Chelomey, who had not previously dealt with intercontinental ballistic missiles
Rocket UR-100 in a silo launcher with an open TPK. Photo from the site
Among the many legendary samples of domestic weapons, a special place is occupied by those that have become the most massive. A three-line rifle, a Kalashnikov assault rifle, a T-34 tank, an Il-2 attack aircraft, MiG-15 and MiG-21 fighters … Surprisingly, but in the same range, you can add examples that are much more technically complex, such as, say, underwater boats of project 613, which became the most massive in the history of the Russian fleet. Or, for example, the UR-100 intercontinental ballistic missile, aka 8K84, aka SS-11 Sego, which has become the most massive missile of this class in the Russian Strategic Missile Forces.
This missile was in many ways a milestone for the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces, and for the Soviet missile industry as a whole. The first large-scale intercontinental ballistic missile - this is it. The first missile, which became the basis of a ballistic missile system, built on the principle of "separate launch" - this is it. The first ampoule rocket, completely assembled directly at the plant, placed there in the transport and launch container and in it fell into the silo launcher, in which it was constantly on alert - it was also it. Finally, the UR-100 became the first missile in the USSR, the preparation time of which for the launch was the shortest - it was only three minutes.
All this, as well as the great modernization capabilities inherent in the UR-100 missile, allowed it to remain in service for almost thirty years. The official start of work on the creation of this rocket was set by a joint resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of March 30, 1963, the 8K84 missile system was adopted on July 21, 1967, the last missiles of the "hundredth" family were removed from combat duty in 1994, and destroyed - in 1996.
Our answer to the Minuteman
To understand where the history of the "hundred" originates - this is what the ballistic missiles of the UR-100 family were called in the Soviet missile forces and at enterprises associated with their development and production - it is necessary to assess the situation with strategic nuclear parity that had developed by the early 1960s in the world. And it took shape in a very unpleasant way for the Soviet Union. The country that was the first to create the R-7 intercontinental ballistic missile and launch the first artificial Earth satellite with it, alas, quickly began to lag behind its main competitor in this area - the United States.
Intercontinental ballistic missile "Minuteman". Photo from the site
Despite the success with the creation of the R-7, the USSR was late in putting this missile on alert. "Seven" started it only on December 15, 1959, and the American "Atlas", which was its direct competitor - a month and a half earlier, on October 31. In addition, the US Air Force was building up its ballistic missile force at a very high rate. By mid-1961, 24 Atlas missiles were already on alert in the United States.
In addition to the Atlases, the deployment of the Titan ICBM, which entered service a year later, went on at the same high pace in America. The two-stage "Titans", created almost in parallel with the "Atlas", were more reliable and perfect in design. And therefore they deployed much more: by 1962, 54 missiles were on alert, and not on open launch sites, like the Atlas or R-7, but in underground silo launchers. This made them much more secure, which means that it further strengthened the superiority of the United States in the first stage of the nuclear missile race.
Alas, the Soviet Union was unable to immediately respond to this challenge. By March 30, 1963, that is, by the official start of the development of the UR-100, only 56 ICBMs of all models were on alert in the Soviet Union. And with the appearance in the United States of the first so-called second generation rocket - the solid-fuel two-stage LGM-30 Minuteman-1 - the speed with which this advantage grew became completely unacceptable. Much simpler in production and operation "Minutemans" could be deployed not in dozens, but in hundreds. And although the American concept of nuclear war assumed the possibility, first of all, of a massive retaliatory nuclear strike, and not of a preventive one, the adoption of the Minutemans by the US military leadership could revise these provisions.
This is exactly how nuclear parity took shape in the early 1960s, with a huge advantage in America's favor. And the Soviet Union was looking for any opportunity to change such an unpleasant balance of power. However, in reality there was only one opportunity - to follow the same path that US Air Force Colonel Edward Hall suggested to American missilemen in the mid-1950s, who argued that "quantity always beats quality." The Soviet missile forces needed a rocket that was as easy to manufacture and maintain as a three-line rifle - and just as massive.
R-37 versus UR-100
Information that America had begun the production and deployment of a massive intercontinental ballistic missile reached the Soviet leadership, if not immediately, then with a slight delay. But Nikita Khrushchev had nothing in reserve that would allow doing the same in the Soviet Union - such tasks have simply not been set for domestic rocket scientists until now.
However, there was nowhere to go - the rapid growth of the group of American intercontinental ballistic missiles required an adequate response. The famous NII-88, the leading Russian institute for the development of problems related to rocket technology, was involved in working out possible solutions to this problem. During 1960-61, the specialists of the institute, having examined all the data that were at their disposal - including those that were obtained with the help of Soviet intelligence, came to the conclusion: the domestic Strategic Missile Forces need to rely on a kind of duplex system - not to develop only "heavy" ICBMs with an almost unlimited flight range and powerful warheads, but also "light" ICBMs that can be produced in large quantities and which ensure the effectiveness of the salvo due to a large number of warheads simultaneously going to the target.
Split layout of the 8K84 rocket in a transport and launch container. Photo from the site
Not all rocket experts supported the theoretical calculations of the NII-88. But very soon, reports began to arrive that the United States had chosen this very path, supplementing the light Minutemans with heavy Titans, including Titan II, the only American liquid-propellant missile that had been ampulized. This meant that she got up on combat duty fully fueled, and at the same time had a very short preparation time for the start - only 58 seconds. It became clear that the proposals of NII-88 are not just justified, but completely fair, and must be taken for their implementation.
Experts from OKB-586 under the leadership of Mikhail Yangel were the first to present their project, who in 1962 developed two versions of a small-sized rocket project - a single-stage R-37 and a two-stage R-38. Both were liquid, both were ampulized, made it possible to keep them in combat readiness for up to ten years and at the same time provided for automatic control and the use of a "single start". This option was significantly more efficient and easier to maintain than all Soviet ICBMs, which at that time were in service with the missile forces.
But standard practice in the development of weapons in the Soviet Union required that each topic had at least two developers - this was how socialist competition looked. Therefore, very soon there was a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, signed by Nikita Khrushchev, which was called "On the provision of OKB-52 assistance in the development of carrier rockets." This document provided for the transfer from OKB-586 to the disposal of the Design Bureau, which was led by Vladimir Chelomey, design documentation and three ready-made R-14 missiles. The formal reason for this decision was work on the creation of a universal missile UR-200, which Chelomey had been developing since 1959 and which was considered as a single carrier for various combat and reconnaissance missions. But since OKB-52 did not have experience in missile development, and Khrushchev had support, the simplest way to spur the process of creating a "two-hundred" was to transfer to his disposal the developments of other missilemen.
After the release of the decree, a group of engineers from the design bureau of Vladimir Chelomey arrived at the Mikhail Yangel Design Bureau - for the agreed documents. And soon, in the bowels of OKB-52, a project was born, called the UR-100 - by analogy with the UR-200. It was a "light" or, as they said then, a small-sized rocket, which could also be used as a universal carrier, but for lighter loads. In addition, if the "two hundred" was supposed to be used in the anti-satellite defense system, then Vladimir Chelomey proposed to adapt the "hundred" for the domestic missile defense system.
The beginning of the rocket rivalry
By the end of 1962, both OKBs completed a preliminary study of their projects for "light" missiles, and the solution of the issue moved to the political plane - to the level of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government. This is how the competition between the two famous rocket design bureaus began, which eventually turned into a victory for Vladimir Chelomey. It was tense and dramatic - so much so that the degree of intensity of passions can be judged even by the dry lines of official documents and the recollections of the direct participants in the events.
The UR-100 training missile at the November parade in Moscow. Photo from the site
The rapid development of events began shortly after the New Year. January 19, 1963 Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Chairman of the Commission of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers on military-industrial issues Dmitry Ustinov, Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Malinovsky, Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers for Defense Technology Leonid Smirnov, Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers on Radio Electronics Valery Kalmykov, Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers in chemistry, Viktor Fedorov and the commander-in-chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Sergei Biryuzov, sent the following letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU:
The names of the designers mentioned in this letter require clarification. Viktor Makeev was at that time the chief designer (since 1957), and soon the head of SKB-385, which developed and produced ballistic missiles for Soviet submarines. Alexey Isaev is the head of OKB-2 NII-88, which developed liquid-propellant rocket engines and the theory of their operation. And Mikhail Reshetnev is the head of OKB-10 (shortly before that former branch of OKB-1 of Sergey Korolev), who since November 1962 has been dealing with the topic of creating a light-class launch vehicle, transferred to him from Yangelevsky OKB-586. In a word, all the specialists mentioned in this letter are representatives of organizations directly related to the State Committee for Defense Technology, directly subordinate and directly supervised by Dmitry Ustinov.
But eleven days later, on January 30, following the meeting of the USSR Defense Council, Protocol No. 30 was adopted, in which there is such a clause:
This document completely changes the balance of power in the race of the creators of the "light" intercontinental ballistic missile. Indeed, for the first time, Vladimir Chelomey is mentioned on an equal footing with Mikhail Yangel, and among top government officials authorized to influence the fate of this rocket, Peter Dementyev is included - the head of the State Committee on Aviation (the former and future Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR), to whom he was directly subordinate OKB-52. In addition to him, two more key people are included in the number of decision-makers - Leonid Brezhnev, who in a little over a year will replace Nikita Khrushchev as head of the Soviet Union, and Frol Kozlov, second secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and one of the most loyal people in the party leadership to Khrushchev. And since the current head of the USSR openly favored Vladimir Chelomey, these people clearly had to provide support for the UR-100 project as opposed to the R-37 and R-38.
UR-100 missile in a transport and launch container, without sealing. Photo from the site
The missiles were like one another
This political deck was played on the agreed date, February 11, at a meeting at the OKB-52 branch in Moscow Fili. In the memoirs of the participants in those events, and in the conversations of people who had no direct relation to them, but associated with the missile industry of the USSR, it was called the "council in Fili" - by an obvious association. Here is how the son of the then leader of the USSR, Sergei Khrushchev, tells about her in his book of memoirs “Nikita Khrushchev. The birth of a superpower ":
“Yangel and Chelomey reported. Both have just finished their sketches. Calculations, layouts and layouts were presented to the court. It was necessary to choose the best option. The task is not an easy one, the missiles were extremely similar to one another. This has happened more than once in technology. The same level of knowledge, common technology. Inevitably, designers come up with similar thoughts. Externally, the products are almost twins, differ in the "zest" enclosed inside.
Each of the projects had supporters, their fans both among the military and among officials of various ranks, right up to the very top - the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee.
Yangel was the first to report.
The R-37 rocket turned out to be elegant. She could hit point targets and be at the starting position in a fueled state for a much longer time. As in all previous developments, high temperature fuel and oxidizer components based on nitrogen compounds were used here. But now Yangel seemed to have found a solution to tame all the corrosive acid. The message sounded convincing. But will the design bureau be able to pull it off with two such labor-intensive and important projects on which the country's security depends - R-36 and R-37? Is it wise to put all your eggs in one basket? But this is already the concern of the Government, not the Chief Designer.
After answering numerous questions, Yangel sat down.
Chelomey was the next to speak. The main task that he sought to solve in the new development, called the UR-100, was the long-term autonomy of the rocket and the complete automation of its launch. Until these problems are resolved, the mass deployment of intercontinental missiles on duty will remain a utopia. If we keep the technical solutions adopted to date, then all the technical and human resources of the country will be required to service the missiles.
“In recent years, a great deal of experience has been accumulated in working with nitrogen compounds,” Chelomey moved on to the main point. - Despite all the negative aspects, we have learned to work with them and, having shown some engineering ingenuity, we will be able to subjugate them. Let the Americans do gunpowder, we will rely on acid.
Special treatment of the inside of the tanks, a system of especially resistant pipelines, cunning membranes - all this, collected in a multistage scheme, provided the rocket for many years (up to ten years) of safe storage and instant initiation at a given moment.
- Our rocket, - continued Chelomey, - is somewhat similar to a sealed ampoule, until the deadline its contents are completely isolated from the outside world, and at the very last moment, at the command "start", membranes will break through, components will rush into the engines. As a result of the measures taken, despite such a formidable content, during the period of duty, it is as safe as solid fuel.
Chelomey fell silent. Judging by the reaction of the majority of the members of the Defense Council, Chelomey won.
And his father clearly sympathized with him. Dementyev smiled triumphantly, Ustinov stared gloomily in front of him. The report was followed by endless questions. Chelomey answered confidently, clearly. It was felt that he had suffered through the rocket.
After lunch, we gathered again in the conference room. There was discussion and decision making. We started with rockets. Who should you give preference to? At dinner, my father talked about this with Kozlov and Brezhnev. He liked Chelomey's proposals, and rocket design bureaus from state positions were loaded rationally: the heavy R-36 - Yangelya, and the light UR-100 let his competitor design, but he wanted confirmation.
Kozlov and Brezhnev supported their father. At the meeting, the father spoke out for Chelomey. Nobody began to contradict him. Yangel looked just dead. Ustinov was upset. Wanting to support Mikhail Kuzmich, my father began to say kind words about his great merits, about the importance of working on the 36th rocket, about state interests that require dispersing efforts. Words did not comfort, but only healed the wound."
