Jewelry of the Russian Imperial Navy. "Pearl" and "Emerald". The night of May 14-15 passed calmly, but the next morning the Russians discovered an old Japanese armored cruiser Izumi next to the squadron. It happened "at the end of the 7th hour", when the observers of our squadron saw an unknown and very poorly visible ship at a distance of about 6 miles from the starboard beam of the flagship "Suvorov". More precisely, approximately in the direction of 2 points behind the traverse, and let me remind myself that one point corresponds to 11, 25 degrees.
"Izumi" in Sasebo, 1908
It must be said that a detailed description of the events preceding the beginning of the battle will again lead us very far from the history of the armored cruisers of the 2nd rank "Pearls" and "Emerald". However, the author sees no way to omit this period. The thing is that Z. P. Rozhestvensky, even before the collision of the main forces, had several interesting opportunities to use his cruisers, but he, in fact, refused this. So, for example, both "Pearl" and "Izumrud" were specialized ships for conducting reconnaissance in the interests of the main forces, but in this capacity Z. P. Rozhdestvensky did not use them. Why?
Alas, it is absolutely impossible to give a somewhat comprehensive answer to this question without a deep analysis of the plans of Z. P. Rozhestvensky and his actions from the early morning of May 14 until the beginning of the battle of the main forces. In fact, the passive role of the "Pearl" and "Emerald" during this period of time can only be explained if all the intentions of the Russian commander at that time are understood. Therefore, one should not think that the author, describing all this, deviates from the topic - on the contrary!
Main events of the morning of 14 May
The Izumi spotted the Russian squadron at 06:18 Russian time, and was spotted by itself at about the same time. At the same time, on our ships, the Japanese cruiser was poorly observed, periodically losing sight of, and Z. P. Rozhestvensky believed that the Japanese cruiser did not approach our ships closer than 6 miles. The Japanese themselves believed they kept 4-5 miles. Most likely, the distance between the Izumi and the Russian fleet was maintained at the limit of visibility, when the opponents could barely observe each other.
At about 0700 hours, a reconnaissance detachment headed by the Russian squadron consisting of Svetlana, Almaz and the auxiliary cruiser Ural crossed into the rear of the Russian system, and Zhemchug and Izumrud moved forward. This was completely logical, if not for the extremely small distance separating them from the lead ships of the squadron. According to the Zhemchug commander, his cruiser took a position 4 points from the squadron's course (45 degrees) and only 8 cables from the Suvorov. Thus, it turns out that the "Pearl" moved forward a distance of less than a mile! And even then - not for long, because somewhere in the interval from 09.00 to 11.00 on a signal from the "Suvorov" "Pearl" took its place on its right traverse. The Emerald underwent the same evolutions as the Pearl, but on the other side of the squadron's course, that is, to the left of its left column, which was led by Emperor Nicholas I.
According to the report of P. P. Levitsky, the commander of the "Pearl", at 08.40 his cruiser drove off the Japanese junk, heading for the island of Tsushima.
At about 09.40, that is, 3 hours after the enemy warship was found on the Russian squadron, the 3rd combat detachment appeared from the north (Chin-Yen, Matsushima, Itsukushima and Hasidate). The Japanese lookouts of the 3rd detachment discovered the Russian squadron a little earlier - at 09.28. This Japanese detachment also kept aloof, limiting itself to observation, which, however, was completely unsurprising.
Seeing a detachment of Japanese, Z. P. Rozhestvensky decides to start rebuilding the battle formation, but he does it very slowly. At about 09.45 (later 09.40 but until 10.00) the right column, that is, the 1st and 2nd armored units receive the admiral's order to increase the speed to 11 knots, which they do. As a result, the right column of the Russian fleet gradually overtakes the left column and transports.
At some point in time, the "Pearl" found a Japanese steamer ahead of itself, following across the course of the Russian squadron, and at full speed went to it for "clarification", firing a warning shot from a 47-mm gun. The steamer stopped and tried to lower the boat, but due to rather strong excitement, it crashed against its own hull. "Pearl" approached the ship on a half-cable, visible were the Japanese kneeling and praying, as well as making other gestures, which the cruiser commander regarded as a plea for mercy. However, it was not part of P. P.'s plans to offend the non-combatant. Levitsky - explaining (with signs) to the crew that the latter must leave, where he came from, he made sure that the steamer quickly left in the opposite direction. Then "Pearl" returned to its assigned place. Unfortunately, when exactly this happened is completely unclear: the official history says that it was at 10.20, but P. P. Levitsky reported in his report on the battle that he went to intercept the steamer at 09.30. And he finally confused the case, indicating in the testimony of the Investigative Commission that the "Pearl" intercepted the Japanese ship at 11:00!
Further timing, alas, also suffers from inaccuracies. Our official historiography reports that at 10.35 am, destroyers were found on the Russian squadron on the right and left ahead of the course of the Russian squadron. In fact, they were not there, but on the signal of "alarm" "Emerald" crossed from the left traverse of the squadron to its right side and entered the wake of "Pearl", and destroyers of the 1st detachment joined them. Thus, a small detachment of light forces was ready at any moment to move forward if the Japanese destroyers launched an attack - which, of course, did not follow. And a little later, the 3rd combat detachment of the Japanese was lost from sight, so by 11.00 an order was given to dine on the watch.
Everything seems to be clear, but the problem is that the reports of the Zhemchug and Izumrud commanders directly contradict this conclusion of the employees of the historical commission. Both documents report that the Emerald crossed over to the right side of the Russian squadron later, during a short exchange of fire between our main forces and Japanese cruisers.
That is, if, for the reconstruction of those distant events, nevertheless, the reports of the commanders are taken as a basis, then this was the case. At 11.05, new Japanese scouts appeared - Chitose, Kasagi, Niitaka and Tsushima, but then disappeared again in the fog. And at the same time, the right column of the Russian squadron took 2 points to the left - it had already moved forward enough to lead the ships of N. I. Nebogatova. However, at 11.10 the Japanese ships appeared again, both squads together. Five minutes later, the Russian squadron lined up in battle formation - a wake column, and an accidental shot was fired from the battleship Eagle. A short skirmish ensued with the Japanese cruisers, while the Russians believed that the distance between the fighters was 39 cables. We are talking, of course, about the distance to "Suvorov", it is clear that for other ships of the long wake column it could be different. The Japanese believed they opened fire from a distance of about 43 cables. Apparently, there were no hits from both sides, and the Japanese immediately retreated, turning 8 points (90 degrees) to the left, so that the fire was soon stopped by both sides.
Squadron battleship "Eagle"
So, the commander of the "Izumrud" reported that his cruiser, at the beginning of the exchange of fire, that is, at 11.15, was still on the left traverse of the "Emperor Nicholas I" By order, he took up a position on the right traverse of the Oslyabi, that is, so that the formation of Russian battleships was between the Izumrud and the enemy. During the execution of this maneuver, the cruiser fired back from stern guns. The report from the Zhemchug commander confirms his words.
According to the author, we are most likely talking about some kind of delusion of the historical commission, because the only way to somehow reconcile both versions is that the "Izumrud", indeed at 10.35, moved to the right traverse of the Russian squadron, and - moving forward right columns, then, for some reason, again returned to "Emperor Nicholas I". But this looks like nonsense, moreover, it has no confirmation.
The firefight lasted no more than 10 minutes, that is, until about 11.25, and then the Japanese cruisers disappeared from view. Then, at 11.30 on the "Pearl" they saw, or thought they saw, enemy cruisers crossing the course of the Russian squadron from left to right. "Zhemchug" fired in their direction from a bow 120-mm gun, wishing to attract the attention of the admiral, but received no instructions in response to this.
For a while, nothing deserving of attention happened, but at 12:05 the Russian squadron, believing that it had reached the middle of the eastern part of the Korean Strait, turned left and lay down on the now famous course NO23. At the same time, the 3rd Japanese detachment turned out to be on the right of the new course of the Russian ships, and they were now moving closer to them, so the Japanese commanders preferred to retreat.
Taking advantage of the fact that the Russian squadron was temporarily left without supervision, and assuming that since the Japanese patrols are retreating to the north, then the main forces of H. Togo, Z. P. Rozhestvensky decided to rebuild the ships of the 1st and 2nd armored detachments (and not only the 1st, as they write in a number of sources) with the formation of the front, but instead, for reasons that we will consider below, the squadron again found itself in two wake columns. However, this formation differed from the marching one, because now the 2nd armored detachment, led by "Oslyabey", was not in the right column, behind the 1st armored detachment, but headed the left column. During this unsuccessful attempt to rebuild, apparently, the "Izumrud" left the right traverse of the "Oslyabi" and moved after the "Pearl", which is why an improvised detachment of light forces from two cruisers and the 1st destroyer detachment was formed on the right flank of the Russian squadron. At the same time, the head "Pearl" followed on the traverse of the "Suvorov". And so, in general, it continued until the very meeting of the main forces of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky and H. Togo.
"Pearls" and "Dmitry Donskoy" at the Revel Show on September 27, 1904
Oddities in the actions of the commander
Of course, a lot of different questions arise for the above. A brief summary of the above looks like this: the commander of the Russian squadron Z. P. Rozhestvensky, discovering early in the morning that a Japanese cruiser was watching the forces entrusted to him, did not make any effort to destroy him, or at least drive him away. Although at his disposal were quite high-speed cruisers: Oleg, Zhemchug, Izumrud, and, perhaps, Svetlana. He knew that the Japanese were actively communicating by radiotelegraph, but he expressly forbade interfering with them in this. Z. P. Rozhestvensky continued marching for a long time, although at any moment one could expect an enemy to appear, and when he nevertheless began rebuilding into a wake column, he did it very slowly, so the rebuilding itself took him an hour or perhaps even more (not an hour and a half, but about that). Then, when the squadron finally rebuilt, for some reason, for some reason, he broke the wake column obtained with such difficulty and again divided his battleships into 2 unequal parts, with the most powerful 1st armored detachment walking in proud loneliness. Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not order to drive away the enemy cruisers, the firefight began by accident, and not at his command. And, among other things, the Russian commander for some reason did not try to push forward, for reconnaissance, his high-speed cruisers!
As we said earlier, Z. P. Rozhestvensky was much reproached for not making an attempt to conduct long-range reconnaissance by cruisers, which meant sending them several tens, or even a hundred miles ahead. He replied that such a use of cruisers was completely meaningless for him, since he could not give any new information about the Japanese, whom he did not know anyway. But sending such a detachment forward could lead to his death, since the cruisers of the 2nd and 3rd TOE were much inferior to the Japanese in number. In addition, the appearance of such a detachment would have warned the Japanese about the imminent appearance of the Russian squadron, that is, alerted them ahead of time. The reasons of the Russian commander were recognized by the authors of the national official history of the Russian-Japanese war at sea as absolutely correct, and the idea of long-range reconnaissance was counterproductive. And this is despite the fact that the official historiography, in general, is not at all inclined to defend Z. P. Rozhestvensky - the historical commission has more than enough claims to him.
But Z. P. Rozhestvensky, abandoning long-range reconnaissance, did not organize close reconnaissance either, did not put forward his own cruisers, and even the Zhemchug and Izumrud were not several miles ahead. And these are the compilers of the "Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905." considered a very gross mistake by the commander. The authors of this venerable work quite rightly note that for rebuilding from a marching to a battle formation, Z. P. Taking into account the time for signaling, Rozhestvensky would need about 20 minutes, while his squadron would follow at a speed of about 9 knots. But during this time, the Japanese squadron, if it were suddenly ahead of the Russian forces, could move towards our ships at a speed of 15 knots. Accordingly, the speed of convergence could be up to 24 knots and in 20 minutes both squadrons, following towards each other, would approach each other by 8 miles. And the visibility limit that morning barely reached 7 miles - it turns out that if the Japanese rushed towards the Russians immediately after the visual detection of the latter, Z. P. Rozhestvensky, in principle, could not have time to rebuild, and the Japanese fleet would have attacked the squadron that had not finished rebuilding!
Thus, we see that in the first half of May 14, another Russian commander could have found a lot of work for Zhemchug and Izumrud, but Z. P. Rozhestvensky kept them in close proximity to the main forces. Why?
Let's start with Izumi.
Why Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not order the sinking of the Izumi?
Of course, it would be possible to send a detachment of the fastest cruisers in pursuit of the Izumi, but what would it do? The problem was that the Japanese cruiser, according to the Russian commander, was about 6 miles from its flagship.
Let's assume that Z. P. Rozhestvensky would send his fastest cruisers, Pearls and Emerald, to destroy the Izumi. In fact, this idea is not as absurd as it might seem at first glance, because the Izumi was lighter than the Russian cruisers - its normal displacement did not even reach 3,000 tons. And the armament, although it was somewhat stronger than that of one Russian cruisers - 2 * 152-mm and 6 * 120-mm guns versus 8 * 120-mm guns on the "Pearl" or "Izumrud", but still lost twice in the number of barrels to both cruisers.
Suppose that both Russian cruisers gathered in a small detachment and would have managed to approach the Japanese ship the same 6 miles before the Izumi commander realized what was going on and began to retreat. But the Izumi's passport speed was 18 knots. And if we assume that the "Pearl" and "Emerald" could give 22 knots, and the "Izumi" could not develop a full speed, having no more than 16-17 knots, then in this case the speed of approach of the ships would be 5- 6 miles an hour. Thus, in order to even get closer to a distance from which one could expect to inflict some damage on the Japanese cruiser (30 cables), the fastest Russian cruisers would need half an hour, during which they would have moved away from the squadron by 11 miles, that is, they would go beyond the line of sight and be left to their own devices. But even then, one can speak not about a decisive battle, but only about shooting in pursuit from a pair of 120-mm guns. It took almost the same amount of time to get close enough for a full-sided battle. And this is not to mention the fact that it is unlikely that the "Pearl" and "Emerald" would be able to maintain 22 nodes for a long time (in fact, the admiral doubted that they would be able to withstand 20 for a long time), and the Izumi, perhaps, was able to provide and more than 17 knots.
Could it be that there were no other Japanese ships behind the Izumi, 20-30 miles away? Especially considering that the entire experience of the Port Arthur siege suggested that the Japanese were using not single scouts for reconnaissance, but whole detachments? Would the Russian cruisers, after a battle, even a successful one, be able to return to the squadron, having overcome the 20-30 miles separating them, or even more, because the squadron, of course, should not wait for them, but continue to go to Vladivostok? What if two Russian cruisers were cut off from the main forces by a large detachment of enemy cruisers? Small armored cruisers did not have great combat resistance, and an accidental successful hit by the Japanese could reduce the speed of one of them. What was to be done in this case - to throw the "wounded", one might say, to certain death?
As a matter of fact, it was these reasons that were probably guided by Z. P. Rozhestvensky, when he said: "I did not order the cruisers to drive him away and believed that the commander of the cruisers did not make orders about this on his own, sharing my views on the possibility of being carried away by the pursuit in the direction of the nearby superior enemy forces hidden by the darkness."
And the point here is not that Rear Admiral O. A. Enquist allegedly was in some kind of "warlike fervor", about which the authors of "The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905" allowed themselves to joke, but that having struck up an artillery duel with "Izumi" and out of sight of the main forces of the squadron without observing anyone around, it would be very easy to get carried away, especially if the battle was in favor of the Russians, and to move too far from the squadron - which could result in the death of a seemingly victorious detachment.
We talk a lot about the fact that the death of "Izumi" would have a huge moral impact on the squadron - and it is difficult to argue against this. But there was no chance at all to sink it in view of the squadron, and by sending the cruiser in pursuit, there was too great a risk that the pursuit would either end with a retreat in front of superior enemy forces, or even lead to damage and death of Russian ships. And besides, one should not forget one more important aspect.
The ships have come a long way, and the same "Emerald" and "Pearl" did not go through a full cycle of tests. A high, close to maximum stroke could easily lead to a breakdown in the car. And now let's imagine a picture - the two best runners of the squadron rush to intercept the Izumi, he runs … and suddenly one of the Russian cruisers loses speed out of the blue and lags sharply behind. It can be safely asserted that such an episode would not have raised the morale of the squadron for sure. What if such a breakdown happened during the pursuit, out of sight of the squadron?
Here, of course, it is worth noting that the ships, actually. went into battle, and in it, as you know, all the same, if necessary, it was required to develop high speed. But remember that the tasks set by Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not demand excellent driving performance for their cruisers, "as it were". In order to protect transports and serve as rehearsal ships at the main forces, as well as to repel possible attacks from destroyers, to cover up wrecked ships, even a 20-knot speed, in general, was not really required. Yes, the orders of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky to the cruisers of the 2nd Pacific Squadron were completely unheroic and not very characteristic of their classical role, but they took into account the actual technical condition of the Russian ships of this class. Well, and if some cruiser had a car in the heat of battle and “flew” - well, there was nothing to be done about it, what could be, it could not be avoided. But this would not have produced any special impact on the rest of the squadron - the rest of the crews in battle would have had no time for that.
Nevertheless, the author of this article considers the decision of Z. P. Rozhestvensky leave alone "Izumi" erroneous. Of course, he had many reasons not to send the cruiser in pursuit of the Izumi, but he could order, for example, to drive the Japanese cruiser away from the squadron out of line of sight. And who knows, what if some "golden hit" would have caused the Izumi to lose speed? In the end, “Novik” managed to disable the “Tsushima” with a single hit from a 120-mm projectile! And this Japanese armored cruiser was both larger and more modern than the Izumi.
Of course, by sending the "Pearl" with the "Emerald" into battle, the commander to some extent risked that one of them could be hit by a "golden hit", but in order to only drive off the "Izumi", it would be quite possible use not "second-rank" cruisers, but "Oleg" and "Aurora". These ships were significantly larger, and the chances that an accidental hit from a Japanese ship could severely damage them was extremely low. In addition, as artillery platforms, large cruisers were more stable than Emerald and Pearl, so they had more chances of hitting the enemy. Of course, the chances of dealing with the Japanese intelligence officer were regrettably small, but the sight of the Izumi running at full blades would have a very beneficial effect on the morale, if not of the officers, then of the sailors of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons.
So, with the description of the episode with "Izumi", we have finished, but why Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not put forward, even for a few miles, "Pearls" and "Emerald" for close reconnaissance? After all, this was the only way he could gain time so that, when an enemy was detected, he could have time to reorganize into a battle formation.
The answer to this question will sound paradoxical, but, apparently, the early detection of the Japanese main forces was not at all included in the plans of Zinovy Petrovich, and moreover, it was in direct conflict with them. How so? Alas, the volume of the article is limited, so we will talk about this in the next article.
