The first day of the Tsushima battle, May 14, ended deplorably for the Russian squadron. By nightfall, it could not yet be considered destroyed, but it suffered heavy losses and was defeated, because almost nothing remained of its main force - the 1st armored detachment. Shortly before sunset, the "Emperor Alexander III" died with the entire crew, and then, at 19.10-19.20, "Borodino" and "Prince Suvorov" were destroyed. Taking into account the Oslyabi that died at the very beginning of the battle, the Russian squadron lost four modern battleships out of five, but the only remaining Eagle was badly damaged, and, which is very important, the centralized fire control was destroyed on it. In other words, he was quite capable of holding out for some time in battle, but he could no longer hope to inflict tangible harm on the Japanese. But still, by the night of May 14-15, out of 12 battleships (and the armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov) there were still 8, although their combat value was not great, and in addition, in the daytime battle, many of them were damaged.
So, after sunset, the paths of the Emerald and Zhemchug parted - as you know, the first remained with the armored squadron, while the second joined the cruising detachment. Why did it happen?
Why "Emerald" stayed?
As for the "Izumrud", everything is clear here - its commander, Baron V. N. Fersen, received an order from the squadron commander to stay with the 2nd armored detachment, from which 3 ships out of 4 survived by the evening. Rozhestvensky transfers command to Rear Admiral N. I. Nebogatov. Probably, we are talking about "Buynom", because, although "Impeccable" also announced the transfer of command to "Emperor Nicholas I", he did it with a voice, coming close to the battleship, while V. N. Fersen nevertheless talks about the signal in his report. Therefore, the baron quite rightly decided that the services of his cruiser would still be needed by the squadron. After an unsuccessful attempt to save at least part of the crew of the "Emperor Alexander III", he returned to the squadron, took up a position on the left traverse of the flagship battleship N. I. Nebogatov's "Emperor Nicholas I", and he stayed there until morning.
The night for the "Izumrud" passed calmly, the destroyers on the cruiser were not seen and no fire was opened on them. At the same time, in his report V. N. Fersen noted that before midnight the Japanese destroyers were intensively attacking the end ships of the Russian column, but he believed that these attacks were unsuccessful, since they did not hear the explosions of mines. Russian battleships, according to V. N. Fersen, the formation was greatly stretched, and the head fire was not fired and the combat lighting was not turned on, but the end ones did both. As for the main forces of the Japanese, the commander of the Emerald believed that they were nearby, and noted that the Russian ships, unmasking themselves with the light of searchlights, immediately fell under the fire of Japanese heavy guns. Of course, in fact, this was not the case, because after sunset H. Togo gave an order for all the detachments (having sent an advice note "Tatsuta" to bring this order) to go to the north, to about. Even so. With these actions, the Japanese admiral pursued two goals: firstly, on the morning of the next day, his main forces would again be between the Russian squadron and Vladivostok, and secondly, he left the battlefield for his numerous destroyers, thereby avoiding friendly fire. But V. N. Fersen saw the situation exactly as he saw it.
Why did Zhemchug leave?
In fact, the cruiser commander did not even think about going somewhere there. But the armored detachment, to which his cruiser was "assigned", ceased to exist, and simply to be next to the battleships of P. P. Levitsky considered it unnecessary and even harmful. Almost until sunset, the main forces of the Russian squadron continued to fight with the 1st combat detachment of H. Togo. Being with the battleships, the "Pearl" could not harm the enemy, since, holding on from the side opposite to the Japanese, it did not have any acceptable conditions for its own shooting, while the flights of enemy shells created a great danger for it. P. P. Levitsky also pointed out that the Japanese main forces, having much more combat experience, did not keep light ships like small cruisers or advice notes next to their battleships.
Z. P. Rozhestvensky, "tying" the 2nd rank cruiser to the main forces, hoped to use them as rehearsal ships, and this was correct, but by the evening of May 14 it became quite obvious that this function would remain unclaimed. The main forces of the Russian squadron were led by the badly beaten Borodino, followed by the Oryol, about three cables away, which was also badly damaged. "Emperor Nicholas I", instead of trying to lead the column, pulled the cables by 5-6, and it was clear that N. I. Nebogatov is not going to take command of the squadron. In such a situation, obviously, no complex evolutions were possible, and there was no one to start them, so the need for a "rehearsal vessel" was clearly not visible.
At the same time, the cruising detachment of O. A. Until recently, Enqvista fought a heated battle with numerous Japanese armored cruisers: a similar target was quite capable of the 120-mm guns of the Pearl, and here, according to P. P. Levitsky, there would be much more benefit from him than with the battleships of the squadron. But the most important thing was that P. P. Levitsky could not even think that O. A. Enquist will leave the main forces of the squadron to their own devices and act independently.
For P. P. Levitsky events unfolded as follows. From 18.00, as before, he led his "Pearl" after the cruisers of O. A. Enquist, and the cruisers kept close to the battleships, the squadron was assembled. At about 19.00 on the Zhemchug we saw several detachments of Japanese destroyers, "4-5 ships in each" - they were in front, along the course of the Russian battleships, and the distance to them was very great. Soon, "Borodino" died, and the "Eagle", finding itself in the head of the squadron, turned sharply to the left, according to P. P. Levitsky - by 8 points, that is, 90 degrees. and the rest of the battleships followed him. The new course of the main forces led them to a rapprochement with the Russian cruisers, and "Oleg" also turned to the left, increasing the speed. The rest of the cruisers, including the Zhemchug, followed Oleg, but here P. P. Levitsky discovered that O. A. Enquist led his ships at a much higher speed than before, and the "Pearl" is lagging behind, with transports "pressing" behind it, and destroyers on the left.
P. P. Levitsky ordered to increase the speed, and soon caught up with the left ahead "Oleg", "Aurora", "Svetlana" and "Almaz". At that moment, the last two cruisers were being rebuilt, so that the "Pearl" went third in the ranks, after the "Aurora". Much to the surprise of P. P. Levitsky, "Oleg" did not slow down, despite the fact that the transports and destroyers lagged behind, and the battleships were not visible. Only then did the Zhemchug commander suspect that O. A. Enquist is not going to stay with his battleships at all, but goes to the breakthrough, or somewhere else, on his own.
And what now remained to be done by P. P. Levitsky? By that time it was already dark, and “Oleg” was already poorly seen on the Zhemchug, although he was no further than 3 cables from the cruiser. One could, of course, try to leave the cruiser and return to the battleships, but the rumble of the guns suggested that this was a bad idea. Firstly, in the darkness of the night it was easy to lose the cruiser O. A. Enquist, but not to find the battleships, and secondly, the discovery of the main forces of the Russian squadron could end in tragedy for the "Pearl". On battleships engaged in repelling mine attacks, they could easily mistake a small cruiser that suddenly appeared from the darkness for an enemy, and shoot him point-blank.
In general, in the current situation P. P. Levitsky thought it best to stay with the cruisers of O. A. Enquist. Do not forget that before the battle, Z. P. Rozhestvensky ordered the commanders to keep together as much as possible, and in general, from the standpoint of the tactics of those years, the most correct thing for a ship that had "lost" its detachment was not to look for it, but to join the detachment of the first flagship it met.
It is interesting that P. P. Levitsky in the very near future had the opportunity to be convinced of the legitimacy of his own suspicions about the danger of "friendly fire". The fact is that "Oleg" constantly changed course, and it was not so easy to stay in the ranks. At some point P. P. Levitsky, wanting to figure out where his cruiser is now, entered the wheelhouse on the bridge, and stayed there, studying maps, at most 5 minutes, when he was informed from the bridge that contact with the cruisers had been lost.
The commander of the "Pearl" immediately ordered to change the course by 2-3 rumba to the right (as if P. P. Levitsky did not remember) and add speed. It was the right maneuver - the wind was oncoming, and soon on the "Pearl" they felt the smell of smoke from the chimneys of the ships going ahead, and then, after about 10 minutes, the cruisers themselves appeared. P. P. Levitsky immediately ordered to give Ratier identification flashlights, which was done - nevertheless, the Aurora and Oleg were already ready to fire and deployed their guns. In order to avoid such misunderstandings in the future, P. P. Levitsky ordered to change the place of the "Pearl" in the ranks, and go on the left traverse of the "Aurora" in order to see well not only her, but also "Oleg", and notice their maneuvers in time.
For some time nothing happened, and then the "Pearl" parted on its left side with a certain ship, which its commander described as "a private steamer without lights", and the distance between them did not exceed a half cable, and on the right side the ship lights of ships going parallel with cruisers on the course. That all this really happened is absolutely impossible to say.
At about 23.00, the cruisers left the Tsushima Strait in the East China Sea, and P. P. Levitsky for some time believed that O. A. Enquist will lead his ships across the western Korean Strait, but this did not happen. At this time, the cruisers were sailing at 17-18 knots, but then, after midnight, they reduced their speed to 12, and shortly before dawn - to 10 knots. At dawn, however, they discovered that only 3 ships remained of the entire detachment: Oleg, Aurora and Zhemchug, and there was no enemy within sight, and it was necessary to decide what to do next.
In this series of articles, we will not analyze the motives that prompted O. A. Enquist to leave for Manila, but note some inconsistencies in the reports of the Rear Admiral and the commander of the Pearl. O. A. Enquist writes about the numerous mine attacks that the Japanese made on Oleg, while nothing of the kind was observed on the Zhemchug. O. A. Enquist claimed that he repeatedly tried to turn back, to break through the Korea Strait, but all the time it turned out that in this case he was going to approach some kind of fires in which the Japanese combat detachment assumed. Lights were also seen on "Pearl", but it seems that they were not the same and not when OA saw them. Enquist, but the constant turns of "Oleg" fully confirm.
In one of his publications, A. Bolnykh cited such a saying that was circulating among military historians: "He lies like an eyewitness." Its essence is that the memory of a person who has been in a battle plays evil tricks with him, and after some time it is very difficult for him to remember what exactly he saw and in what sequence. Apparently, this is exactly what happened to P. P. Levitsky, when describing the events of May 15.
According to him, at about 12.00 the cruising detachment stopped so that the rear admiral would switch from Oleg to Aurora, from Zhemchug they asked for Oleg: "Does the admiral intend to try to get to Vladivostok?" and received a response from the commander of the cruiser L. F. Dobrotvorsky: "Try it yourself if you find yourself strong enough to go through the entire Japanese fleet." At this time, according to P. P. Levitsky, a tugboat "Svir" appeared, but nothing new about the fate of the squadron was reported from it. As soon as O. A. Enquist climbed to the Aurora, he sent a request to the Pearl if it could go to Manila, and P. P. Levitsky, having checked with the morning report of the mechanic, reported that he could not, as there was not enough coal. However, at the same time, he immediately sent his chief mechanic to personally inspect the available coal reserves.
The point here was this - for some unclear reasons, the daily consumption of coal at the "Pearl" was considered somewhat higher than it was in reality. The commander knew about this, but, it seems, "closed his eyes", believing, in all likelihood, that having an unaccounted supply of coal would always be more useful than not having it.
Rear Admiral O. A. Enquist, having learned about the lack of coal on the Pearl, ordered him to approach the Aurora, and when this was done, P. P. Levitsky received the order over a megaphone. "Pearl" should have gone to refuel in Shanghai, entering it at night, since the presence of Japanese warships is possible. During the day it was necessary to reload the coal from the Russian transports that were there, and the next night - to go out to sea and go to Manila on their own. As for "Oleg" and "Aurora", they had enough coal reserves to go straight to Manila without bunkering.
Everything had already been decided, and "Oleg" received an order to go to the wake of "Aurora", and "Pearl" - to follow its destination, that is, to Shanghai. But then the senior ship mechanic of Zhemchug showed up with a report that the actual coal reserves were 80 tons more than the calculated ones. This changed everything, since with the available supply, the "Pearl" could follow to Manila without entering Shanghai, which was immediately reported to the rear admiral. As a result, the cruisers did not split up, but went to Manila with the whole detachment.
What is wrong in the report of P. P. Levitsky? In fact, everything happened a little differently. On the afternoon of May 15, Rear Admiral O. A. Enquist did indeed switch from Oleg to Aurora, but not “at about noon,” but at 15.00, and on the same day, probably in the morning, requested data on the remains of coal. But on May 15, the admiral did not think about going directly to Manila: he considered it necessary to go to bunkering in Shanghai with the whole detachment, it was there that all three cruisers kept their course all day on May 15 and the morning of May 16.
But the meeting with "Svir" took place the next day, on May 16 in the morning. The cruisers were again stalled at about 09.30, but this was now done in order to enable the relatively slow-moving tug to get closer to the detachment faster. And only then O. A. Enquist changed his mind about going to Shanghai and, most likely, again requested data on the remains of coal on "Oleg" and "Zhemchug": it is obvious that it was then that the episode described by P. P. Levitsky.
Be that as it may, "Oleg", "Aurora" and "Zhemchug" went to Manila, and "Svir" went to Shanghai. By order of O. A. Enqvista, upon arrival in Shanghai, the tug was supposed to send an urgent telegram to Saigon, so that a transport with coal would be sent from there to Manila. O. A. Enquist hoped that the Americans would give the Russian detachment enough time to repair the most dangerous damage, accept coal, and would not object to the ships leaving to sea.
So, the cruisers went to Manila. But the chimneys on all three ships were damaged, which increased the consumption of coal, and O. A. Enquist began to seriously fear that he would not reach Manila. Then he decided to go to the port of Sual, located on the road, where they expected to find a hospital for the seriously wounded, supplies and coal, as well as a telegraph, with the help of which the rear admiral hoped to redirect the transport with coal, which was supposed to leave Saigon, from Manila to Sual.
But these hopes were not destined to come true, since Sual turned out to be completely abandoned, and it was impossible to get anything there. As a result, the cruisers O. A. Enquist had no choice but to follow to Manila. In fact, only very calm weather, which was extremely favorable for the transition, made it possible to get there: the risk that the ships would find themselves completely without coal in the ocean was very high. In his report, the commander of "Oleg" L. F. Dobrotvorsky gave the following description: “We barely got to Manila, risking, in case of fresh weather or the appearance of ships on the horizon, to be left completely without coal in the ocean and perish from a lack of desalinated water. No battle can be compared to the torment of the imagination, which painted us a picture of the death of people from thirst”.
But the Russian cruisers still managed to get there. Approximately 100 miles from Manila, they saw 5 warships following in wake formation, and, fearing that it might be the Japanese, prepared for the last battle. But it turned out to be an American squadron of two battleships and three cruisers, which accompanied the detachment of O. A. Enquista to Manila, where three Russian cruisers anchored at 19.45 on 21 May.
The description of the twists and turns of being in Manila are beyond the scope of this series of articles - someday, in another cycle dedicated to the cruisers of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, the author will definitely return to them. For now, we will restrict ourselves to stating the fact that upon arrival in Manila, the Russo-Japanese war for the Pearl was over. Here we will leave it, and we ourselves will return to the "Izumrud", which, unlike its "brother", remained with the main forces of the squadron and witnessed the tragic events of 15 May.
