In the previous article, the author completed the description of the actions of the armored cruiser "Pearl" in the Russo-Japanese War - having dropped anchor in Manila, the ship remained there until the very end of hostilities. Consider now what happened to the "Emerald" of the same type.
As mentioned earlier, the night from May 14 to May 15 passed relatively calmly for the Izumrud - the cruiser was on the left traverse of the Emperor Nicholas I and, as far as can be understood from the commander's report, did not open fire. Nevertheless, no one on the ship slept a wink, so the night turned out to be sleepless for the crew.
Joyless morning
At dawn, the Emerald team found out with bitterness that a detachment of five ships remained of the once large Russian squadron: the battleships Emperor Nikolai I and Eagle, the coastal defense battleships Admiral Apraksin and Admiral Senyavin, and also the "Emerald" itself. At about 05.00 in the morning, this detachment was located approximately 100 miles from about. Dazhelet and continued to move to Vladivostok: at the same time, the Japanese main forces were about 30 miles from about. Dazhelet, to which they went in order to be between the remnants of the Russian squadron and Vladivostok in the morning.
Almost immediately, one might say, with the first rays of the sun, the Russian ships were discovered. The Japanese 6th Combat Detachment saw the smoke, immediately reported it to the other detachments and, increasing speed, went to approach. Having found out that there were four battleships in front of him, including two - coastal defense, following accompanied by a cruiser, the 6th detachment again reported this to all the detachments and began tracking.
Of course, the other Japanese ships immediately moved towards the remnants of the Russian squadron. The first to approach was the 5th Combat Detachment, the ubiquitous Chin-Yen, Itsukushima, Matsushima and Hasidate, which were accompanied by an advice note from Yayeyama, as well as the cruisers Otova and Niitaka. It was this detachment that informed Kh. Togo about the discovery of the remnants of the main forces of the Russians at approximately 05.00: despite the fact that the 6th detachment twice radioed about the same thing, both of its radiograms on Mikas were not received. At the same time, according to the reports of Russian officers, it turns out that the 6th combat detachment remained unnoticed, and the first Japanese ships that were seen on our squadron were the cruisers of the 5th detachment: they were to the left of the Russian battleships, the closest to them was "Izumrud ".
Finding smoke, as it seemed then - a single ship, from the "Izumrud" immediately reported this with a signal to the flagship of Rear Admiral N. I. Nebogatov, but even before the answer was received from "Emperor Nicholas I", the number of smoke had increased to four. "Izumrud" reported this on "Nikolay", but the number of smokes increased again - now to seven.
Strictly speaking, this is where divergences begin with the Japanese version of the same events. According to the report of the "Izumrud" commander, Baron V. N. Fersen, one of the Japanese cruisers of the Suma class, separated from the rest of the ships and approached the Russians at a distance of good visibility in order to get a good look at the remnants of our squadron. But the Japanese themselves do not write about this, in addition, "Suma" and "Akashi" were still two-pipe, "Otova" and "Niitaka" - three-pipe, "Matsushima" had only one pipe, so confuse them at a "good distance visibility”would be rather difficult. However, the Japanese could simply not mention this maneuver of one of their cruisers, and it is not so difficult to confuse a cruiser at dawn.
Then on the "Izumrud" they saw that "Emperor Nicholas I" and "Eagle" increased their speed - given the fact that no one else describes this, it is not clear how such an illusion came about. But Baron V. N. Fersen suggested that N. I. Nebogatov is going to give a signal "save yourself who can," that is, to break through the ability one by one. Then the "Emerald" approached the "Nikolai", and with a semaphore asked the admiral for permission to follow to Vladivostok at high speed. But N. I. Nebogatov, not going to do anything like that, ordered the "Izumrud" to stay in place, so the cruiser returned to the left traverse of the flagship battleship.
Then the rear admiral asked the battleships about the state of their artillery, the answer he received satisfied him, only the Senyavin reported: "I have minor damage, I will soon fix it." After that N. I. Nebogatov ordered to prepare for battle and turned to the left, towards the Japanese cruisers. The latter did not want to accept the battle and also turned to the left. Official Japanese historiography passes over this episode in silence - again, possibly due to its insignificance.
Although nowhere in the reports is it stated directly, but when the flagship of N. I. Nebogatov turned to the Japanese, "Izumrud" apparently switched to the other side of the squadron. That is, if earlier he was on the left abeam of "Emperor Nicholas I", now he took a position on his right abeam or in another place, but to the right of the battleships. Here's the point. When the "Emperor Nicholas I" lay down on its previous course, more smoke was found behind the stern - perhaps it was the 6th combat detachment. Then the Russian admiral ordered the Emerald to inspect the enemy ships with a semaphore. The cruiser did not understand which ones, and asked again: N. I. Nebogatov clarified that we are talking about the Japanese detachment to the left of the squadron. "Emerald" gave full speed and immediately went to carry out the ordered. But, according to the report of V. N. Fersen, for this the cruiser was forced to turn and pass under the stern of the terminal battleship. A maneuver that is completely unnecessary and even impossible if the "Emerald" was on the left side of N. I. Nebogatov, but quite understandable if the cruiser was on its right side. And, again, if the squadron was going to take the battle on the left side, then, of course, it would be logical for the small cruiser to be on the starboard side, but not on the left side.
"Izumrud" went to rapprochement with the Japanese detachment and, having made reconnaissance, quickly returned with a report: alas, the quality of reconnaissance was not so hot. Only three "Matsushima" were correctly identified, but the "Emeralds" reported the presence of "Yakumo", with which, apparently, "Chin-Yen" was confused, and "Otova", "Niitaka" and the advice of "Yayyama" then miraculously turned into "Akitsushima" and three small cruisers.
Having informed the admiral about the composition of the enemy forces, the Emerald took its place on the right traverse of the Emperor Nicholas I. The battleships had an approximately 12-13-knot course, and the Japanese detachment, seen from the stern, was gradually approaching. There is a discrepancy in what happened next in the Russian documents.
Meeting of the main forces
Official Russian history reports that the Japanese approached the squadron from all sides, that Admiral H. Togo, not yet seeing the Russian battleships, sent the 2nd combat detachment forward for reconnaissance at 08.40. At 09.30 the cruiser Kamimura was found on the right along the course by Russian ships, respectively, they themselves were at that moment on the right shell of our squadron. Then N. I. Nebogatov sent the Emerald on a reconnaissance mission to these new forces.
But V. N. Fersen in his report states something else: that he was sent not to the enemy cruisers that appeared ahead and to the right, but to the detachment that was catching up with the Russians from the stern. Of course, the cruiser X. The Kamimurs could not catch up with the Russian detachment, so we can only talk about the 6th combat detachment, which consisted of the cruisers Akitsushima, Suma, Izumi and Chiyoda, probably Chitose was at that time next to them.
Most likely, it was the commander of the Emerald that was mistaken - having approached the Japanese detachment, he discovered that it consisted of 4 armored and 2 armored cruisers, which is completely unlike the 6th combat detachment. Returning to the flagship battleship, the Emerald reported the results of the reconnaissance. In response, N. I. Nebogatov asked if the Russian ships were still visible, and if so, which ones. To this V. N. Fersen replied that no Russian ships had been seen on the Izumrud.
At the same time, the main forces of H. Togo appeared - 4 battleships, accompanied by "Nissin" and "Kasuga", and V. N. Fersen, in his report, clearly indicates their place: between the 5th combat detachment and the armored cruisers that the Emerald reconnoitred, which indirectly confirms the previously stated author's guess about the error in the report of his commander. After all, if V. N. Fersen went on reconnaissance to the 6th detachment, and he took him for the armored cruisers of the Japanese, then he still could not help but notice the 2nd combat detachment, which was located between the 1st and 6th, and had to somehow mention it is in the report, like the ships located between the armored cruisers and the main forces of H. Togo. Meanwhile, V. N. Fersen is gone.
Be that as it may, the Japanese troops surrounded the remnants of the Russian squadron.
There is no doubt that the sight of all 12 armored ships without visible damage was a real shock for the Russian sailors. It turns out that for the entire time of the fierce battle on May 14, our two squadrons failed not only to sink, but even seriously damage at least one battleship or armored cruiser of the enemy. Alas, it was so. Russian artillerymen in Tsushima showed themselves very well, the total number of Russian hits of all calibers in Japanese ships, according to Japanese data, reached 230. N. J. M. Campbell wrote in the future:
"In total, the Russians achieved 47 hits with heavy shells (8 to 12"), of which all but 10 or so were 12. " This is a good result, especially considering the weather conditions of the battle and the overall defeat of the Russian fleet."
But the small amount of explosives in the Russian shells led to the fact that when they hit, they did not cause serious damage to the Japanese, and therefore on the morning of May 15 the remnants of the Russian squadron met 4 battleships and 8 armored cruisers of the 1st and 2nd combat detachments. And the only visible damage to them was the knocked down topmast on the Mikasa.
Change
As mentioned above, at 09.30 am the armored cruisers of Kh. Kamimura made contact with the Russian ships, but did not enter the battle on their own, waiting for the approach of the main forces of Kh. Togo. Then, when the Japanese battleships approached, the 1st and 2nd combat detachments approached N. I. Nebogatov for 60 cables and opened fire at approximately 10.30. From "Eagle" the Japanese responded with fire, but "Emperor Nicholas I" lowered the stern, rear admiral and topmast flags, and then raised the signals of the international vault "surrounded" and "surrender." After that, from the board of "Nikolay" to the other ships of the squadron, a semaphore was sent: "Surrounded by the superior forces of the enemy, I have to surrender."
Without a doubt, the Japanese really had a colossal superiority in forces - in fact, five Russian warships were opposed by 5 enemy combat detachments. But still there is no doubt that the decision of N. I. Nebogatov about the surrender laid an indelible shame on the honor of the Russian Imperial Navy.
"Breakthrough" Emerald"
For the "Emperor Nicholas I" signals about surrender were raised by the other three battleships, and on the "Izumrud" it (apparently - on the machine) rehearsed, but immediately caught on and let it go. V. N. Fersen immediately ordered a team to be assembled. This is how the mine foreman and radiotelegraph operator "Izumrud" N. М. Sobeshkin:
“His manner of speaking is a soft baritone, a little affectionate, fatherly and edifying. Sometimes in the evenings, in good weather, he gathered a bunch of sailors around him on the quarterdeck, treated them to cigarettes and lied to them endlessly … The crew's attitude towards him was not loving, but there was no particular hatred for him either. During the campaign, V. N. Fersen often walked along the upper deck, hunched over and bowing his head. And now, when the team hastily formed, he seemed to be transformed and everyone was amazed at his decisive voice: “Gentlemen, officers, as well as you, brothers-sailors! I decided to break through before Japanese ships blocked our way. The enemy does not have a single ship that is comparable in speed with our cruiser. Let's try it! If you cannot escape the enemy, then it is better to die with honor in battle than shamefully surrender. How do you look at it?". But everyone understood that it was not the commander's desire to consult, but an order - “Firemen and machinists! Our salvation depends on you. I hope that the ship will develop its maximum speed!"
V. N. Fersen did everything to make the Emerald get the most out of its boilers and machines. Down, in the boiler rooms, combatant sailors were sent to help the stokers - to bring coal. The cruiser began to smoke heavily, its stem, crashing into the sea, heaved waves that almost reached the upper deck of the ship. In order to lighten the bow, the anchor chains were riveted, and they, together with the anchors, went into the depths of the sea. The cruiser's radio operators tried to interrupt the Japanese radio communications with amplified signals.
The course of the Emerald is not entirely clear. Official Russian and Japanese historiography say that the cruiser went east, but V. N. Fersen in the report points out: "Lay down on SO, as on a course, equally diverting from the cruisers to the right and to the left." SO is the southeast, and most likely, it was the case that at first the Emerald went exactly to the southeast to pass between the 2nd and 6th divisions of the Japanese, and then turned to the east. The cruisers of the 6th detachment went in pursuit of him, but, of course, they could not catch up with him, and only the Akitsushima, together with the Chitose, which was nearby, were still trying to catch up with the Russian ship. True, on the "Izumrud" itself it was believed that they were being pursued not by two, but by three cruisers: "Niitaka", "Chitose" and "Kasagi". The chase lasted for approximately 3-3.5 hours, from 10.30 to 14.00, after which the Japanese cruisers, seeing that they could not catch up with the Emerald, turned back.
Was there a battle between the Emerald and the cruisers pursuing it? Apparently not, although A. A. Alliluyev and M. A. Bogdanov point out that the shells of the pursuing Japanese cruisers "barely reached" the Izumrud. On the other hand, the description of the participation of "Pearl" and "Emerald" by these authors, unfortunately, contains many inaccuracies, so it is dangerous to rely on them. As for the "Emerald" itself, then V. N. Fersen directly points out that on May 15 "there was no need to shoot," that is, the cruiser did not return fire, apparently beyond the range of distances.
How fast did the Emerald break through?
In the writings of historians, one can find the opinion that in those approximately 3 hours, while the cruiser was still in view of the enemy pursuing him, the speed of the Emerald reached 24 knots, but this is extremely doubtful. Unfortunately, Baron V. N. Fersen, in his report, did not report anything about the speed of his cruiser, but we have the opinions of two officers of the Emerald - the navigator's officer Lieutenant Polushkin and the senior cruiser officer, Captain 2nd Rank Patton-Fanton de Verrion.
The first reported that the speed of the "Izumrud" during the breakthrough was "about 21 knots." The fact is that Lieutenant Polushkin, in the testimony of the Investigative Commission, said: "Judging by the previous tests," Emerald "could develop a full speed of about 21 knots on May 14". This opinion is quite logical, because the Emerald developed 22.5 knots during the tests in Kronstadt, but, of course, in daily service the ship is usually unable to show the same speed as during the tests, and the transition from Libava to Tsushima had a negative effect on the condition of the boilers and machines of the cruiser. So, from this point of view, the opinion of Lieutenant Polushkin looks quite reasonable.
But with all this, the navigator did not take into account that the 22.5 knots shown by the Emerald during the tests were not the ship's maximum speed: the tests themselves were not completed due to the urgency of sending the cruiser in pursuit of the departed 2nd Pacific Squadron, to the formation of which "Emerald" was late. Thus, it is not at all excluded that the maximum speed of the cruiser was not "about 21 knots", but higher. At the same time, although Polushkin never says this directly, but from reading his testimony to the Investigative Commission there is a persistent feeling that the lieutenant reasoned as follows: stroke, that means during the breakthrough its speed was about 21 knots."
At the same time, the senior officer of the Emerald, Patton-Fanton-de-Verrion, indicates that during the breakthrough, the cruiser was sailing at a speed of about 21.5 knots. In the opinion of the author of this article, it is this assessment that is as close to the truth as possible.
But no matter how fast the Emerald goes, there is no doubt that its breakthrough through the tightening ring of the Japanese fleet is a heroic and highly worthy deed, especially against the backdrop of the actions of Rear Admiral N. I., who surrendered to the Japanese. Nebogatova.
